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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U. S.  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 13, 1957

Respectfully referred to

The Honorable John Foster Dulles  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

The attached communication is  
submitted for your consideration.

Nathan Waldman

320.5780

674.84A/2-1357

Very respectfully,

*Jack Brooks*

JACK BROOKS M. C., Texas District 2nd

*Kraft file*  
*27*

674.84A/2-1357

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In reply refer to  
SEV 674.84A/2-1357

February 26 - 1957

Dear Mr. Brooks:

I refer to your communication of February 13 with which you enclosed a telegram you had received from Mr. Nathan Waldman of Liberty, Texas, concerning sanctions against Israel. Thank you for bringing Mr. Waldman's comments to our attention.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations

develop

The Honorable  
Jack Brooks,  
House of Representatives.

Returned to  
674.84A/2-1357

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develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

I hope the above information will be helpful to you in replying to Mr. Waldman. His telegram is returned for your records.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram from Mr. Waldman  
(returned).

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2603, FEBRUARY 14, 2 PM

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 2603, REPEATED INFORMATION JIDDA 203,  
AMMAN 192, TEL AVIV 132.

JOINT STATE-USIA MESSAGE.

REFERENCE DEPTTEL 2654, EMBTEL 2602.

HEAVY PLAY TODAY'S CAIRO PRESS CONDEMNING DULLES PROPOSALS,  
WHICH ALLEGEDLY BACK ISRAEL'S CLAIMS RE UNRESTRICTED NAVIGA-  
TION GULF OF AQABA AND GIVE US SUPPORT TO STATIONING UN  
FORCES GAZA "UNDER PRETEXT PROTECTION ISRAEL FROM EGYPTIAN  
AGGRESSION". THIS OFFSET BY ONLY SMALL FRONTPAGE ITEM AL  
AHAM GIVING SOMEWHAT MORE CORRECT VERSION US POSITION ATTRI-  
BUTED TO OFFICIAL SOURCES NEW YORK WHO QUOTED AS SAYING  
REPORT UNTRUE THAT GUARANTEE OF FREE NAVIGATION OFFERED BY  
DULLES TO ISRAEL IN RETURN FOR EVACUATION FROM EGYPTIAN SOIL.  
ITEM CONTINUES DULLES SUMMONED EBAN MONDAY AND INFORMED HIM  
AMERICA WILL ISSUE STATEMENT DECLARING AQABA STRAITS OPEN  
AND THAT IF EGYPT OBJECTS MATTER WILL BE REFERRED TO INTER-  
NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE; AND THAT ALL PUBLISHED CONTRARY  
TO FOREGOING UNTRUE. ITEM ADDS FAWZI ASSERTS NO AMERICAN  
OFFICIALS HAD CONTACTED HIM ON THIS MATTER.

EMBASSY STRONGLY SUSPECTS GOE MAY ATTEMPT BY MAJOR PRESS  
DISTORTIONS LAY GROUNDWORK DISCREDIT US DURING FORTHCOMING  
MEETING 4 ARAB HEADS OF STATE SCHEDULED CAIRO ACCORDING  
LOCAL PRESS FOR FEBRUARY 23. DEPARTMENT MAY THEREFORE WISH  
BRING CORRECTED VERSION DULLES PROPOSALS TO ATTENTION KING  
SAUD WELL BEFORE HIS ARRIVAL EGYPT. IF DESIRED EMBASSY COULD  
ALSO FURNISH BACKGROUND EXPLANATION TO SAUDI EMBASSY CAIRO  
RE INTENT DULLES PROPOSAL TO EBAN.

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2604, FEBRUARY 14, 3 PM

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JOINT STATE-USIA MESSAGE.

REFERENCE EMBTEL 2603.

NEED URGENTLY ANY AVAILABLE INFORMATION IN OFFICIAL STATEMENT OR ATTRIBUTED TO INFORMED SOURCE TO COUNTERACT GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT AND PRESS THESIS THAT DULLES MADE AGREEMENT WITH EBAN WHICH IS "STAB IN BACK" TO ARABS. INDICATIONS ARE THAT ISRAELI PRESS LEAKS HAVE DISTORTED DULLES PRESENTATION TO EBAN. GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT COUNTERATTACK GAINING MOMENTUM. PREFER FACTUAL STORY BUT IF THIS NOT POSSIBLE NEED GUIDANCE FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH EDITORS AND GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT OFFICIALS.

Control: 8794

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 14, 1957

1:31 PM

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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55-51

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Action

Control: 8992

NEA

Rec'd: February 14, 1968  
5:44 p.m.

Info

FROM: Cairo

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2612, February 14

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2612, USUN 78, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 133, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BENGHAZI, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KHARTOUM, LONDON, PARIS, NEW DELHI, TRIPOLI UNNUMBERED

"Dulles plan" overshadows all other topics 14 February. Press following lead two official spokesmen (EMBTEL 2602) headlines "stab in back to Arabs and UN" and interprets "plan" as "guarantee" freedom navigation. AKHBAR asks "who could have believed US would stoop to such degradation" and opines "US has given another proof she cannot risk antagonizing Israel and is ready even repudiate her own principles" noting "US which once insisted on unconditional withdrawal now agrees to provisos imposed by Israel". Labeling US position towards Arabs "in every way flagrant transgression our rights", editorial declares "US proclaimed free navigation without consulting Egypt despite fact waterway is entirely in Egyptian territory" and concludes "issue should have been left to International Court". SADAT expresses surprise "US insists on showing greater animosity to Arabs than Israel" declaring "we cannot understand blind loyalty which makes might US satellite insignificant Israel". He asserts plan "not only meets all demands Israel but destroys all sanctity international law, justice, and morality", and charges "Ben Gurion's most ardent hope re Gaza was forcing Arabs discuss peace. He never dreamed Dulles would state problems refugees and Palestine no longer count and move to force Arabs surrender to all Israeli demands". Criticisms repeated by Government Radio which broadcast full texts two official statements and charged "US action is reward to Israel for attacking Egypt" adding "real intention US is precipitate another world war in effort preserve its interests and influence in this area". Commentator Ahmad said declared "sovereignty over Egyptian Jordanian and Saudi territorial waters being taken away and presented to Israel as reward for its aggression. Tomorrow they will give her parts of Jordan Syria and Sinai until one after another our nations will be added to Israel and Zionist dreams of an Israel stretching from Nile to Euphrates come true".

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-2- 2612, February 14, from Cairo

Shepilov plan held to contain "essential principles for any settlement Mid East problems: Respect for will and independence area people, cessation attempts drag Mid East countries into foreign military groupings, and withdrawal all foreign troops and bases." KHALID MOHIEDDEN declares plan seeks "keep Mid East out of cold war, preserve unity area thereby enabling peoples be their own masters, and develop cooperation all parties develop region economically without any political or military conditions". Explaining "Soviets did not charge international capitalism threatening Mid East nor demand right establish military bases in area" Khalid points out "cooperation among big powers to develop area will end policy of monopolies since Soviet plan does not exclude any big powers from giving unconditional assistance". SHAAB asserts "US will refuse new Soviet proposal just as she refused join Soviets in stopping aggression against Egypt in hopes keeping Soviets out of Mid East". KAHIRA and AKHBAR object fact "both eastern and western camps formulated schemes for preservation peace and security in Mid East without taking either UN or peoples area into account.

We insist on having final word in all that concerns this area and we will not have schemes imposed on us by one side or the other."

HARE

AAL:BAG/14

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Department of State

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55-51

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Action  
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Rec'd:February 14 1957  
6 a.m.Info  
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 959, February 14

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SENT DEPARTMENT 959; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 167, BEIRUT 147, CAIRO 166, DAMASCUS 119, LONDON 189, PARIS 155, JERUSALEM 72, NEW YORK 47.

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Early press reaction "Dulles, Proposals" as reported by NEW YORK TIMES nearly unanimous that US has given encouraging new recognition Israel's position but nonetheless fail to provide adequate assurances Israel will obtain minimum requirements. All morning news papers gave development top position except KOL HAAM. Most papers also frontpaged Soviet's "Six-point Plan" but less conspicuously.

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JERUSALEM POST said evidence contained in US proposals of "more realistic understanding of problems posed in connection with Israel's security is helpful but basic solution of problem may still be appreciated. Problem's root is Egypt's refusal to abandon its claim of belligerency towards Israel. Clear and unequivocal declaration by Egypt made to UN that shw has abandoned this attitude would clear way immediately to lasting settlement in Middle East."

LAMERHAV (Achdut Avoda) said US offer does not match Israel's requirements as defined both by "Knesset and Cabinet resolutions. US guarantee declared before UN Assembly can certainly not be regarded as effective assurance of Israel's rights." According to HAMODIA (Agud Israel) proposals "can not serve as substitute for concrete undertaking of Egyptian Government" but mark a new approach which should encourage "Israel's efforts to show that her case is right."

According to HATZOFE (Mizrachi) "USG achievements in imposing international authority on Nasser has so far been very poor. Israel would continue to insist on her claims as previously stated."

Two papers treated both US and Soviet's Middle East proposals in same editorials. DAVAR (Histadrut) regarded them as first "sobering up signs in approach of big powers to problem of Middle East ... new US proposals are now being looked into by Prime Minister. It will be asked whether these proposals constitute real guarantee for Israel navigation or whether this is but promise

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-2- 959, February 14, from Tel Aviv

promise that US would support freedom of navigation, after it is violated, by way of diplomatic protest and UN resolution. Soviet proposal for Middle East neutralization constitutes positive sign. It may therefore be probably that Moscow has also started wondering whether it was worthwhile betting on Arab horse brandishing swords and condemning Israel."

HATZOFFE remarked that it was obvious "Soviet proposals were mere hypocrisy when one remembers Soviet-Egyptian arms deal caused recent Israel-Egypt flare-up."

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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 966, FEBRUARY 14, 1967 (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 966, REPEATED INFORMATION, AERO 16, USUN 48.

DEPIELS 778 AND 786.

I SAW BEN GURION AT MY REQUEST DURING MID DAY BREAK IN CABINET'S CONSIDERATION OUR AID MEMOIRE WHICH BEGAN AT HIS HOME THIS MORNING AND WAS TO BE RESUMED IMMEDIATELY AFTER LUNCH TO CONTINUE THROUGH AFTERNOON. HIS AIDE TOLD ME PRIME MINISTER HAD CONSUMED MORNING SESSION IN PERSONAL ANALYSIS AID MEMOIRE AND SECRETARY'S REMARKS TO EBAN AND THAT AFTERNOON SESSION WOULD BE DEVOTED TO CABINET COLLEAGUES COMMENTS. THEY HOPED TO CABLE INSTRUCTIONS TO EBAN TONIGHT.

BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION I TOLD BEN GURION PURPOSE OF CALL NOT TO ATTEMPT TO HURRY HIS DECISION IN ADVANCE FULL GOVERNMENTAL CONSIDERATION BUT TO REVIEW AID MEMOIRE AND SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH EBAN IN MANNER THAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO HIM AND TO OUR UNDERSTANDING EACH OTHER'S VIEWPOINTS. HE SAID HE APPRECIATED VISIT AND SPIRIT THAT PROMPTED IT.

BEN GURION PLEASED WITH INTENT OF UNITED STATES SUGGESTIONS IF NOT THEIR PARTICULARS. AID MEMOIRE AND EVEN MORE HEARTENING REMARKS OF SECRETARY HE SAID SHED GREAT DEAL OF LIGHT FOR FIRST TIME ON SITUATION AND MIGHT LEAD TO SOLUTION. EMPHASIZING THAT HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR HIS COLLEAGUES HE ADDRESSED HIS COMMENTS IN GENERAL WAY TO 3 ASPECTS...STATUS OF IRAN, ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS WITH EGYPT, AND GAZA.

RE SHARM EL SHEIKH. HE SEEMED IN MOOD TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF SOLUTION OF

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Rec'd: FEBRUARY 15, 1967

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-2- 966, FEBRUARY 14, 7 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO).

SOLUTION OF ISSUE ALONG LINES LAID DOWN IN UNITED STATES AIDE-MEMOIRE. HE DELIGHTED HE SAID WITH THOUGHT THAT UNITED STATES SHIPS MIGHT TRANSIT GULF AND MIGHT EVEN VISIT EILAT AND THAT UNITED STATES WOULD INVITE OTHER INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING TO FOLLOW. HE STRESSED POINT, HOWEVER, IT NOT CLEAR WHETHER UNEF WOULD REMAIN AT STRAITS UNTIL PEACE ESTABLISHED OR UNTIL AGREEMENT TO MAINTAIN FREEDOM OF TRANSIT ACHIEVED BY FOUR LITTORAL STATES. SUPPOSE HE SAID UNEF LEFT AREA BEFORE PEACE ACHIEVED OR BEFORE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BY LITTORAL STATES AND THEN EGYPT INTERFERRED WITH ISRAEL SHIPPING? HE CITED EXAMPLE OF EGYPTIAN "DEFIANCE WITH COMPLETE IMPUNITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION OF 1950 CONVENTION OF 1888 NEITHER UNSYG NOR UNITED STATES MAKING ANY EFFORT STOP EGYPT. IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN AT SHARM EL SHEIKH WOULD STILL HAVE NO OTHER RECOURSE THAN TO FIGHT OR SUBMIT WHICH WAS NOT AN AGREEABLE CHOICE TO US OR YOU EITHER".

RE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S LATEST REPORT STATES EGYPTIANS HAVE REAFFIRMED THEIR ADHERENCE TO ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF SYG HAS RECEIVED WRITTEN DOCUMENT FROM EGYPT TO THAT EFFECT, AND, IF SO, WHY HAS NOT HE MADE IT PUBLIC? BUT IT REALLY DOES NOT MATTER HE SAID. FOR 8 YEARS EGYPT HAS VIOLATED ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND DECLINED TO CONCEDE THAT ALLEGED EGYPTIAN ADHERENCE TO ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS INCOMPATIBLE WITH ITS INSISTENCE ON RIGHT OF BELLIGERENCY. HE REPEATED AGAIN AS HE HAS IN SO MANY RECENT CONVERSATIONS THAT ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS DO NOT EXIST AND THAT NOTHING WILL MAKE ISRAEL RETURN TO THEM.

RE GAZA STRIP: HE SAID KEY SENTENCE IN AIDE-MEMOIRE WAS THAT WHICH STATED "FUTURE OF GAZA STRIP TO BE WORKED OUT THROUGH EFFORTS AND GOOD OFFICES OF UNITED NATIONS". HE COULD AGREE IN PRINCIPLE WITH THAT VIEWPOINT BUT THERE NUMBER OF QUESTIONS INCLUDING MAJOR ONE JUST RAISED... STATUS OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS. OLD ARMISTICE AGREEMENT REGIME MEANS RETURN OF FEDAYEEN ACTS AVOID BLOCKADE AND BOYCOTT BY OTHER SIGNATORY STATES. INSTEAD ISRAEL PREPARED MAKE

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-3- 966, FEBRUARY 14, 7 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO).

PREPARED MAKE SOLEMN DECLARATION ON BASIS OF RECIPROCITY WITH EGYPT THAT WE DO NOT REGARD OURSELVES AT WAR THAT WE WILL COMMIT NO HOSTILE ACT AND WE PREPARED AT ONCE TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS FOR PERMANENT PEACE UNDER UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

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9290

February 15, 1957  
6:34

Action

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 906, February 14, 1957. (SECRETARY OF STATE), USIN 48

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SENT DEPARTMENT 906, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 167.

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Ben Gurion at this point proposed Israel civil administration for Gaza character of which he said he would like to discuss with us. Israel had no hard and fast ideas on Gaza administrations but would like to work out blueprint in collaboration with United States in effort to find settlement. GCI would then submit it to United Nations if possible supported by United States which he said would be all that was necessary to win its passage.

He said Israel would like United States representatives sent here to make thorough study of Gaza's problems. Such study would persuade United States he said of real necessity for Israel becoming administering authority under general United Nations supervision. By establishing links between indigenous Gaza community and Israel's economy those 80,000 to 100,000 people would become viable self-sufficient unit with perhaps one-third engaged in agriculture and remaining two-thirds in local industry and commerce.

150,000 to 200,000 refugees were different problem to solution of which Israel would be prepared to contribute substantially including repatriation of some.

I referred to United States determination to aid in settlement of this problem; our clear picture of Israel's stated position; and said in general we had some understanding of objectives of United Kingdom, France and Israel with respect to Suez Canal but did not agree with methods adopted. I said views set forth in aide-memoire established hopeful atmosphere for solution of problems involved. I then enumerated several most encouraging features and made principal points contained in Secretary's remarks to Eban.

He readily agreed Secretary's comments insofar as they had connotation of moral support for or sympathetic interest in Israel's problems.

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-2- 966, February 14, 7 p.m. from Tel Aviv (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

problems. Specifics he regards largely as providing avenue for further approaches to us.

Comment: Ben Gurion's comments and general approach to two issues of Shar'el Shakh and Gaza inclines me to believe if they could be separated, settlement of former along lines envisaged by Secretary might be more easily achieved. On Gaza I feel Ben Gurion trying to find some formula that will make de facto civil control by Israel acceptable to us. Prospect which he most adamantly opposes is return of Egyptian authority there under any guise. He frankly hoping for time, having told me this noon that complicated questions surrounding Gaza's future might require period of two, three or four weeks for study before plan acceptable to important interested parties could be devised.

He has some way to go to restore health to its state before recent bout of pneumonia. Today he showed clearly that to talk is physical strain. When I saw him he completely spent from morning's Cabinet discussions. I convinced however he will not rest until government position on this issue is formulated.

On leaving Prime Minister's house Herzog told me he thought by early this evening I could expect copy of instructions they will send to Eban.

LAWSON

BB:RAP/7

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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4111, FEBRUARY 14, 8 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 4111; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 671.

CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION EXISTS HERE REGARDING TWO-POINT  
PLAN ALLEGEDLY SUBMITTED EBAN BY SECRETARY FEBRUARY 11  
TO EASE CURRENT ARAB-ISRAELI TENSIONS.

IOP ONE FRENCH NEWSPAPER STATED SECRETARY GAVE EBAN ASSURANCES  
UNITED STATES WOULD SUPPORT FREE PASSAGE ALL SHIPS BOTH  
SUZ AND GULF AQABA, WHILE MOST VERSIONS LIMITED ASSURANCES  
TO GULF AQABA.

FONOFF (MAILLARD), QUOTING FRENCH AMBASSADOR WASHINGTON  
AS SOURCE, SAID TODAY THAT PHRASEOLOGY WAS TANTAMOUNT  
TO UNILATERAL UNITED STATES GUARANTEE, BY FORCE IF NECESSARY,  
OF FREE PASSAGE ALL SHIPS GULF AQABA. MAILLARD SAID BITTER  
PRESS ATTACKS FROM EGYPT TENDED SUPPORT THIS INTERPRETATION.

IF FRENCH AMBASSADOR'S REPORT WERE TRUE, MAILLARD SAID,  
UNITED STATES POLICY HAD TAKEN NEW AND SIGNIFICANT TURN  
AWAY FROM ARAB WORLD TOWARD ISRAEL. FURTHERMORE, UNITED  
STATES WAS NOW THREATENING UNILATERAL ACTION INSTEAD OF  
UNITED NATIONS OR EVEN TRIPARTITE ACTION.

MAILLARD SAID FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD CERTAINLY WELCOME  
UNITED STATES SWING TOWARD ISRAEL ALTHOUGH MAILLARD  
PERSONALLY BELIEVED UNITED STATES WAS MAKING GRAVE MISTAKE  
IN SACRIFICING PRESTIGE WITH ARABS WHICH HAD BEEN SO  
CAREFULLY DEVELOPED.

SINCE EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED NO (REPEAT NO) OFFICIAL INFO  
ON SECRETARY'S TALK WITH EBAN AND SINCE USIS DAILY RADIO  
BULLETIN INTRODUCED ITEM THIS SUBJECT DATED LINED WASHINGTON

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-2- 4111, FEBRUARY 14, 8 P.M., FROM PARIS

WITH "IT IS UNDERSTOOD", EMBOFF HAD NO GROUNDS TO DENY OR  
QUALIFY SUBSTANCE TEL TRANSMITTED BY FRENCH AMBASSADOR.

EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ANY CLARIFICATION  
DEPARTMENT MIGHT WISH TO TRANSMIT TO FORNOFF.

YOST

MAA

APR 12 1957

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1957 FEB 15 PM 8 37

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SENT TO: Embassy, PARIS

3173 674.84a  
+ R 340.5774  
974.7301  
353

Origin

Info

Depairals 681 Feb 13 which touched Paris and 691 Feb 14 which  
telegraphed should be helpful in your discussions with Fonoff on US  
position re Israel withdrawal. Your 4111.

Control  
Info

674.84A/2-1457  
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674.84a / 2-1457

Dulles  
(SivR)

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+ R 353

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2-1457

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Drafted by: *WCB*

NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 2/15/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA:NE - Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

Mr. Looman

*WCB*  
*EMP*

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FROM: Beirut

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1971, February 14, 10 p.m.

Control:

Rec'd:

8587

February 14, 1957

9:19 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1971; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 242, JIDDA 73, DAMASCUS 275, AMMAN 157.

President Chamoun sent for me today to say that reports would indicate that USG is weakening stand that Israel must retire unconditionally from Gaza and Sharm El Sheikh. President Chamoun asked me to communicate urgently to Washington his recommendation that there be no weakening American position at this point until after King Saud will have had his consultation with Abdul Nasser. Chamoun said that while his reports were that King Saud had accepted "Eisenhower Doctrine" and had expressed sincere confidence in American friendship, Saud nevertheless was still a little under the spell of Abdul Nasser and would be more under spell if Nasser could allege with some show of truth that US was yielding to Zionist pressures.

HEATH

BB:JCK/1

1957 FEB 14 AM 11 10  
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NEA

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674,34A/2-1457

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OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

# Department of State

SECRET

Classification

09040

1957 FEB 16

16 PM  
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Use of  
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SENT TO: Amembassy BEIRUT 2984

RPID INFO: Amembassy AMMAN 956  
" CAIRO 2739  
" DAMASCUS 1434  
" JIDDA 608

In reply Chamoun approach reported Embtel 1971, you should seek earliest opportunity convey to him substance Depcirtels 681 and 691 emphasizing that there has been no "weakening" US position. Add that we have kept Saud currently informed of US position.

Tell Chamoun we welcome his interest in situation in Jordan by (Embtel 1972) and his assurance re financial assistance/Lebanon. Add that we are following situation closely and convey substance our message to King Husayn transmitted Deptel 2825.

DULLES

Dulles  
(PW)

674.84A/2-1457

SECRET

CS/R

674.84A/2-1457

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:SWRockwell:ELWaggoner:le

Clearances:

2/15/57

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NE - Fraser Wilkins

SECRET

Classification

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**OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

# Department of State

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Classification

07981

1957 FEB 14 PM 8 47

DC/T

PRIORITY

SENT TO: CIRCULAR 691

Origin

Info

Refer circular 681 re US position on Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza. You should make every effort with government and through USIS to explain US attitude along lines this circular. You should stress that US stands first and foremost for immediate Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Straits Aqaba. Our efforts designed to achieve this and to do so urgently. We do not think Israel should gain advantages from its invasion or that Egypt should have to make fresh promises to Israel to assure Israeli withdrawal. After Israeli withdrawal we believe that rules of international law should apply to shipping of all nations in Gulf Aqaba. As to this we would consider any decision of International Court Justice to be binding, if such decision is involved. Thus we believe Israel would obtain no rights or privileges to which it is not entitled by international law.

Evening Feb 13 Department spokesman issued following statement:

QTE Inquiries have been made of Department of State as to whether Secretary Dulles stated to Israeli Ambassador Eban that Egypt had informed the Secretary General of the UN that it will allow Israeli shipping to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba if Israeli troops withdraw from Egyptian territory. The Department said that no such statement has been made by the Secretary.

UNQTE.

Drafted by:  
NEA:NE:SWRockwell:ajh 2/14/57

Cleanances:

Cleared with: Secretary

S/S-CR  
FEB 14 1957 P.M.

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Fraser Wilkins William M. Reuntree

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Classification

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files

374.84A/2-1457

67484A/2-1457

# 691 2/17/54 (NEA)

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Classification

PRIORITY

Send ~~XXXX~~ to following Embassies:

ANKARA  
AMMAN  
BAGHDAD  
BEIRUT  
CAIRO  
DAMASCUS  
JIDDA  
KARACHI  
KHARTOUM  
NEW DELHI  
MADRID  
RABAT  
TEHRAN  
~~TEHRAN~~  
TRIPOLI  
TUNIS

REPEAT NEXX INFO

TEL AVIV

~~XXXX~~ PRIORITY

Send by POUCH to following Embassies:

LONDON ✓  
PARIS ✓

*Sen*

Classification

**OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

**Department of State**

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Classification

08890  
1957 FEB 15 PM 10 53  
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For use JDC

SENT TO: Amembassy, PARIS CIRC. 691

Origin
Info
Dist. Desired (Office Only)

CODE ROOM

by telegraph

Please repeat Depcirtel 691 of February 14, 1957, Control

No. 07931 to post above. US practices Subj of

*Agaba and Raja*

**DULLES**

*Dulles  
C.D.C.B.*

DC/R  
al 67  
or  
Det

Returned to

*FW 674.842/2-1457*

Drafted by:  
NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 2/15/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA:NE:Donald C. Bergus

Clearances:

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Classification

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COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS  
PROHIBITED.

*smB*

JOHN LESINSKI  
16TH DIST., MICHIGAN

HOME OFFICE:  
13708 MICHIGAN AVENUE  
DEARBORN, MICHIGAN

COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE  
AND CIVIL SERVICE

COMMITTEE ON  
HOUSE ADMINISTRATION

# Congress of the United States

## House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

**ACTION**  
is assigned to



February 14, 1957

Honorable John Foster Dulles  
The Secretary of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

So that you may be aware of the thinking of  
my constituents regarding the Israeli-Egyptian situation,  
I am enclosing a copy of a telegram I have received from  
Rabbi Leon Fram, President of the Michigan Council of the  
American Jewish Congress.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

*John Lesinski*  
John Lesinski, M.C.

Enclosure - att

*Draft 2/14/57*

674.84A/2-1457

FILED

674.84A/2-1457

A/6

DC/R

Anal 6

Rev 1

Cat CLASS  
SHEET

323742

In reply refer to  
SEV 674.84A/2-1457

FEB 26 1957

Dear Mr. Lesinski:

I refer to your letter of February 14, 1957, enclosing a copy of a telegram from Rabbi Leon Fram, President of the Michigan Council of the American Jewish Congress, Detroit, Michigan, who opposes the adoption in the United Nations of sanctions against the state of Israel and urges that the United States delegation to this organization support Israel's request for safeguards against renewed acts of hostility by Egypt in the Gaza strip and in the Gulf of Aqaba. We appreciate your courtesy in bringing this telegram of Rabbi Fram to our attention.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President

DC/R  
2  
The Honorable  
John Lesinski,  
House of Representatives.

Rev  
Cat  
RF

674.34A/2-1457

674.84A/2-1457  
US/R



The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

With respect to the plea of your constituent for the prevention of further hostile acts by Egypt originating from the Gaza strip or concerning the use of the Gulf of Aqaba I am enclosing a copy of the Aide-Memoire mentioned above with the thought that you may wish to forward it to Rabbi Fram. His telegram is returned for your records.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

**Enclosures:**

1. Press Release No. 72.
2. From Rabbi Fram (returned).

P:SEV:OBLee:DKP:bt

*Rae*  
H

2/27/57



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-61/1a1  
Ser 68P61  
14 Feb 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. W. Tapley Bennett  
Special Assistant to the Deputy  
Under Secretary of State  
New State, Room 5118

Subject: Right of Innocent Passage Through the Strait  
of Tiran

Enclosure: (1) Memorandum prepared by the Office of the  
Judge Advocate General of the Navy,  
serial 101078, dated 14 Feb 1957

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in response to your request for a Navy expression of opinion regarding the status of the Strait of Tiran.
2. I had hoped to get this to you yesterday, but when the Office of the Judge Advocate General was asked to put their opinion in writing, they decided it would be best to do a little more research...

*Respy*  
*Davidson*  
J. F. DAVIDSON  
CAPTAIN, USN  
DIRECTOR, POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS

374.6.1-1457

6041.24092-1457

60

FILED  
FEB 1 1957

March 21 1957

Dear Senator Payne:

I refer to your telegram of February 14, 1957 to Secretary Dulles concerning sanctions against Israel. We appreciate your interest in this matter and your wiring us of your views. Please accept my apologies for the inadvertent delay in our response.

The United States does not now have the question of sanctions against Israel under consideration because of the decision of the Government of Israel to complete her withdrawal behind the Armistice line in compliance with the United Nations Resolution of February 2, 1957. This decision demonstrates once again that the free world nations have decent respect for the opinion of mankind as reflected in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Now that this withdrawal has been completed, in the President's words, "...there should be a greater effort by the United Nations and its members to secure justice and conformity with international law... The United States, for its part, will vigorously seek solution<sup>s</sup> of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law."

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable  
Frederick G. Payne,  
United States Senate.

Am 53 P:SEV:CErushing:OBL:bt

Rev

Cat CR

Cleared (P) substance: ch  
NEB/P; IC

S/S-CR  
MAR 18 1957 P.M.

HX 3/15/57

Returned to 374.34A/2-1457

674844/2-1457  
CS 1R

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 15, 1957

10 - Mr. Davis

There is attached a telegram opposing sanctions against Israel to the Secretary from Senator Payne. Please prepare for signature in H and clear with P an appropriate reply to Senator Payne.

Copies for S/S are requested by February 21.

  
J. H. Cunningham  
for R. German

S/S-RO

Ext. 3737

Att. As stated

LPB069

WU026 GOVT PD

SN WASHINGTON DC FEB 14 1957 1106AME

HONORABLE JOHN FOSTER DULLES

SECRETARY OF STATE DEPT OF STATE

I AM STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON  
ISRAEL. THE GUARANTEES ISRAEL IS SEEKING OF FREEDOM FROM  
ATTACK FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN  
THE GULF OF AQABA APPEAR ENTIRELY REASONABLE

FREDERICK G PAYNE USS 1136A.

DC/T  
CODE SECTION

1957 FEB 14 AM 11 44

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File  
674.84A/2-1457

CS/R

674.84A/2-1457

APR 26 1957

FILED

DC/R
Anal <i>[initials]</i>
Rev <i>[initials]</i>
Car <i>[initials]</i>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

7912


EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 15, 1957

IO - Mr. Davis

There is attached a telegram opposing sanctions against Israel to the Secretary from Congressman Friedel. Please prepare for signature in H and clear with P an appropriate reply to Congressman Friedel.

Copies for S/S are requested by February 21.

  
J. H. Cunningham  
for R. German  
S/S-RO  
Ext. 3737

Att. As stated

DC/T  
CODE SECTION

*Rum*  
1957 FEB 14 PM 4 21

1064

*SS*

*S*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1957 FEB 18 PM 2/23

*Drift 2/23*

This Document Must Be Returned to  
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Central  
Files  
FOR  
DIV.

674.84A/2-1457

FILED

MAR 4 - 1957

LL EDLL

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WU236 GOVT PD

EX WASHINGTON DC FEB 14 1957 320PME

HON JOHN FOSTER DULLES

SECRETARY OF STATE

AMBASSADOR LODGE ADVISES UNITED STATES POSITION ON  
ISRAELI SANCTION BEING DECIDED IN WASHINGTON. I WISH  
TO REGISTER THE EMPHATIC OPPOSITION OF MY CONSTITUENTS  
AND OF MYSELF TO SUCH SANCTIONS. SANCTIONING OF ISRAEL  
WOULD ESTABLISH DOUBLE STANDARD FOR JUDGING  
INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS AND WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH  
AMERICAN TRADITIONS. STRONGLY URGE UNITED STATES SUPPORT  
ISRAEL'S REQUEST FOR CONCRETE AND TANGIBLE GUARANTEES  
OF HER SECURITY IN THE FUTURE. TO INSURE WORLD PEACE WE  
MUST HAVE EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL

SAMUEL N FRIEDEL MEMBER OF CONGRESS 401P.

674



February 26, 1957

In reply refer  
to SEV

Dear Mr. Friedel:

I refer to your telegram of February 14, 1957 expressing your opposition, shared by your constituents, to the adoption in the United Nations of sanctions against the state of Israel and your support for firm guarantees of security in the future. We appreciate your courtesy in informing us of these views, and I am glad to have this opportunity to comment on them.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient.

However

The Honorable  
Samuel H. Friedel,  
House of Representatives.

674,844/2-1457

674,844/2-1457

However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

P:SEV:OBLee:DKP:mm

H 2/27/57

Roc

WF-X

7960

March 19 1957

Dear Rabbi Herman:

After consideration at the White House, your telegram of February 12 to the President, also signed by Dr. Milton J. Eisenhower, on behalf of the Midwest Conference on the Middle East of seventeen American Jewish organizations has been sent to the Department of State for reply. We appreciate the interest of the Conference in sending the President its resolution concerning the present situation in the Middle East and its approval of the President's proposal to combat the dangers of international communism in that area.

The United States Government is continuing its efforts, both in the United Nations and through bilateral negotiations, to achieve a just and permanent settlement to the problems that beset the Middle East. Throughout the current crisis, we have repeatedly stated our position that the Suez Canal should be open to the ships of all nations without discrimination. It is our belief that the six principles adopted by the United Nations Security Council and agreed to by the Government of Egypt concerning transit through the Canal will provide the basis for such unfettered passage.

Our positions on freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the administration of the Gaza Strip remain as stated in the aide-memoire of February 11 presented to the Israeli Ambassador by Secretary Dulles and explained by the President in his recent nationwide radio and television broadcast. The United States continues to believe that following the withdrawal of Israeli

forces there

Rabbi Morton H. Herman, Conference Chairman,  
Midwest Conference on the Middle East,  
220 South State Street, Suite 1704,  
Chicago, Illinois.

DC/R
Anal <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Rev <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Cat. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

374.841/E-1457

Returned to

CS/J

374.841/E-1457

forces there should be, as stated recently by the President,  
"a united effort by all of the nations to bring about  
conditions more stable, more tranquil and more conducive  
to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore."

Sincerely yours,

Francis O. Wilcox  
Assistant Secretary for  
International Organization Affairs

*See attached blue  
for initials*

P:SEV:CE Rushing:IKP:pp 2/26/57

NEA/P:TR Frye:le 3/6/57 retyped JP:dh 3/15/57

*UNP/10P*

S/S-CR

*ABC*  
MAR 15 1957 P.M.

*to 20 Professional*

MAR 15 1957

P - J. Parker

*JP*

Dear Rabbi Berman:

After consideration at the White House, your telegram of February 12 to the President, also signed by Mr. Milton J. Silberman, on behalf of the Midwest Conference on the Middle East of seventeen American Jewish organizations has been sent to the Department of State for reply. We appreciate the interest of the Conference in sending the President its resolution concerning the present situation in the Middle East and its approval of the President's proposal to combat the dangers of international communism in that area.

The United States Government is continuing its efforts, both in the United Nations and through bilateral negotiations, to achieve a just and permanent settlement to the problems that beset the Middle East. Throughout the current crisis, we have repeatedly stated our position that the Suez Canal should be open to the ships of all nations without discrimination. It is our belief that the six principles adopted by the United Nations Security Council and agreed to by the Government of Egypt concerning transit through the Canal will provide the basis for such unfettered passage.

Our positions on freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the administration of the Gaza Strip remain as stated in the aide memoire of February 11 presented to the Israeli Ambassador by Secretary Dulles and explained by the President in his recent nationwide radio and television broadcast. The United States continues to believe that Israel should effect a complete withdrawal of the areas she occupied during her attack upon Egypt.

Upon

Rabbi Morton M. Berman, Conference Chairman,  
Midwest Conference on the Middle East,  
220 South State Street, Suite 1704,  
Chicago, Illinois.

*following the Israeli forces*

-2-

upon withdrawal there should be, in the view of the United States Government as stated recently by the President, "a united effort by all of the nations to bring about conditions more stable, more tranquil and more conducive to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore."

Sincerely yours,

Francis O. Wilcox  
Assistant Secretary for  
International Organization Affairs

S/S-CR

MAR 7 1957 P.M.

*to J for clearance*

P -

P:SEY:CE:ushing:IKP:pp 2/26/57  
NEA/P:TRFrye:ls 3/6/57

Dear Rabbi Berman:

After consideration at the White House, your telegram of February 12 to the President, also signed by Mr. Milton J. Silberman, on behalf of the Midwest Conference on the Middle East of seventeen American Jewish organizations has been sent to the Department of State for reply. We appreciate the interest of the Conference in sending the President its resolutions concerning the present situation in the Middle East and its approval of the President's proposal to combat the dangers of international communism in that area.

adopted by  
The United States Government is continuing its efforts, both in the United Nations and through bilateral negotiations, to achieve a just and permanent settlement to the problems that beset the Middle East. Throughout the current crisis, we have repeatedly stated our position that the Suez Canal should be open to the ships of all nations without discrimination. It is our belief that the six resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council and agreed to by the Government of Egypt concerning transit through the Canal will provide the basis for such unfettered passage.

Our positions on freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the administration of the Gaza Strip remain as stated in the aide memoire of February 11 presented to the Israeli Ambassador by Secretary Dulles and explained by the President in his recent nation wide radio and television broadcast. The United States continues to believe that Israel should effect a complete withdrawal of the areas she occupied by virtue of her

attack

Rabbi Morton M. Berman, Conference Chairman,  
Midwest Conference on the Middle East,  
220 South State Street, Suite 1704,  
Chicago, Illinois.



attack upon Egypt. Upon withdrawal we are prepared to take action directed at the prevention of further hostilities in the Gaza Strip and to insure freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba

Sincerely yours,

Francois D. Wilcox  
Assistant Secretary  
International Organization Affairs

*use*  
P:SEV:CE: Rushing:DKP:pp

*AKI*  
2/26/57

HEA/P-Mr. Frye  
P-Mr. Wilkinson

S/S-CR

MAR 7 1957 P.M.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 18, 1957


*REV*  
*in action*  
(1104)

7080

IO - Mr. Davis

I enclose a telegram to the President from the Mid-Western Conference on the Middle East of a group of 17 major American-Jewish organizations. You are requested to prepare an appropriate reply for signature by Mr. Wilcox, and to clear your reply with P and NEA.

Please send copies of your reply to S/S by February 21.

  
J. Cunningham [for R. Gorman]  
S/S-RO  
Ext. 5261

Att: As stated dtd 2/12/57

cc: P - Mr. Platt

NEA - Mr. Oulashin

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

ROUTE SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

TO Mr. Fisher Howe  
Director, Executive Secretariat  
Department of State

PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL.  
WHEN DRAFT REPLY IS REQUESTED  
THE BASIC CORRESPONDENCE MUST  
BE RETURNED. IF ANY DELAY IN  
SUBMISSION OF DRAFT REPLY IS  
ENCOUNTERED, PLEASE TELEPHONE  
OFFICE OF THE STAFF SECRETARY.

Date February 14, 1957

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

**ACTION:** Comment \_\_\_\_\_  
Draft reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For direct reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For your information \_\_\_\_\_  
For necessary action \_\_\_\_\_  
For appropriate handling x \_\_\_\_\_  
See below \_\_\_\_\_

374.84A/2-1457

**Remarks:** Tel to President from 17 major American Jewish orgs encl text of resolution re: seeking UN guarantees against resumption of border raids and blockades; Gulf of Aqaba and Straits Tiran open; passage thru Suez; Gaza Strip not be restored Egypt; endorses Eisenhower Doctrine.

2 Secy of School for Afflicted Children at Guildford, Australia expressed appreciation of visit of Jesse Owens, President's Per Rep at 1956 Olympic Games. (Ltr to President)

Washington State Representative expresses his deep alarm at dangers brought about by President's "Middle Eastern Doctrine". (Ltr to President)

GPO 16-71284-1

By direction of the President:

*A. J. Goodpastor*  
A. J. GOODPASTER  
Staff Secretary

*Sam*

2 of 3 pages of info  
when received 10/11  
2/14/57

6747-106  
C 3/18  
1107

lev  
The White House  
Washington

1957 FEB 12 PM 11 13

DA521 NL PD

CHICAGO ILL FEB 12

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

RESOLUTION OF MIDWEST CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

WHEREAS, WE THE ELECTED MIDWESTERN REPRESENTATIVES  
OF THE SEVENTEEN MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS  
IN THE STATES OF ILLINOIS, INDIANA, IOWA, KANSAS,  
MINNESOTA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEBRASKA, NORTH DAKOTA,  
OHIO, SOUTH DAKOTA AND WISCONSIN, MET AT THE SHERMAN

92 5 36  
1957 FEB 12 PM 11 13  
Draft file  
CPS  
724  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

HOTEL IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF  
CONSIDERING THE GRAVE DANGERS TO WORLD PEACE AND TO  
OUR COUNTRY'S INTERESTS ARISING FROM COMMUNIST  
PENETRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND

WHEREAS, LEADING MEMBERS OF BOTH PARTIES OF THE  
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE, IN A JOINT  
RESOLUTION SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE JANUARY 29, 1957,  
REQUESTED THAT THE UNITED STATES SEEK GUARANTEES IN  
THE UNITED NATIONS AGAINST "A RESUMPTION OF BORDER  
RAIDS AND BLOCKADES OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS" IN

AM  
Preliminary

THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH HAVE BROUGHT ENDLESS CONFLICT  
INTO THE AREA AND PREVENTED REGIONAL COOPERATION  
AND RECONSTRUCTION, AND

WHEREAS, IT IS OUR FIRM CONVICTION THAT THESE  
WERE THE CONDITIONS WHICH PRODUCED THE DEFENSIVE  
ACTION OF ISRAEL IN THE SINAI DESERT INITIATED ON  
OCTOBER 29, 1956, AND THAT IT IS IN THE BEST  
INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE REST OF THE  
FREE WORLD NOT TO RESTORE THOSE CONDITIONS MAKING  
FOR VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF FREE

SHIPPING THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE GULF OF  
AQABA, AND NOT TO RETURN THE GAZA STRIP TO EGYPTIAN  
CONTROL, DOMINATION AND EXPLOITATION AS A BASE FOR  
FEDAYEN RAIDS, AND

WHEREAS, THE STATE OF ISRAEL HAS SUCCEEDED IN  
INTEGRATING ITS ARAB CITIZENS INTO THE LIFE OF THE  
COUNTRY RESULTING IN HIGHER STANDARDS OF LIVING,  
EDUCATION, HEALTH AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY BEING  
EQUALLY ENJOYED BY ALL ITS CITIZENS, AND

WHEREAS, AS ATTESTED BY UNITED NATIONS AND



OTHER OBSERVERS ON THE SPOT, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS ALREADY MADE NOTICEABLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RESTORATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF CIVILIAN LIFE IN THE GAZA STRIP AND THE AMELIORATION OF THE LOT OF THE ARAB REFUGEES, AND

WHEREAS, THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON FEBRUARY 2-3, 1957, BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED POSITIONS OF THE NATIONS CONCERNED, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, DO NOT MEET THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION,

**THEREFORE:**

**BE IT RESOLVED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS, THROUGH THE USE OF THE U.N.E.F. (UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE) OR THROUGH SUCH OTHER PROTECTIVE MEASURES AS IT MAY DETERMINE, TAKE STEPS TO KEEP THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN OPEN FOR FREE PASSAGE OF ALL SHIPPING, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONS INVOLVED CAN BE REACHED.**

**BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT STEPS BE IMMEDIATELY TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM**

---

OF PASSAGE OF THE SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS, INCLUDING  
THOSE OF ISRAEL, THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL WHEN IT IS  
AGAIN OPENED FOR TRAFFIC.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT THE GAZA STRIP BE  
NOT RESTORED TO EGYPTIAN CONTROL TO BE USED AS A  
BASE FOR FEDAYEN RAIDS, AND THAT FOR THE IMMEDIATE  
FUTURE, UNTIL A PERMANENT PEACE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED,  
THE GAZA STRIP SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER UNITED NATIONS  
SUPERVISION WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE THE UTILIZATION OF  
THE STATE OF ISRAEL FOR SUCH ADMINISTRATIVE AND

---

RELATED SERVICES AS WILL IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE  
POPULATION OF THE GAZA STRIP, AND NOW

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT THIS CONFERENCE  
VIEWS FAVORABLY THE PROPOSED EISENHOWER DOCTRINE FOR  
THE MIDDLE EAST. IT EMPHASIZES, HOWEVER, THAT THE  
INTEREST OF PERMANENT PEACE IN THE AREA AND IN THE  
WORLD WILL BE BEST SERVED BY EARNEST EFFORTS ON THE  
PART OF OUR GOVERNMENT, THROUGH ITS GOOD OFFICES  
DIRECTLY AND THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS INDIRECTLY,  
TO EFFECT DIRECT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL

AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

RABBI MORTON M BERMAN CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN

MILTON J SILBERMAN CHAIRMAN RESOLUTIONS

COMMITTEE 220 SOUTH STATE ST SUITE 1704

CHICAGO ILLINOIS.

SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS:

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

AMERICAN RELIGIOUS ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

AMERICAN TRADE UNION COUNCIL FOR LABOR ISRAEL

AMERICAN ZIONIST COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS

AMERICAN ZIONIST COUNCIL

B'NAI B'RITH

HADASSAH

JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

JEWISH LABOR COMMITTEE

JEWISH WAR VETERANS

LABOR ZIONISTS

NATIONAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN

UNION OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS

UNION OF AMERICAN ORTHODOX CONGREGATIONS

UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF AMERICA

ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

COOPERATING ORGANIZATIONS:

COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS AND WELFARE FUNDS

CONFERENCE OF JEWISH WOMENS ORGANIZATIONS.



**INCOMING TELEGRAM**

*Department of State*

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44-48  
Action

**SECRET**

Control: 9865  
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 15, 1957  
4:55 PM

NEA  
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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2620, FEBRUARY 15, 2 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 2620, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 193, BEIRUT 295,  
DAMASCUS 190, TEL AVIV 134, USUN 80.

WITH REFERENCE BEIRUT TELEGRAM 1955 AND CURRENT PRESS REPORTS  
ISRAEL CHARGES RENEWAL EGYPTIAN FEDAYEEN RAIDS, EMBASSY  
INFORMED (BY SOURCE IN POSITION KNOW BUT NOT ALWAYS RELIABLE)  
THAT IN CONFIDENTIAL BRIEFING EGYPTIAN CORRESPONDENTS ASSIGNED  
PRESIDENCY NASSER LAST TUESDAY NIGHT STATED THAT EGYPTIAN  
RETALIATION CONTINUED REFUSAL ISRAEL WITHDRAW FORCES WOULD  
TAKE FORM FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS NOT NORMAL MILITARY OPERATION.

HARE

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57-51

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Action

Control: 9899  
Rec'd: February 15,  
5:49 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Cairo

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2624, February 15

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2624; REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 81, AMMAN, RACHDAD, BEIRUT, BENCHAZI, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KHARTOUM, LONDON, PARIS, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI UNNUMBERED

Failure Israelis withdraw and Dulles "plan" dominate press 15th February. Statements by "official source" and by Information Director Hatem played prominently along with assessment "plan" threatens US-Saudi relations. "Allegations Gaza used as base for aggression" described as "clear perversion truth aimed at assisting Israel in her designs on Arabs"; and all the more astonishing "since inconceivable US unaware Israel has always been aggressor". Hatem stated "question passage Israeli ships in Arab or Egyptian territorial waters is really part Palestine problem and not (part of) of recent aggression against Egypt. Before asking that her ships be granted passage through Egyptian territorial waters, Israel should first implement UN resolutions on rights Palestine Arabs. Imperialistic powers have helped Israel ignore those resolutions which explicitly stipulate Palestine Arabs rights in their homeland and to their homes and property. This yet another attempt destroy rights Palestine people and do away with what chance there may still be for implementation UN resolutions." He added that reports stating US supports these claims "make us wonder" and added "principles international justice obligate all countries especially big powers apply those principles fairly and squarely in their dealings with all countries alike. They are not to treat Israel one way and Arabs another. Before Israeli claims may be looked into, Arabs must know what is to become rights Palestine people. But attempt realize Israeli claims at expense Arabs can never be accepted".

GOMHOURIYA asserts "US acting in defiance both Egypt and UN" and asks if Dulles has taken into consideration "Egypt's determination stand between Israel's ships and Aqaba" and that "action may lead to World War three".

AHRAM declares  
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-2- 2624, February 15, from Cairo

AHRAM declares "In spite vague reports re US attitude on Aqaba navigation, sudden change reflects America's flagrant partiality toward Israel".

SHAAB charges "Dulles plan seeks reward Israel for her attack on Egypt" adding plan at same time gives "US opportunity impose her protection on Mid East waterways in addition to protection imposed on Baghdad Pact countries".

SADAT asserts "Demand Gaza be occupied by UNEF not acceptable because it would mean resolution Palestine question in favor Israel" comparing step to Anglo-French ultimatum which clearly benefited Israel adding "just as Egypt rejected ultimatum although Israel accepted it, so she refuses accept occupation Gaza and refuses give Israel any rights in something purely Egyptian".

MASAA opines US has now revealed her true stand and "since Egypt has proved to world its good intentions while others have failed implement UN resolutions, it is time to take matter back into our own hands."

SKHBAR wonders "if Egypt was mistaken in responding to UN cease fire and Canal clearance decision now UN has failed for seventh time and US said to be contemplating granting Israel's demands" and concludes "world feels it is exposed unpredictable dangers now UN has lost its capability act and is being driven to dark abyss by those who support Israel's demands".

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Control:

10148

Rec'd:

February 16, 1957

7:02 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 967, February 15, 3 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 967; REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 156, BURSSELS 5,  
THE HAGUE 2, TORONTO UNNUMBERED.

Menachem Begin Herut Party leader left by air February 13 for  
visits to France, Belgium, Holland, United States and Canada.  
Begin told reporters he intends explain Israel's problems  
(including right to Gaza and guarantees on free navigation).

Knesset yesterday defeated 33 to 5 Herut motion asking national  
referendum on people's readiness accept difficulties resulting  
from "economic sanctions already imposed by United States" or  
from other pressures. Government opposed motion on grounds it  
would create impression there doubt about people's attitude. Refer-  
endum discussed apparently without conclusion by Begin and Ben-  
Gurion in rare meeting February 10.

Comment: Embassy suspects Begin also intends mend Herut political  
fences among Diasporazionists and plead for funds. On previous  
visit France last September (EMBTEL 54 to Paris and Paris 1320  
to Department) he again reportedly met with French political and  
military leaders. Local Herut circles since have hinted he helped  
obtain French military aid for Israel. GOI made clear through  
press Begin's visit to Ben-Gurion does not imply former entrusted  
with "government mission" while abroad. According to JERUSALEM  
POST "it is safe assumption" Ben-Gurion would not delegate authority  
to Begin "at this critical stage affairs".

LMS:JCK/1

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Action

Control: 9449

Rec'd: February 15, 1957  
9:09 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 968, February 15, 2 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 968; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 168, USUN 49.

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Reference: EMBTEL 966

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Prime Minister's aide called Embassy late last night to say Cabinet had been unable reach final position on its reply to United States aide-memoire and able only prepare tentative draft which it sending to Foreign Minister Meir and Eban for their comments. Responsive to inquiry aide said while draft sent to its officials in US bore resemblance remarks made to me by Ben Gurion, it departed from their outline in several respects.

Today's press said while "appropriate instructions had been sent to Israel's United Nations delegates, Cabinet would continue discuss United States proposals at regular weekly meeting Sunday".

SW:MJH/5

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Control: 10115  
Rec'd: February 16, 1957  
5:34 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Beirut

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1996, February 15, 9 p.m.

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TOUSI 271; circular 681.

In reaction delayed by Soviet six-point proposal and intensified by continued speculation Christian editorialists join Moslems pointing out dangers to Eisenhower proposals while most headlines tend partially dissipate excellent results Saud visit. Sample headlines anti-west AD DIYAR, "tension in Saudi American Relations": Pro-Egyptian AS SIYASAH, "Crisis Between Saud and USG"; PSS-organ SADA LUBANAN "Saud Worried Over US Stand Towards Israel"; Pro-western AN NAHAR, "Dulles Plan Touches Off Crisis". Christian AL JARIDA and leftist TELEGRAPH headline "US Denies Dulles Plan" while Moslem nationalist AL YOUN headlines "Mix-up-doubts Revolve About Dulles Plan".

Pro-western AN NAHAR's editorialist Michel Abu Jaudeh says Arab stomachs won't digest mixture of settlement guarantees with Israel withdrawal and concludes "We hope Dulles will not play part of fifth columnist aiming blow up Eisenhower ME plan". AL JARIDA's Bassem el Jissr concludes on same subject "Israeli mutiny against UN resolutions is not only detriment to UN prestige but harms US position in general and Eisenhower ME doctrine in particular".

Opposition pro-Egyptian AS SIYASAH in editorial entitled "Dulles Blows up Eisenhower Principles" professed bewilderment at US bargaining over Israeli withdrawal "because we remember good US stand condemning Israeli attack on Egypt".

HEATH

LR:HC/16

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


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: February 15, 1957



SUBJECT: Italian Interest in Near Eastern and North African Events

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Egidio Ortona, Italian Charge d'Affaires ad interim  
NEA - Lampton Berry  
NE - Lewis Hoffacker

COPIES TO: NEA (2cc) Embassy Rome (cc)  
NE (2cc)  
EUR ( )  
WE ( )  
AFIN ( )  
AF/S ( )  
OLI (2cc)

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Mr. Ortona, calling at his request, invited comment on the Aqaba-Gaza problem, the Suez issue, the visit of King Saud, and North African unity.

Mr. Berry responded generally along the lines of Circulars 681, 691, 682, and 670, which deal with the first three of these subjects.

Mr. Ortona referred to recent reports that the United States was pursuing its present course of action with respect to the Straits of Tiran in order to make possible an alternate pipeline through Israel. While Italy would welcome any such move as a reduction of Nasser's dominant position concerning oil shipments, Mr. Ortona was fearful lest these reports cause Nasser to fly into a "state of fury" and once again retaliate irrationally. Mr. Berry was unaware that United States policy was inspired by the suggested motive.

With regard to reports of a potential North African union, Mr. Berry said that, as far as he knew, the United States had taken no firm stand one way or the other. He commented personally that the independent North African states would probably be better off if they were oriented westward and away from the consuming intrigues and difficulties of the Near East. He outlined the United States position on Algeria and expressed the hope that the French were finally convinced that the United States had their interests at heart in this respect. Mr. Ortona voiced the opinion that while Italy might play a larger role in the North African region, she lacked capital to do anything significant. He hinted that Italy would welcome the opportunity to serve as a channel for United States-inspired

investments

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investments and other activity in the area.

Mr. Ortona replied, in answer to Mr. Berry's question, that the Italian Government spent in the neighborhood of five billion liras a year in Somaliland. The Italian Treasury, according to Mr. Ortona, was eager to terminate this expenditure immediately. Italy therefore hoped that the United States might come to early assistance in carrying the Somali financial burden.

NEA:NE:LHoffacker:feg  
2/19/57

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*1. NEA - Fred Palmer*  
*2. RM/R*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 2/15/57

SUBJECT: U.S. Position on Gaza and Aqaba

PARTICIPANTS: Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia  
Ambassador Abdullah Khayyal of Saudi Arabia  
Mr. Moudouh Adib  
Mr. Abdul Aziz Rajid  
Mr. William M. Rountree, IEA  
Mr. David D. Newsom, IEA

COPIES TO: IE, IEA, URP, S/S  
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Mr. Rountree said he had asked Sheikh Yusuf to come in in order to give him the substance of a letter which President Eisenhower had sent to King Saud with respect to the U.S. policy on Aqaba and Gaza. He read Sheikh Yusuf a summary of the substance of the letter. Sheikh Yusuf said he appreciated the efforts of the United States on this matter and that he knew the King would appreciate the President's message. He said the King would be pleased to hear that the United States policy had not changed and that the United States remained determined that Israel evacuate Gaza and Aqaba. He said the letter would serve to eliminate rumors.

Sheikh Yusuf said he had no comment on the first portion of the letter. On the question of the free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, he said, he could not speak of the motives of the United States in raising this matter at this time, but he believes raising the question to have been unfortunate. He stressed, as he had in previous conversations, that this was a matter of life and death for Saudi Arabia and that the presence of Israel in the Gulf represented a direct threat to the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Rountree assured Sheikh Yusuf that the position the United States had taken was motivated solely by the principles of international law as the United States understands them.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: February 15, 1957

SUBJECT: The Questions of Gaza and the Straits of Aqaba

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel  
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister of Israel  
The Secretary  
The Under Secretary  
Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, IO  
Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA  
Mr. Herman Phleger, I  
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NE

FEB 19 1957

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R, Amembassy Tel Aviv, Amembassy Cairo

Approved for dist  
by NEA-Mr. Rountree  
per WSM instruction  
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Ambassador Eban called on the Secretary this afternoon further to discuss the questions of Gaza and the Straits of Aqaba. He referred to the attached Aide Memoire which had been delivered to the Secretary earlier in the afternoon and said that it represented a constructive response to the American initiative of February 11 and he hoped that it would break what appeared to be a deadlock. He described the Israeli Aide Memoire as a supplementary document to the American Aide Memoire of February 11 and as envisaging swift action.

Ambassador Eban referred to the American proposal on the Straits of Aqaba and observed that the area of doubt was small, that there was a broad ground of agreement and that within a matter of days questions of control of the Straits and freedom of navigation could be resolved. Ambassador Eban mentioned two points: 1) necessity for a legal definition and interpretation of the Gulf of Aqaba. He thought that Israeli and American representatives could get together over the weekend and work out a definition of the international character of the waterway; 2) necessity for a definition of the functions of the UNEF in the Straits of Aqaba. He thought it would be an axiom beyond controversy that unless UNEF were placed there Egyptian guns would quickly appear and would stop Israeli ships. Previously pessimistic predictions on his part had usually been correct. Egyptian statements had already indicated what they may do. Ambassador Eban thought that the stability of tenure of the UNEF should be defined in the Straits of Aqaba area. He recalled that on January 28 and again on February 2 Ambassador Lodge had indicated in the UNGA that it would be essential that the UNEF be there, which would permit freedom of navigation. Ambassador Eban suggested that Ambassador Lodge's views be embodied in the terms of reference of UNEF. If there were a legal definition of the waters of the Gulf and if the UNEF's tenure at the Straits was defined, uncertainties regarding future blockade would be removed.

Ambassador

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Ambassador Eban continued that, with respect to Gaza, two points were essential: 1) it would be disastrous and pose a grave threat to Israel if Egypt reoccupied the area; the possibility of an Egyptian return was a major Israeli preoccupation, and 2) if Egypt did not return to the Gaza territory it would be an area not at war with Israel. If Egypt returned, the Gaza area would be at war. To avoid the latter possible development, Israel could accept and would commit itself to settlement of Arab refugees. For the first time, Israel was willing to plunge into new and icy waters in this respect. Ambassador Eban recalled that the Secretary in August 1955 had suggested that there should be a repatriation where feasible or resettlement and compensation where repatriation not feasible. Israel agreed and planned to pursue a similar approach. Israel had concluded that we here have a new opportunity.

Ambassador Eban said that if the lines of thought which had been expressed in the Israeli Aide Memoire were adopted, the following developments could occur:

- |              |   |
|--------------|---|
| <u>Aqaba</u> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Declaration by the US and others regarding international waters of the Gulf of Aqaba and freedom of passage through the Straits.</li><li>2. Israeli withdrawal of military forces.</li><li>3. Entry by UNEF with agreement on terms of reference, including stability of tenure.</li></ol> |
| <u>Gaza</u>  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Israeli withdrawal of military forces.</li><li>2. Arrival of mission to study civil administration and subsequently to report to the UNGA.</li></ol>   |

Ambassador Eban added that to return to the previous status in the Gaza area would be so drastic that Israel would wish to explain its views to a mission before such action was taken.

The Secretary said he had read the Israeli Aide Memoire with deep disappointment. It seemed to misapprehend the nature of the declaration which we had there proposed. The Israeli Aide Memoire was not really responsive. It had been indicated in the American Aide Memoire that there was in these matters an order of events and an order of urgency which had been fixed by the UN; first, the UNGA had called upon Israel to withdraw to the Armistice lines. We had felt that Israel's willingness to do so might be increased and that its ability to satisfy its public opinion and its Parliament would be assisted if we had set forth the American attitude. Ambassador Eban's suggestion with respect to negotiations was a misconception of our attitude. The US as a member of the UN and as a maritime power would be willing to use its influence in the directions indicated but we did not suggest that we would set ourselves up as a rival to the UN to negotiate in its stead, nor to take the place of Secretary General Hammarskjold. We had no mandate from the UN, nor would we be willing to act in that capacity. We were, on the other hand, prepared to make our views known in an authoritative way and, in fact, have already done so. We had thought that such action might make it easier for Israel to comply with the UNGA Resolutions. These suggestions were a far cry from negotiations as suggested by Ambassador Eban. It seemed to be his thesis that negotiations between Israel and the US should precede other action. Furthermore, we would be dealing with matters which were of concern to such other littoral states as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

The Secretary

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-3-

The Secretary continued that some of these observations also applied to the Gaza area where there was a general armistice agreement involving Israel and Egypt. The Israeli Aide Memoire seemed to contemplate that there should be an effort to impose Israeli-United States views on the United Nations. The Secretary expressed amazement that Ambassador Eban had thought this suggestion would prove to be an acceptable procedure. Such action would leave a confused and dangerous situation in the Gaza area if, in fact, it were the only basis for Israeli withdrawal.

Ambassador Eban said Israel's formal position seemed to be misunderstood. Israel feared that withdrawal would be followed by renewed blockade, for which reason Israel could not comply with the United Nations request. With Israeli withdrawal from Gaza it would create a situation which was of legitimate concern. In both cases hostilities might result. Consequently, if the U. S. were willing to adopt the Israeli suggestions there would be no hostilities and the final result would also be in the Arab interest. Ambassador Eban continued that Israel was not suggesting usurpation of U.N. interest. Any public statements by the U.S. would be corollary to the U.S. attitude which had already been expressed in its Aide Memoire. If the U.N. went along with expanded activities for the UNEF we would avoid conflagration in the area.

Ambassador Eban said that regarding Gaza, Israel acknowledged the priority of Israeli withdrawal. Thereafter the U.N. could have a look at the situation including the proposed solution of the refugee question. The U.S. could give valuable assurances in attaining these objectives. What was unreasonable in these remarks? Israel was merely asking for a statement by the U.S. regarding Aqaba and steps to achieve the objective already indicated by Ambassador Lodge. Israel was agreeable to Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and had made suggestions for a settlement of its future.

The Secretary said we seemed to have a situation in which Israel had been called upon repeatedly and unconditionally to withdraw. However, Israel had held back which had caused a disposition in U.N. quarters to take vigorous action to secure Israel's withdrawal. Against this background we had given Israel a statement of policy which would actuate the U.S. when Israel withdrew. We hoped this would make it possible for Israel to say it would withdraw. We could give no guarantee that the rest of the world would agree with our position. We had thought that the reasons inherent in the situation would have tipped the scale in favor of compliance. However, prior to compliance Israel seemed to want unilateral exploration and agreement regarding Gaza and Aqaba. Why does Israel assume the U.N. and others would accept anything more than the policies already stated? Even if we reached agreement there would be no guarantee that they could be carried out. Probably it would be less likely because there would be bitter and justifiable resentment on the part of other U.N. members, the Secretary General,

and the

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and the littoral states if we arrogated to ourselves settlement of these questions without consultation with them. The Israeli plan seemed less calculated to achieve the desired result than the knowledge that the U.S. would commit itself as indicated in its Aide Memoire.

The Secretary admitted that the action which he proposed could not be 100% certain but he suggested that the Israeli procedure was also not 100% certain and was subject to greater risks.

Ambassador Eban said that he was not able to acknowledge any conflict in the Israeli Aide Memoire. Israel was willing to withdraw if the UNEF took over and remained until there was a more permanent arrangement for freedom of navigation. He asked if we would ascertain whether the U.N. would endorse what Ambassador Lodge had said. Could we not wait a week to see if those objectives were obtainable? There was a responsibility to avoid the risk of a return to hostilities in the Aqaba area which the Israeli withdrawal might precipitate.

The Secretary referred to that passage in the Israeli Aide Memoire which said "The Israel Government is ready to enter into immediate conversations with the United States on specific steps for an early settlement". The Secretary continued that we had no more basis of entering into a conversation with Israel than with any of the other members of the U.N. To suggest bilateral conversations would be to suggest an improper and unacceptable role.

The Secretary also noted Ambassador Eban had suggested regarding Gaza "that the Governments of the United States and of Israel consult together urgently in an effort to find a suitable arrangement which might be submitted to the United Nations". The Secretary interpreted this passage to mean that after agreement we would submit the report of the two Governments to the U.N. for ratification. This approach would not only be unacceptable to us but also would be deeply and properly resented by the U.N.

Ambassador Eban said that the emphasis should not be on the formal or procedural aspects but on the policies themselves. The Secretary noted that we had already made a policy statement in the Aide Memoire of February 11. We wanted to know if Israel would withdraw. The Israeli Aide Memoire was negative in this respect. Ambassador Eban observed that it had made no negative but only affirmative statements. The Secretary said that in any event it was not responsive to the American Aide Memoire of February 11.

Ambassador Eban asked if we could use our influence in the U.N. to see whether or not the UNEF functions could be defined. The Secretary replied that we had covered this point by our willingness to make a public declaration. Ambassador Eban continued that because of special international interests in the Gulf of Aqaba it should not be treated as Sinai had been but with greater definition. If this action were taken, we would be closer to a solution. If not, the Egyptian guns would return to the Straits. It was therefore essential that we be prudent and show foresight. Israel was merely asking for precisions.

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-5-

The Secretary said that, with reference to precisions of language, he wished to make one or two changes in the American Aide Memoire of February 11. In the paragraph relating to the Gulf of Aqaba the first sentence should read "The U.S. believes that the Gulf comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits, giving access thereto." In other words, "comprehends" would replace "constitutes" and "forcibly" would be dropped from the sentence as now written.

Ambassador Eban again said that greater precision was required regarding the UNEF. The Secretary replied that for whatever his judgment was worth he thought there was not a great likelihood that the Straits of Aqaba would be closed following Israeli withdrawal. He pointed out that Aqaba and Gaza were not unrelated in that American action was contingent upon Israeli withdrawal from both. Ambassador Eban noted that the process in Gaza would be longer than in Aqaba and asked why it would be difficult to obtain a definition of UNEF functions. The Secretary said that other countries in the U.N. must be consulted and that all points of view should be taken into account. In acting without consultation deep resentment would be caused. American-Israeli conversations and a joint mission would not be the right way to proceed.

Ambassador Eban said that it would not be a U.S. mission but a U.N. mission. The Secretary said this formulation would be a different matter. Ambassador Eban added that there was a view now circulating in the U.N. that a mission could go out after Israeli withdrawal.

The Secretary again pointed out that the Israeli Aide Memoire stated that "the Governments of the U.S. and of Israel consult together urgently in an effort to find a suitable arrangement which might be submitted to the U.N." The Secretary added, however, that we could indicate as a member of the U.N. that we would be in favor of a mission or commission regarding the future of the Gaza Strip. If we were now talking about an elaboration of the American policy declaration which would justify Israeli withdrawal, these details could be included but quick action before Monday was desirable; otherwise a storm would break in the U.N.

Ambassador Eban said that an American declaration regarding the UNEF would be helpful after which it might be taken up by the Secretary General. The Secretary thought that the majority of the members of the U.N. would move forward if Israel withdrew.

The Secretary said he wanted to make certain matters clear: we had tried very hard to work out a solution for the present situation. Israel and the U.S. had relationships which were very different from those with other countries and which were very close. Israeli-American relations were unlike American-Egyptian relations. The Secretary said that he would be deeply disturbed if events should push us into antagonism toward Israel. A deep cleavage of opinion would

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develop within the U.S. It had been his desire, to the best of his ability, to find a reasonable solution. He did not blame the Israeli Government for endeavoring to reduce future risks. He felt that we were very close in the American Aide Memoire of February 11, although there might be some modifications. The paragraphs regarding Gaza, for example, did not touch on the question of administration. Question of U.N. study might be considered and perhaps other modifications. He earnestly suggested that the Israeli Ambassador go over the American Aide Memoire of February 11 in this light, that it be accepted and that Israel withdraw from Gaza and Aqaba.

Ambassador Eban said he would consult the Israeli Foreign Minister in New York but wished to observe that if Israel withdrew it would have no assurances of an open waterway at the Straits. The Secretary said that the greatest assurance could be found not in what people said, but in what were the elemental forces at work. For example, treaties were not dependable after the conditions in which they were signed ceased to exist. Greater dependability could be placed upon conditions which served vital interests. Such conditions were far better than red ribbon and seals on paper treaties. If Israel withdrew what, in reality, would Israel have in Aqaba? It would have an alternative to the Suez Canal which would be of great interest to all of the maritime powers. The great error of Western Europe was its reliance upon the Suez Canal alone.

Ambassador Eban observed that Nasser might close both the Straits of Aqaba and the Suez Canal. The Secretary observed that he would be acting contrary to world public opinion, in which event Israel would not stand alone. Under such circumstances if Egypt took steps which could not be justified, then a case could be made. Israel's best assurance would lie in this basic fact. Israel would take a great risk if it centered upon a U.N. recommendation by which Egypt might not be bound.

The Secretary said that he was going down to Georgia to discuss these and other matters with the President. He believed that he had made the American position clear. He planned to return in the early afternoon of February 16 and hoped that Ambassador Eban meanwhile would be able to make progress along the lines of the American Aide Memoire of February 11. We were considering making our Aide Memoire public tomorrow afternoon. Israel might also wish to publish its Aide Memoire of February 15. We would then see what would develop thereafter.

Ambassador Eban said that he would set down some words which might be helpful. He thought there was no wide area of division to justify a parting of the ways. Minister Shiloah observed that the Israeli procedural suggestions contained in its Aide Memoire had not correctly described the substance of the Israeli case.

CONFIDENTIAL

-7-

Ambassador Eban, in response to the Secretary's query as to what remarks Ambassador Eban would make to the press on leaving, said he planned to say that the Israel Government's proposals had been submitted to the Secretary for study, that Ambassador Eban had made some oral observations and that he presumed that the various matters were being considered.

Attachment: *at 4:00*

Israeli Aide Memoire,  
February 15, 1957.

70.  
*[Signature]*  
NEA:NE:FWilkins:crc:rej - 2/16/57

CONFIDENTIAL

AIDE-MEMOIRE

The Government of Israel deeply appreciates the sympathetic interest of the President and the Secretary of State in its problems, and their willingness to devote earnest study to the quest for solutions. It regards this constructive interest as a further expression of American friendship for Israel and of American concern for peace in the Middle East.

Israel has noted with satisfaction the affirmative approach of the United States to the question of free navigation in the Gulf of Akaba and the Straits of Tiran.

The Government of Israel expresses its agreement in principle with the approach to this question defined by the Secretary of State in his Aide Memoire of February 11 and in his conversation with the Ambassador of Israel on that date.

In particular, Israel is appreciative of the following elements in the United States' position:

- (1) the affirmation that the Gulf constitutes international waters, and that all nations, including Israel, have the right of free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto;
- (2) the invocation in the Aide Memoire of the assurances conveyed by Egypt to the United States on January 28, 1950;
- (3) the statement of the readiness of the United States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, to exercise the right of free and innocent passage, and to join with others to secure general recognition of

-2-

this right.

- (4) the suggestion that as a precautionary measure the UNEF move into the area of the Straits as the Israeli forces are withdrawn.

The Government of Israel is impressed by the statement of the Secretary of State to the Ambassador expressing awareness of the responsibility which would rest upon the United States if Israel were to withdraw and the Egyptian restrictions were to be resumed.

While giving full weight to these policies and attitudes, the Israel Government is conscious of the danger which would arise to the freedom of Israeli shipping in the Gulf and to peace in the area if Egypt were to resume occupation of the Straits of Tiran before the attainment of a settlement. For many years Egypt has maintained restrictions in the Suez Canal contrary to the Convention of 1888 and to decisions of the Security Council which, under Article 25 of the Charter, have binding effect on all members of the United Nations. These policies, together with corresponding restrictions in the Gulf of Akaba, have cut Israel off from her freedom of commerce with large parts of the world; have inflicted enormous losses and burdens upon Israel's economy, and have constituted a danger to peace and security in the Middle East.

Despite the disapproval of the United Nations and of the maritime community, including the United States, no effective steps were taken to ensure the termination of these practices.

Recent expressions of Egyptian policy give ample grounds

-3-

for the belief that, if no preventive measures are taken, the Egyptian restrictions in the Gulf of Akaba and the Straits of Tiran will be resumed, with consequent peril both to Israel's national interests and to peace in the area.

In order to meet this danger, the Government of Israel supports the suggestion that units of the UNEF move into the Straits as Israel troops withdraw. But it holds that these units should be stationed along the western coast of the Gulf of Akaba until a peace settlement is achieved, or until an agreed and permanent arrangement for freedom of navigation is otherwise secured. In this connection Israel has noted the proposal made on behalf of the United States by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in the United Nations on January 28 and February 2, 1957.

Failing such an arrangement for the stationing of UNEF, the Government of Israel suggests that a precise guarantee be afforded for the specific protection of Israel-bound shipping exercising its right of passage in the Straits and the Gulf.

Israel believes that the Aide Memoire and the oral observations by the Secretary of State in his conversation with the Ambassador on February 11 signify the sincere intention of the Government of the United States to provide an effective guarantee against interference with free navigation in these international waters. Accordingly, the Israel Government is ready to enter into immediate conversations with the United States on specific steps for an early settlement. It is desirable to co-ordinate the sequence to be adopted in such matters as a

-4-

public declaration of United States policy embodying the guarantee of free navigation; concurring declarations by other maritime powers; the evacuation of the Sharm-el-Shaikh area by Israel forces; and the entry of UNEF into the evacuated area and the definition of its functions.

A preliminary list of other specific points suggested for discussion is submitted as an Annex to this Aide Memoire.

The Government of Israel has studied the observations in the Aide Memoire of February 11/<sup>on</sup> the Gaza Strip. It has, in particular, noted the following elements:

- (1) the recognition that this area, until recently under Egyptian occupation, "has been a source of armed infiltration and reprisals" and of "great potential danger because of the presence there of so large a number of Arab refugees";
- (2) The observation of the Secretary of State that the United States has not crystallized a final view on the future of the Gaza Strip but that this future "should be worked out through the efforts and good offices of the United Nations."

The Government of Israel wishes to add the following comments:

The Gaza Strip, occupied during the invasion of 1948, was never Egyptian territory. The Armistice Agreement under which Egypt occupied the Strip was continuously broken by Egypt. In violation of the United Nations Charter and of the decision of the Security Council against belligerent acts, Egypt conducted

hostile acts against Israel. These actions were based on a doctrine of "a state of war" with Israel, which Egypt still declines to relinquish, despite the fact that this doctrine, and any actions arising therefrom, were repudiated by the Security Council in 1951. In these circumstances there is no basis for the restoration of the status quo ante in Gaza by the return of Egypt to an area which she used exclusively for the purpose of establishing an aggressive base against Israel.

Israel's stand on the Gaza question is influenced by three problems:

- (a) The security of Israel, and especially that of its villages and settlements in the South and the Negev;
- (b) The welfare and economic situation of the local population;
- (c) The problem of the refugees.

Israel is prepared to make a supreme effort to raise the standard of the residents of the area from the fearful poverty which grew increasingly disastrous during the Egyptian occupation.

The Government of Israel is ready to make its contribution to a United Nations program for settling the refugee population of the Gaza Strip. Israel's contribution, within this framework, will consist both in the payment of compensation and in the settlement of a part of the refugee population of Gaza. Israel is confident that the United States will understand the significant effect of this step for the solution of basic problems which have



been deadlocked for several years.

In view of the vital importance of the Gaza problem and of the contribution envisaged by Israel towards its solution, it is suggested that the Governments of the United States and of Israel consult together urgently in an effort to find a suitable arrangement which might be submitted to the United Nations.

This examination, which should include an investigation of the position in the area by a suitable mission, should not take a long time. The steps immediately envisaged are the withdrawal of Israel forces and the discussion of a suitable relationship between the U.N. and the local and Israel Administrative services.

Israel believes that it is necessary to prevent a recurrence of the turbulent conditions out of which the recent hostilities arose. There should be a new era in the relations between Egypt and Israel. By constantly violating the Armistice, through the invocation of belligerent rights and the conduct of blockades and hostilities, Egypt distorted the fundamental character of the Armistice Agreement as a transition to peace, and emptied it of its central purpose. At a time when the Agreement had full legal force, Egypt regarded it as an expression of "a state of war". In those circumstances, Israel cannot legitimately be requested to return to the status quo ante, and to resume adherence to an agreement which Egypt has nullified throughout a period of eight years by claiming and exercising a policy of belligerency inconsistent with its terms.

-7-

At the same time, the Government of Israel declares that it does not seek or claim any belligerent rights against Egypt, and that it undertakes to abstain, on the basis of reciprocity, from any hostile act whatever against Egypt.

The Aide Memoire of February 11 deals with the questions of Gaza and the Gulf of Akaba, since problems exist in both areas in connection with the withdrawal of forces. While no context of withdrawal arises in the case of the Suez Canal, the Government of Israel emphasizes its hope for United States support in securing the implementation of Israel's rights under the 1888 Convention. On many occasions, the most recent of which was President Eisenhower's public statement on February 6, the United States has noted the violation by Egypt of its obligations under the 1888 Convention in respect of Israel-bound shipping.

The United Nations has devoted great effort to secure the clearance of the Suez Canal for navigation. If the Suez Canal is to be reopened physically and then to be operated with discrimination, the United Nations will have inadvertently become responsible for expediting the renewed violation of international law.

It is inconceivable that the Suez Canal can be opened by the United Nations and remain closed to any of its member-States. It is essential, in the interest of peace and security, to ensure that Egypt refrains from interference with Israeli and Israel-bound shipping exercising the right of free and innocent passage in this international waterway. The Government of Israel would welcome a

clarification of United States policy on this point.

The constructive and affirmative approach expressed by the Secretary of State in the conversation and Aide Memoire of February 11 confirms the belief that the United States and Israel have a common aspiration to strengthen peace in the Middle East. In view of the great measure of proximity between the viewpoints of the two Governments on the questions under discussion, the Government of Israel desires to hold urgent conversations with the United States Government in order to clarify the issues and to promote an early solution.

Israel hopes that the United States will help to create such international conditions in the immediate future as will allow swift progress to be made in such discussions, designed to bring about a settlement of problems which, until the Secretary's initiative on February 11, were in a position of acute deadlock.

Embassy of Israel,

Washington, February 15, 1957

A N N E X

PRELIMINARY LIST OF POINTS ON THE GULF OF AKABA  
ARISING OUT OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE OF FEBRUARY 15, 1957

- (1) It is Israel's understanding that the term "free passage" as generally accepted in international law means passage of ships irrespective of flag or destination of cargo, without previous authorization of the littoral state or states, and without the right of the littoral state to suspend such passage; furthermore that "innocent passage" means passage of a ship whose conduct is not essentially injurious to the safety and welfare of the littoral state.  
(Hyde, International Law 1945 p.517). It is suggested that these two definitions be explicitly stated in any declaration to be made by the United States, setting out the policies envisaged in the Aide Memoire.
- (2) Reference is made to the statement in the Aide Memoire "that no nation has the right forcibly to prevent free and innocent passage etc." It is suggested that in any formal declaration of purpose these words be amended to read "forcibly or otherwise". The object is to preclude interference by the enactment of obstructive regulations, the penalisation of ships exercising innocent passage, or by such methods as the blocking of the waterway by placing obstacles in the navigable channel. Such interference by regulation, intimidation and physical obstruction have been followed by Egypt in the Suez Canal. It is consequently submitted that Governments prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage should specifically decline

(ANNEX - Continued)

to recognize the validity of regulations imposed by any of the littoral states with the effect of frustrating the basic aim of free and innocent passage.

- (3) The Government of Israel would welcome information on the steps proposed by the United States in order to exercise its rights of passage in the Gulf and the Straits at an early date. Israel would also welcome a discussion of methods whereby the United States might "join with others to secure general recognition of this right". It is presumed that this involves cooperative effort with other maritime nations who have an interest in developing navigation in the Gulf and the Straits.

ROBERT H. MICHEL  
18TH DISTRICT, ILLINOIS

HOME OFFICE:  
FIRST NATIONAL BANK BUILDING  
PEORIA, ILLINOIS  
SUE FULTON, SECRETARY

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**

Washington, D. C.

February 15, 1957

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT  
JAMES H. CROMWELL  
WASHINGTON STAFF:  
ARLINE CAVE  
MARGARET POWERS

7993

**ACTION**  
is assigned to

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ME +

Hon. John Foster Dulles  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I want to thank you first, for your candid views given to us in the Briefing Session last week.

Secondly, I should like you to know that I have been taking advantage of the Lincoln Day recess to get the first hand views of my constituents of the 18th Congressional District. Many of my constituents are very much disturbed with the attitude of the State Department and our delegation to the United Nations with respect to the State of Israel.

There is widespread support in my District for the position of the State of Israel and its insistence that it is entitled to guaranties against the continued threat of invasion and blockade by Egypt before withdrawing completely from the Gaza Strip and the territory adjoining the Gulf of Aqaba. There is strong feeling that Colonel Nasser should not be rewarded for his past invasions of Israel territory and the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal by imposing penalties on the State of Israel. Many of my good constituents feel that it would be a bad mistake for our United Nations delegation to support any resolution to impose sanctions on the State of Israel.

Notwithstanding the many facets that I know you must consider, and realizing full well the heavy yoke that bears down upon your shoulders, I respectfully bring these views to your attention with the fervent hope that they will in some small way help you and the Department to set upon a course that will resolve the difficult Middle East problem in keeping with the wishes of the vast majority of the American people.

Sincerely,

*Robert H. Michel*  
Robert H. Michel, M. C.

This letter (and its  
teletype, if any) must be  
placed in the records of

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 18, 1957

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DG

IO - Mr. Davis

I attach a letter to the Secretary from Congressman Michel commenting on United Nations in regard to Israel.

Please prepare an appropriate reply for signature by Mr. Hill and send copies to S/S by February 25.

  
J. H. Cunningham  
S/S-RO

Attachment:

Ltr to Dulles fm Robert H. Michel  
dated 2/15/57 (S/S-1122)

cc: NEA - Mr. Oulashin



In reply refer to  
UNP 674.84A/2-1557

February 26, 1957

Dear Mr. Michel:

I have received your letter of February 15 addressed to the Secretary, acknowledged by telephone on February 18, 1957, expressing your concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still

hopeful

The Honorable  
Robert H. Michel,  
House of Representatives.

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hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

Your views concerning the efforts of the Secretary and the Department to resolve the present difficulties in the Middle East are appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

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2/26/57

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

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Shepilov transfer overshadows all other news 16 February. In sole commentary Mustafa Amin opines "Since Shepilov was outstanding success as Foreign Minister, sudden resignation must be due Soviet internal policy". Noting "Hungarian events weakened position anti-Stalin-group", Amin predicts "Khrushchev will soon be out" but points out Molotov supported Soviet MidEast policy which was product many minds".

News coverage Israel developments especially US statement on withdrawal and Agaba played prominently. Editorials continue attack Dulles "plan" a "contrary armistice agreement" and as seeking "reward Israel for attack". AKHBAR assets "Dulles knows exactly what Israel wants and always does whatever please Israel and Zionists" and charges plan "seeks isolate Egypt from Syria and Jordan". KAHIRA asks if "Dulles wants Arabs add US danger to existing Israeli-French-British danger to MidEast", MASAA charges "US policy is new phase Zionists conspiracy", and KASIM GUDA reiterates "Israel insisting on free passage Agaba because Britain, France and US want construct pipeline through Israel as alternative to canal". COMHOURIYA accuses west wanting "destroy Arab strength and independence forever and resolve Palestine case in favor Israel for all time", and declares "imperialists not aiming at Egypt alone but at every Arab state fighting for freedom".

MASAA observes "Afro Asian plan for sanctions insufficient since three big western powers will keep helping Israel in spite UN resolution" and insists Afro Asians must devise another means achieve objective.

KHALID MOHIEDDIN compares Eisenhower plan which "aimed

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-2- 2636, February 16, from Cairo

at subjugation and exploitation peoples MidEast in name anti-Communism and diversion their attention from real enemy" with Soviet plan which "based on collective guarantees and recognition freedom MidEast devise its own economics and cultural programs" which "wants all states world including Soviets enemies guarantee independence MidEast" and which "insists on withdrawal Israelis and recognizes Egypt's sovereignty over canal". According Khalid Soviet plan "does not call for making MidEast over into Communist image nor profess enmity toward any doctrine". He contrasts Soviet plan which does not "ask US join east or west" with sixth fleet and its guided missiles and asks if "firing first missiles represents proposals protect peace, pledge non-intervention internal affairs, or raise economic and cultural standards". After emphasizing "Soviet plan like US plan was prepared without consulting Arabs", KAHIRA observes "Soviet plan seeks take MidEast out of cold war, is more realistic, and is nearer policy peace and cooperation". Editorial adds "while some parts are vague, Soviet plan does not stir feeling doubt and fear which Eisenhower plan aroused" noting "America's support Israel causes Arabs fear western plan" and concludes "Soviet plan undoubtedly will find fertile ground, especially in view Soviets insistence Israel must withdraw unconditionally, and will increase amount opposition to Eisenhower plan".

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Department of State

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 971, February 16, 8 am

Control: 10369  
Re: February 16, 1957  
10:11 pm

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3-14-57*

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SENT DEPARTMENT 971; REPEATED INFORMATION-PARIS 157.

With uniformity which admits little possibility of error Israel press reports French Ambassador Gilbert as having told Tel Aviv audience February 14 that when USSR and United States acted together to bolster Nasser France stood beside Israel. Speaking in Hebrew Gilbert's remarks addressed to audience attending symposium on "Israel and France at this hour" under auspices Israel-France Association.

Is my view Gilbert skirted very close to what could be termed attempt to exploit to French benefit latent anti-American sentiment resulting from local conviction United States holds key to ultimate disposition Gaza and Straits of Tiran. He might have said same things just as effectively without insidious comparisons between French performance and that he ascribed to United States.

According to JERUSALEM POST he said "France will endeavor help Israelis although we have not so many dollars as some" (in obvious reference to United States). "In these critical days when United States and USSR were siding together to save Egyptian tyrant France would stand beside Israel".

HAARETZ reporting same passage quoted him as saying "France will endeavor help Israel even though we have not so many dollars. We shall give you credit to enable you to buy in France all those things you have been getting from America...in these critical days when United States and USSR siding together to save Egyptian tyrant when principles of justice bowed to interests of oil France would stand by Israel. France and Israel might not have weight to tip scales over in United Nations but voice of justice would be heard at last."

Both HAARETZ and JERUSALEM POST as well as other papers declared France would help with equipment needed in development of land route between Mediterranean and Red Sea "as defended substitute for Suez Canal". Both countries according to Gilbert had to face "fanaticism" of Islam and Sinai had proved how short time had been to resist.

Comment

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-2- 971, February 16, 8 am, from Tel Aviv

Comment: Abramov President Israel-America friendship league told me he intended ask Foreign Ministry for reaction to "uncalled for remarks" of French Ambassador and he would report to me.

LAWSON

AB:CC/1

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MAR 15 1957

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FROM: Amman

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 942, February 16, 2 p.m.

PRIORITY

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Department's guidance DEPCIRTEL 691, timely and most helpful in tracing wave adverse publicity. USIS using question and answer technique quoting Ambassador succeeded in placing on front page all papers under 8 column banner streamers special release making all major points covered reference guidance.

MALLORY

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7:02 a.m.

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FROM: Damascus

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TO: Secretary of State

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TEL AVIV 119, BEIRUT 561, BAGDAD 235.

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DEPCIRTELS 681, 691.

After three-day blackout Syrian press February 15 broke Aqaba  
story emphasizing:

(A) USG guarantee freedom Aqaba passage as condition Israeli  
withdrawal Gaza and,

(B) Radio Cairo interpretation that proposals "threaten Saudi-  
US relations".

SBS February 15 carried Department correction DEPCIRTEL 691.

Comment: Reasons for delayed reaction unknown. Decision concen-  
trate (B) above suggests official concern local effect of success-  
ful Saud-Eisenhower talks.

MOOSE

LMS:JCK/1

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 747, FEBRUARY 16, 10 AM

NIAC

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

SUBSTANCE OF DULLES-EBAN COVERSATION, AS COMMUNICATED BY WILCOX TO SISCO, GIVEN TO SYG LATE FRIDAY EVENING.


SYG DISAPPOINTED AND SAID HE WAS NOT SURPRISED. HE EXPRESSED VIEW "US HAS GOTTEN NOTHING FROM ISRAELIS FOR ITS EFFORTS."

WADSWORTH

JS

Note: Advance copy to Miss Zarger (IO) 10-30 a.m., CWO/FED

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State


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NO: DELGA 749, FEBRUARY 16, 8 PM

PRIORITY

FOR SECRETARY AND WILCOX

RE PALESTINE (ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL)

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LODGE INFORMED SYG U.S. INTENDS KEEP FAITH WITH POSITION IT TOOK LAST FALL. WHILE WE HAD NOT WORKED OUT TYPE OF ACTION WE HAD IN MIND, WE INTENDED TO DO WHATEVER NECESSARY TO GET ISRAELIS OUT. LODGE SAID WE HAD TAKEN THIS POSITION FOR SEVERAL REASONS: FIRST, WE WANTED TO SUPPORT UN; SECOND, WE WANTED TO MAINTAIN RESPECT OF COUNTRIES IN MIDDLE EAST AND OF WORLD GENERALLY; THIRD, WE WANTED TO AVOID GIVING AREA AWAY TO SOVIETS, AND CONSEQUENTLY AVERT WORLD WAR III. SYG IMMEDIATELY EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH ALL OF THIS.

LODGE ALSO INFORMED SYG THAT SECRETARY TO MEET WITH EBAN SATURDAY AFTERNOON IN ONE LAST ATTEMPT TO TRY WORK SOMETHING OUT. LODGE SAID IT CONCEIVABLE THAT POSITION HE OUTLINED WOULD MAKE IMPRESSION ON EBAN AND ISRAELIS, THOUGH THIS PROBABLY DOUBTFUL. IN ANY EVENT THIS WAS LAST STAGE WHICH MUST BE PLAYED OUT. LODGE SUGGESTED THAT IN ORDER GIVE US LITTLE MORE TIME SYG MIGHT CONSIDER ASKING FAWZI WHETHER WE COULD HAVE ANOTHER SLIGHT DELAY IN CALLING PLENARY.

SYG, BUNCHE AND CORDIER ALL SAID ENTHUSIASTICALLY U.S. POSITION WAS VERY SOUND. BUNCHE SAID, IF SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL PERMIT ME TO STEP OUT OF MY ROLE AS INTERNATIONAL SERVANT, I MUST WANT TO SAY THAT I AM PROUD TO BE AN AMERICAN." CORDIER QUICKLY ECHOED THIS SENTIMENT AND SYG ADDED, I CONSIDER MYSELF AN HONORARY AMERICAN ON THIS POINT AND AM EQUALLY PROUD."

SYG ASKED CORDIER TO CALL FAWZI IMMEDIATELY. UPON CORDIER'S

RETURN

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-2- DELGA 749, FEBRUARY 16, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK

RETURN HE INFORMED US FAWZI HAD READILY AGREED TO DEFERMENT OF PLENARY CONSIDERATION FROM MONDAY AFTERNOON TO TUESDAY MORNING. CORDIER DID NOT GIVE ANY REASON TO FAWZI FOR DEFERMENT OTHER THAN "AS TIME-TABLE WORKS OUT, IT WOULD BE WISER TO HOLD PLENARY ON TUESDAY MORNING." SYG WAS ANXIOUS AVOID GIVING FAWZI IMPRESSION THERE WAS EITHER STALLING OPERATION GOING ON OR WE ACTUALLY HAD SOMETHING CONCRETE IN HAND OF AN ENCOURAGING NATURE. BUNCHE, DURING COURSE OF THIS CONVERSATION, ONCE AGAIN MADE POINT THAT "ISRAELIS WOULD NOT BELIEVE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT SANCTIONS UNTIL THEY SAW IT." HE REPEATED IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CARRY THROUGH VOTE ON SANCTIONS BEFORE ISRAELIS WOULD WITHDRAW. BUNCHE SAID FROM ISRAELIS POINT OF VIEW THIS WAS "SAFE GAMBLE" SINCE ALL THEY WOULD HAVE TO DO WHEN SANCTIONS ABOUT TO BE APPLIED WOULD BE TO WITHDRAW, THEREBY PREVENTING SANCTIONS FROM GOING INTO EFFECT.

LODGE ALSO INFORMED SYG U.S. PLANNED TO MAKE PUBLIC OUR AIDE-MEMOIRE WITH VIEW GIVING AMERICAN PUBLIC AND UN ADDITIONAL UNDERSTANDING U.S. POSITION. (AFTER SECRETARY-LODGE CONVERSATION THIS EVENING, WE INFORMED CORDIER AIDE-MEMOIRE WOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC UNTIL AFTER FURTHER MEETING WITH EBAN SCHEDULED FOR 3 P.M. SUNDAY.)

LODGE ASKED SYG TO CONSIDER DURING NEXT DAY OR TWO WHETHER HE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO BALANCED UNDERSTANDING OF PRESENT POSITION BY MAKING PUBLIC SUCH INFORMATION AS HE MIGHT FEEL WOULD BE HELPFUL IN CIRCUMSTANCES. SYG REACTED BY MENTIONING THAT AT SOME STAGE THOUGH NOT NOW IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE REVEAL FULL STORY ON FEDAYEEN RAIDS, THAT EGYPTIANS HAD NOT ORGANIZED FEDAYEENS UNTIL GAZA RAID HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BY ISRAELIS ON FEBRUARY 28, 1955. HE TOOK NOTE OF FACT BYROADE HAD MADE THIS POINT IN HIS TESTIMONY ON THE HILL. SYG SAID IN HIS VIEW BYROADE WAS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT ON THIS POINT. SYG FELT ALL EVENTS SINCE FEBRUARY 1955 WERE ATTRIBUTABLE TO GAZA RAID AS CULMINATION OF ISRAEL'S SO-CALLED RETALIATION POLICY. SYG SAID HE WOULD GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO ANYTHING WHICH HE MIGHT PUT OUT PUBLICLY WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER UNDERSTANDING OF PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

LODGE

MAY 17 1955

JJ

Note: Mr. Waring (IO:DO) notified 2/16/10:30 pm JAW

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Following based on memo conversation unclassified by Secretary:

Eban called Secretary Feb 15, handed aide-memoire which made following points: Re Aqaba, Israel felt it essential UNEF be stationed at Sharm el Shaikh until peace settlement achieved or agreed and permanent arrangement for freedom of navigation was otherwise secured. Failing such an arrangement, Israel suggested that precise guarantee be afforded for Israel-bound shipping exercising its right of passage in Straits and Gulf. Israel believes US aide-memoire of February 11 signified clear intention US provide such guarantee; accordingly is ready to enter into immediate conversations with US on specific steps for early settlement. Re Gaza, Egyptian occupation was based on Armistice Agreement which Egypt had continuously broken. Egypt continues doctrine of "state of war" against Israel. Accordingly no basis for Egyptian return. Israel prepared make effort raise standard of residents of area; pay compensation and resettle part of refugees in Gaza. Israel suggests US and Israel consult urgently together to find suitable arrangement which might be submitted to UN. This examination should include investigation of position in area by suitable mission. Other points: Israel declares it does not seek

or claim

DC/R

Aug 16

FW

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 2/16/57

Telegraphic transmission and

Classification approved by:

F. Wilkins

Clearance: Wilkins

cleared with MR. Rountree (FW)

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or claim belligerent rights against Egypt and undertakes abstain, on basis reciprocity from any hostile act against Egypt. While no context of withdrawal arises in case Suez Canal, Israel hopes for US support in securing implementation Israel's rights under 1953 convention.

Eban orally added at Akaba there was necessity for legal definition and interpretation of international character of waterway; necessity for definition of functions of UNEF. Repeated usual Israel arguments re Gaza.

Secretary said he had read Israel aide-memoire with deep disappointment. It was not really responsive. It had been indicated in US aide-memoire that there was order events and of urgency which had been fixed by UN. First, UNGA had called upon Israel withdraw to Armistice lines. We had felt Israel's willingness do so might be increased if we set forth US attitude. Eban's suggestion with respect negotiations was misconception US attitude. US as member UN and as maritime power would be willing use influence in directions indicated but we did not suggest we set selves up as rival to UN to negotiate in its stead or to take place of UNSC. Furthermore we dealing with matters of concern other littoral states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan. Secretary continued some of these observations applied Gaza where there General Armistice Agreement involving Israel and Egypt. Secretary expressed amazement that Eban thought suggestion US and Israel try impose their views on UN would prove acceptable procedure.

Secretary asked why Israel assumed UN and others would accept anything more than policies already stated by US? Even if US and Israel reached agreement on these matters, no guarantee it would be carried out. Perhaps it would be less

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likely because of bitter and justifiable resentment on part of other UN members, USSR, and littoral states. Secretary admitted action he proposed could not be 100% certain, Israel procedure also not 100% certain and subject greater risks.

Secretary said he wished make following change in US aide-memoire Feb. 11: In paragraph relating to Gulf Aquaba first sentence should read "The US believes that Gulf comprehends international waters and that no nation has right to prevent free and innocent passage in Gulf and through Straits giving access thereto."

Secretary expressed doubt whether joint mission such as Israel aide-memoire seemed to propose on Gaza would be right way proceed. Eban said it would not be US but UN mission. Secretary left open possibility that we could indicate as member of UN that we would be in favor of a mission regarding future of Gaza Strip. If we were now talking about elaboration of US policy declaration which would justify Israel withdrawal, these details could be included, but quick action before Monday was desirable, otherwise storm would break in UN.

Secretary said he wanted make certain matters clear: We had tried very hard work out solution for present situation. Israel and US had relationships which very different from those other countries and very close. Israel-US relations not like US-Egypt relations. We would be deeply disturbed if events should push us into antagonism towards Israel. Deep cleavage opinion would develop within US. It had been his desire to test his ability find reasonable solution. He did not rule out modifications of US aide-memoire such as questions re administration Gaza and possibility UN study there. He earnestly suggested Israel Ambassador go over

US

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US aide-memoire in this light, that it be accepted and that Israel withdraw from Gaza and Aqaba.

Eban said he would consult Israel Foreign in NY but wished to observe that if Israel withdrew it would have no assurance of open waterway at Straits. Secretary said that greatest assurance could be found not in what people said, but in what were elemental forces at work. For example, treaties not dependable after conditions in which signed ceased exist. Greater dependability could be placed on conditions which served vital interests. Such conditions were far better than red ribbon and seals on paper treaties. If Israel withdrew it would have in Aqaba alternative to Suez which would be of great interest to all maritime powers.

Secretary said he was going Georgia discuss these and other matters with President. He planned return early afternoon Feb 16 and hoped Eban meanwhile would be able make progress along lines US aide-memoire Feb. 11. We considering making our aide-memoire public afternoon Feb. 16. Israel might also wish publish its Feb. 15 aide-memoire. We would then see what would develop thereafter.

Eban said he would set down words which might be helpful.

Ambassador Eban has a further meeting with the Secretary afternoon February 16, and they will meet again February 17.

DULLES

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 16, 1957

4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador  
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Israeli Minister

MAR 6 1957

The Secretary  
Francis O. Wilcox - IO  
Herman Phleger - L  
William M. Rountree - NEA

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Ambassador Eban met with the Secretary at the latter's house shortly after the Secretary's return from Thomasville (Georgia). The Ambassador said he had sent a full report to Jerusalem on the discussion with the Secretary on Friday, February 15, and expected later in the day to receive further instructions. Meanwhile, he had discussed the matter in detail with the Foreign Minister in New York and he felt that her views, which he would summarize, would be very close to those of the Government in Jerusalem. The Foreign Minister, the Ambassador said, did not have the feeling of being as far apart from the United States as might generally be felt. She considered that the United States and Israel had in general a common policy. The American Aide Memoire of February 11 and the conversation with the Secretary on that day had impressed her and the Israel Government, both having expressed in particular appreciation for the constructive efforts of the United States. She thought the objectives of the two governments regarding Agaba were similar, although she would desire some suitable form of assurance that those objectives would be met. She shared the Secretary's sense of urgency regarding the withdrawal of forces from Gaza, but was encouraged to believe that the United States also wanted a situation in Gaza different than that existing before the military operation. Thus, the Foreign Minister felt, there was considerable common ground and she wanted the two governments to get together on an approach to the matter. There were, however, some procedural problems particularly regarding timing. The Foreign Minister felt this was a situation in which her presence in Israel might be very useful and she would like to go there without delay, accompanied by the Ambassador. The question was whether this would be practicable in view of possible activity in the General Assembly. If there should be any violent proposals put forth,

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there within the next few days it would be difficult for the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador to leave. The Foreign Minister would, therefore, welcome any impressions which the Secretary might have as to what General Assembly action was likely to take place. The Ambassador remarked that neither the Foreign Minister nor he could commit themselves to return with anything different than that already expressed to the Secretary, although he thought the visit might be useful.

The Secretary responded that he was also concerned about the time element. Ambassador Lodge did not think that it would be possible to hold off beyond the first of the week further General Assembly action. We had been successful in delaying matters for about ten days, although there had been great pressure for putting forth resolutions calling for sanctions. Responding to the Secretary's query, Mr. Wilcox expressed the view that while we might be able to hold off further General Assembly action until the first of the week, it was unlikely that a delay beyond that time could be achieved.

Ambassador Eban said he was not aware of any broad opposition in the General Assembly to a delay. A number of European and Latin American countries had expressed themselves as opposed to sanctions on the grounds that they would not solve any problem. The opposition also was based upon the character of the beneficiary, i.e., Nasser, who was regarded as a "highway man" seeking the assistance of the United Nations. He, therefore, did not take it for granted that those who wanted to develop a constructive situation, rather than a destructive one, could not attain it.

Continuing, the Ambassador turned specifically to the question of Aqaba. He felt the issues boiled down to a few key points. The declaration of American policy and legal position was reassuring. The problem was to implement that position and to assure that the spirit inherent in it would prevail. Israel had no lack of trust of the United States, but did have a deep mistrust of Nasser. There were three ways in which this "missing link" could be provided: 1) to provide stability through the UNEF by having the Assembly endorse its functions in accordance with Ambassador Lodge's January 28 statement; 2) if the foregoing were not possible, to provide a statement of the intention of the United States and other maritime powers which would set forth clearly their intentions regarding the defense of the freedom of passage for all nations; 3) alternatively, for Egypt to say something in the General Assembly or elsewhere to the effect that it would not impose a blockade of Israeli vessels. The Egyptians probably would not do this, the Ambassador recognized, but if they should it would go far in solving the problem. The Foreign Minister felt that these possibilities held the key to the situation and would eliminate the "tormenting feeling" that Nasser was getting away with another "paper victory". Israel felt that if there were not a physical representation of the anti-blockade forces, there could be no confidence regarding passage through the Straits. The United States had indicated it had no reason to believe that any one would prevent passage through the Straits. That statement was impressive, but on the other hand declarations by Egypt to the effect that it would claim belligerent

rights



rights until all Arab refugees were repatriated had to be fully weighed.

Mr. Shiloah remarked that he had been impressed by the Secretary's statement at the February 15 meeting that Israel would not stand alone should anything unexpected happen following withdrawal. If Nasser should do something following Israeli withdrawal, Israel would have to defend her rights of passage. He had no doubt as to the usefulness of the Secretary's statement, but the possibility could not be excluded that, should this unfortunate contingency occur, the United States might come to Israel and say that for reasons of international peace no action should be taken to impose its rights of passage. Israel did not want to be faced with such a crucial test. A decision might then have to be taken to undertake military action to defend Israeli rights. Thus, the Israel Government felt that it was much better to make a supreme effort for another few days to assure that the UNEF was stationed at Aqaba until a danger did not exist.

The Ambassador questioned whether the United Nations might not adopt a resolution, following a declaration by the United States and other maritime powers, calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces and for the introduction of the UNEF for as long as may be necessary to assure passage through these international waters. He observed that when the Western powers stood together regarding Algeria, the Arab-Asian bloc had to go along. He felt that some Asian and the more moderate Arabs would be "detached" on such a reasonable proposal regarding the Straits.

Continuing, the Ambassador said Israel had to consider what would happen if it acceded to the American suggestions as an act of faith and then, three or four months later, Egypt should start trouble. He did not know what Egypt's relations with the Soviet Union would be, although he felt that the Eisenhower Doctrine might enter into a situation of this type. The theory that any guns implanted by Egypt along the Straits could be blasted away presented many questions. Israel felt it possible that the United States might say that, while Israel had a right to send its ships through the Straits, it should not do so because of the danger. This concept had been applied, in fact, in certain other instances such as with respect to the waters of the Jordan. Israel had been told while it had a right to the waters, it should not exercise that right since it might cause trouble.

Turning to Gaza, the Ambassador said that the November 2 General Assembly resolution had spoken of the withdrawal of forces. Only recently had it been implied that the Israeli withdrawal should include every aspect of Israeli participation in Gaza. Israel would like to achieve a staged process under which there would first be a withdrawal of Israel forces, after which there would arrive in Gaza a United Nations mission to decide what the future administration would be; to determine what were the Egyptian rights and what was the Israeli interest. If this should be done after withdrawal from Aqaba, all purely Egyptian territory would have been cleared. It would then be easier to discuss Israel's interest in Gaza.

The Secretary

The Secretary thought he understood and appreciated, as well as any outsider could, the pre-occupation of the Israel Government. He did not see a situation which would not involve some risks. He would be the last to try to persuade Israel that its withdrawal, even with the benefit of what the United States had said, would provide any guarantee that what Israel wanted would come about. There was no assurance that Egypt would not be obstructive after the Israel withdrawal, and certainly the United States could give no guarantee in this regard. He did believe, however, that the experience which we had been through had provided a lesson in maintaining world order and justice, and that there would be a less lethargic attitude in the future than in the past where nations had been disposed to allow the rights of others to be ignored so long as their own rights were not affected. He did not think that we could give a guarantee in favor of Israeli ships and cargoes. He could state our general policy, but to back it up by an internationally binding guarantee could not be done without a treaty or something of that sort. Nor could we provide assurances regarding the UNEF moving into and staying in the area of the Straits. Neither did he think that we could obtain a statement from Egypt as suggested by the Ambassador, particularly since Egypt had stated that it would make no promises to obtain the withdrawal of Israel forces which were illegally in Egyptian territory. Even if they did, they could logically say that the promises were given under duress. It was recalled that just before the seizure of the Universal Suez Canal Company, Egypt had made certain statements reassuring the Company, but such statements had done nothing to prevent the seizure. Thus, the Secretary thought we could do little more than we had already done in making a statement of our intentions. The President also did not feel that we could go beyond that, or put ourselves in a position of negotiating with Israel on these questions. He thought the second resolution of February 2 had gone far in the right direction. It had been difficult to get that resolution adopted without negative votes from the Arab countries, which would have implied that they would oppose what was requested in the resolution. Although we might be able to make slight variations in the wording of our February 11 Aide Memoire, it was unlikely that we could in substance go beyond what was said in that document.

The Ambassador commented that he had drafted some possible variations in the wording of the Aide Memoire and hoped to have authority by the following day to hand these to the Secretary. The Secretary responded that if the authority was received the variations would be discussed at a meeting the following day. If not, however, we would have done all we could and would have to let the matter proceed in the United Nations. That would not be good, but the Israeli decision would have been made solemnly and with recognition of what was involved. We also would have made our decision on the basis of a most careful study of the matter. Regarding our own attitude, we had felt that the Israel grievances against Egypt were not of a character which justified a full scale armed attack. We had taken the position which history alone can judge that the first task of those trying to build world order was to avoid war for the settlement of grievances. If that was the correct principle, it was important that Israel withdraw and not condition its withdrawal on the satisfaction of its grievances. When the territory of another state was held, it was hardly possible to achieve a peaceful settlement of disputes. This was

so basic

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so basic and fundamental that we must correct that situation as a first task. If we accepted the principle that nations having grievances had the right to use force, the clock would be dangerously set back. It may be that our efforts to achieve peace and justice on this basis were in vain and there was no other way to settle grievances, but the Secretary did not believe that to be so. The United Nations was a first step in the direction of world order, even though as yet inadequate means had been developed to achieve peace and justice. There was, however, a great deal more pressure of world opinion to achieve this goal, and events of the recent past had contributed much to that pressure. We believed that Israel should use the Charter of the United Nations and not use force. The interests of our two governments could be achieved much more easily if Israel would join in that great effort. Even if it should fail, Israel's position before world opinion, and certainly Israel's relations with the United States, would be much better. That was a big decision which Israel would have to make. Our position and our advice was not based upon short-range expediency, but was based upon what we thought was best in the long term. We had assumed the same attitude with regard to the United Kingdom and France, both of which had acceded to the demands of the United Nations. The Secretary observed that the position which he stated transcended the views of any single individual. We had done our best to make the Israeli Government feel that if it joined with us in this matter, it would not in the long run be the loser for having done so. It was the judgment of the President and himself that the two governments could find a way to work together, and we would be gravely distraught if this should not be done. He believed the way was withdrawal in accordance with the United Nations resolutions, putting the United States and all the United Nations under responsibility for having urged Israel to take the risks involved, and hoping that Israel would be repaid for its efforts to achieve a just settlement.

The Ambassador said his Government was weighing these matters with great care. He observed that, regarding the broad question of the United Nations, there was an obverse side of the coin under which member states could perform every kind of violence short of war without getting into trouble. Egypt had engaged in military action in civil disguise, had imposed blockades against Israeli shipping, and had carried out many other acts as detrimental to Israel as if overt military force had been employed. A defect in the Charter was that it did not contain effective provisions against such forms of aggression. Israel had, therefore, never had the feeling that the Charter provided it with adequate assurances, and in fact Arab-Israel relations generally had never been within the Charter. The big question was what the United States position would be if Israel's rights were violated. That was far more important to Israel than any United Nations assurances. Israel had a number of friends in the United Nations, particularly Western Europe and Latin American countries, which felt that the position that Israel was taking was reasonable and that its withdrawal should be conditioned on something more than generalities. He repeated his concern that if Israel should withdraw, it should know what the United States

would do.

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would do. What would history say of Prime Minister Ben Gurion if he should withdraw without adequate assurances? What would be the attitude of Israel's American friends who persuaded them to withdraw if Israel again should be confronted with hostile Egyptian acts? These questions, the Ambassador said, tormented his Government.

The Secretary responded that those questions could not be answered in any clear out way. All of us at the State Department who had been giving thought to the broad aspects of the problem realized that ways had to be found to put some measure of force behind action to prevent the unlawful interruption of lawful rights. As he had said before, however, we did not believe that these were circumstances in which force should be used to achieve Israeli purposes. The situation would require a far more careful shaping of the issues than was the case in the recent military intervention by Israel, France and Great Britain, before the use of force could have been justified before world opinion. We would be unhappy to see a situation develop, after the withdrawal of Israel in accordance with the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter, involving a continuation of Egyptian obstruction. We would be prepared to consult regarding ways to meet any such problem, which certainly ought to be met. As the Secretary had said in his November 1 speech before the General Assembly, we must do better than go back to the conditions existing before the military attack. If we should now merely return to the status quo ante, it would be as much of a defeat for United States policy as it would be a defeat for our policy if Israel should not withdraw. He could promise on behalf of the Administration that we would try to make the second resolution of February 2 succeed, just as much as we were now trying to make the first resolution succeed.

The Ambassador said that was important. However there were many issues and many dangers which had to be considered, which in the aggregate were also very important. Israel was acutely aware of the possibility of various countries saying in the future that, while Israel might have rights to transit the Straits, it should not exercise those rights. Nations had previously said that, while Israel had rights to take waters from the Jordan, it should not do so in light of the present situation. If that should apply to Aqaba, the result would be that many areas of Israeli national life would be "blackened out".

The Secretary remarked that he had previously indicated to the Ambassador that we might want to make public our Aide Memoire of February 11. If the Ambassador had hopes of further progress the following day we would hold off publication until then. In any event, however, our position must be made clear before Monday when the matter would be resumed in the United Nations. It was agreed that a further meeting between the Secretary and the Ambassador would be held at 3 o'clock February 17.

Mr. Shiloah

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Mr. Shiloah commented that the Embassy intended to correct the statement in the Israeli Aide Memoire relating to the proposed mission to Gaza. It wished to make it clear that the suggestion was for a United Nations mission and not for a United States-Israeli mission. He then commented that if it should be decided that the Foreign Minister and Ambassador would fly to Israel, he hoped that the United States would support a delay in the United Nations so that matters would not be brought to a head there during their absence.

The Secretary said we would support a delay so long as we ourselves were convinced that there was a hope for progress. We had successfully postponed discussions for a number of days, however, and could not give any assurance as to how long we might succeed in further delaying matters.

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PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE (ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL)

LODGE SAW PEARSON (CANADA), AT LATTER'S REQUEST, SUNDAY AFTERNOON. IN RESPONSE TO PEARSON'S QUERY, LODGE INFORMED HIM THAT ISRAELI RESPONSE HAD BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, AND THAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDED TO KEEP FAITH WITH POSITION IT TOOK LAST FALL. LODGE INFORMED PEARSON THAT SECRETARY WOULD SEE EBAN AGAIN AT 3 P.M. SUNDAY IN HOPE THAT ISRAELIS MIGHT MODIFY THEIR POSITION.

PEARSON SAID HE SAW THREE ALTERNATIVES: FIRST, THAT ISRAEL MODIFY ITS POSITION AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR ARABS TO HOLD OFF ON SANCTIONS RESOLUTION; SECOND, THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BUDGE FROM ITS PRESENT POSITION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN ARABS BRINGING FORWARD THEIR SANCTIONS RESOLUTION IN GA; AND THIRD, THAT SOME OTHER DEVICE MIGHT BE FOUND LINKING WITHDRAWAL WITH KIND OF ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ISRAELIS HAVE SOUGHT BOTH IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND IN GAZA.

PEARSON SAID CANADA DID NOT WANT TO HAVE TO VOTE ON SANCTIONS RESOLUTION PER SE, AND FOR THAT REASON THEIR THINKING WAS ALONG LINES THIRD ALTERNATIVE NOTED ABOVE. PEARSON SAID HE HAD NOT TALKED OVER HIS IDEAS WITH OTHERS AS YET BUT HE HAD IN MIND A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD RE-AFFIRM NECESSITY FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL; CALL FOR DEPLOYMENT OF UNEF ON BOTH SIDES OF DEMARCATION LINE, INCLUDING EL AGZA AND THE GAZA AREA; CALL UPON ALL MEMBERS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH GULF OF AQABA; AND NO DETERMINATION OF STRAITS (PEARSON SAID WE OUGHT TO AVOID REFERENCE TO WORD "RIGHTS")

WITH RESPECT

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-2- DELGA 750, FEBRUARY 17, 3 PM, FROM NEW YORK

WITH RESPECT TO GULF OF AQABA).

WE NOTE CANADIAN THINKING RE GAZA HAS DEVELOPED WITHIN LAST FEW DAYS. LAST WEEK PEARSON HAD IN MIND MISSION BEING SENT TO GAZA AREA TO STUDY SITUATION AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ITS ADMINISTRATION. NOW PEARSON BELIEVES THAT ISRAELI CIVIL ADMINISTRATION SHOULD DEFINITELY BE WITHDRAWN AND THAT MISSION SHOULD BE SENT TO "SECURE AND SUPERVISE REPLACEMENT ISRAELI CIVIL ADMINISTRATION". WHEN WE POINTED OUT THAT THIS APPEARED TO BE AN ADVANCE IN THEIR THINKING, PEARSON AGREED AND SAID THAT THEY NO LONGER THOUGHT MERE STUDY WOULD BE POLITICALLY FEASIBLE AND THEY HAD DEVELOPED ABOVE FORMULA INSTEAD. THIS MISSION WOULD ALSO FORMULATE "AN APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION WITH UNITED NATIONS" ACCORDING TO PEARSON.

PEARSON ALSO REPEATED IDEA HE SPOKE TO US ABOUT LAST WEEK REGARDING A FINAL PARAGRAPH IN RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD "RECOMMEND THAT UNLESS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IS BROUGHT ABOUT ON BASIS OF ABOVE DETAILED CONDITIONS (UNEF IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH, ON BOTH SIDES OF THE DEMARCATION LINE INCLUDING EL AUJA AND GAZA, AND UN MISSION TO SECURE AND SUPERVISE REPLACEMENT OF ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION FROM GAZA) GA SHOULD GIVE CONSIDERATION TO SUCH EFFECTIVE MEASURES AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO BRING THEM ABOUT."

PEARSON SAID HE INTENDED SPEAK TO COMAY (ISRAEL) THIS AFTERNOON ALONG THESE LINES.

HE THEN WENT INTO THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC OPINION IN CANADA ON QUESTION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS. HE SAID THERE WAS ALMOST UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT IN CANADIAN PRESS IN FAVOR OF ISRAELI POSITION, THEREBY MAKING IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE CANADIAN GOVT TO VOTE IN FAVOR RESOLUTION ON SANCTIONS. HE SAID THERE WAS GOOD DEAL OF SYMPATHY FOR ISRAELI DESIRE FOR ASSURANCES. HE POINTED OUT DIFFICULTIES CANADIAN GOVT HAD HAD IN TAKING POSITION AGAINST UK AND FRANCE DURING RECENT EVENTS IN MIDDLE EAST. LODGE SAID THAT GOOD PART OF OUR PRESS HAD TAKEN SIMILAR LINE AND THAT THERE MIGHT BE GREATER PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF UNREASONABLE POSITION PRESENTLY BEING TAKEN BY ISRAELIS WHEN OUR AIDE MEMOIRE WAS MADE PUBLIC SOMETIME AFTER SECRETARY HAD SPOKEN TO EBAN SUNDAY AFTERNOON.

DISCUSSION

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-3- DELGA 750, FEBRUARY 17, 3 PM. FROM NEW YORK

DISCUSSION CONCLUDED WITH REQUEST BY PEARSON THAT WE CONSULT  
AGAIN ON THIS MATTER MONDAY.

LODGE

JJ

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 17, 1957

3 p.m.

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal

PARTICIPANTS:

Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador  
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Israeli Minister

The Secretary  
Francis O. Wilcox - IO  
Herman Phleger - L  
William M. Rountree NEA

COPIES TO: cc S/S, NEA(2), NE(2), IO, C, G, L, R, USUN,  
Ambassies TEL AVIV/CAIRO

Ambassador Eban said that since the meeting of the previous day he had received a number of telegrams from Jerusalem, and had worked late the previous evening with the Foreign Minister in New York. The Prime Minister was anxious that the United States should understand his attitude. He was concerned with what his situation would be if he should withdraw from the two positions in question and later a situation should develop in which Israel was denied passage through the Straits and violence should again erupt from Gaza. Already there had been raids across the UNEF lines, with Egypt engaged in attacks and mine-laying. His questions in this regard would explain the tenacity of the Israelis and the feeling on their part that it was better to take more time now to prevent such a recurrence, than to make hasty arrangements without maximum precautions. The Prime Minister had expressed deep appreciation for the care with which the United States Government had set forth its position to Israel and explained what the United States was prepared to do in the United Nations.

The Ambassador said he had a number of points to raise concerning the American Aide Memoire of February 11. Regarding the first paragraph, the last sentence stated that Israeli forces "---- also occupy the Gaza strip which is territory specified by the Armistice arrangements to be occupied by Egypt". That would overstate Egypt's case, he said, since the Agreement specifies only that Gaza was not to be occupied by Israeli forces. There was nothing in the Agreement to prevent an Israeli civil administration so long as the area was not occupied by Israeli military forces. (The Secretary questioned this interpretation of the Agreement).

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Regarding the second paragraph, the Ambassador said the Israeli position was not reflected with complete accuracy. It was properly stated in the Aide Memoire that Israel would withdraw from the Sharm el-Shaikh area if continued freedom of passage through the Straits was assured. Israel's position on Gaza, as noted in its Aide Memoire of February 15, was that it was willing to evacuate forces from the Gaza strip but was opposed to the restoration of the Egyptian occupation, while being willing to discuss a suitable relationship between the United Nations and the Israeli administrative services. The Ambassador said that the Israeli position in this respect had been elaborated since the Prime Minister had first written to the President on the subject.

Regarding paragraph 3, the Ambassador again questioned the statement that the Armistice Agreement had given Egypt the "right and responsibility" of occupation. He thought that Egypt had no such duty and responsibility, and that the Armistice Agreement had been negative and not positive in this sense. Concerning the second sentence of that paragraph, stating the United States believes "that Israeli withdrawal from Gaza should be prompt and unconditional" he said the term "Israel forces" in this connection would be appropriate if it were agreed that a decision on the civil administration should be deferred pending further examination and discussion by the United Nations. He noted this was a question of political attitude and not merely of text. The Ambassador went to some length to rationalize this attitude and to demonstrate that the United States and the United Nations presumably intended some distinction between complete withdrawal and withdrawal of forces, citing as an example the President's letter of February 3 which stated the belief that "Israeli forces" should be withdrawn from Gaza. He said he thought the concept of withdrawing forces before the civil administration was "not foreign to the United Nations or to the United States".

At this point the Secretary observed that the Ambassador's comments were interesting but were only of secondary importance. The main question was whether the Government of Israel accepted the basic thesis in the Aide Memoire of February 11.

The Ambassador commented that changes in the Aide Memoire might conceivably affect in some degree the Israeli attitude, recognizing that some of the changes suggested involved points of substance. Turning to paragraph 6 of the United States Aide Memoire, he said he would assume that the United States position regarding free and innocent passage through the Straits related to the conduct of vessels and not to the flag which the vessels flew or what was aboard. The Secretary observed that this would appear to be an academic question now since Israel could presumably not claim innocent passage if it was in military occupation of a part of Egypt and held the Gaza strip.

Regarding paragraph 8, stating that the United States was prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to

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secure the general recognition of this right, the Ambassador said the question arose on the basic point of how far the United States would go in this regard. Israel wondered whether we would show determination not to acquiesce in any interference with the right of free passage.

The 9th paragraph, the Ambassador said, was an extremely important problem since it involved the question of the degree of Israel's withdrawal from Gaza necessary to restore the right of free and innocent passage. If the paragraph meant that Israel would not have the right of passage through Aqaba (and the Suez Canal) even after withdrawing military forces from Gaza and the Straits, the value to Israel of this provision would be annulled until the question of the administration of Gaza was resolved. He did not think it right to link everything to every vestige of Israel's rights in the administrative sphere in Gaza.

The Secretary inquired whether, if that point were resolved, Israel would withdraw its military force behind the Armistice lines. He remarked that from what the Ambassador had said, he assumed he was not authorized to say that would be the case.

The Ambassador responded that he would not be so authorized, since other matters were involved in the Israeli decision to withdraw. Perhaps, however, these other aspects were less "deadlocked" than this.

The Secretary commented that the United States had no authority or inclination to derogate the responsibility from the United Nations to decide questions of this nature. If Israel wished to put forth propositions of this character it should do so to the United Nations.

The Ambassador replied that his Government would undoubtedly do so at the appropriate time. Meanwhile, he would like to give the United States the complete picture of the Israeli thinking on the matter. Returning to the United States Aide Memoire, he said that in paragraph 10, regarding the UNEF, the belief was stated that the UNEF should move in after Israeli forces were withdrawn; however the Aide Memoire said nothing about the tenure of the functions of the UNEF. Ambassador Lodge had expressed himself in the General Assembly as to what the UNEF should do. The fact that this was not spelled out by the United Nations in its resolution constituted a difficulty. If it had been defined there would be greater hope of moving forward.

The Ambassador said he would like to discuss procedural subjects. He had gone as far as he could in clarifying the position of his Government regarding the American Aide Memoire. He believed that our two positions were not substantially different in their objectives, but there were differences in details. The two main points concerned American views on the

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future of Gaza and whether we felt nothing more could be done to obtain assurances regarding Aqaba. The Government of Israel had met that morning and had considered the matter thoroughly. It desired further clarification of American views and positions before making any final decision. The Foreign Minister and Ambassador Eban would like to leave for Israel tonight to explain the American view, after which the decision would be solemnly and gravely rendered. He could not say what effect their presence in Israel would have upon his Government's position. An important question was whether the United Nations processes would continue in their absence and there would develop a situation which would rule out the benefits of the trip.

The Secretary was not sure about the United Nations time schedule. We had received assurances that the debate would not start until Tuesday, February 19. However there was some doubt that it could be postponed beyond that time. He asked what Mr. Wilcox thought about this. Mr. Wilcox thought it would be extremely difficult to obtain a longer postponement. There already was great pressure to resume the debate. The Secretariat had been helpful thus far, but he did not know whether it would be possible to delay much longer.

The Secretary observed that with hopes of Israeli acceptance of the American Aide Memoire as a basis for immediate withdrawal having been dissipated, he could not estimate the possibilities of a delay. We certainly had no desire to precipitate matters. The United Nations was faced with dealing with the matter further and he did not know what the attitude of the other delegations might be.

Mr. Phleger said that, as a lawyer, he would like to make an observation concerning the legal aspects of the Israeli position on its civil administration of Gaza. The Armistice Agreement had provided essentially that Israel would be on one side of the Gaza-issue boundary and Egypt on the other. That situation prevailed, subject to raids and counter raids and other difficulties, until the unilateral military action by Israel during which it seized by force the Gaza area. Under the protection of Israeli troops a civil administration had been set up in Gaza. The United Nations had called for the withdrawal of these forces. It was inherent that both be withdrawn, civil as well as military. The civil administration could not exist except by agreement between Israel and Egypt, or under protection of Israeli troops. Israel apparently asserted that there should be a revision of the Armistice Agreement under cover of armed protection by the occupation forces. That, he thought, was legally untenable.

The Ambassador had no convincing reply to Mr. Phleger's observation, but again commented that the Israeli concept of the Armistice Agreement was that Egypt had been given no special rights or privileges in Gaza. Israel believed that a military withdrawal should be continued by discussions of the future of Gaza after the visit of a United Nations mission.

The Secretary

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- 5 -

The Secretary observed that some thought was being given in the United Nations Secretariat to the future administration of Gaza. While we had not been consulted and had no details, he was aware that this matter was receiving some attention.

The Ambassador said that Israel had not been associated with any such planning and had not been consulted. He reverted to his trip to Jerusalem and expressed the hope that he could have a few days for consultation with his Government before any United Nations action.

The Secretary expressed the view that there had been a fairly thorough exchange between the Israeli Government and the United States, and that any further talks might best be between Israel and the United Nations. Many areas into which the Israeli Government was now getting in the bilateral talks could not properly be dealt with on a bilateral basis. We had gone as far as we could without encroaching upon the authority of the United Nations and the Secretary General. The basic questions now being raised by Israel were matters with which we could not deal since we had no United Nations mandate.

The Ambassador expressed the hope that the United States might in the United Nations adopt positions supporting Israel regarding further assurances on the Straits and regarding the administration of Gaza. He said that in any future General Assembly debate it was expected that Israel's difficulties would become more understood and Israel would get wider support.

The Secretary observed that Israel no doubt would have another chance for debate in the General Assembly. He said he was sad about what the Ambassador had told him concerning the Israeli position. Great trouble was ahead. He had felt there was a real opportunity to work together, and had striven to do so. If the withdrawal did not take place, there would be a multiplicity of trouble affecting our relations officially with the Government of Israel and affecting the attitude of the American people toward Israel. Perhaps there would be divisions along racial and religious lines, which we would deeply deplore. A situation might arise which would provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union to inject itself in the area ostensibly to assist the United Nations. This would be an extremely dangerous disguise. He did not know the consequences of these grave developments. He gathered that the Government of Israel had weighed them in deciding its attitude. It was probably presumptuous of him to ask, he said, but he was curious to know how the Government of Israel might calculate that it would get the things that it wanted by assuming the attitude described by the Ambassador.

The Ambassador

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The Ambassador said that these matters had been weighed by the Government. He assumed that the main hope was that there would be a change in the attitude of the United Nations, which would accept conditions to the Israeli withdrawal.

The Secretary thought that Israel had gravely miscalculated if it thought that, as a result of its position, there would be a change in the United Nations regarding negotiation and settlement of these issues prior to Israeli withdrawal. Thus the Secretary did not see where the solution might lie. There might be a resumption of hostilities, but if this should take place it would be under conditions where Israel would be largely looked upon as the aggressor. He doubted that under these conditions Israel could indefinitely prevail. Israel might annex large territories of other countries and attempt to hold those territories by military might, but such a course would indeed be risky.

The Ambassador, obviously impressed by the Secretary's remarks, said he did not feel that his government's appreciation of the situation was the same as the Secretary's. However, since the Secretary did feel so he thought it even more important that he should go to Jerusalem and carefully explain these views to the authorities.

The Secretary repeated that if Israel was gambling on the theory that it could break down the present United Nations position he felt that would be a vain hope. If so, there was nothing ahead except grave danger.

Mr. Shiloah interjected at this point that perhaps the Ambassador had understated the importance of his trip to Israel by describing it as "procedural". It is because of the grave implications of the matter that the Israeli representatives had sat up most of the previous night in serious discussions, and it was thought that every nuance of the Secretary's thinking should be brought to the attention of the Israeli Government.

Responding to the Secretary's question, Ambassador Eban said it was planned that both he and the Foreign Minister would return to Israel. The only thing that might obstruct the trip was the possibility of immediate action in the United Nations which might involve the discussion of sanctions.

The Secretary concluded by saying that we would do what we could to gain time in the General Assembly but he did not think it possible to delay much if at all. The pressure for immediate debate was very great.

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
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136, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, BEIRUT, LONDON,  
PARIS UNNUMBERED.

DURING DISCUSSION U.S. POSITION ON AQABA QUESTION WITH  
EMBASSY OFFICIAL THIS MORNING DIRECTOR NORTH AMERICAN  
DEPARTMENT FOREIGN OFFICE WITH REFERENCE ISRAELI OCCUPATION  
STATED, "ONCE THEY GET OUT QUESTION CAN THEN BE DECIDED BY  
WORLD COURT". QUERIED WHETHER IT WAS DEFINITE POSITION  
GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT TO HAVE THIS QUESTION DECIDED BY INTER-  
NATIONAL COURT FOREIGN OFFICE REPRESENTATIVE FIRST REPLIED  
THAT THERE HAD BEEN SEVERAL STATEMENTS INDICATING THIS TO BE  
THE CASE BUT HE THEN STATED THIS AN IMPRESSION HE HAD FOR  
SEVERAL YEARS BUT THAT HE COULD NOT READILY CITE THE STATEMENTS  
HE HAD IN MIND. HE AGREED ENDEAVOR FIND REFERENCE.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

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Ben Gurion's request to me to come to his Jerusalem residence this afternoon was for purposes, first and most important, of soliciting US influence to delay General Assembly discussion and second, to urge our consideration of UN commission to make on-the-spot study of Gaza problem.

He said Sharm-e-Sheikh presented no serious difficulties for eventual solution in view of "agreement in principle" that Tiran Straits were international waterway. Nor was Gaza insoluble problem if only time could be provided to enable "three or four sensible people" to sit down and work out problem.

"I am convinced we are on very brink of settlement," he said, "and it would be great tragedy if it eluded us just for lack of little time."

"If UNGA meets on this problem tomorrow, sanctions will be voted against Israel. If they are proposed, they probably will be approved no matter what US decides to do because that is mood of Arabs, Afro-Asians and Soviet bloc. I do not think US people will be very happy. Surely many of them will ask why we are penalized while Russia, Government of Hungary, India and Nasser have consistently ignored resolutions of General Assembly or Security Council."

Ben Gurion intimated strongly his people would choose to endure sanctions if only alternative was to capitulate to proposals which neither gave them security nor remove restrictions on their commerce.

"But why," he asked, "does it have to be done tomorrow? If Israel,

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-2- 980, February 18 from Tel Aviv

Israel, 'the criminal' is to be punished in absence of solution, why isn't it as satisfactory to punish us six weeks hence, first attempting to find peaceful solution?

"I know some say we were told to withdraw three months ago, and we haven't yet complied, but what is few more weeks? Egypt has refused to comply for more that 6 years and no one has suggested sanctions against her."

Rest of our conversation was largely familiar recital his views on essentials of Sharm-e-Sheikh and Gaza problems.

Re Sharm-e-Sheikh: Definition by President and Secretary of Straits as international waterway goes almost but not all the way towards meeting GOI's problem. To assume that merely because US, perhaps British and French and even Scandinavian, shipping is permitted free passage Israel will have it as well is to overlook fact that these maritime powers used Suez without interference. But freedom they enjoyed in no way established Israel's right to same privilege.

Re Gaza, Ben Gurion said Israel thought strip posed three major questions--(1) Israel's security, (2) welfare of permanent inhabitants, 2/3 of whom are now charity cases, and (3) refugees. "None of these elements of Gaza question present really serious problems if approached by reasonable commission," he said "Israel was confident it can greatly improve lot of permanent inhabitants, perhaps even making them self-sufficient by tying their lands into Israel's irrigation system, providing technical assistance and marketing their crops." Israel was prepared to make substantial contribution to refugee problem as well including, as he has stated before, some resettlement in Israel.

Comment: Ben Gurion spoke in conciliatory and quite unemotional tones, speaking with firm confidence several times of his conviction that time and "on the ground" study by a UN group would produce solution. He is certain decision is now in US hands, and he is not without hope we will undertake to delay UN debate few more days to consider alternatives. As I left aide said they felt Secretary would make his decision today.

Ben Gurion moved back to Jerusalem over week end and appears considerably improved in health.

LAWSON

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PRESS PRESENTING FACTS US POSITION, ALTHOUGH EDITORIALY OPPOSED TO FREEDOM NAVIGATION GULF OF AQABA. ALL PAPERS FEBRUARY 17 USED MAJOR PORTIONS POLICY BACKGROUNDER (MEF95 FEBRUARY 14) DISTRIBUTED BY SYRIAN NEWS AGENCY WHICH INACCURATELY REFERRED TO IT AS NOTE PRESENTED BY AMBASSADOR TO PRIME MINISTER. SPA VERSION STRESSED (A) US POLICY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL UNCHANGED AND (B) US ORIGINALLY RAISED QUESTION AGGRESSION ON EGYPT IN UN AND CONTINUES INSIST ENFORCEMENT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS. FOUR DAILIES THUS FAR PUBLISHED FULL TEXT PAUL FORD COLUMN (MEF137, FEBRUARY 15).

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12:58 PM

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 751, FEBRUARY 18, 1 P.M.

PRIORITY

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LODGE

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

CONFIRMING LODGE-SECRETARY CONVERSATION THIS MORNING, SYG BELIEVES EGYPTIANS WOULD ACCEPT UN ADMINISTRATION GAZA ON DE FACTO BASIS, PROVIDED THERE IS EGYPTIAN "CLOAK". SYG BELIEVES FAWZI WOULD AGREE THAT UN SHOULD CARRY MAIN BURDEN IN GAZA AREA AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE EXTENSION OF UN FUNCTIONS AND COOPERATION.

SYG IS SEEING FAWZI TODAY, BUT DOES NOT EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO GET ANYTHING MORE PRECISE THAN THE ABOVE. SYG SAID THIS IS NO TIME TO CROWD EGYPTIANS IN VIEW OF POSITION BEING TAKEN BY ISRAELIS.

LODGE

JCK



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### LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Following based on memorandum conversation unclassified by Secretary

Eban met with Secretary Feb 16 shortly after Secretary's return from Thomasville. Eban said he had sent full report to Jerusalem re Feb 15 discussions and expected further instructions shortly. Meanwhile he had discussed matter with Fonmin in New York and felt her views would be close to those of his Govt. Fonmin did not have feeling of being as far apart from as might generally be felt. Fonmin felt this situation where her presence Israel very useful and she would like go there without delay accompanied by Ambassador. Question was whether this practicable view possible activity in UNGA.

It was indicated consensus US opinion was that delay in UNGA action beyond first of following week was unlikely. Eban felt impossibility of delay should not be taken for granted.

Eban turned to Aqaba stating declaration US policy and legal position reassuring but problem was to implement that position and assure spirit inherent in it would prevail. Israel had no lack of trust in US but deep distrust of Nasser. Three ways in which this "missing link" could be provided

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NEA - William M. Rountree

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provided: 1) provide stability through UNEF by having UNGA endorse its functions according to Lodge's Jan 28 statement; 2) if this not possible, provide statement of intention of US and other maritime powers which would set forth clearly their intentions re defense freedom passage for all nations; 3) alternatively, for Egypt say in UNGA or elsewhere that it would not impose blockade of Israel vessels. Shiloah expressed fear that after Israel withdrawal, situation might develop where Egypt blockaded Israel shipping but US, while sympathizing with Israel position, felt compelled urge Israel, in interest world peace, not to impose its rights of passage. Israel did not want be faced with such a crucial test. Eban stated this was case re Jordan waters, where US agreed that Israel had right to these waters but told Israel it should not exercise right since it might cause trouble.

Re Gaza, Eban said Nov 2 UNGA resolution had spoken of withdrawal of forces. Only recently had it been implied that Israel withdrawal should include every aspect of Israel participation in Gaza. Israel would like achieve staged process under which there would be first withdrawal of Israel forces, after which there would arrive in Gaza a UN mission to decide future of administration.

Secretary thought he understood and appreciated as well as any outsider preoccupation of Israel Govt. He did not see situation which would not involve some risks. He would be last try persuade Israel that its withdrawal, even with benefit of what US had said, would provide any guarantee that what Israel wanted would come about. He did believe, however, that experience which we had been through had provided lesson in maintaining world order and justice and there would be less lethargic attitude in future than in past where nations had been disposed allow rights others be ignored

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he ignored so long as their own rights not affected. He did not think we would give guarantee in favor Israel ships and cargoes; he could state general policy but to back it up by internationally binding guarantee could not be done without treaty or something of that sort. Nor could we provide assurances regarding UNEF moving into and staying in Straits area. Neither did he think that we could obtain statement from Egypt since Egypt had said it would make no promises obtain withdrawal Israel forces which illegally in Egyptian territory. Even if they did make promises, they could logically say promises given under duress.

Thus, Secretary thought we could do little more than we had already done in making statement our intentions. President also did not feel we could go beyond that or put ourselves in position negotiating with Israel on these questions. He thought second resolution of Feb 2 had gone far in right direction. Although we might be able make slight variations in wording our Feb 11 aide-memoire, unlikely we could go in substance beyond what said in that document. Eban said he had drafted some possible variations in aide-memoire and was seeking GDI authority present them to Secretary.

Secretary responded that if authority received variations could be discussed at meeting on following day. If not, however, we would have done all we could and would have let matter proceed in UN. That would not be good but Israel decision would have been <sup>made</sup> solemnly and with recognition of what involved. We also would have made our decision on basis most careful study of matter. Regarding our attitude, we had felt Israel grievances against Egypt were not of character which justified

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which justified full-scale armed attack. We had taken position which history alone can judge that first task of those trying build world order was avoid war for settlement of grievances. UN was first step in direction world order and even though as yet inadequate means had been developed achieve peace with justice, there was great deal more pressure of world opinion to achieve this goal. Interests of our two Govts could be achieved much easier if Israel would join in that great effort. Even if it should fail Israel's position before world opinion and certainly Israel's relations with US would be much better. It was judgment of President and himself that two Govts could find way to work together and <sup>we</sup> would be gravely distraught if this should not be possible. He believed way was withdrawal in accordance with UN resolutions putting US and all UN members under responsibility for having urged Israel take risk involved.

Eban said his Govt weighing these matters with great care. Re broad question UN there was ~~obverse~~ <sup>obverse</sup> side of coin under which member states could perform every sort of violence short war without getting into trouble. Egypt had engaged in military action in civil disguise, blockaded Israel shipping, and carried out other acts as detrimental to Israel as if overt military force had been employed. Defect in Charter was that it did not contain effective provisions against such forms of aggression. Israel therefore had never had feeling Charter provided it with adequate assurances. Big question was what US position would be if Israel's rights violated. He repeated concern that if Israel should withdraw it should know what US would do.

Secretary responded these questions could not be answered in clear cut way.

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All who had been giving thought to broad aspects of problem realized that ways had to be found put some measure force behind action, prevent unlawful interruption lawful rights. Situation would require far more careful shaping of issues than was case in recent military intervention by Israel, France and UK before use of force could have been justified before world opinion. We would be unhappy see situation after Israel withdrawal involving continuation Egyptian obstruction. We would be prepared consult re ways meet any such problem, which certainly ought to be met. If we should now merely return to status quo ante it would be as much a defeat for US policy than it would be defeat for our policy if Israel should not withdraw. He could promise on behalf of Administration that we would try make second UNGA resolution of Feb 2 succeed just as much as we were trying make first resolution succeed.

Shiloah said that if it should be decided that Foramin and Eban should fly Israel, he hoped US would support delay in UN so that matters would not be brought to head there during their absence. Secretary said we would support delay so long as we convinced there was hope for progress. We had successfully postponed for number of days, however, and so could give no assurances for future.

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Following based on memorandum conversation unclear by Secretary:

Eban was again with Secretary Feb 17 said since meeting previous day he had received number telegrams from Jerusalem. Ben Gurion anxious US should understand his attitude. He concerned with what his situation would be if he should withdraw from two positions in question and later situation would develop in which Israel denied passage through Straits and violence should again erupt from Gaza. Primin had expressed deep appreciation for care which USG had set forth its position to Israel and explained that US prepared to do in UN.

Eban said he had number points to raise concerning US aide-memoire of Feb. 17. Re first para, last sentence stated, Israel forces occupying Gaza Strip "which territory" specified by Armistice Agreement to be occupied by Egypt." That would overstate Egypt's case since agreement specified only that Gaza was not to be occupied by Israel forces. Nothing in agreement to prevent Israel civil administration. Secretary questioned this interpretation of agreement.

Re second para, Eban said Israel position not reflected with complete accuracy.

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accuracy, Israel's position on Gaza was that Israel willing evacuate forces from Gaza Strip but was opposed to restoration of Egyptian occupation and was willing discuss suitable relationship between UN and Israel administrative services.

Re para three, Ambassador again questioned statement that Armistice Agreement had given Egypt the "right and responsibility" of occupation. In second sentence stating that US believed that Israel withdrawal from Gaza should be prompt and unconditional, he said that term "Israel forces" in this connection would be appropriate if it were agreed that decision on civil administration should be deferred pending further examination and discussion by UN.

At this point Secretary observed that Eban's comments interesting but only of secondary importance. Main question was whether GOI accepted basic thesis of February 11 US aide-memoire.

Eban commented that changes in aide-memoire might conceivably affect in some degree Israel attitude, recognizing that some of changes suggested involved points of substance. Turning to para six of US aide-memoire he said he would assume that US position re free and innocent passage through Straits related to conduct of vessels and not to flag which vessels flew or what was aboard. Secretary observed this would appear be academic question now since Israel presumably could not claim innocent passage if it was in military occupation of a part of Egypt and held the Gaza Strip.

Re para eight stating that US prepared exercise right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right, Eban said question rose on basic point of how far US would go this regard. Israel

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wonder whether we would show determination not to acquiesce in any interference with right of free passage.

Ninth para, Eban said, was extremely important problem since it involved question of degree of Israel's withdrawal from Gaza necessary to restore right of free and innocent passage. If paragraph meant that Israel would not have right of passage through Aqaba even after withdrawing military forces from Gaza and Straits value to Israel of this provision would be annulled until question of administration of Gaza was resolved. He did not think it right link everything to every vestige of Israel's rights in administrative sphere in Gaza.

Secretary inquired whether if that point were resolved Israel would withdraw its military force behind the Armistice lines. He remarked that from what Eban had said, he assumed he was not authorized say that would be the case. Eban responded he would not be so authorized since other matters involved in Israel decision to withdraw. Perhaps, however, these other aspects less "deadlocked" than this.

Secretary commented US had no authority or inclination derogate responsibility from UN to decide questions of this nature. If Israel wished put forth propositions of this character it should do so to UN. Eban replied his Govt would undoubtedly do so at appropriate time. Returning to US aide-memoire he said that in para 10, re UNEF, belief was stated that UNEF should move in after Israel forces withdrawn. However, aide-memoire said nothing about tenure or functions of UNEF. Fact this not spelled out by UN constituted difficulty. If it had been defined there would be greater hope moving forward.

Eban said Israel Cabinet wanted further clarification of US views and positions

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before making final decision. Fommin and Eban would like leave for Israel that night explain US views after which Israel decision would be solemnly and gravely rendered. Important question was whether UN processes would continue in their absence and there would develop a situation which would rule <sup>out</sup> benefits of trip. Secretary observed that with hopes of Israel acceptance of US aide-memoire as a basis for immediate withdrawal having been dissipated he could not estimate possibilities of a delay in UN. We certainly had no desire precipitate matters.

Phleger said that as lawyer he wished make observation concerning legal aspects of Israel position on its civil administration of Gaza. Israel civil forces had been set up in Gaza under protection of Israel troops. UN had called for withdrawal of these forces. It was inherent that both be withdrawn, civil as well as military. Israel apparently asserts there should be revision of Armistice Agreement under cover of armed protection by the occupation forces. That he thought was legally untenable.

Secretary observed that some thought being given in UN Secretariat re future administration Gaza. While we not consulted and had no details he was aware matter receiving some attention. Eban said Israel had not been associated with such planning and had not been consulted. He reverted to trip to Jerusalem and expressed hope he could have few days' consultation before UN action.

Secretary expressed view there had been fairly thorough exchange between Israel Govt and US and that any further talks might best be between Israel and UN. Many areas into which Israel Govt now getting in bilateral talks could not properly be dealt with on bilateral basis. Eban expressed hope US might in UN adopt positions supporting Israel re further assurances on Straits and regarding administration of Gaza.

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Secretary observed Israel no doubt would have another chance for debate in UNGA. He was sad about what Eban had told him re Israel position. Great trouble was ahead. He had felt there was real opportunity work together and had striven to do so. If withdrawal did not take place there would be multiplicity of trouble affecting our relations officially with Govt of Israel and affecting attitude of American people toward Israel. Situation might arise which would provide opportunity for USSR inject itself in area ostensibly assist the UN. It probably presumptuous of him to ask but he curious know how Israel Govt might calculate it would get the thing that it wanted by assuming attitude described by Eban. Eban assumed main hope was that there would be change in attitude of UN which would accept conditions to Israel withdrawal.

Secretary thought Israel had gravely miscalculated if it thought that as result of its position there would be change in UN re negotiations and settlement of these issues prior to Israel withdrawal. Secretary did not see where solution might lie. There might be resumption hostilities but if this should take place it would be under conditions where Israel would be largely looked upon as the aggressor. ~~Recontinued~~

by Secretary's remarks said he did not feel his Govts appreciation of situation same as Secretary's. However since Secretary did feel so he thought it even more important that he should go to Jerusalem and carefully explain these views to authorities. (Secretary's remarks that if Israel was possible something that it

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
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 18, 1957



SUBJECT: Near Eastern Problem.

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler, German Ambassador  
Mr. Erich Ollenhauer, Leader, German Social Democratic Party  
Mr. Fritz Heine, Press Chief, " " "  
The Secretary of State  
Mr. Carl W. McCardle, Asst. Secy. of State for Public Affairs  
Mr. John W. Jones, Acting Deputy Asst. Secy. of State for European Affairs  
Mr. R.E. Lisle, Deputy Director, Office of German Affairs

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After a discussion of other matters, Ambassador Krekeler stated that he and Mr. Ollenhauer had earlier been considering the problem of Israeli withdrawal from Egypt. Was the situation as desperate as the papers indicated?

The Secretary replied that the situation was very serious. So far it had been impossible to persuade the Israelis to withdraw their troops from the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip. After all, the U.S. could not make an agreement on behalf of Egypt or of the United Nations. We had stated what our position would be and could not go beyond that. Egypt was not willing to negotiate under the pressure of hostile occupation. Unless some agreement were reached, the Canal would probably stay closed. Egypt would resume guerilla operations and build up her armament, and the Soviet Union would obtain a stranglehold on the area. That morning the Secretary had asked the British and French Chargés to urge their Governments to do all possible to induce the Israelis to withdraw. Germany could be particularly persuasive in this connection because of the reparations payments it makes to the Israeli Government. Ambassador Abba Eban and Foreign Minister Meir were flying to Israel today and he understood they would seek to persuade their government to end the present impasse by withdrawal. The Secretary hoped that Ambassador Krekeler would urge that his Government do all possible to persuade the Israelis to withdraw. The Ambassador agreed to communicate with Bonn immediately.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 18, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal from Aqaba and Gaza

PARTICIPANTS: Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, Deputy Foreign Minister, Saudi Arabia  
Ambassador Al-Hajjaj of Saudi Arabia  
Mr. Moudouh Adib, Saudi Arabia  
Abd al-Aziz Majid, Saudi Arabia

Mr. William H. Rountree, NEA.  
Mr. David D. Newsom, NE

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Mr. Rountree gave Sheikh Yusuf the substance of King Saud's reply to the President. Referring to the events of the weekend, Mr. Rountree told Sheikh Yusuf that American efforts were directed at doing all possible to effect Israeli withdrawal. He said that the aide memoire which the United States had given to Israel went as far as the United States could properly go. He said the Israeli aide memoire was not, in the United States view, responsive. The Israelis, he said, apparently wished to use the United States position to begin bargaining. The United States would make it clear, he said, that it would not negotiate on matters which could only be decided by the United Nations or were of interest to other countries.

Mr. Rountree said that the Israeli Ambassador was in touch with his government, but that the Department had no idea whether Israel would change its position. Nevertheless, Mr. Rountree said, he felt the United States' approach had been a necessary part of its efforts to persuade Israel to withdraw.

Sheikh Yusuf said that they had also received word from the King and that the King was pleased to see that the United States position remained that Israel should withdraw immediately and unconditionally. Insofar as the question of the freedom of passage is concerned, Sheikh Yusuf said, the United States should be well aware of the King's attitude

and of

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Dr. Allen Dulles' view that neither the United States was contemplating, nor had the question of the possible relocation of the embassy at Havana been brought forward, was the thing.

2. Ambassador Fakhri said, as the Secretary had told the King, the United States of America will force Israel for the withdrawal of Israeli forces. He said that it is the United States belief that as long as Israeli forces occupied Egyptian territory, they could not claim any right of non-belligerency. The United States attitude on the question of the Straits, following Israeli withdrawal, he said, has been dictated only by international law. Dr. Fakhri added that what the United States has said on this matter was in force on Israeli withdrawal on conditions under which Israel ~~cannot~~ exercise ~~its~~ belligerent rights.

12. Lountree said he could reassure Sheikh Yassir of the assurances given by the President and the Secretary of the New United States interest in the security of Saudi Arabia.

With reference to the possible release of the letters or a statement, Mr. Rountree said he would study this matter and be in touch with Sheikh Yusuf at a later time.

Shadi Yusuf said that before he left he would also like to discuss further with the United States two questions: frozen Egyptian funds and Suezini.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: February 18, 1957



The question of Israeli Withdrawal from Egypt

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PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary (during part of the conversation)

IO - Mr. Francis O. Wilcox

EUR - Mr. C. Burke Elbrick

UNP - Mr. Ware Adams

CORRESPONDENTS:

Mr. J. E. Coulson, Minister, British Embassy

Mr. R. W. Bailey, Counselor, British Embassy

Mr. S. F. Rae, Minister, Embassy of Canada

Mr. J. R. Maybee, First Secretary, Embassy of Canada

Mr. Charles Lucet, Minister, Embassy of the French Republic

Mr. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor, Embassy of the French Republic

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Mr. Wilcox opened the meeting by saying that the Secretary hoped to join them for a part of the meeting, and wanted them to be informed of the developments over the weekend concerning the Israeli Ambassador's calls on the Secretary.

Mr. Wilcox noted that in the corridors of the General Assembly pressure had been building up rather strongly toward a proposal for sanctions, and the Secretary last week decided that the time had come to indicate to the Israelis our thinking about the general problem of withdrawing their troops from Egypt together with any assurances we might be able to give them. Our reasoning proceeded from simple basic factors which were set out in our aide-memoire of February 11: (1) the General Assembly has no authority to change the Armistice Agreement which had provided for the Gaza Strip a form of Egyptian occupation; (2) therefore, withdrawal by the Israelis from the Gaza Strip should be unconditional including the withdrawal of the civil administration; (3) UNEF should thereupon enter the Gaza Strip in preparation for whatever was to follow; (4) the Gulf of Aqaba comprehends international waters, access to which should be open to all nations with innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran. . .

At this point Secretary Dulles entered the meeting. He said he had tried to get in touch with the three diplomatic representatives yesterday, but without success, to talk over the situation with them. He said that Ambassador Eban and Minister Shiloah seemed to be convinced that the Israelis would find it in their own best interests to withdraw from Egypt, but apparently not the

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Government at Tel Aviv. He said Ambassador Eban was going back to Tel Aviv to talk further with his Government about it. The Secretary said it was a serious question because if the UN cannot get the Israelis to withdraw from Egypt, there will be increasing likelihood of hostilities there, with all that that implied, including Soviet activity and a delay in clearance of the Canal. He noted reports that the Egyptians were slow in removing explosives from the Canal, apparently awaiting the outcome of the current debate. It would be easy to imagine hostilities breaking out again, even if on a small scale, and a failure of the Canal to reopen to traffic, to the renewed detriment of Western Europe. To avert these serious dangers it is our view that we should do everything we can do to bring about Israeli withdrawal from Egypt. One possible means that comes up for discussion is the question of sanctions--this is a general word and much depends on the content given it as it comes under discussion in the General Assembly. We face a serious situation requiring careful thought. The Secretary said we do not see how we can get more assurances for the Israelis than had been given them and than were contained in the resolution of February 2. He said if they do not withdraw he does not see anything possible as a likely alternative outcome than more fighting and an interruption of progress toward the Suez Canal reopening. He would welcome any views put forward on behalf of the three governments represented in the meeting.

Mr. Coulson said that the British are as eager as Secretary Dulles to see the Israelis out of Egypt, but do not want to have to vote on sanctions. At this point Secretary Dulles had to leave the meeting to answer the telephone.

Mr. Wilcox continued, saying the Israelis naturally wanted to get all the assurances they can, and in their discussions over the weekend had raised questions about the various elements in the problem, such as when various moves should be made, how long UNEF would remain at the Straits, what specific guarantees could be made about the Straits, and what other countries might do with respect to this matter. Secretary Dulles had replied to the Israelis that the United States could not assume the position of negotiator between the Israelis and the UN. Mr. Coulson remarked that obviously one could not give the Israelis all the assurances they desire. He asked whether we thought that, if an Israeli ship went through the Straits and was attacked by the Egyptians, the Israelis could defend themselves by force. Mr. Wilcox remarked that that would draw Egyptian fire and might thus result in a resumption of hostilities, contrary to the cease-fire. The United States would be willing to make a declaration of its view about the character of the Straits and Gulf, but would not get into the position of negotiator between the Israelis and the UN. Secretary Dulles had told them this and had said that there were two orders of action to be taken: the first consisted of Israeli withdrawal from Egypt, and the second of the other measures to be taken thereafter.

The Secretary reentered the meeting at this point, and Mr. Coulson explained that he had been wondering what would happen if the Egyptians did attack an

Israeli

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Israeli ship. He thought it might be worth "spelling out" the position a little more clearly in the GA, where the second resolution of February 2 was rather sketchy. He said that the UK Government might be prepared to make a statement about the Straits and asked whether this might help. The Secretary replied that his impression is that the Israelis are worrying more about Gaza than the Straits. Their main concern is about some form of administration in Gaza that would protect them from commando raids in the future.

Mr. Lucet said the French would like to avoid debate on sanctions. They could not agree to sanctions. He wondered whether it would not be possible to do more to provide formal guarantees about the Straits, and to make clearer the position concerning Gaza. He asked whether it would not be a good idea to send a Commission to the Gaza Strip to make a report and recommendations, and also to remind the Egyptians of the November 2 resolutions.

The Secretary said that in considering resolutions there is always the question what kind of resolution will get a two-thirds vote, although naturally we want to get the best assurances we can. Ambassador Lodge had thought that the resolution of February 2 squeezed in all the advantages possible in the circumstances. The Secretary went on to say that if sanctions are not to be imposed (and our present disposition is to impose them), the presence of troops and their effect on the future of the Canal is not easy to foresee. If Israel wants moral support, it should avoid a situation in which it would be difficult to give such support. Either we get the Israelis out, or the Russians will get the Israelis out, and their influence will thus come into the Middle East to stay.

Mr. Rae said Canada also wants to get the Israelis out, and UNEF into their place, but sanctions would be hard to contemplate. The Secretary replied that we all find sanctions hard to contemplate. However, if the Arabs think that only the USSR can get the Israelis out of Egypt, it will be bad if they thus begin to feel that the only country they can count on is the Soviet Union.

Mr. Rae then suggested one might try to conceive some intermediate regime for the Gaza Strip. The Secretary agreed that one might consider the ideal solution to be to get the troops out of the Gaza Strip and have a UN administration take over, but whether Egypt could accept this or not is a question. Mr. Rae asked whether we were familiar with the views of Egypt in these matters, and the Secretary replied that we don't know them all; Ambassador Hare talked with Nasser the other day but the latter was very vague; Secretary General Hammarskjold sees the Egyptians and is an able diplomat who can talk with them skillfully, although he does not necessarily take us into his confidence.

The Secretary left the meeting to keep another appointment and Mr. Wilcox went on to say that the Israelis feel they could leave a civil administration in Gaza without violating the Armistice Agreement, but we don't think the Afro-Asians would accept this view. Mr. Coulson inquired whether anyone knew

Mr. Pearson's

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Pearson's views in these matters, and Mr. Wilcox reviewed them for him.

Mr. Wilcox then added a few other points: Ambassador Eban had asked whether a further delay would be possible and had been told that we thought it would be difficult, having already managed to get delays amounting to some ten days. Mr. de Laboulaye suggested that a declaration by maritime nations concerning the Straits might give more time on the question of Gaza. The group agreed that it might give a little more, but Mr. Elbrick pointed out that even so this would hardly be helpful and might even make a final arrangement more difficult in that each of the parties would have come to feel that it had already made concessions in order to start the withdrawal. Mr. Wilcox pointed out again that the Secretary feels that withdrawal seems essential at this stage since it would do much to ease so many things such as the question of final clearance of the Canal, etc. Mr. Coulson said that if it would help, he thought he could suggest to his delegation in New York that they try for further delay, and could suggest that the UK Government inform Tel Aviv of its willingness to make a declaration regarding the Straits. He asked Mr. Wilcox if he could tell him what our attitude would be if the Israelis did not effect withdrawal. Mr. Wilcox referred him to the remarks already made by Mr. Dulles and said that he could not add to what the Secretary had already said.

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Feb. 25, 1957

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*PWB.*  
P - Mr. Burris

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As stated



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February 20, 1957

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For appropriate handling.

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*Archer Blood*  
S/S-RO

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USIA, re handling of Pres's  
statement on Israel.

(S/S #1161)

cc: IO - Mr. Davis  
NEA - Mr. Oulashin





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February 18, 1957

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Dear Mr. Secretary:

Your telephone call yesterday alerting us to the President's statement on Israel was most helpful and considerate. Our Wireless File was being transmitted when you called. Your warning made it possible for our news desk to hold wire space open for the full text and story, which I have attached, and thus to reach all major posts promptly. We were also able to alert the Voice of America, which began broadcasting immediately after we obtained the text.

The kind of thoughtfulness you have shown means a great deal to the success of our information program and is deeply gratifying to me personally.

Sincerely yours,

*Arthur Larson*

Arthur Larson  
Director

674.84A/2-1857

The Honorable  
John Foster Dulles,  
Secretary of State.

APR 17 1957

FILED

A/39

674.84A/2-1857

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DC/R	
Anal	39
Rev	t
Clt	Cl
Cdt	Cl



45- Commonwealth Ave  
Boston 16, Mass.

Feb. 18, 1957

ACTION  
is assigned to



The Secretary of State,

Dear Sir: —

Why does the U.S. put  
all the pressure on Israel, <sup>letting</sup>  
live a country that does not want  
to hurt any other country, only  
to live — and let Egypt go  
on attacking Israel with commands  
raids right over or under or between  
the U.N. police force, letting Egypt  
keep the Suez Canal closed or opening  
to slowly, injuring our allies  
and all of Europe, and her own  
people — with no pressure  
apparently from the U.N. or the  
U.S. I sincerely hope that the  
pressure is being put upon Egypt  
behind the scenes. But on the  
surface, our policy — seems  
immoral — in spite of  
the U.S. policy is not clear  
on several points. I think

674.84A/2-1857

674.84A/2-1857

CSELK

FILED  
APR 8 - 1957

RECEIVED  
FEB 19 1957  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RM/R

Israel is perfectly right to hold  
on to Gaza if she wants to  
live.

Our State Department says if  
Israel will get out of Gaza, it  
"thinks" that Egypt will agree  
not to attack. How can anyone  
think such a thing. We say  
we want the Gulf of Aquaba to be  
free, that Israel should be able  
to use it - but we won't do  
anything about it.

Something may be going on  
behind the scenes. I hope so.  
Publicly our policy is vague, ~~indeed~~  
indeterminate, unclarified - as far  
as I can see it means nothing  
except that we hope it will come  
out all right.

As for sanctions against Israel,  
it is unjust.

I deeply regret that the U.S.  
sent or agreed to send military  
aid to King Saud. I believe it  
is all wrong - He will use it in  
any way we do not expect or want.

Yours very Truly,  
Elmer L. Lind.

RCR
APR 29
FILE
1

*I think Israel is right*

# Willing to Suffer Sanctions

Six

THE BOSTON DAILY GLOBE—3

## Israel Official Says People

### MRS. MEIR

Continued from the First Page

"But Israel has suffered throughout history for her refusal to give in to what was not right, and if we are convinced we are right, we will suffer," she continued.

against her countrymen, she continued, the government would have to go to the people and "offer (them) the choice of suffering or death."  
"I think my people would choose great economic difficulties," she added.

(Rep. John W. McCormack,

Mass., House Democratic leader, said on another television program that "imposition of sanctions on Israel at this time would be unwise." That comment echoes the feeling of other Congressmen and Senators on this issue.)

Mrs. Meir also said that Egypt "must not come back to Gaza," and outlined the guarantee Israel seeks from the United States in exchange for withdrawal of troops from the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel wants to assure free passage of ships in the gulf.

#### U. S. Won't Use Force

The foreign minister said if the United States would "protect the right of all peoples" to free navigation in the gulf, "then, perfect, we would be out the next morning."

The United States offered, in effect, to send ships into Aqaba but has drawn the line against using

force to achieve freedom of navigation there.

Mrs. Meir was adamant against returning to Egypt the Gaza Strip which Israel captured in the brief campaign last October. She said Israel would not abide by any United Nations vote to return Gaza to Egypt "unless we are assured of our security." Israeli officials have accused Egypt of using Gaza as a base for raids into their country.

The Israeli foreign minister also declared her country would not accept unilateral United Nations administration of Gaza, but implied that Israel would agree to a joint UN-Israeli rule over that area.

"We want them (the U.N.) to cooperate with us in the administration" of Gaza, she said, adding "civil administration and security should be in the hands of the local councils" in which Israel and the U.N. would participate.

She said Israel does not seek annexation of the Gaza Strip, but declared "the Egyptians must not come back to Gaza."

(Boston Globe-N.Y. Herald Tribune)

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# Nasser May Put Stop to Clearance Work on Suez Canal

CAIRO, Feb. 16 (UP)—Egypt may halt clearance of the Suez Canal in reprisal against Israel's refusal to evacuate the Gulf of Aqaba area and the Gaza Strip, well-informed sources said today.

The "crucial decision" on the matter will be made in the next few days. These sources said. Egypt was reported by informants to have made a veiled threat to keep the vital 100-mile-long waterway closed to traffic if Israel stands firm in refusing to withdraw troops from the two Egyptian-claimed areas.

The Associated Press reported President Nasser is considering "some counteraction" in the Israeli crisis.

Although rumors of direct military action by the Egyptians had spread in recent days, the best informed quarters believe Nasser will not go further than stopping Suez Canal clearance work.

Hints of reprisal were made by

Egypt to the United Nations, informants said. These sources said the Egyptians had made it clear to U.N. salvage officials that in any case, clearance operations could not go full speed ahead until the question of Israel withdrawal had been settled.

March 10 had been set as the target date for reopening the waterway to 10,000-ton vessels. One sunken vessel, the Akka, has been removed. Two others are due to be hauled away as soon as explosives can be taken off one of them.

Reuters said the United Nations has been waiting 37 days for permission to clear the canal of the

sunken tug Edgar Bennett and the freighter Aboukir. So far it has not been given. Egypt's President Gamal Abdel

Nasser told Indian legislator B. Anup Singh this week that resumption of canal traffic hinged on "certain conditions."

## High Oil Prices Hitting Norway's Fishing Industry

OSLO, Feb. 16 (Reuters)—High oil prices may cause about half the Norwegian trawler fleet to be laid up, according to the president of the Norwegian Trawler Owner's Association.

Sixteen trawlers with crews totaling 800 men are immediately concerned, and hundreds of shore workers and the frozen fish factories also will be affected.

## "It Ought

### To Be Obvious . . ."

To the Editor — Sanctions against Israel! What a farcical proposal!

It is an attitude taken toward one of the tiniest of countries. Such an attitude was not taken although proposed against Japan, Germany under Hitler, Italy under "Old Muss" when they made the first move that led eventually to general wars.

It ought to be obvious to any right-minded person that Israel has no designs on any of her neighbors. She wants to be left alone in peace that she may continue building a civilized, humanitarian state in the center of a cluster of feudal countries where slavery and pitiable poverty persist while the few in power roll in disgusting wealth and a conspicuous overplus of everything.

I am not Jewish, consequently not a Zionist, just an ordinary man who tries to be half decent at least a part of the time, and one who keeps his eyes open.

HENRI BOUILLARD  
Brewster.

CARL HATSEN, ASST. CHAIRMAN

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EVERETT MCKINLEY DINKEN, ILL.  
CHARLES E. POTTER, MICH.

## United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

EDWARD H. SMITH, CLERK  
THOMAS J. SCOTT, ASST. CLERK

February 15, 1957

Mrs. J. Anderson Lord  
45 Commonwealth Avenue  
Boston 16, Massachusetts

Dear Mrs. Lord:

Thank you for your recent communication relative to the United Nations debate concerning the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Peninsula.

As I am sure you realize, as a United States Senator, I do not have jurisdiction over debates and issues before the United Nations. I have, however, frequently expressed my views to the United States Ambassador. In this case, I shall certainly let him know of your concern in this matter.

This week on the floor of the Senate, I made certain remarks, in part, as follows:

"It seems to me in this instance what we must do is to realize that the United Nations cannot be successful if, when there has been aggression, it orders sanctions against one nation but not against another, as will be the result if sanctions are put into effect against Israel but not against Egypt or Russia."

Thank you for informing me of your views.

Kind regards.

Sincerely yours,



Leverett Saltonstall  
United States Senator

LS:


WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD  
FOURTH DISTRICT  
CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON  
MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES

Congress of the United States - 8015  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

18 February 1957

ACTION  
is assigned to



The Honorable Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary for  
Congressional Relations  
Department of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hill:

Attached are four typical communications from constituents dealing with the Middle East situation, and particularly with the question of "sanctions being applied by the UN against Israel."

Congressman Mailliard will very much appreciate any information and/or comments you may furnish him that will be of assistance in appropriately replying to communications of this type. His constituents' letters have been acknowledged and they have been advised that foreign policy matters are properly the responsibility of the Department of State.

Return of the communications is requested.

Sincerely,

*Mildred A. Oulicky*  
Miss Mildred A. Oulicky  
Secretary to  
Congressman Mailliard

Enclosures *207 Jm*

1. Tgm, Davis, Dr. Miriam S., 2/11/57
2. Ltr, Olinsky, Miss Dora, 2/11/57
3. Ltr, Erlanger, Helmut, 2/12/57
4. FC, Harriman, R. W. (undated)

323974

DC/R
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Rev. <i>Sheel</i>
Ext. <i>Sheel</i>

674.84A/2-1857

A/39

674.84A/2-1857

FEB 26 1957

In reply refer to  
IO:UNP: 674.84A/2 - 1857

Dear Mr. Mailliard:

I have received the letter of February 18, 1957, signed by your secretary, transmitting four communications from your constituents expressing their concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the

The Honorable  
William S. Mailliard,  
House of Representatives.

RECEIVED  
FEB 26 1957  
IO:UNP: 674.84A/2 - 1857

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only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

The communications from your constituents are returned as requested, copies having been made for the files of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

H-WF-X

Central  
Files

February 18, 1957


made no returned to

Dear Boyd:

I am sending you six copies of the text of an Aide Memoire handed to Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban on February 11, 1957 by the Secretary, for your records and the convenience of the Committee.

Sincerely yours,

Roderic L. O'Connor  
Deputy Assistant Secretary



Enclosures:

Press Release No. 62

674.84A/2-1857

Mr. Boyd Crawford,  
Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
House of Representatives.

*Wally H. Hensinger*  
*2/18/57*

H:RLO:C:fg

CS/R

674.84A/2-1857

February 18, 1957

Dear Carl:

I am sending you six copies of the text of an Aide Memoire handed to Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban on February 11, 1957 by the Secretary, for your records and the convenience of the Committee.

Sincerely yours,

Roderic L. O'Connor  
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

Press Release No. 72

Mr. Carl Marcy,  
Committee on Foreign Relations,  
United States Senate.

H:RLO'C:fg

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Del'd by H. Kennedy  
2/18/57  
674.842/2-1857

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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53-B  
Action

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Control: 11671

Rec'd: February 19, 1957  
2:47 p.m.

NEA FROM: Cairo

Info

MR TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2652, February 19

SS  
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PRIORITYEUR SENT DEPARTMENT 2652, REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 84, AMMAN, BAGHDAD,  
L BEIRUT, BENGHAZI, DAMASCUS, JIDDA KHARTOUM, LONDON, PARIS, NEW  
IO DELHI, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI UNNUMBERED.  
PUOP Israeli refusal withdraw together with accounts recall Eban  
ND Eisenhower return Washington and UN debate schedule dominate press  
O 19 February Eisenhower statement widely disseminated on 18th with  
OLI radio broadcasting text for excerpts three times in addition to  
coverage in all new papers.OCB Editorials insist "sanctions are only way preserve peace, Israel  
USIA wants profit from her aggression; Gaza and Aqaba are elements  
CIA October aggression and must be separate from over all Palestine  
settlement note. Referring Meir's statement Israel prepared with-  
draw if Egypt signs peace SHAAB asserts "peace with Israel means  
betrayal Palestinians and lifting blockade giving Israel chance  
strengthen her army and prepare attack Arabs whenever imperialists  
want her to".AFRAM reiterates common view "everyone know US can force Israel  
at any moment submit to UN decisions". KAHIRA declares "if Dulles  
really wants protect peace and force Ben-Gurion stop defying  
Eisenhower and UN he should tell Britain and France stop helping  
Israel and shut off back door aid of supplies, money, oil and arms"  
AKIBAR insists "would have been better for US and UN if US had  
left withdrawal problem to UN" adding "US interference weakened  
UN by patting Israel on back" just as UN was about impose sanctions.SHAAB points out UN on horns dilemma since if she fails support  
sanctions "she will not dare show her face in UN or before Mid-  
East peoples or be able implement Eisenhower plan" but imposition  
sanctions "means total collapse Israel which contrary US policy"  
KHALED MOHIEDDINE points "US ought to have asked Israel carry out  
all UN decisions on Palestine before demanding free passage for  
Israeli ship" and asserts US instead "gave Israel guarantees while  
ignoring refugees Israel expelled from their homes."

Testimony

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-2- 2652, February 19, from Cairo

Testimony Ambassadors Caffery, Green and Byroade as well as General Van Fleet's praise of Nasser and denial Communist threat played prominently and comments last three used as spring boards to reiterate familiar editorial themes. SADAT reviews past history relations with Israel, Baghdad Pact and arms deal and concludes "we refuse believe in Hypothetical danger from outside when actual danger is so near and real".

TAHRIR charges "busy intriguing throughout Mid-East in order destroy Arab nationalism and what west calls Nasser's empire" adding "plan is work of international capitalism and monopolies with headquarters in Washington" citing as evidence "deal with Abdullilla; Nixon visit to Morocco, Sudan and Ethiopia; US plan for Pact between Sudan and Ethiopia; Lebanese request for US troops forestall Syrian plot; North African Pact; Baghdad Pact; presence Sixth Fleet and its atomic weapons and appeasement of Israel" TAHRIR concludes "Sixth Fleet can exterminate millions Arabs but belief in Arab nationalism will live on thanks to one man--Nasser".

HARE

MEJ:SGC

FEB 26 1957

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Department of State

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Action

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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 981, FEBRUARY 19, 10 AM

PRIORITY

PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE BOARD OF ISRAEL-AMERICA FRIENDSHIP LEAGUE, AN ORGANIZATION WITH MEMBERSHIP OVER 2800 AND REPRESENTING CROSS-SECTION OF POPULATION, CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THEIR GREAT CONCERN OVER US POLICY AND POSSIBILITY SHARP DECLINE IN PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS US.

THE 5-MAN GROUP, WHICH INCLUDED MEMBERS OF SEVERAL POLITICAL PARTIES, PRESENTED STRONG INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF PRESENT SITUATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO US INSISTENCE ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL BEFORE THERE IS FIRM ASSURANCE OF SECURITY FROM EGYPTIAN ATTACKS AND THAT AQABA WILL NOT AGAIN BE BLOCKED. WITH MINOR VARIATIONS IN EMPHASIS ALL AGREED THAT PRESENT SITUATION WAS ONE OF MOST CRITICAL IN HISTORY OF COUNTRY AND THAT LIFE OF NATION WAS AT STAKE; VIRTUALLY ENTIRE NATION WAS SUPPORTING GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT POSITION RE WITHDRAWAL; THAT LARGE PART WORLD JEWRY WAS BEHIND ISRAEL; THAT THERE WAS WIDE PUBLIC "DISILLUSIONMENT" AND DISAPPOINTMENT REGARDING PRESENT US APPROACH TO PROBLEM WITH INTERPRETATION OF US INSISTING ON "RETURN TO STATUS QUO ANTE" AND EVEN WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE ISRAEL TO PERMIT ILLUSORY PLACATION OF ARABS. ALL OF FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS USED BY GOI WITH RESPECT TO DISASTER TO FOLLOW INEVITABLY FROM THE RETURN OF EGYPTIANS TO STRAITS AND GAZA WERE PRESENTED. THE HOPE WAS EXPRESSED THAT US WOULD PRESENT A "CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL" WHICH WOULD MEET PRESENT DIFFICULT CONTROVERSY. IN THIS REGARD, THE SECRETARY'S TALKS WITH EBAN, AS REPORTED IN PRESS, WERE CONSIDERED AS A WELCOME STEP IN THAT DIRECTION. IN CONCLUSION, THE GROUP REAFFIRMED ITS FAITH IN CONTINUING US-ISRAEL FRIENDSHIP AND REQUESTED THAT ITS ATTITUDE AND CONCERN BE REPORTED TO DEPARTMENT.

Control: 11578

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 19, 1957  
12:09 PM

NEA  
FEBRUARY 19, 1957  
12:09 PM

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-2- 981, FEBRUARY 19, 10 AM FROM TEL AVIV

I REPLIED WITH EXPRESSION GRATITUDE FOR OPPORTUNITY HEAR VIEWS OF FRIENDLY AND WELL-INFORMED GROUP. NOTING CONTINUING US INTEREST IN EXISTENCE ISRAEL, I SUGGESTED MEMBERS OF GROUP MUST AGREE (A) US HAD MADE AND WAS MAKING SINCERE AND GENUINE EFFORT SOLVE THE COMPLEX PROBLEMS, (B) THAT US SHOWED CONCERN AND UNDERSTANDING FOR DIFFICULT PROBLEMS CONFRONTING ISRAEL, AND (C) THAT JUDGMENT ON US EFFORTS SHOULD BE DEFERRED. I REPEATED US POLICY WAS TO SUPPORT UN AND WE COULD NOT UNDERTAKE RESPONSIBILITIES CLEARLY WITHIN ITS PROVINCE. BUT WE WERE TRYING TO HELP. I ASSERTED BELIEF THAT, WITH COOPERATION AND FORBEARANCE ALL CONCERNED, SOLUTION WOULD IN TIME BE WORKED OUT. MAINTAINING SPIRIT OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND US WOULD CONTRIBUTE MATERIALLY TO THIS END.

AGREED PRESS RELEASE ON MEETING WILL BE ISSUED BY LEAGUE. COPY BEING POUCHED.

LAWSON

JS

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7:04 a.m.

Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 982, February 19, 11 a.m.

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AIR

Without benefit of knowledge content February 17 conversation between Secretary and Eban, press February 17-18 unanimously supports GOI refusal to withdraw and describes US proposal as inadequate. Most charitable reactions appear in HAARETZ today (with statement US "would have liked" find settlement acceptable to Israel but hands tied by necessity impress Arabs) and in JERUSALEM POST (with view paralleling that of HAARETZ and suggestion progress has been made toward understanding and gap bridgeable given time negotiate). However as DAVAI put it, "with all appreciation Washington's efforts, Israel cannot (repeat not) exchange freedom of passage for blockade".

Other papers regard US proposals in distinctly less favorable light. HERUT says "unless guarantees" mean only "immediate renewal Egyptian blockade and resumption Fedayeen activities". HATZOFE and AL HAMISHMAR see US proposals as designed for "home consumption" in order put Israel in bad propaganda position.

LAWSON

SW:MJH/7

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 983, February 19, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 983; REPEATED INFORMATION BEIRUT 149, AMMAN 168,  
DAMASCUS 120, CAIRO 169, BAGHDAD 58, LONDON 190, PARIS 159.

Although Israel public and government have viewed US policies in Middle East with at least disappointment ever since receipt of President's letter November 8 (which was viewed locally as virtual ultimatum), there has been only limited evidence of what might be called anti-Americanism until past two-three weeks. Basically criticism during this recent period centers on reiterated assertion by press and individuals (including government officials) that US has already unjustifiably imposed sanctions on Israel (without waiting for UN action). Only few statements from less responsible elements press and public go beyond criticism this aspect US policy and take on character general anti-Americanism.

Embassy believes in any event there is some artificial element in present criticism of US policy. Recognition of friendly role played by US in past history Israel and of continuing need for US friendship remains widespread.

Calculated manner in which press (particularly of coalition parties) appears to have introduced and played up theme that UN sanctions now in force leads tentatively to conclusion there may have been some official guidance. Assertions of existing and unilateral US sanctions blossomed suddenly in press generally following passage of January 19 UN resolution calling for evacuation occupied territories within five days. New impetus was given campaign after February 2 UN resolutions again called for withdrawal: US was accused of not waiting for UN action and continuing "private sanctions."

Embassy suggests if there has been government-inspired press attitude it has both internal and external objectives. On domestic scene there is genuine belief certain amount austerity is inevitable even without further sanctions. Some government circles see (probably over optimistically) possibility carrying out needed economic reforms with aid from national unity inspired by threat of sanctions.

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674.84A/2-1957

CAA

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 983, February 19, 5 p.m. from Tel Aviv

sanctions but this has not reduced tendency to blame US for existing sanctions condition and threat of future sanctions. On foreign scene purpose is probably to gain public and official sympathy (particularly in US) for indomitable small nation already suffering and prepared to suffer more at hands of great powers in order gain minimal security needs. GOI probably considers possibility of gaining some domestic advantages from national unity in face of threat without actually suffering imposition sanctions.

Evidences of more general anti-American mood difficult to pinpoint. Some seem to have ring of being artificially stimulated rather than spontaneous expression genuine hostility. Avidity of press in highlighting any reports anti-US situations to exploit news value is probably significant this regard. For example, HAARETZ article February 10 announced "many resignations" from Israel-America friendship society with "faith in Israel-US friendship shaken." Rash of exaggerated items on same theme then appeared other papers. Investigation shows however story in fact practically baseless and society has publicly reaffirmed goal promoting friendship.

GOI has also worked to prevent development anti-US sentiment. A case in point concerns nationwide demonstrations February 9. Informed sources freely predicted US, as power behind UN throne, would be main target of gatherings. UN however bore brunt of attack, and only few speakers (but including one Cabinet minister) mildly criticized US. This failure attempt arouse anti-American sentiment is reportedly due Ben Gurion suggestion such tactics be avoided. In personal relationships with private and official Israelis, Embassy staff members have not yet noted anti-Americanism, although few Israelis miss opportunity criticize US policies this area. This criticism, as well as that in press, which not yet believed become deep-seated anti-Americanism, likely continue and reach substantially stronger level if no way found out of present impasse on Israel withdrawals and UNGA sanctions voted with US support of abstention.

LAWSON

BB:RAP/7

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Department of State

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FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4208, February 19, Noon

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 4208; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 964, CAIRO 141, TEL AVIV 72.

Sebilleau, Director Afrique-Levant, said French delegation had been instructed to support Israel. Under no circumstances would France vote for economic sanctions against Israel. However, Sebilleau said, French would vote in UNGA for withdrawal Israeli troops from Gaza strip provided same resolution called on Egypt to guarantee freedom of passage for Gulf of Aqaba and Suez and Egyptian guarantees against Fedayeen activity. Sebilleau, describing strong pressure within French Government to support Israel, said it took him all morning to persuade top-level Foreign Office to agree even to above conditions. At same time, Sebilleau confided that Foreign Minister's position was apparently not without reservation since at end of draft instructions to French delegation to support Israel, Pineau himself had added words "for the moment".

Sebilleau said during last 10 days US Government had greatly advanced solution Suez question by (1) recent assurances to Israeli Government on US support of freedom passage Gulf of Aqaba and stationing UNEF in Gaza strip and (2) 50-50 system for payment Suez tolls, arrangement which Sebilleau enthusiastically favored.

Sebilleau, in reply his request, had received cabled text French Ambassador Gilbert's speech (Tel Aviv telegram 971; repeated Paris 157). Despite uniformity press version, Sebilleau said press had exaggerated original text which was unfortunate in tenor but not as extreme as Israeli press deliberately reported.

YOST

CWB:JCK/1

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Department of State

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Action

IO - UNP - *De Palma*  
FROM: Paris

Info

RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 4209, February 19, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4209, REPEATED INFORMATION. PRIORITY TEL AVIV 73.

Reference EAPTEL 4208.

I discussed withdrawal Israeli Forces with Joxe yesterday and argued that to tie Israeli withdrawal to Suez Canal settlement, as French position seems to do, would be likely delay withdrawal definitely and hence, since withdrawal prerequisite to Arab cooperation on practically any issue, also delay provisional Suez settlement and all others pending ME questions. Joxe, who clearly agreed, replied yesterday's instruction of French UN delegation was "best he had been able to do". He hoped some way would be found to "strengthen" guarantees to Israel and thus produce prompt settlement.

Comment: We have impression French, far from urging Israelis to withdraw, may have been encouraging them to stand firm. French reasoning would be that Egypt can be obliged to accept reasonable provisional settlements Suez and Palestine questions only if Israeli Forces hold presents positions until Egypt give adequate guarantees. Foreign Office apparently has doubts as to lengths to which this line can be carried, but it is probably that which is being passed to Israelis by French political leaders and by French Ambassador Gilbert.

In view extremely strong pro-Israeli sentiment in French Government and Parliament at this time, I believe very high level demarche would have to be made in Washington or in Paris in order obtain even fair measure French cooperation on this issue.

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Action

Control: 11358

NEA

FROM: Damascus

Rec'd: February 19, 1957  
6:44 a.m.

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1918, February 19, Noon

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1918; REPEATED INFORMATION BEIRUT 568,  
AMMAN 200, CAIRO 240, TEL AVIV 122, JIDDA 117, BAGHDAD 228,  
USUN 1.

DEPCIRTEL 691

February 18 Kayyali of Foreign Office made strong informal  
appeal for US support Afro-Asian resolution sanctions against  
Israel or, as minimum, US absention in vote and no effort  
influence Latin Americans. While acknowledging strength US  
declarations Gaza-Sinai withdrawal, Kayyali asserted sanctions  
vote would be conclusive test US policy ME and "turning point  
in Syrian (and Arab) relations with US".

MOOSE

CWD:MJH/7

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Department of State

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Control: 12230  
Rec'd: February 20, 1957  
8:24 a.m.

FROM: New Delhi  
TO: Secretary of State  
NO: 2317, February 19, 7 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2317: REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 65, TEL AVIV 8  
Reference CIRTEL 691.

United States position on Gaza and Gulf of Aqaba discussed  
this morning with MEA joint secretary Jha along lines reference  
telegram and copies President's statement of February 17 and  
Department aide memoire of February 11 to Eban left with him.  
Jha volunteered no (repeat no) remarks beyond saying Eban's  
position very difficult and question Straits Aqaba might need  
ICJ decision since navigable channel wholly in Egyptian territory

BUNKER

MS:RAP/7

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-Control: 11642  
Rec'd: February 19, 1957  
2:10 p.m.

FROM: Copenhagen

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 579, February 19, 5 p.m.

DEPARTMENT PASS USUN.

Prime Minister told me today Danish General Assembly delegation agreed not (repeat not) vote for UN sanctions against Israel. He expressed view that while Israel's original military action wrong, they now justified seeking adequate guarantees. He is very critical of Nasser.

This position reflects majority opinion here which has consistently been pro-Israel due in part to natural sympathy small country and anti-Nasser because of latter's dictatorial methods and natural Danish affinity with UK.

COE

TT:DEM/10

NOTE: PASSED USUN 2/19/57, 6 PM (CTW)

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957 FEB 19 PM 7 15

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SENT TO: Amembassy, RABAT 493

Origin

Info:

Please make available King Saud President's statement and Department's aide-memoire to Israel Government released February 17 and carried Sunday Joint Wireless Files 14 and 15. If Saud already departed, pass request Tunis.

*Dulles  
(Supt)*

DULLES

674.84A/2-1957

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S/S-CR  
FEB 19 1957 P.M.

Drafted by:

NEA/P:TRF:ye

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA/P - Edwin M. J. Kretzmann

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Sherwood in substance  
Mr. Newsom in substance

Af - Mr. Norland in substance

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FYI Since despatch Depcirtel 691 Secretary has had three further meetings with Israelis. Israelis have continued maintain their withdrawal from Sharm el Shaikh can take place only in event one of following situations established:

- 1) unequivocal US guarantee of right passage for Israel shipping; 2) clear cut UNGA action assigning UNEF to Sharm el Shaikh until peace settlement arrangement for freedom navigation secured; achieved or until agreed and permanent ~~arrangement achieved~~; 3) declaration by Egypt in UNGA or elsewhere that it would not impose blockade of Israel vessels. Re Gaza they seek acquiescence in formula under which Israel would withdraw only military forces pending study by appropriate UN commission of measures to be taken re future civil administration Gaza. Israelis state they convinced any UN commission would see wisdom of not sundering links between Gaza and Israel. Israelis have stated their readiness assist raise standard of population of strip and to make contribution to a UN program for settling refugee population which could include both compensation and settlement.

US has taken position we could do little more than we had already <sup>suggested</sup> ~~done~~ in making statement our intentions. We thought second UNGA resolution Feb 2 had gone far in right direction. <sup>Not</sup> ~~EXPLICITLY~~ We could <sup>go</sup> in substance beyond what said in Feb 11 US Aide-Memoire. Many of points being raised by Israelis were not

NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 2/19/57.

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - William M. Rountree

Clearances:

S/S-OR

FEB 19 1957 P.M.

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were not proper matters for bilateral discussions but required action in UNGA or by UNSYG. US would not wish put itself in position ~~to~~ cut across UN efforts.

Secretary made strong plea for Israel withdrawal in accordance with UN resolutions ~~stating that the UN resolutions were not proper matters for bilateral discussions but required action in UNGA or by UNSYG. US would not wish put itself in position to cut across UN efforts.~~  
~~XXXXXX~~ While this course not without risk, <sup>to Israel</sup> Israel's refusal to terminate illegal occupation of non-Israel territory unconditionally entailed greater risk of highly dangerous consequences.

White House statement and text of US Aide-Memoire released Feb. 17. Secretary again consulting President Feb 19, both meet with Congressional leaders on Feb. 20. UNGA debate now scheduled for Feb. 21.

*Dulles*  
*in* DULLES

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Send by POUCH to following Embassies:

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

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(Security Classification)

FOR DC USE ONLY

NO.: A-711 April 1, 1957

SUBJECT: Telegram to President of the United States from Pierre Dumont,  
of the "Assemblée des Présidents des Chambres de Commerce -  
Union Française".

TO: The American Embassy, PARIS

Enclosed is a copy of a telegram from the "Assemblée des  
Présidents des Chambres de Commerce - Union Française" to  
the President of the United States.


It is suggested that the Embassy, at its discretion, make  
appropriate reply to the telegram.

DULLES

Dulles  
(SSS)

Enclosure: *sent ml.*

✓ Copy of telegram.



UNCLASSIFIED

(Security Classification)

DRAFTED BY:  
EUR:WE/P:LJLeClair:aw 3/29/57

APPROVED BY:

WE - Joseph J. Jova

CLEARANCES:

APR 1 1957 A.M.

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1957

Enclosure to  
NO: A-711 to Paris  
of

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Enclosure

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(Security Classification)

COPY OF TELEGRAM

WN2 47 VIA RCA

PARIS 1230 FEB 19 1957

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTONDC

ASSEMBLEE PRESIDENTS CHAMBRES DE COMMERCE UNION FRANCAISE ATTIRE  
ATTENTION ORGANISATION NATIONS UNIES SUR IMPORTANCE ECONOMIQUE  
RESPECT LIBERTE NAVIGATION DANS GOLFE D AKABA SOUHAITE VIVEMENT  
REGLEMENT DIFFEREND EGYPTO ISRAELIEN APPORTE GARANTIES INDISPENSABLES  
MAINTIEN RELATIONS COMMERCIALES INTERNATIONALES

PIERRE DUMONT

UNCLASSIFIED

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: February 19, 1957

SUBJECT: The question of Israeli Withdrawal from Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. J. E. Coulson, Minister, British Embassy

IC - Mr. Wilcox  
EUR - Mr. Kerry  
UNP - Mr. Adams

COPIES TO: MR/R  
S/S  
EUR  
NEA  
USUN  
OLI (2)

American Embassy London  
American Embassy Tel Aviv

574.84A/2-1957

Mr. Coulson referred to the conversation he had had with the Secretary and Mr. Wilcox yesterday and said that he had now heard from London that his government would be glad to "back up" the United States in Tel Aviv, in the question of Israeli withdrawal from Egypt. They were a little uncertain, however, what to aim for, and it was to discuss this that he had returned to the subject of yesterday's conversation. He wondered whether it would help to try to persuade the Israelis to issue a declaration of their intention "in principle" to withdraw from Egypt. He said the UK government would also be willing to issue a declaration regarding the Straits of Tiran, but did not quite see how this would help the Israelis if, for example, U.S. ships or UK ships, or others should pass freely through the Canal, it might still transpire that the Egyptians would endeavor to stop Israeli ships, and he did not quite see how the former could help the latter.

Mr. Wilcox said that of course the Israelis, too, raised the same question, but that the passage of international shipping generally through the Straits and declarations by maritime nations concerning international interest in passage through these waters would help to establish their juridical status.

Mr. Coulson asked whether we had told the Israelis anything in more precise terms, about, for example, what the United States would do if in fact Israel's ships were fired on, or whether it was the intention that U.S. vessels convoy Israeli ships. Mr. Wilcox said that we had not done so, that we had told them what we considered to be their rights and our rights and had indicated our intention to exercise our rights and thus contribute to establishing the juridical status of the Straits. We had told them that we would support them in any question about the juridical position, or move to put a question to the International Court of Justice. Mr. Coulson suggested it might be good rather to have the General Assembly pass a resolution on freedom of passage through the Straits. Mr. Wilcox said this would depend on a number of other things, that one can't be too explicit

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sometimes

sometimes; it would need to be thought out.

Mr. Coulson asked generally whether there was anything specific that we thought the UK Government could do in Tel Aviv. Mr. Wilcox said that some friendly reasoning with the Israelis might help them to see that their own best interests lie in getting out of Egypt. He pointed out that the Israelis incur risks either by getting out or by staying in, but that the latter course seems to offer by far greater risks than the former, in that prolonging their stay will cause other elements in the situation to worsen, the Suez Canal question to become complicated again, and the Russians to begin again to meddle with the situation. Mr. Coulson said that the British fully agree and will advise the Israelis in this sense, but wanted also if possible to give them the best reasons and the best possible justification for pulling out. He said he interpreted the U.S. statement to mean that the United States would not use armed force to help the Israelis exercise their rights in the Straits but would help in supporting their position in the U.N. and in the ICJ, etc. Mr. Wilcox said that this is correct and went on to point out that the U.S. will be in a much better position to press the Egyptians with respect to the safeguards in which the Israelis are interested after the Israelis will have withdrawn from Egypt.

Mr. Coulson again asked whether Mr. Wilcox thought that an Israeli statement to withdraw "in principle" would be helpful. Mr. Wilcox replied that such a statement would probably be fuzzy in any case, and may in fact be the form in which the Israelis will finally react to our aide memoire of February 11. Mr. Adams asked whether Mr. Coulson had anything additional in mind in speaking of a declaration "in principle". Did he not think that the Israelis had in effect already been stating that they would withdraw if they had absolute assurance about free passage for their ships and protection against fedayeen raids, in particular from the Gaza Strip. Mr. Coulson demurred, saying they had not quite said this really, but had rather merely said that they would not withdraw in the absence of such assurances, but had not quite said that they would withdraw if they did have such assurances.



IC:UNP:WAdams:rs

FORM DS-10  
4-1-55

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REFERENCE SLIP

DATE

March 1, 1957

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SIGNATURE <i>Samuel DePalma</i>	PHONE NO.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 19, 1957

SUBJECT: Middle East Problems; U.S.-Lebanese Relations

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Charles Malik, Foreign Minister of the Lebanon

NEA - William M. Rountree

NE - Edward L. Waggoner

COPIES TO: IES(cc) NEA(2cc) NE(3cc) OLI(2cc) Embassies BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO,  
DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, JERUSALEM, TEL AVIV (1 ea.)

Dr. Charles Malik, the Foreign Minister of the Lebanon, called at his request on Mr. Rountree at 3 p.m., February 19, 1957.

Israeli Withdrawal from the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza

Dr. Malik asked whether there were any new developments in connection with Israeli withdrawal from the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza. Mr. Rountree said there were no assurances as yet that the Israelis would withdraw. We had explained our concept of the situation to the Israelis. In our talks with the Israelis we had confined ourselves to those matters in which we had responsibility and had not injected ourselves into questions which came within the purview of the United Nations. We had hoped that our efforts would be successful, but so far they had not been. The President was at that moment discussing the problem with the Secretary.

Dr. Malik said that he wanted to make two points in this connection, one formal and one strictly private. The great gains in trust, hopefulness and respect which the President and the United States had made as a result of the stand taken in connection with the Suez problem might well be dissipated were the Israelis to continue to refuse to withdraw from Egyptian territory. However incorrectly, most Arabs believed that the United States was omnipotent and could force the Israelis to withdraw. Thus, failure to withdraw would be interpreted in the Arab world as the result of a lukewarm attitude on the part of the United States. Israel ought to be able to see that this was the case and to help the United States.

Privately

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Privately, Dr. Malik expressed the opinion that the Israelis were behaving very foolishly. If they were to withdraw at once, then the onus in the situation would be transferred to Egypt and most of the world would be with Israel. Mr. Rountree said that he agreed with Dr. Malik's observation, and that we were hopeful that the Israelis would shortly come to understand the point of view expressed by Dr. Malik.

Dr. Malik continued that it would be no pleasure for him or many of his colleagues in the United Nations to have to call publicly in the United Nations for sanctions against Israel. Nevertheless, he and most of his colleagues would do so if Israel did not withdraw even though they recognized that a call for sanctions would cause great complications in many quarters. Mr. Rountree observed that there was genuine concern in the United States over the implications of undertaking sanctions, particularly against a small power. Dr. Malik said that once sanctions were approved against Israel, the United States would have no difficulty in immediately having sanctions voted against the U.S.S.R. for its actions in Hungary. It was, furthermore, Dr. Malik's opinion that the U.S.S.R. would vote against sanctions for Israel, and that the United States would thereby achieve a great boost in the Arab world.

Dr. Malik's 34 Fundamental Problems in the Near East

Mr. Rountree thanked Dr. Malik for his paper covering 34 fundamental problems in the Near East. He said that the Secretary and other officers in the Department were currently giving it very careful study.

Ambassador Richards' Visit to Beirut

Mr. Rountree noted that Dr. Malik had asked to be informed concerning the tentative dates Ambassador Richards would visit Beirut, and said that present plans were for Ambassador Richards to reach Beirut sometime during the second week of March. Mr. Rountree asked Dr. Malik whether that time would be convenient for him. Dr. Malik said that he expected to be back before that time, and that it would be most satisfactory to him.

U.S. Assistance to the Lebanon

Dr. Malik asked whether any decisions had been reached concerning additional U.S. assistance for the Lebanon. Mr. Rountree said that no definitive decisions had been reached, but that progress was being made, and that Dr. Malik could be sure that in principle we would be willing to extend additional economic assistance. Mr. Rountree added that we hoped to be able to help the Lebanon with its military problems as well and that studies on both economic and military assistance were in advanced stages.

Baalbek Festival

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-3-

Baalbek Festival

Dr. Malik said that the Committee of the Baalbek Festival had asked him to propose various considerations for United States participation in the Festival. They had specifically suggested that an American symphony orchestra perform at the Festival, that one or more American singers participate and that the United States assist in giving publicity to the Festival. They had furthermore suggested that ICA might be willing to make a study of the possibility of constructing motels in the vicinity of Baalbek to house visitors for the Festival. Mr. Rountree replied that he would give immediate consideration to these various suggestions. Mr. Waggoner added that the possibility of sending an American symphony orchestra to the festival was already under study.

ICA Assistance to Private Institutions

Dr. Malik said that he had inadvertently not discussed with ICA the possibility of channeling some ICA assistance in the Lebanon through private institutions. He said that he thought there was a need for greater flexibility on this point, especially in the Lebanon where private enterprise played a more important role than in other countries of the Middle East. Dr. Malik described the institution run by Father Cortbawi for rehabilitating street waifs and giving them technical training so that they can become useful citizens. Mr. Rountree said that the basic purpose of a U.S. aid program was to contribute to the development of the economy and that assistance must necessarily be related to the development of the economy. He said, however, that this was a subject that Dr. Malik might usefully discuss with ICA.

Syrian Pipeline Problem

Dr. Malik asked what progress was being made on the pipeline problem. Mr. Rountree said that we could have no confidence in the commitments of the Syrian Government and in the long run must certainly seek alternate means of transporting oil. Meanwhile, world opinion was focused more and more on this problem, particularly the unreasonableness of tying the pipeline question in with Israeli withdrawal from Egypt. We assumed that if the Israelis withdrew from Egypt, the Syrian Government would permit repair of the pipelines. However, Syrian conduct has weakened the confidence of world opinion in the stability of the Syrian Government and in the reliance to be put on any commitment by that Government. Dr. Malik said that the Iraqis were thinking of bringing this question to the United Nations. Mr. Rountree said that he thought they would be justified in doing so.

Suez Canal

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Suez Canal

Dr. Malik asked what progress was being made on the clearance of the Suez Canal. Mr. Rountree said that the Canal was virtually open, although the Egyptian Government had not yet permitted the removal of the last obstacle, a vessel loaded with ammunition. Fortunately, the Egyptian Government had not taken the position that the reopening of the Canal was dependent on Israeli withdrawal from Egypt. Were the Egyptian Government to take such a stand its position would suffer a complete change. The United States had not assumed that the Egyptian Government would do so since in so doing, it would be imposing sanctions on a great many governments throughout the world, most of which had been on the side of Egypt. We had assumed and continued to assume that clearance of the Canal would be completed in the near future and that no obstruction would be placed in the way of free movement in the Canal.

Dr. Malik's Plans

Dr. Malik asked whether Mr. Rountree thought that he could expect concrete results from his conversations before he departed from the United States. Mr. Rountree said that we had already had concrete benefits from Dr. Malik's visit and were grateful for the ideas which he had given us. At the moment it was impossible to say when we might be able to render definitive judgments on the Lebanese requests for aid. Mr. Rountree stated that he hoped that by the time Ambassador Richards reached Beirut we could give the Lebanese Government definite ideas on how we could be helpful.

Dr. Malik said that he would keep in touch with his Embassy to determine what progress was being made and whether it would be useful for him to have a further conversation with Mr. Rountree. Mr. Rountree said that he would like to have another conversation with Dr. Malik and asked Dr. Malik to let him know a day or two before he planned to return to Washington so that arrangements could be made for a final conversation.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
NEA:NE:ELWaggoner:flt:cdt  
2/25/57

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HOME OFFICE:  
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

February 19, 1957

JOHN J. ALLEN, JR.  
7TH DIST., CALIFORNIA

SECRETARIES:  
MILICENT FOX  
HELEN GALE  
SHARON WELLS  
AUDREY C. SMITH  
SALLY CLEMENT  
RAYMOND V. HALL

ACTION  
is assigned to



Hon. Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I enclose a letter from a constituent, Mrs. Arthur Johnson, 1627 Trestle Glen Road, Oakland 10, concerning Israel.

I would appreciate your reading Mrs. Johnson's letter and giving me any comments and suggestions that will be helpful to me in replying to her letter.

When the enclosure has served its purpose, will you please have it returned to this office.

Cordially yours,

*John J. Allen, Jr.*

John J. Allen, Jr.

674.84A/2-1957

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enclosure

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DATE

*att Jy 14*

JUN 21 1957

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enclosures, if any) micro-  
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*Handwritten signature and initials*

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A/53

MARGUERITE STITT CHURCH  
13TH DISTRICT, ILLINOIS

S/S  
COMMITTEE  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ACTION  
is assigned to

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

February 19, 1957

8138

File  
LIVE-RE-PAID  
3-12-57

REPLY SENT  
FEB. 27 -

My dear Mr. Dulles:

May I most respectfully express my commendation of your untiring efforts to bring about a temporary modus vivendi and eventual peace in the troubled Middle East.

At this moment I would like to express my own hope that the United States will not support economic sanctions against Israel. Such action would, in my opinion, be discriminatory so long as similar measures are not taken against other nations that have refused to heed the recommendations of the United Nations.

Whereas I realize, with compelling logic, that two wrongs cannot make a right, I nevertheless feel that every effort should be made not to impose sanctions against Israel at this time.

Sincerely yours,

Chapman St. Church

The Honorable John Foster Dulles  
Secretary of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1957 FEB 20 PM 2 18

RECORDS  
CURRENT RECORDS  
BRANCH

674.84A/2-1957

A/39

674.84A/2-1957

This letter (and its enclosures, if any) micro-filmed for EM/R records

324071

DC/R
Adm 39
Rev
Out

H - Mr. Forsten

February 20, 1958

IO - Mr. Davis

Roy:

For appropriate handling. Please  
coordinate with H.

R. K. German  
S/S-60

Att: Ltr to Sec fm Marguerite  
S. Church, dtd 2/19, re  
sanctions against Israel.  
(S/S #1181)

cc: H - Mr. Forsten

RKGerman:jcs

FROM AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT

DATE DUE

DATE REC'D

Church, Marguerite Stitt

3/12/57

DATE

FILED

2/19/57

NO.

SUBJECT

Commendation for efforts in Middle East

TO:

TO:

TO:

TO:

~~RM~~

RM/R File

DATE

DATE

DATE

DATE

3/12/57

ANSWERED

NO REPLY NECESSARY

FEB. 27 BY UNP RBP



FEB 26 1957

In reply refer to:  
IO:UNP:674.84A/2-1957

Dear Mrs. Church:

I have received your letter of February 19 addressed to the Secretary, acknowledged by telephone on February 18, expressing concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be accurate or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that

sanctions

The Honorable  
Marguerite S. Church,  
House of Representatives.

DC/R	1
Anal	2
Rev	
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This Document  
Filed  
Central  
Files

674.84A/2-1957

674.84A/2-1957  
CS/R

sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

Your views on the efforts of the Secretary to bring about a settlement of the troubled conditions in the Middle East are appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

H-WF-X


*W. E. P. Mr. Le Clair*  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 27, 1957

EUR - Mr. Belcher

Attached for appropriate handling  
is a telegram to the President from  
Mr. Pierre Dumont of Paris France.

  
J. H. Cunningham  
for Archer Blood  
S/S-RO

Attachment:

SS 1275. Tel. dtd. 2/19 re  
Gulf of Aqaba.

5/5 Rec 3:40 pm  
2/26/57  
1775

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

**ROUTE SLIP**

(To Remain With Correspondence)

TO Mr. Fisher Howe  
Director, Executive Secretariat  
Department of State

PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL.  
WHEN DRAFT REPLY IS REQUESTED  
THE BASIC CORRESPONDENCE MUST  
BE RETURNED. IF ANY DELAY IN  
SUBMISSION OF DRAFT REPLY IS  
ENCOUNTERED, PLEASE TELEPHONE  
OFFICE OF THE STAFF SECRETARY.

Date February 26, 1957

**FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY**

**ACTION:**


Comment \_\_\_\_\_  
Draft reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For direct reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For your information \_\_\_\_\_  
For necessary action \_\_\_\_\_  
For appropriate handling X \_\_\_\_\_  
See below \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

GPO 16-71364-1

By direction of the President:

*A. J. Goodpastor*  
A. J. GOODPASTER  
Staff Secretary  
*Law*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Division of Language Services

IS No. 37475

T-19/ ✓

TRANSLATOR'S SUMMARY OF COMMUNICATION

Language: French

Date of Communication: February 19, 1957

Addressed to: The President

Name and address of writer: Mr. Pierre Dumont  
Paris  
France

Substance of writer's statement: Full text of telegram

ASSEMBLY OF PRESIDENTS OF CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE OF THE FRENCH UNION  
CALL ATTENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION TO THE ECONOMIC  
IMPORTANCE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA. EARNESTLY  
HOPES SETTLEMENT OF THE EGYPTO-ISRAELI DISPUTE WILL PROVIDE FOR  
GUARANTEES INDISPENSABLE TO MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE RE-  
LATIONS.

This Document Must Be Returned to  
RM/R  
Central  
Files

The White House  
Washington

*TO ELR  
927*

WNT 47 VIA RCA

1957 FEB 19 AM 8 39

PARIS 1230 FEB 19 1957

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITEHOUSE WASHINGTONDC

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
**RECEIVED**  
MAR 29 1957  
WE/E  
Department of State

*Info. To Pres  
WE/P: L. L. Clair  
3/29/57*

ASSEMBLEE PRESIDENTS CHAMBRES DE COMMERCE UNION FRANCAISE

ATTIRE ATTENTION ORGANISATION NATIONS UNIES SUR IMPORTANCE

ECONOMIQUE RESPECT LIBERTE NAVIGATION DANS GOLFE D AKABA

SOUHAITE VIVEMENT REGLEMENT DIFFEREND EGYPTO

ISRAELIEN APPORTE GARANTIES INDISPENSABLES MAINTIEN RELATIONS

COMMERCIALES INTERNATIONALES

PIERRE DUMONT

*Oct 1957*  
*Ref*  
*Local 62*  
*DCR*

APR 7 1957

**FILED**

674.842-2-1957  
674.84A/2-1957

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FOR THE PRESS**

FEBRUARY 17, 1957

NO. 72

The attached is the text of an Aide Memoire handed to Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban on February 11, 1957 by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles:

Cs/F

February 11, 1957

The United Nations General Assembly has sought specifically, vigorously, and almost unanimously, the prompt withdrawal from Egypt of the armed forces of Britain, France and Israel. Britain and France have complied unconditionally. The forces of Israel have been withdrawn to a considerable extent but still hold Egyptian territory at Sharm el Shaikh at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. They also occupy the Gaza Strip which is territory specified by the Armistice arrangements to be occupied by Egypt.

We understand that it is the position of Israel that (1) it will evacuate its military forces from the Gaza Strip provided Israel retains the civil administration and police in some relationship to the United Nations; and (2) it will withdraw from Sharm el Shaikh if continued freedom of passage through the Straits is assured.

With respect to (1) the Gaza Strip -- it is the view of the United States that the United Nations General Assembly has no authority to require of either Egypt or Israel a substantial modification of the Armistice Agreement, which, as noted, now gives Egypt the right and responsibility of occupation. Accordingly, we believe that Israeli withdrawal from Gaza should be prompt and unconditional, leaving the future of the Gaza Strip to be worked out through the efforts and good offices of the United Nations.

We recognize that the area has been a source of armed infiltration and reprisals back and forth contrary to the Armistice Agreement and is a source of great potential danger because of the presence there of so large a number of Arab refugees -- about 200,000. Accordingly, we believe that the United Nations General Assembly and the Secretary General should seek that the United Nations Emergency Force, in the exercise of its mission, move into this area and be on the boundary between Israel and the Gaza Strip.

The United States will use its best efforts to help to assure this result, which we believe is contemplated by the Second Resolution of February 2, 1957.

With respect to (2) the Gulf of Aqaba and access thereto -- the United States believes that the Gulf comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto. We have in mind not only commercial usage, but the passage of pilgrims on religious missions, which should be fully respected.

The



The United States recalls that on January 28, 1950, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the United States that the Egyptian occupation of the two islands of Tiran and Senafir at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba was only to protect the islands themselves against possible damage or violation and that "this occupation being in no way conceived in a spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through the stretch of water separating these two islands from the Egyptian coast of Sinai, it follows that this passage, the only practicable one, will remain free as in the past, in conformity with international practice and recognized principles of the law of nations".

In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.

It is of course clear that the enjoyment of a right of free and innocent passage by Israel would depend upon its prior withdrawal in accordance with the United Nations Resolutions. The United States has no reason to assume that any littoral state would under these circumstances obstruct the right of free and innocent passage.

The United States believes that the United Nations General Assembly and the Secretary General should, as a precautionary measure, seek that the United Nations Emergency Force move into the Straits area as the Israeli forces are withdrawn. This again we believe to be within the contemplation of the Second Resolution of February 2, 1957.

(3) The United States observes that the recent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly call not only for the prompt and unconditional withdrawal of Israel behind the Armistice lines but call for other measures.

We believe, however, that the United Nations has properly established an order of events and an order of urgency and that the first requirement is that forces of invasion and occupation should withdraw.

The United States is prepared publicly to declare that it will use its influence, in concert with other United Nations members, to the end that, following Israel's withdrawal, these other measures will be implemented.

We believe that our views and purposes in this respect are shared by many other nations and that a tranquil future for Israel is best assured by reliance upon that fact, rather than by an occupation in defiance of the overwhelming judgment of the world community.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 26, 1957

SEV - Mr. Meagher

Please send a suitable acknowledgment to the attached telegram to the Under Secretary from Mr. Edward Smith regarding the Israeli situation.

Copies should be sent to S/S, with a copy for U, by March 1.

  
J. H. Cunningham  
S/S-RO

Attachment:

Tel to U Sec. fm Edward Smith  
dtd 2/19/57 re Israeli situation.

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

# WESTERN UNION

## TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS

DL=Day Letter  
NL=Night Letter  
LT=International Letter Telegram

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at destination.

=(37)

1957 FEB 20 PM

This Document Must Be Returned to  
R/R 674.84A/2-1957

WZ078 NL PD VIA DLY VIA TX NOT EOB= NEWYORK NY FEB 19:  
=HON CHRISTIAN C HERTER=  
3108 P NORTHWEST=

*draft file*  
*SEV*  
*Rec'd 2/21/57*

URGE YOU NOT BE MISLED BY MINORITY POLITICAL PRESSURE  
FROM AMERICAN ZIONISTS. SUPPORT THE EISENHOWER DULLES  
UN. INSISTENCE ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT FURTHER  
SECURITY GUARANTEES. ISRAEL IS OF MINOR STRATEGIC  
IMPORTANCE TO U S MID EAST POLICY PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE  
RECEIPT=

FILED  
MAR 2 1957

EDWARD W SMITH 3RD 8 PETER COOPER RD NEWYORK 10 N

CS/4

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

DLR  
37  
Rev  
Cst

674.84A/2-1957

March 14 1957

Dear Mr. Smith:

Under Secretary Harter has asked me to thank you for your telegram of February 13. We appreciate your expressions of approval for United States policy in the Middle East and believe that the problems surrounding the withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the Armistice line can be solved with justice to all parties concerned.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Mcagher  
Chief  
Public Services Division

Mr. Edward W. Smith, III,  
8 Peter Cooper Road,  
New York 10, New York.

DC/R
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Adj-1
Rev
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P:SEV:CERusing:ad 3/4/57

S/S-CR  
CPL  
MAR 13 1957 A.M.

NEA/P

LPB049

WU 031 NL PD CD NEW YORK NY FEB 19

ROBERT C HILL, ASST SEC OF STATE

DC/T  
CODE SECTION

SENT FOLLOWING WIRE TO THESE GENTLEMEN

ON, KNOWLAND, HERTER, MARTIN AND LODGE: "URGE YOU

BE MISLED BY MINORITY POLITICAL PRESSURE FROM  
AMERICAN ZIONISTS. SUPPORT THE EISENHOWER-DULLES-U N  
INSISTENCE ON ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT FURTHER SECURITY  
GUARANTEES. ISRAEL IS OF MINOR STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO  
US MID-EAST POLICY PLEASE EXERT YOUR OFFICE TOWARD

THIS END

EDWARD M SMITH 3RD 8 PETER COOPER RD

10 NY FEB 20 532AM.

DC/R
Anal <u>2</u>
Rev
Cat <u>SUN</u>

FILED  
MAR 4 - 1957

1957 FEB 20 AM 9 31

674.84A/2-1957

H-ASSISTANT SECRETARY/  
FOR CONGRESSIONAL  
RELATIONS

CS/R

Returned

74-8000

2-1957

*Reply drafted*  
*2/25/57*  
*W. Hill*  
*#*

*Nothing more than an*  
*expression of opinion*

February 27 1957

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your telegram of February 19 in support of United States policy in the Middle East.

It is our hope that the question of Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from Sharm ash-Shaykh can be settled peacefully to the ultimate benefit of all concerned. Your views in this matter are sincerely appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

674.84A/2-1957

CS/R

DC/R

Anal

Fev

S/B-CR

FEB 25 1957 P.M.

FEB 27 1957

Mr. Edward W. Smith, III,  
8 Peter Cooper Road,  
New York 10, New York.

NEA:NE:RParker:rej - 2/25/57

H  
Hue

1193

20 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. A. J. GOODPASTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reply to Mr. Jerome L. Metz

In accordance with your request of February 19, 1957,  
there is enclosed a copy of the Department's reply to  
Mr. Jerome L. Metz's letter of February 12 to a member of  
the White House staff, concerning sanctions against Israel.

FISHER HOWE

Fisher Howe  
Director  
Executive Secretariat

Enclosure:

Copy of Department's reply  
to Mr. Jerome L. Metz.

S/S-RO

A true copy of  
original

P:SEV:CE Rushing:OBLlbt 3/15/57  
Retyped S/S-RO 3/20/57

SC/R  
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674.84A/2-1957

A/29  
674.84A/2-1957



**MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL A. J. GOODPASTER**  
**THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Subject: Mr. Metz's letter of February 12, 1957 concerning sanctions against Israel.**

In accordance with your request of February 19, 1957, there is enclosed a copy of the Department's reply to Mr. Metz's letter to a member of the White House staff.

**Fisher Howe**  
**Director**  
**Executive Secretariat**

**Enclosure:**

**Copy of Department's reply.**

**P:SEV:CE****Rushing:CEB:bt**

**3/15/57**

**S/S-CR**  
**MAR 15 1957 P.M.**  
*To SEV with orig. of  
encl. to be signed.*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL A. J. GOODPASTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: *Reply to Mr. Jerome L. Metz*  
~~Mr. Metz's letter of February 12, 1957 con-~~  
~~cerning sanctions against Israel.~~

In accordance with your request of February 19,  
1957, there is enclosed a copy of the Department's  
reply to <sup>Jerome L.</sup> Mr. Metz's <sup>of February 12</sup> letter, to a member of the White  
house staff, *concerning sanctions against Israel.*

Fisher Howe  
Director  
Executive Secretariat

Enclosure:

Copy of Department's reply.

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

ROUTE SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

TO Mr. Fisher Howe  
Director, Executive Secretariat  
Department of State

PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL.  
WHEN DRAFT REPLY IS REQUESTED  
THE BASIC CORRESPONDENCE MUST  
BE RETURNED. IF ANY DELAY IN  
SUBMISSION OF DRAFT REPLY IS  
ENCOUNTERED, PLEASE TELEPHONE  
OFFICE OF THE STAFF SECRETARY.

Date February 19, 1957

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

ACTION:

Comment \_\_\_\_\_  
Draft reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For direct reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For your information \_\_\_\_\_  
For necessary action \_\_\_\_\_  
For appropriate handling \_\_\_\_\_  
See below X

Remarks:

It will be appreciated if the Department will write Mr. Metz  
in reply to the letter he addressed to a member of the White  
House staff -- text attached.

Please let us have a copy of the reply.

re: Sanctions against Israel.

GPO 16-71204-1

By direction of the President:

*A.J. Goodpastor*  
A.J. GOODPASTER  
Staff Secretary  
*PAM*

329739

DC/B
FILED 29
CLASS
SECRET

FILED  
MAR 15 1957

TO THE CHIEF OF CENTRAL FILE

674:84A/2-1957

A/29  
674.84A/2-1957

# J. L. Metz Furniture Co., Inc.

Established 1900

DESIGNERS AND MANUFACTURERS

HIGH GRADE FURNITURE

February

12,

1957

252 WILDWOOD ROAD

HAMMOND, INDIANA

I am writing this directly to you instead of the President since we have corresponded before and since I am in hopes that this particular letter will actually be brought to the President's immediate attention. I fully realize that thousands of letters must be scanned by staff people and answered for him.

It is doubtful that the President will remember me as an officer member of two of his most important 1942 meetings and it is very unimportant that he signed photographs for me as holding two major citations. However this is mentioned only as the reason given by a number of important Calumet District business and professional men who as a group have asked me to write directly to the President, hoping that he would certainly change his views in connection with recently stated policy regarding Israel.

To believe that such a policy of discrimination and economic sanction could exist in this day of Democracy is almost unthinkable, particularly in face of the Hungarian atrocities wherein no policy of action has been taken by the Administration.

If the policy toward Israel, which has apparently created much disfavor in Congress as of this date, is pursued it is my fear that officer resignations in the Army Reserve of this area can be expected in large numbers. It is my hope that this letter is accepted in the spirit in which it is written and though these may be my personal views, they are shared by those whom I represent in the Calumet Industrial District in this great area.

We trust this will receive the President's personal attention and that he realizes that it is written with the deepest respect.

Sincerely,

JLM:fl

cc: Dr. Louis L. Mann  
cc: Rabbi Jacob Weinstein  
cc: Rabbi Ulrich B. Steuer  
cc: Rabbi Frank D. Plotke  
cc: Mgr. F. A. Jansen  
cc: Bishop Grutka

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1957 MAR 19 AM 10 55

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.  
PCB

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

58-B

UNCLASSIFIED

Action  
NEAControl: 12467  
Rec'd: February 20, 1967  
1:38 p.m.Info  
RMR

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2657, February 20.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2657, REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 85, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BENGHAZI, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KHARTOUM, LONDON, PARIS, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI UNNUMBERED

UOP  
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CHI

Accounts secretary's press conference, scheduled meeting President with Congressional leaders and other aspects. Israeli problem continue receive main press emphasis February 20th but share frontpages with developments Canal, Saud on Baghdad Pact, and Bulganin attack.

COB  
USIA  
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OCT  
ARMY  
NAVY  
AIR

Editorials rephrase familiar arguments re Israel. After attacking Israeli claim she wants live in peace, GUMHOURIYA concluded "so long as Israel exists neither Mid East nor world will have peace and security". AHRAM noting it "is clearer than ever before supporting Israel and trying dissuade UN from imposing sanctions", declares "US opposes sanctions for fear antagonizing American Zionists while realizing no harm domestically in riding over rights Egyptians and Arabs", and asks "does any American believe Israel will change unless forced to". KAHIRA reiterates theme US efforts effects withdrawal are not "serious" because "no one will believe US can't force Israel get out", and concludes "US acting on behalf imperialists", explaining "while US pats Israel on back Israelis are busy exterminating Arab population in Gaza". KHALID MOHIEDDINE again observes "US on spot" since if she does not support sanctions "neither Eisenhower plan nor any other American plan for Mid East will bear fruit". SADAT compares restrictions non-belligerent US imposes on transit Soviet ships through Panama with Egypt's refusal permit enemy ships use territorial waters and concludes "real objective Mister Dulles is reward Israel for her aggression". In view testimony former US Mid East Ambassador AKHBAR declares either Ambassadors did not report accurately or White House and Department did not bother read reports transmitted or reports although read "were overruled by superior authority in form power of 9 million American Jews".

HARE

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

ACTION COPY

31

Action

CONFIDENTIAL

Control:

12337

Rec'd:

February 20, 1957  
10:53 a.m.

NEA

Info

FROM: Damascus

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1925, February 20, 1 p.m.

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ARMY

NAVY

AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 1925; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 203, BEIRUT 573,  
CAIRO 243, TEL AVIV 124

Foreign Minister Bitar called me to Foreign Office February 19, to raise following two points re President's February 17 Thomasville statement: (A) President failed distinguish between Arab (Egyptian) innocence of wrong-doing in Sinai and Israeli culpability for frontier incidents and (B) Suggestion UNEF occupy Gaza region represented unacceptable alienation Arab territory.

Bitar said Israel, should not (repeat not) be permitted profit by aggression, and US should not (repeat not) take initiative in modifying armistice terms. He expressed Arab view President's suggestion about Gaza strip likely cause resentment.

I undertook transmit GOS views to Department after remarking to Foreign Minister Syria appears criticize suggestion intended improve conditions Gaza area which resulted in hostilities. I expressed doubt that Arab interests would be served by return to status quo ante of Fedayeen infiltration followed by reprisal raid.

MOOSE

SW:RAP/7

NEA  
MESSAGE CENTER

12-29 PM 12-12-57

-file

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Department of State

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58-51

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Action

Control: 12505  
Rec'd: February 20, 1957  
2:08 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Damascus

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1928, February 20, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1928; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 206, BAGHDAD 233, BEIRUT 576, CAIRC 246, JIDDA 122, TEL AVIV 126.

JOINT STATE-USIA.

Although most Syrian press February 19 publishes text "U.S. aid memoire" (USIS Release left by me with Prime Minister) and President Eisenhower's statement on Israeli withdrawal editorial reaction U.S. position continues hostile. RAI AL AM (G-2 CMUS) declares President would have returned Washington earlier and stopped financial aid Israel if he serious about withdrawal. Also claims U.S. indirectly asking Arab U.N. delegates opinions possibility ending withdrawal deadlock Regue international court but this unacceptable Arabs since simply Zionist maneuver to avoid certain loss of case in U.N. AL NUR (Communist-line) asserts U.S. is protector Israel. AL JAMHUR (pro-Soviet) says sanctions ineffective because U.K. France would support Israel secretly and therefore only solution is use of force liberated Arab states. These comments typical while support or understanding U.S. position non-existent.

Syrian broadcasting system neglected report "aide memoire" or President's statement but in English and French commentaries February 18 castigated U.S. as parent and guardian of Israel.

MOOSE

MAA

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674.84A/2-2057

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100-521-11-13-4

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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CORRECTION ISSUED:

58-51  
Action

Control: 12505

Rec'd: February 20, 1957  
2:08 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Damascus - CORRECTED COPY

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1928, February 20, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1928; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 206, BAGHDAD 233, BEIRUT 576, CAIRO 246, JIDDA 122, TEL AVIV 126.

JOINT STATE-USIA.

Although most Syrian press February 19 publishes text "US aide memoire" (USIS release left by me with Prime Minister) and President Eisenhower's statement on Israeli withdrawal editorial reaction US position continues hostile. RAI AL AM (G-2 ASRP) declares President would have returned Washington earlier and stopped financial aid Israel if he serious about withdrawal. Also claims US indirectly asking Arab UN delegates opinions possibility raising withdrawal deadlock Hague international court but this unacceptable Arabs since simply Zionist maneuver to avoid certain loss of case in UN AL NUR (Communist-line) asserts US is protector Israel. AL JAMHUR (pro-Soviet) says sanctions ineffective because UK France would support Israel secretly and therefore only solution is use of force liberated Arab states. These comments typical while support or understanding US position non-existent.

Syrian broadcasting system neglected report "aide memoire" of President's statement but in English and French commentaries February 18 castigated US as parent and guardian of Israel.

MOOSE

EB:ALR-11

MESSAGE  
1957 FEB 22Correction made  
by RM/R

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674.34A/2-2057



INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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54-51

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Control: 12469  
Rec'd: February  
1:52 p.m.1957 FEB 21 AM 7-13  
MESSAGE  
NEA  
ENTERThis Document Must Be Returned to  
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FROM: Jidda

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 469, February 20, 3 p.m.

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EUR  
LSENT DEPARTMENT 469, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 23, BAGHDAD 35,  
BEIRUT 42, CAIRO 96, DAMASCUS 33, TEL AVIV 6.IC  
P

Department circular telegram 691

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Acting head Foreign Office Sheikh Ali Awad received me with more than usual cordiality February 17 when I called to reiterate firm stand USG re immediate unconditional Israeli withdrawal. Left aide memoire on lines department circular telegrams 681 and 691.

CCB  
USIA  
OTA

Both he and Hafiz Wahba, former Saudi Ambassador to UK, who joined discussion, expressed appreciation this assurance, commenting that press and radio reports from Cairo, London and Washington past few days had been confusing on this point. Both men went out of their way to express deep appreciation USG's "courageous stand" from beginning of UK-France-Israel "aggression against Egypt." Fact that Soviet "contribution" to cessation hostilities was not mentioned is something of an innovation in Saudi officials discussion of subject. Both emphasized that only by continued firm stand of USG could Israel be left to comply with UN resolutions.

In subsequent call Chief of Protocol Mutasib on another matter I found him in exceptionally agreeable mood. Although he is not influential politically, it is noteworthy that in this meeting he marred his previously unsullied record of tendentiousness on subject of "US paternity of Israel".

Non-official influential Saudis past few days have expressed to Embassy officer concern about "apparent wavering" of US re Israel withdrawal. Only yesterday and today has Embassy received beginning signs of reassurance in these quarters, apparently as result VOA broadcasts.

JENKINS

MOG:SGC

674.84A/E-2057

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL  
AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

45-48

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 770, FEBRUARY 20, 9 P.M.

Control: 12797

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 20, 1957  
10:55 P.M.

PRIORITY

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

LODGE SAW RIFAI (JORDAN), FAWZI (EGYPT) AND MALIK (LEBANON) WITH VIEW TO SEEKING 24 HOUR POSTPONEMENT FOR GA CONSIDERATION MID EAST SITUATION. LODGE TOLD THEM BRIEFLY OF PRESIDENT'S CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, AND FACT THAT PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE STATEMENT WEDNESDAY EVENING WHICH WE HOPED WOULD MAKE IMPACT ON ISRAELIS. LODGE ALSO SAID FURTHER EFFORTS BEING MADE BY US WITH ISRAEL IN TEL AVIV.

FAWZI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR "STEADY EFFORTS OF US". FAWZI AGREED DELAY GA CONSIDERATION TO FRIDAY AFTERNOON AND SUGGESTED TO RIFAI, WHO IS CHAIRMAN OF AFRO-ASIAN GROUP THIS MONTH, THAT HE NOT GO INTO MUCH DETAIL AS TO REASONS WHY HE WAS REQUESTING FURTHER POSTPONEMENT OF GA. FAWZI SUGGESTED RIFAI TELL AFRO-ASIANS THAT EFFORTS "TO GET OVER PRESENT DIFFICULTIES OUTSIDE UN" ARE BEING CONTINUED AND THAT AFRO-ASIAN GROUP SHOULD ALLOW A LITTLE MORE SCOPE".

FAWZI EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN THAT CANADA, WHICH HE SAID HAD DRAFT RESOLUTION, MIGHT GO AHEAD WITH IT AND THEREBY FORCE EGYPT'S HAND. HE ASKED US TO SEE TO IT THAT NO SUCH ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN SINCE THIS MIGHT FORCE HIM TO SUBMIT SANCTION RESOLUTION WITHOUT DELAY.

RIFAI CALLED LATER THIS EVENING AND INFORMED US THAT AFRO-ASIAN GROUP HAD AGREED TO POSTPONEMENT. RIFAI ALSO SAID HE HAD ANNOUNCED TO PRESS REQUEST FOR POSTPONEMENT HAD BEEN MADE BY US.

WHEN GADEL

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PA

674.84A

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 770, FEBRUARY 20, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK.

WHEN CADET OFFICER INFORMED PARSON (CANADA) OF POSTPONEMENT TO FRIDAY AFTERNOON, HE INFORMED US THAT HE HAD DRAFT STATEMENT PREPARED WHICH MAY HAVE TO BE ALTERED IN LIGHT OF WHAT PRESIDENT SAID THIS EVENING. HE SAID DRAFT STATEMENT CONTAINS SOME IDEAS AS TO WHAT CANADA BELIEVES OUGHT TO BE IN RESOLUTION. HE DID NOT EXPRESS ANY INTENTION TO MOVE AHEAD WITH RESOLUTION. HE SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH HIS DELEGATION THURSDAY WITH REGARD TO DEVELOPMENTS.

LODGE

OKY

CONFIDENTIAL

NND 897403  
BOX 2677

17  
1/3/89

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 674,84A/2-2057  
Tel 809  
Date 2/20/57  
From State  
To Tel Aviv

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☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NSC  
Authority

1/4/89  
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

17

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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☐ CHARGE TO

## Department of State

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Classification

10833  
1957 FEB 20 PM 6 06  
Files  
BC/T  
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SENT TO: CIRCULAR - PRIORITY

704.

Origin

Info

XR  
501

Tonight's Wireless Bulletin will carry full text President's address to American people re Middle East. You should in manner you consider desirable bring to attention of Government to which accredited.

Send to following Embassies:

AMMAN  
ANKARA  
BAGHDAD  
BEIRUT  
CAIRO  
DAMASCUS  
JIDDA  
KARACHI  
KHARTOUM  
MADRID  
NEW DELHI  
RABAT  
TEHRAN  
TRIPOLI  
TUNIS

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674.84A/2-2057

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Desired  
(Offices  
Only)

SV  
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Drafted by:  
NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 2/20/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by: NE - Fraser Wilkins

Clerks

S/S-CR

FEB 20 1957 P.M.

UNCLASSIFIED  
Classification

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CS/R  
7674.84A/2-2057

AIR POUCH

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

674.84A/2-2057

## FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy COPENHAGEN

659

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

February 20, 1957

DATE

REF

18 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	NEA-4 2/25	RM/R-2, EUR-5, IO-4, OLI-8 CIA-12, OSD-4, ARMY-4, NAVY-3, AIR-3

SUBJECT: Danish Prime Minister's Comments on Middle East Situation

During a discussion of the international situation with the Prime and Foreign Minister, H. C. Hansen, February 19th, the Prime Minister asked me if I had any information on the American attitude regarding Israel. I said that I had received nothing in the last day or so and only knew what has appeared in the press. I did point out that it was apparently a continuing crisis and the President had cut short his stay in Georgia to return to Washington.

The Prime Minister then said that he most certainly had not approved of Israel's original military action against Egypt but he feels now that Israel has considerable right and justification in demanding guarantees. He was critical of Nasser's performance.

Mr. Hansen then told me that Denmark would not vote for sanctions against Israel and he had already caused the Danish Ambassador to the UN to be informed that this was the Danish position and instructed him to make this position known discreetly in appropriate quarters. Mr. Hansen said he saw no reason why any discrimination should be practiced, that no sanctions had been imposed on Russia over the Hungarian affair nor against India because of Kashmir.

Robert Coe

Robert Coe

copy to Tel Aviv

CONFIDENTIAL

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674.84A/2-2057 HBS

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

1957 FEB 28 AM 10 38

MESSAGE CENTER

RDCoe:rvm

REPORTER

1957

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: February 20, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal and Elath Pipeline


PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Avraham Salmon, Economic Counselor, Embassy of Israel  
Mr. Ware Adams, Director, UNP

COPIES TO: RM/R ✓  
NEA  
IO  
UNP  
USUN  
OLI

Mr. Salmon, whom I had known in Stockholm, invited me to lunch, saying that his work being on the economic side he did not intend the occasion to become a discussion of the question of the day about Israeli withdrawal. Nevertheless, the subject came up soon enough. I noted that Secretary Dulles had spent several hours going over it carefully with Ambassador Eban over the weekend and that there was nothing I could add to what the Secretary had already said. I repeated again our view that the Israeli forces should be withdrawn from Egypt and Mr. Salmon repeated the customary Israeli argumentation about needing assurances before the troops could be withdrawn. None of our discussion was new but the following points may be noted: Repeatedly when he would declare that the sole thing that Israel wanted before withdrawing from Sharm-el-Sheikh was assurance against Egyptian violence, I asked him whether this was equally true of the Gaza Strip. Each time he hesitated over the answer to this question and in the end said yes but there were other things to consider there also. It seemed clear that in their minds the Gaza area is not, like the Stratis area, a simple matter of needing to be assured of freedom from Egyptian attacks and raids. He made a point of saying that the representatives of a number of countries had assured them that they would oppose economic sanctions against Israel. I replied that I could not give him that assurance, adding that economic sanctions might in any case turn out to be a minor consideration compared to the limelight of world opinion, which would prove even less sympathetic to Israel in the absence of economic sanctions than with them, if the Israelis persisted in staying in Egypt, and incurring for themselves as for the rest of the world the greater risks entailed by that course.

Discussing other economic questions, he said that Time magazine is shortly going to have an article on the pipeline through Israel. He said it is expected that the French will finance the new pipeline although he could not reveal this to Time.

IO: UNP: WAdams: scp  
2/22/57



CONFIDENTIAL

GPO 898715

374.34A/2-2057

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

CS/R

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Memorandum of Conversation*

DATE: February 20, 1957

SUBJECT: Receipt of the President's Message to Ben Gurion

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel  
NEA - William M. Rountree  
NE - Donald C. Bergus

COPIES TO: S/S (2cc), NEA (cc), NE (2cc)

This Document Returned to  
DC/R  
(Central)

674.84A/2-2057

Mr. Shiloah called at about 6:00 PM and reported that he had got through on the telephone to Mr. Ben Gurion and read him the text of the President's message. Mr. Shiloah handed Mr. Rountree a letter giving Mr. Ben Gurion's preliminary reaction to the message. Ben Gurion had spoken in terms of the following timetable: reference of the message to the Israel cabinet in the morning of February 21; debate in the Knesset that afternoon. Mr. Gurion could not guarantee what the cabinet decision would be or how long the Knesset might take to debate on this matter. He would do his best to assure that this process would not be prolonged. Ben Gurion had stressed that there should be no atmosphere of threat which might bring about undesirable results while Israel was taking this important decision. Accordingly, he hoped that debate in the General Assembly could be postponed. He was deeply appreciative of the steps already taken by the United States to postpone debate.

Mr. Rountree indicated that this possibility had been in our minds and that we were in touch with the U.S. Delegation in New York on the subject. The situation had developed in such a way, however, that we could give no assurances as to the success of any efforts to defer debate.

DC/R  
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NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 2/21/57

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR - 8 1957

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674.84A/2-2057  
Confidential File



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: February 20, 1957

SUBJECT: Transmission of President's Message to Prime Minister Ben Gurion

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Zev Argaman, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Israel  
NE - Fraser Wilkins

COPIES TO: S/S (2cc), NEA (cc), NE (2cc)

Mr. Argaman was asked to call at the Department to receive a message from the President to the Israel Prime Minister. Mr. Wilkins handed it to him at 2:15 PM, with the request that the substance be telephoned to Mr. Ben Gurion. Mr. Argaman undertook to transmit it in this fashion.

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674842 / 2-2057  
CS/U

ACTION  
is assigned to

*SET*

# United States Senate

Washington, D. C., February 20, 1957

Respectfully referred to

Hon. Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary of State for  
Congressional Relations  
Washington 25, D. C.

Transmitted as requested,  
by Dr. Silver.

This letter (and its  
enclosures, if any) micro-  
filmed for RM/R records  
Silver,

Encl. ltr dtd 2/8/57 w/newspaper  
articles.

324287

*Charles E. Potter*

Charles E. Potter,

U. S. S.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-65103-2

674.84A/2-2057

*Encl. file*  
*2/27*

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7-1-1957

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*8*  
*1*  
*clerk*  
*stark*

February 26, 1957

In reply refer to  
SEV 674.84A/2-2057

Dear Senator Potter:

I refer to your communication of February 20 enclosing a letter from Dr. I. Walter Silver of Detroit, Michigan, concerning United States policy in the Middle East and in which he enclosed newspaper clippings concerning United States foreign policy. Dr. Silver's views have been noted.

As you know, we have been giving the matter of the possibility of sanctions against Israel a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be

reluctant.

The Honorable  
Charles E. Potter,  
United States Senate.

674.84A/2-2057

674.84A/2-2057  
OS/R

reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

Dr. Silver's letter is returned for your records.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

From Dr. Silver (returned).

H-ROC  
WF-X

P:SEV:CErushing:DKP:cf

2/26/57



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
February 21, 1957

SEV

208  
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NEA - Mr. Oulashin

Please prepare for Mr. Hill's  
signature an appropriate reply to  
the attached telegram to the Secretary  
on the Israeli situation <sup>from</sup> ~~for~~ Edith  
Nourse Rogers.

Copies of the reply should be in  
S/S by February 28.

J. H. Cunningham  
S/S-RO

Attachment: Telegram to the Secretary  
fm Edith Nourse Rogers  
dtd 2/20/57

SANCTIONS

March 21 1957

In reply refer to  
SEV

Dear Mrs. Rogers:

I refer to your telegram of February 20, 1957 to Secretary Dulles concerning the possibility of sanctions against Israel. We appreciate your interest in wiring the Secretary your views on this matter and are sorry for our delayed response.

The United States does not now have the question of sanctions against Israel under consideration because of the decision of the Government of Israel to complete her withdrawal behind the Armistice line in compliance with the United Nations Resolution of February 2, 1957. This decision demonstrates once again that the free world nations have decent respect for the opinion of mankind, as reflected in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Now that this withdrawal has been completed, in the President's words, "...there should be a greater effort by the United Nations and its members to secure justice and conformity with international law... The United States, for its part, will vigorously seek solutions of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law."

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable  
Edith Neourse Rogers,  
House of Representatives.  
P:SEV:CE Rushing:OBL:bt

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674.84A/2-2257

CS/G

674.84A/2-2257

S/S-CR

MAR 18 1957 P.M.

3/18/57

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100-100000  
100-100000

**ACTION**  
is assigned to

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*Filey*  
*3/18/67*

*on 3/18/67*  
*at 10:00 AM*

*in the morning of the 18th of March, 1967, a*  
*subject of the above mentioned nationality, arriving,*  
*arriving at the above mentioned port, trying to*  
*obtain land certificates, stating that Israel has*  
*been economically crippled and has been forced from*  
*among the nations. In his statements, he has*  
*mentioned a number of facts for which, and*  
*which, given the chance, he would accept, but*  
*he has not mentioned any other evidence. He stated*  
*that he was once in the prison for some*  
*time, but not until he had been in Egypt, and*  
*upon the matter, he is in the situation*  
*of a refugee, and he has been asked for*  
*any other evidence, written, or otherwise, from the*  
*United States, the United Kingdom, or*  
*any other country, which would permit*  
*him to leave the country, that the United*  
*States will not allow him to leave, or make*  
*any other decision, that the Federal Bureau will*  
*not allow him to say that "Self-protection,"*  
*that "armed aggression" is the correct term,*  
*for which, according to the State Dept., the commitment*

674.84A/2-2057

CSELK

674840/2-2057

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.  
PCB

107 MAR 14 AM 9 27

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



[illegible]

small and unimportant nation, so small that  
no serious consideration is given to her interests  
by the economically dominant nations of the  
United States. But Israel is little more than  
a nameless, nobody, deserving to be left alone, &  
to be indefinitely neglected. No one  
wishes to protect her where there are not  
guarantees of protection well supplied her -  
serving her special interest of Egypt with all  
guarantees of protection well supplied her. What  
is she to do? What right has the United  
States to ask her special interest of Egypt con-  
ditionally, after she has learned, time after  
time, that the same country she does  
cannot be trusted?

an independent of means, which  
will immediately include the right to determine  
in United States and the United Nations  
should put pressure on Egypt to make a  
positive statement to the effect that they  
will permit Israel to use the Suez Canal, that  
they will be expressing the basic and  
primary and overriding; and these statements  
should be strongly reinforced by the  
United States and United Nations so that  
Israel can retreat from Egypt assured  
that it will be safe and that the  
United Nations is a truly impartial  
force, saving the good of all nations.

Hoping that this matter will be  
given further serious thought before  
an economic sanction is imposed on Israel,

Sincerely,

Mr. Martin C. Needler

FROM AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT

Mt Holyoke College

Ltr: Joyce Bernstein

DATE DUE

3/1/57

DATE REC'D

2/19/57

DATE

2/17/57

FILED

NO.

SUBJECT

Request for info re trade program with the  
Soviet Bloc, GATT and OTC.

TO: YOUNG  
J. H. Young

TO:

TO:

TO:

DATE

2/19/57

DATE

DATE

DATE

ANSWERED

NO REPLY NECESSARY

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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AIR

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ICA

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2666, February 21

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2666 REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 86; AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BENGHAZI DAMASCUS JIDDA, KHARTOUM, LONDON, PARIS, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI UNNUMBERED

Israeli problem dominates press 21 February. Eisenhower speech arrived too late make all papers but SHAAB carried full text. GOMHOURIYA put out second edition in order report speech and Egyptian radio broadcast full text during morning newscast. Other papers featured accounts meeting with congressional leaders and their subsequent statements UN moves and other developments Israeli issue. Only competing topic is canal consisting Fawzi reiteration no talks before withdrawal and ALI SABRI declaration "canal problem is artificial one created by Britain France in order realize their imperialistic goals".

Editorial (which clearly written before President's speech received) rehash familiar themes "west supporting Israel" and "Israel must obey UN resolutions then we will discuss guarantees" only new lines appeared in KAHIRA which linked "threat by US delegate halt UNRWA activities" to plans resettle refugees abroad Johnston plan and "other imperialist attempts resolve refugee problem in favor Israel" in AHRAM which re-asserted "big imperialist powers will never be able crush internal Arab right to Palestine" and in MASAA where Khalid Mohieddine charged "Eisenhower plan and all other imperialist plans seek enslave Arabs for sake Israel".

SADAT and others laud and elaborate Sabri canal statement noting "problem was solved with nationalization waterway" and review Egypt's demonstrated capability operate canal her implementation 1888 convention and her complete impartiality re transits in contrast British discrimination against her enemies. SADAT concludes "canal will remain property Egypt" and SHAAB adds "Egyptians will not surrender their right administer canal and collect tolls."

HARE

AAL:INK/7

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MESSAGE CENTER

1957 FEB 21 AM 6 03

Control: 13458

Rec'd: February 21, 1957  
3:13 p.m.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

48-D

SECRET

Action  
NEA

Control: 13738  
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 21, 1957  
11:40 PM

FROM: CAIRO

Info  
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS  
G

NO: 2667, FEBRUARY 21, 7 PM.

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PRIORITY

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2667; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 195,  
BAGHDAD 176, BEIRUT 297, DAMASCUS 192, JIDDA 205, TEL AVIV 137.

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IN COURSE CONVERSATION OF EMBASSY OFFICE WITH MUSTAFA AMIN  
TODAY LATTER CALLED NASSER BY TELEPHONE TO ASK HIS REACTION TO  
PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. NASSER SAID HADN'T YET SEEN, WHEREUPON AMIN  
READ ENTIRE SPEECH TO HIM IN ENGLISH, TRANSLATING CERTAIN KEY  
PASSAGES INTO ARABIC. AT END NASSER SAID HIS FIRST IMPRESSION  
FAVORABLE. ONLY SPECIFIC QUESTION WHICH HE RAISED WAS WHETHER  
PHRASE "EXERT PRESSURE UPON ISRAEL TO COMPLY WITH THE WITHDRAWAL  
RESOLUTION" ACTUALLY MEANT UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED  
SUPPORT APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.

CIA

HARE

HC

Copy No(s)

Destroy

Name

Date 3-25-57

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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30  
Action  
SS  
Info

Control: 13202  
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 21, 1957  
10:30 AM

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 990, FEBRUARY 21, 4 PM

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of the Director of S/S.

1

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 990, NEW YORK 53

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM BEN GURION, FOREIGN OFFICE TELEPHONED EMBASSY 3:15 PM LOCAL TIME TODAY FEBRUARY 21, ASKING THAT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER BE CONVEYED URGENTLY TO SECRETARY AND IN HIS DISCRETION TO PRESIDENT.

CABINET HAS BEEN IN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION FOR THREE AND ONE HALF HOURS ALREADY TODAY. IT HAS RECESSED BRIEFLY BUT WILL RESUME DISCUSSIONS AT 5 PM TONIGHT. BEN GURION WISHES SECRETARY TO REALIZE GOI HAS BENT ALL EFFORTS TO REACH A POSITION ON QUESTIONS RAISED BY PRESIDENT'S LATEST COMMUNICATION (DEPTEL 809) BUT THAT IT HAS BEEN PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO COMPLETE CONSIDERATION OF MATTERS SO VITAL TO GOI IN TIME FOR EBAN TO CATCH PLANE LEAVING LYDDA AT 7:30 PM TONIGHT. EBAN WILL LEAVE TOMORROW MORNING, FEBRUARY 22, AT 10:00 AM AND SHOULD BE IN NEW YORK AND/OR WASHINGTON BY SATURDAY. EBAN WILL BRING WITH HIM FINAL POSITION OF GOI. THEREFORE, PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSES URGENT HOPE THAT US WILL BE WILLING USE ITS INFLUENCE TO POSTPONE UNGA DISCUSSION UNTIL MONDAY.

FOREIGN OFFICE HOPES TO HAVE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S LETTER IN FINAL FORM TO TRANSMIT SOME TIME TONIGHT. FOREIGN MINISTRY ALSO EXPRESSED STRONG HOPE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE ABLE SEND PRIORITY NIACT REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE WITHIN MATTER OF FEW HOURS.

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FOR YOUR

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-2- 990, FEBRUARY 21, 1964, FROM TEL AVIV

FOR YOUR INFORMATION: AFTERNOON NEWS BROADCAST STATED KNESSET  
WOULD MEET LATE TONIGHT FOR FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE FOLLOWING  
EXTRAORDINARY CABINET SESSION.

LAWSON

JM

SECRET

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FOR Tel Aviv

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OUTGOING

S ✓ 2

NUMBER 990

U ✓ 3

DATE 2/21/57

G ✓ 4

CONTROL 13202

O

Ben Gurion  
message to Rabin  
See and Pres  
on Suez

Category B President #6

E

Stassen

\*\*\*

Jackson

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3, 4, 8, 9, 10 Det. Major

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3/23/59 P. H. Hall

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U/MSA

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IO ✓ 5

SEC DEFENSE

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NEA ✓ 4

OTHER 10 Pres File

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U/OP (Higgs)

(Richards)

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EYES ONLY





**INCOMING TELEGRAM**

*Department of State*

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B

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Action

S/S

Info

Control: 13555  
Rec'd: February 21, 1956  
5:42 p. m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 992, February 21, 11 p. m.

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of the Director of S/S

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to the Director of S/S

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 992, REPEATED NIACT WSWN 54.

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Re EMBTEL 990 and DEPTTEL 809.

Foreign Ministry in telephone conversation at 9 p. m. local time reported cabinet still considering GOI's reply to President's letter but its deliberations interrupted at that hour to enable Ben Gurion to make scheduled appearance before Knesset. Cabinet will resume deliberations at about 1 o'clock a. m. to continue until reply ready for transmission early Friday morning.

Official said Ben Gurion's address in very general terms would explain situation confronting Israel and inform Knesset that GOI hoped door not completely closed to further efforts to find solution before UNGA debate.

LAWSON

MGG/10

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NUMBER 992

DATE 2/21/57

CONTROL 13555

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*re Israel reply  
Pres. message on  
Suez  
Category 5*

President

Stassen

Jackson

*2-4 Inc-6-10 Inc-\**

CIA

*destroyed 3/23/57*

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USIA

USUN-Lodge

SEC DEFENSE

ISA

JCS

OTHER

10 Presidential File

U/OP (Higgs)

(Richards)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 13599

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 21, 1957

5:48 PM

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4446, FEBRUARY 21, 6 PM

BEELY OF FONOFF TOLD EMBOFF TODAY THAT HE THOUGHT PRESIDENT'S  
SPEECH ON MIDDLE EAST LAST EVENING WAS "MASTERLY"  
AND THAT IT WAS BEING STUDIED HERE WITH CLOSEST ATTENTION.

SPEECH ARRIVED TOO LATE TO BE COMMENTED ON EDITORIALY  
IN THIS MORNING'S PAPERS.

PRESS TODAY QUOTES COLONEL CYRIL BANKS, INDEPENDENT  
MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT AND FRIEND OF NASSER, WHO RETURNED  
YESTERDAY FROM VISIT TO CAIRO, AS STATING THAT NASSER  
TOLD HIM THERE WILL BE A DELAY IN OPENING SUEZ CANAL  
IF ISRAELIS DO NOT WITHDRAW FROM GAZA AND GULF OF AQABA  
AREA IMMEDIATELY.

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Department of State

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31  
ActionControl: 13128  
Rec'd: February 21, 1957  
8:47 a.m.NEA  
Info

FROM: Damascus

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1934, February 21, 1 p.m.

G

SP

SENT DEPARTMENT 1934, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 208, BAGHDAD 235  
BEIRUT 579, CAIRO 248, JIDDA 124, TEL AVIV 128.

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JOINT STATE USIA MESSAGE.

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NAVY

AIR

All press February 20 front pages Secretary Dulles February 19  
press conference comments US position Israeli withdrawal. Texts  
generally accurate but headlines and leads play on theme US  
supporting Israel and opposing Arab interests. Sampling follows:  
US announces support Israeli demands, Dulles hopes no sanctions  
(G-2, ASRP RAI AL AM); Dulles upholds Israel's so-called rights  
in Aqaba (pro-Egyptian AL FAYHA); Dulles defends aggressive Israel  
(Moslem Brethren AL MANAR); Dulles resorts to ambiguity to justify  
Israeli attitude and admits US will send ships protected by force  
into Aqaba (pro-Soviet AL NASR).

Syrian broadcasting system stresses sanctions question stating  
Secretary declined clarify US policy until discussion with congress-  
sional leaders.

MOOSE

BB:DME/16

EWS

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Department of State

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37-36  
Action

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Info

RMR

FROM: Amman

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 965, February 21

Control: 13285  
Rec'd: February 21, 1957  
11:38 a.m.

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR MALLORY

Thank you, Mr. President. Your reaffirmation basic moral  
principles last night was magnificent.

MALLORY

MJH/5

*Israel's Withdrawal*

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FROM Amman

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NUMBER 965

DATE 2-21-57

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*Personal message Amb  
Mallory to Pres.  
Category 13  
Drew*

President 2

Stassen

Jackson

CONTROL 13285

CIA

ICA

USIA

USUN-Lodge

SEC DEFENSE

ISA

JCS

OTHER Presidential File - 19

U/OP (Higgs)

(Richards)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

6/11

h. i. l. h. m.

h. i. l. h. m.

h. i. l. h. m.

and h. i. l. h. m.

h. i. l. h. m.

yes  
mm

7

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Feb 21, 1957

Mr. Howe:

I have made no distribution of Amman 965.

I suggest following: NEA, IO, G, SP, P

  
GE SCHWEITZER



INCOMING TELEGRAM

42  
Department of State

ACTION COPY

32  
Action

UNCLASSIFIED

Control: 13039  
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 21, 1957  
6:42 AM

NEA  
Info

FROM: COPENHAGEN

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 584, FEBRUARY 21

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IN RESPONSE STRONG APPEAL BY LEADER OF CONSERVATIVE PARTY TO  
OPPOSE SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, PRIME AND FOREIGN MINISTER  
HANSEN ISSUED FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

"IT IS VIEW OF DANISH GOVERNMENT THAT ISRAEL HAS JUSTIFIED CLAIM  
TO SECURE FREE AND UNHINDRED PASSAGE INTO AQABA BAY AND PREVENT  
CONTINUATION OF THE NUMEROUS FORMER GUERRILLA ACTIONS.

"IT IS THEREFORE DANISH GOVERNMENT VIEW, OF WHICH FEB, 12 DANISH  
UN AMBASSADOR INFORMED, THAT DENMARK CANNOT PARTICIPATE IN SANCTIONS  
OF ECONOMIC OR MILITARY CHARACTER AGAINST ISRAEL.

"DENMARK WILL IN UN IN STRONGEST POSSIBLE MANNER COOPERATE ON  
AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH CAN CONTRIBUTE TO LASTING PEACE, BASED UPON  
SOLID AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND NEIGHBORS. MUST BE DUTY BOTH  
OF UN AND GREAT POWERS TO TRY FIND A ROAD TO NECESSARY GUARANTEES  
FOR SUCH SOLID ARRANGEMENT.

"AT THIS MOMENT VERY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE  
ARE BEING CONDUCTED IN UN BETWEEN USA AND ISRAEL AND WE MUST  
ALL WISH THAT THEY LEAD TO A LASTING RESULT."

JS

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file 066 4/11/57  
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58-52

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Action

Control: 13416  
Rec'd: February 21, 1957  
2:16 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Oslo

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 980, February 21, 5 p.m.

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DEPARTMENT PASS USUN AND OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED

Israeli Minister over from Stockholm made following representations to Foreign Office yesterday.

1. Requested Norway's opposition sanctions.
2. Requested Norwegian support for US statement re freedom navigation Gulf Aqaba.
3. That Norway support Israeli efforts obtain clarification status and functions UNEF along the gulf.
4. That Norwegians support an Israeli proposal made US to send UN commission to Gaza to negotiate with parties.

Chief Political Office Foreign Office advised minister no action would be taken these matters pending Lange's return tonight and that in meantime Norwegian GADEL will follow existing instructions which are roughly as follows:

- (A) Try to find some resolution alternative to sanctions which would make it easier for Israel to withdraw. (Norwegians are thinking of something along line resolution they understand Canadians working on).
- (B) Attempt in any possible way to avoid a clear cut sanction proposal; at the present time not therefore to support any efforts introduce such proposals.
- (C) Imposition of sanctions should be considered as last resort only. If comes to this delegation must refer text any proposed resolution to Oslo for consideration by government.

Above instruction worked out by Lange with PM and certain other members of government while in Helsinki. In course consideration they discussed this question with members Swedish and Danish Governments in Helsinki. Norwegians have impression

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-2- 980, February 21, 5 p.m., from Oslo

impression Swedish position closely parallels their own while Danes strongly oppose sanctions.

While not included in above instructions Chief Political Office tells Embassy thinking heretofore which he has no reason think changed is that should US find it necessary support sanctions proposal Norway will probably do likewise. Embassy thinks this likely but not at all certain. It will be most difficult decision for Labor Government in view traditional pro-Israeli sentiment Labor Party which recent developments do not appear to have altered materially plus increasing annoyance re Nasser's canal tactics.

RAYNOR

BB:BAG/16

Note: Passed USUN-2/21/57, 3 p.m. JAK

APR 12 1957

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MESSA NR

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Department of State

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43-D

CONFIDENTIAL

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State


NO: DELGA 776, FEBRUARY 21, 8 PM

PRIORITY

VERBATIM TEXT

RE: PALESTINE: GAZA

Control: 13704

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 21, 1957  
8:42 PMThis Document must be Returned  
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AFFAIRS

C74.84A/2-2157

HAMMARSKJOLD TOLD US THAT IN COURSE OF MEETING ON VARIETY OF MATTERS WITH FAWZI, IT WAS AGREED BETWEEN THEM THAT BUNCHE SHOULD DRAW UP PAPER SUMMARIZING THEIR DISCUSSIONS REGARDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR UN "TAKE-OVER" OF GAZA FOLLOWING UPON ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL. PAPER PRODUCED BY BUNCHE LAST NIGHT HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY FAWZI AND CABLED TO CAIRO FOR FINAL APPROVAL. IF IT SEEMS APPROPRIATE AND DESIRABLE SYG MIGHT OPEN MIDDLE EAST DEBATE IN PLENARY, IF CAIRO HAS BY THEN APPROVED, BY READING OUT TEXT AS AGREED. NORWEGIANS TOLD US SYG HOPED HAVE SUCH APPROVAL VERY SOON. IF CAIRO HAS NOT GIVEN FINAL APPROVAL BY TIME PLENARY RESUMES ON ME HE FEELS HE CAN NEVERTHELESS SAY HE IS "CONFIDENT" SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT. FOLLOWING IS TEXT AS GIVEN US IN CONFIDENCE BY BUNCHE WITH CAVEAT IT IS STILL "DRAFT":

ON FEBRUARY ELEVENTH I SUBMITTED THE REPORT (A/3527), IN PURSUANCE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 2 FEBRUARY (A/RES.461). EVENTS SINCE THEN HAVE NOT CALLED FOR A FURTHER REPORT AND I HAVE PRESENTED NONE.

IT IS WELL-KNOWN, HOWEVER, THAT DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN CARRIED ON OUTSIDE THIS HOUSE IN THE CONTINUING RESOLVE TO ATTAIN THE GOALS DEFINED IN THE SEVERAL RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I HAVE MAINTAINED CLOSE CONTACT WITH THESE ACTIVITIES AND HAVE BEEN KEPT WELL-INFORMED ON THEM. THESE SERIOUS EFFORTS TO BREAK THROUGH

THE UNFORTUNATE

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2-DELGA 776, FEBRUARY 21, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK

THE UNFORTUNATE IMPASSE AND TO UNLOCK THE DOOR TO CONSTRUCTIVE ENDEAVOR ARE DESERVING OF WARM APPRECIATION.

INSOFAR AS UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES AND POSITIONS ARE CONCERNED, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERIM HAVE GIVEN NO REASON TO REVISE ANY OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PREVIOUS REPORT. HOWEVER, IN THE LIGHT OF SOME SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS IN WHICH I HAVE ENGAGED, I MAY MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUPPLEMENT TO THAT REPORT.

"THE SECRETARY-GENERAL STATES WITH CONFIDENCE THAT IT IS THE DESIRE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT THAT THE TAKE-OVER OF GAZA FROM THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CONTROL OF ISRAEL - WHICH, AS HAS BEEN THE CASE, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WOULD BE EXCLUSIVELY BY UNEF - WILL BE ORDERLY AND SAFE, AS IT HAS BEEN ELSEWHERE. IT MAY BE ADDED THAT IT IS INDICATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT, RECOGNIZING THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND COMPLEXITIES OF THE GAZA AREA AND OF THE LONG-STANDING MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS THERE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARAB REFUGEE PROGRAM, AND HAVING IN MIND ALSO THE OBJECTIVES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, HAS THE WILLINGNESS AND READINESS, IN THE INTEREST OF ORDER AND QUIET IN THE AREA, TO MAKE SPECIAL AND HELPFUL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOME OF ITS AUXILIARY BODIES, SUCH AS UNRWA AND UNEF. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ARRANGEMENT FOR THE USE OF UNEF IN THE AREA SHOULD ENSURE ITS DEPLOYMENT ON THE ARMISTICE LINE AT THE GAZA STRIP AND THE EFFECTIVE INTERPOSITION OF THE FORCE BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL. SIMILARLY, THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS APPROPRIATE AUXILIARY BODIES SHOULD BE ENROLLED TOWARD PUTTING A DEFINITE END TO ALL INCURSIONS AND RAIDS ACROSS THE BORDER FROM EITHER SIDE. FURTHERMORE, WITH REFERENCE TO THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION, SUCH OTHER ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS MAY BE MADE AS WILL CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS SAFEGUARDING LIFE AND PROPERTY IN THE AREA BY PROVIDING EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE POLICE PROTECTION; AS WILL GUARANTEE GOOD CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION; AS WILL ASSURE MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE TO THE UN REFUGEE PROGRAM; AND AS WILL PROTECT AND FOSTER THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERRITORY AND ITS PEOPLE."

LODGE

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CONFIDENTIAL



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Department of State

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EAU OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

37

CORRECTION

2/22/57 8 a.m.

Action

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Info

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12  
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FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 784, February 21, 8 p.m.

Control: 13704

Rec'd: February 21, 1957  
8:42 p.m.

The serial number of this CONFIDENTIAL message received as DELGA 776 should be corrected to read DELGA 784.

JAK-13



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## United States Information Agency

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Control: 13319  
Rec'd: February 21, 1957  
12.28 p.m.

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IPS

FROM: London

Info

TO: United States Information Agency

F&O

IA/IA

NO: TOUSI 421, February 21

IA/IA

IA/IA

ICP/IC

IDS/ID

JOINT USIS-EMBASSY MESSAGE

CCD

IRS

Foreign Office spokesman made following comment on President's speech at noon press conference today:

CIA

OC

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"President Eisenhower spoke about the complex (correct) of the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the need for a settlement in the area.

RSC

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"We regard all this as a combined operation and Her Majesty's government believes that the collective wisdom of the United Nations should be able to solve this.

C

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"That is to say that the first step should be agreement about the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and that there should then be agreement, another UN resolution, to cover freedom of passage in the Straits of Tiran and other related matters."

CONNORS

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1957 FEB 21 PM 2

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SENT TO: Amembassy TEL AVIV NIACT 812

Re your NIACT

~~YOUR INFO~~

*probably*

Regret impossible further postpone UN consideration but will ~~cancel~~

*stave* *thereof* *and*  
~~cancel~~ delay formulation US position ~~cancel~~ final UN action until


Eban returns.

*Dulles*

DULLES

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CSY 341 84A/2-2157



S JFDulles:ma 2/21/57

S JFDulles

S/S<sup>16</sup> (per JHanes)

S/S CR

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FEB 21 1957 P.M.

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1957 FEB 21 PM 3:55		
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SENT TO: **Ambassy RINGLI 569**

Origin
Info
Dist. Desired (Office Only)

Please make available King Saud President's speech evening  
February 20, carried special wireless file evening February 20.

*Dues*  
*EXDULLES*

674.84A/2-2157

674.84A/2-2157  
CS/R

Drafted by:  
**NEA:NE:RKShawwood/ rks**

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by: **Fraser Wilkins**

Cleared by:  
**NEA/P: Mr. Kretzmann**

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**FEB 21 1957 P.M.**

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☐ CHARGE TO

# Department of State

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Classification

11630

1957 FEB 21 PM 6 50

UNITED NATIONS  
UNITED STATES MISSION

VERBATIM TEXT

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Following draft text resolution dealing with Israeli withdrawal transmitted for your comment and not to be ~~discussed~~ discussed with any other delegation:

"The General Assembly

Conscious of the purpose of the United Nations, expressed in Article 1 of the Charter, to suppress acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace and to bring about the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law;

Noting that Israel has since 29 October, 1956, violated, with military force, the territorial integrity of Egypt and occupied by force the Gaza Strip in breach of the Charter and in disregard of the repeated efforts of the United Nations to bring about Israel's withdrawal behind the Armistice line;

Condemns this persistent breach of the Charter by Israel;

Renews its call upon Israel promptly to withdraw behind the

Armistice line;

Calls upon all governments, while Israel remains in forcible

occupation of territory not its own, to withhold assistance to Israel, and in general

Drafted by: IO:MR:FWilcox

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

IO:FWilcox

Clearences:

The Secretary

NEA - Mr. Rountree

L/Mr. Phleger

JFA & TOW

WR & TOW

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FEB 21 1957 P.M.

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in general so to regulate their peaceful intercourse with Israel as to bring about respect for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and the recommendations of this General Assembly calling for withdrawal;

Urges the parties concerned to cooperate with the Secretary General in giving effect, immediately upon the withdrawal of Israel, to the provisions of its resolution II of 2 February 1957 concerning the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures proposed in the Secretary General's report of 24 January 1957, with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area;

Pledges itself, when Israel has withdrawn, to assist the parties concerned to achieve by peaceful means the settlement of outstanding disputes between them, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law;

Requests the Advisory Committee, established by the General Assembly Resolution of November 7, 1956, to consider and recommend to this General Assembly from time to time, if need be in special session, the further measures appropriate to achieve the objectives of this Resolution."

" DULLES "  
Dulles  
(faw)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Memorandum of Conversation*

DATE: February 21, 1957

SUBJECT: Aqaba, Gaza, Suez Canal, Yemen

PARTICIPANTS: Baron S. G. M. van Voorst tot Voorst, Minister, Embassy of the Netherlands  
NEA - Mr. Berry  
NE - Mr. Bergus

COPIES TO: NEA(2cc), NE(2cc), EUR (cc)

The Minister said that he had noted the President's speech of February 20 and press reports of the negotiations which were taking place. His Government considered that the Israel claim for guarantees was well founded. He wondered if the U.S. felt that the Israelis could really be assured regarding Aqaba and Gaza.

Mr. Berry said that we felt we had said as much as we could. We had said that we considered the Aqaba straits an international waterway. We were prepared to exercise our rights and to support the rights of all nations. It was impossible in the absence of a treaty or Congressional action for the United States to give a guarantee. The President had staked his prestige on this point and we did not feel that the Israelis would ask for more. We had told them that we would support the stationing of the UNEF at Sharm el Shaikh. Whatever one felt of Nasser, he was in a very strong position not only with respect to these matters but also the Suez Canal. He had only to sit tight and say nothing and the Israel attitude so far displayed was strengthening his position. The Minister asked if it were possible to obtain General Assembly blessing for the stationing of the UNEF in Gaza. Mr. Berry felt that the second resolution of February 2 clearly envisaged the movement of the UNEF into Gaza. He thought Egypt would permit a de facto situation in Gaza where the UN played a large part.

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The Minister

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The Minister asked if we felt that the four-nation plan for the Suez Canal could succeed. Mr. Berry said he had no information from Egypt on this but guessed that the Egyptians would either accept this or come back with counterproposals which we could live with. In response to other questions, Mr. Berry stated that the Saud visit had gone well, that there had been agreement on the Dhahran Airfield, and that good progress had been made on the Eisenhower doctrine. The Yemenis were asking us to mediate in their dispute with the British. Since the British had already indicated their desire for talks with the Yemenis, we felt that the interjection of a third party to the dispute would be premature at this stage.

*AW*  
*QAP*  
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*JH*

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**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**Memorandum of Conversation**

**DATE:** February 21, 1957

**SUBJECT:** Middle East Problems

**PARTICIPANTS:** Sait Ramadan, Secretary General, World Moslem Congress

NE - Stuart Rockwell  
NE - Edward L. Waggoner

**COPIES TO:** NE(3cc) OLI(2cc) Amembassies AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD,  
JIDDA, TEL AVIV (1 each)

MAR 2 1957

In the course of a general conversation covering Middle Eastern problems, the following points of particular interest were made:

Egyptian Intentions

Mr. Ramadan said that he did not think the Egyptian Government was disposed to cooperate with the West in solving basic Middle Eastern problems. As a military regime, the Egyptian Government is also not likely to strive for internal progress but rather will concentrate on foreign policy matters in order to distract the attention of the people from regime failures to keep promises.

Arab-Israel Problem

Mr. Ramadan said the US should not seek to impose on the Arabs any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather, the US should seek, and would be given, Arab assurances that the Arab states would not undertake aggressive action against Israel. The Arabs have every reason to fear aggression and expansion by Israel and the least they can do is to maintain the boycott and thereby deprive Israel of its means of survival. The US must face up to the fact that the USSR has publicly taken up the Arab cause and has even said that the question of the existence of Israel must be reconsidered. This has a great appeal to the Arab man-in-the-street who ignores the fact that the only organization in the Middle East which is committed to the continued existence of Israel is the Communist Party.

Mr. Rockwell said that our sympathies were with both sides and that our effort was to steer a course based on justice and international law.

Our policy

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Our policy was one of friendship for both sides with a recognition that Israel is a state and has the right to exist as one, just as have all the Arab states. The US does not seek to impose a solution on anyone, but rather to support the UN in its efforts to resolve problems which could lead to war.

Mr. Ramadan stated that the Communist appeal in the Middle East is political and not economic or social. The USSR has offered the Arabs political support and those who argue for closer relations between the Arabs and the USSR say that the Arabs must take advantage of this support to solve their problems. The US must be attuned to the thinking of the man in the street in this connection. One day Nasser will go. The situation in Saudi Arabia is already changing. The US will need the friendship of the people of the Arab World and of the Moslem World. Probably the best resolution of the Arab-American difference of opinion on Israel is to agree to differ, but the US must at the same time avoid trying to impose or even suggesting a final settlement. Peace in the Middle East is possible without recognition of Israel by the Arabs.

Mr. Rockwell asked whether the Arabs could not put aside the question of Israel and concentrate on the needs of the Arab people. He said that we could have most fruitful relations with the Arab states were this to be the case. Mr. Ramadan replied that unfortunately many Arab politicians are not leading their people but rather being led by them.

Mr. Ramadan observed that the Arab people have much in common with the American people and are particularly susceptible to sympathy and understanding. The real battle in the Middle East is between Communism and religion, particularly Islam. In such a situation the Arabs will turn to their Christian friends in the US for help in defeating Communism if there is sympathy and understanding for Arab problems on the part of the US.

NEA:NE:ELWaggoner:cdt  
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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 21, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza Strip and Aqaba

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Sam Leidesdorf  
 Mr. L. M. Movins.  
 Mr. Jacob Blaustein  
 Mr. Irving Engel  
 Mr. Barney Balaban  
 Mr. William S. Rosenwald  
 Mr. Philip N. Klutznick  
 Mr. Mendel Silberberg

FR. The Secretary  
 Mr. Max Rabb, The White House  
 Mr. Fraser Wilkins

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 IO, USUN New York, P

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The Secretary welcomed his callers and said that he appreciated their visit in response to the President's personal suggestion to them. He said that both the President and he felt that Americans of Jewish faith should have an intimate understanding of the background of the current crisis relating to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Aqaba.

The Secretary thought there could be no more disturbing situation than one in which the United States foreign policy was at variance with the foreign policy of other nations which we respected and admired. Should United States foreign policy be based on what the Government thought in the best interest of the United States or on what other groups considered should be the course of the United States. The Secretary was inclined to believe that the view of the elected leadership ought to prevail.

The Secretary said that the Free World was in great danger unless there was a measure of unity among the nations. The disunity of last October had been an extremely disturbing development for the future of the Free World in view of the monolithic structure of despotic communism. The Secretary said it had been most distressing action for him to appear before the General Assembly last fall to appeal for a condemnation of the United Kingdom, France and Israel because of their intervention in Egypt. We had concluded that the most certain way to avoid war would be to stand on the principles of the United Nations.

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 The Secretary  
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The Secretary said the United States believed that as it was the strongest member of the Free World, it had a greater measure of responsibility. The United Kingdom, France and Israel had been informed of U. S. views prior to their intervention in Egypt. We had thought that they would accept our views and that the outstanding problems were in the process of being worked out. These countries had, however, decided to act otherwise in spite of our warning and disapproval.

The Secretary thought it would be disastrous for Israel to remain in Gaza and Aqaba. Israel's best hope could be found in reliance on the members of the United Nations, including the United States, to achieve tranquillity in the area. If Israel were to remain in Gaza and Aqaba, there might be a breakdown of the cease-fire, a resumption of guerrilla activities in Israel by the Arab states, and continued blockade of the Suez Canal. There might also be closer relations between the Arab states and the Soviet Union.

The Secretary said we had not yet received a final answer from the Government of Israel. Ambassador Eban was scheduled to return to the United States on February 23. Meanwhile, successful efforts had been made to postpone several meetings of the General Assembly, but debate might be renewed February 22. The General Assembly had planned to conclude its current session this week. We hoped, however, that a further delay might be possible. If the debate should be renewed, we would not state the American position until Ambassador Eban had returned and we had received any further views he might have. Prime Minister Ben Gurion had telegraphed requesting delay, to which the Secretary said he had replied he would see what could be done.

The Secretary said that it would be a disaster if Israel and the United States should part at this point. Israel was a creation of the United Nations. It would be a tragedy if Israel's actions should destroy the United Nations. The United States had played an important role in the establishment of Israel.

The Secretary said that American policies were drawn in the best interest of the United States. A basic part of American foreign policy was the preservation of the State of Israel. If Israel now placed itself outside the law it would be difficult for the United States to move. The Secretary realized the present moment was a difficult one for Israel in which to reach a decision. Israel felt it could protect itself through its own military efforts. However, such security could not be maintained indefinitely and would prove illusory.

The Secretary said that once it became apparent that present United Nations efforts had failed a new set of forces which we might not be able to control would be set loose in the area. The United States had gone very far to give Israel assurances which, if accepted, would prove to be the wisest course for Israel to take and one which would hold the Free World together. The Secretary hoped that Israel would accept the views as stated in the American Aide Memoire of February 11. The United Nations might be inadequate but there was a greater realization today that peace was a coin with two sides, one of which read "peace" and the other "justice". Today there was more reliance upon the United Nations. If Israel gave the United Nations an opportunity to act, we would make every effort to secure the justice to which we believed Israel was entitled.

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Mr. Balaban

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Mr. Balaban said that none of them were present as "professional Jews" but as Americans.

The Secretary, Mr. Blaustein and others discussed the desirability of postponement of General Assembly debate pending Ambassador Eban's return. The Secretary reiterated what we had done and what we had tried to do. He thought that early reports of Prime Minister Ben Gurion's statement before the Knesset on February 21 seemed to indicate a rejection. We had not, however, received the final text and would reach no final conclusion until we had definite word.

Mr. Balaban inquired whether there had been any private discussions with Egypt. The Secretary said we understood the Secretary General of the United Nations felt he had more assurances about Egypt's future conduct than had been stated publicly. There was a question, nevertheless, to what extent Egypt would follow through on its assurances.

The Secretary noted that the President's radio address had indicated support for a United Nations Administration in the Gaza area. We had no information at this stage whether Egypt planned to return to the Gaza area or not. We understood that some thought was being given to the possibility that Egypt might agree not to return without renouncing its rights.

The Secretary and his callers also discussed the possibility of settlement of the Aqaba and Gaza questions separately, the creation of a Commission for Gaza and the deployment of the UNEF.

Mr. Klutznick said that there was no disunity on the proposition that the United States and Israel should get together. There was, however, a feeling in the United States that the American proposals had been too tough and that Israel should be enabled to reach a decision without a "gun at its temple".

Mr. Rosenwald said he wished to make a number of points: 1) Israeli officials were appreciative of the actions and assistance of the present administration; 2) the Arabs have consistently used force, and 3) Israel was anxious to withdraw but wished Arab raids stopped.

Mr. Balaban, Mr. Blaustein and others spoke about Israel's desire for security. The Secretary said it was natural for Israel to wish to have security. Israel should choose the path which would provide the greatest assurance. If Israel remained in Gaza and Aqaba, we believed that path would end in hostilities whereas if Israel withdrew, the path would lead to peace. There were risks on both paths. The United States had gone as far as it could to create probability but it could not provide guarantees.

Mr. Balaban, Mr. Klutznick and Mr. Blaustein suggested that the President might make a statement that he would do what he could to bring peace to the

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Middle East to which Israel might reply. The Secretary said that there were possibilities in the suggestion but observed that we had made far-reaching proposals to Israel on February 11 to which they had not yet responded. He said hope would not be given up until Israel closed the door. Meanwhile, the President wanted to have the sympathy if not the support of all those present and hoped there would be no differences based on racial or religious grounds.

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2/23/57

March 5 1957

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Dear Senator Potter:

I refer to your communication of February 21, 1957, with which you forwarded a letter of February 11 you had received from Mr. H. B. Tannenbaum, who enclosed a clipping regarding the plight of the people living on the Gaza Strip. Thank you for bringing Mr. Tannenbaum's comments to our attention.

I am enclosing a copy of the President's address to the nation of February 20, which you may wish to forward to Mr. Tannenbaum as of possible interest.

Mr. Tannenbaum's letter and its enclosure are returned for your records.

Sincerely yours,

~~For the Secretary of State~~

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

- ✓ 1. Letter and clipping (returned).
- ✓ 2. Address by the President.

The Honorable  
Charles E. Potter,  
United States Senate.

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**United States Senate**

*Rubin*

Washington, D. C., February 21, 1957

*Respectfully referred to*

Hon. Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary of State for  
Congressional Relations  
Washington 25, D. C.

For your information.

① This letter (and its  
enclosures, if any) micro-  
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encl. ltr dtd 2/11/57 fr Mr. H. B.  
Tenenbaum, 12521 Woodward  
Ave., Detroit, Mich., with  
newspaper clipping.

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*Charles E. Potter*

Charles E. Potter, U. S. S.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-65109-2

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March 25 1957

In reply refer to  
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Dear Senator Potter:

I refer to your communication of February 21, 1957 enclosing a copy of a letter from Mr. Alvin Steinman, Secretary of Temple Beth Jacob Men's Club of Pontiac, Michigan, concerning the status of the Gaza Strip and the area around the Gulf of Aqaba and navigation rights in that Gulf and through the Suez Canal.

As Secretary Dulles stated at his press conference of March 5, 1957, "It is a matter of great gratification to the United States that the Government of Israel has decided to complete its withdrawal behind the Armistice line in compliance with the United Nations Resolution of February 2... As Israel forces have withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and the area of the Gulf of Aqaba, personnel of the United Nations Emergency Force have occupied those areas. The employment of the forces of the United Nations is designed to prevent further outbreak of hostilities in these areas."

Our position concerning the international status and rights of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Suez Canal has been made well known. ~~In both cases we endorse the right of navigation of all nations without respect to political considerations.~~

I believe that Mr. Steinman will be interested in the enclosed copies of "Foreign Policy Briefs" and the Aide Memoire of February 11, 1957 which explain in further detail United States policy in this matter.

The copy of Mr. Steinman's letter is returned for your records.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Copies of "Foreign Policy Briefs" and Aide Memoire.
2. Copy of Mr. Steinman's letter (returned).

The Honorable  
Charles E. Potter,  
United States Senate.

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United States Senate

Washington, D. C., February 21, 1957

Respectfully referred to

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

For your information.

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encl. ltr dtd 2/20/57 fr Temple  
Beth Jacob sgd by Alvin  
Steinman, Secretary,  
79 Elizabeth Lake Rd.,  
Bontiac 19, Mich.

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*Charles E. Potter*  
Charles E. Potter, U.S.S.  
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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

February 21, 1957

Text of address to Knesset (Israel Parliament)  
by Prime Minister Ben Gurion, as monitored from  
the Israel Radio. (This is not an official text)

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Fate has willed that our small and young state should have to face a hard and bitter controversy with two great world forces for which perhaps no country in the world has a greater esteem than Israel; namely, the United Nations and the United States of America. It is a controversy over a model problem of profound significance in international relations. Shall the United Nations, with the assistance of the United States, show discrimination between dictatorial Egypt and democratic Israel? Shall those who seek to destroy us be allowed to trample underfoot all their undertakings and international obligations, to violate the U.N. Charter and the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, to dispatch murderers and saboteurs into our country and subject us to economic siege, boycott and blockade, while Israel shall not be permitted to fight for her life, for her rights, her sovereign equality and her security? Shall the United Nations with the assistance of the United States, subject us to sanctions because we would not submit to the double moral standards of the Egyptian dictator, who insists that others shall observe all obligations that are to his advantage while he ignores any bilateral agreement or international obligation which confers advantage on the other side? Would the United Nations and the United States set the stamp of their approval on a regime of shameful and deliberate discrimination in international relations?

These are the bitter questions which are now occupying the attention, not only of our own country but of everyone the world over who, like ourselves, is not prepared to accept the rule that might is right.

Any attempt to compel us to accept a miscarriage of justice and a system of discrimination will meet with the unflinching opposition of the people of Israel. If the United Nations does not maintain the same law and the same justice for all nations, the moral basis of the United Nations will be undermined.

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Even in the midst of this tragic controversy we shall not be misled into a sweeping condemnation of others. Whatever is done, there are lights and shadows and let us not be too hasty in condemning anyone on account of the shadows, while ignoring the light, and the converse also holds true. We must keep this great principle in mind when we are dealing with the United Nations and the United States. Undoubtedly, the United Nations is still far from perfect, and we have grave and bitter complaints against it which are not confined to the last few days. But we will not, on that account, reject to this great world organization the vision which is personified in the United Nations with the vision of our prophets and the principles on which it is based; on the principles of peace, justice and equality among nations. These principles are no less precious to us than to any other people in the world. The people of Israel, by its heritage, its faith, and its position in the world, is bound to be loyal to these principles with all its heart, and to cooperate to the utmost of its most modest capacity, in preserving them and establishing their authority in international relations.

The fact that there are certain member States in the United Nations which do not respect human rights and freedoms, and even some which maintain a regime of slavery and slave-trading, does not affect the value and importance of the principles of the United Nations. We must realize that the implementation of the ideal of the United Nations is a historic process which will not be completed in a day, or a year, and we must make the fullest contribution in our power to the speeding up and the consummation of this process. On no account must we despair of the hopes which the great majority of the peoples of the world have reposed in the United Nations.

But even in the midst of our painful controversy with the United States we shall not forget for one moment that the American people has carried out, on an enormous scale in a great and rich country and in the course of several centuries, the pioneering work of redemption that we have been called upon to perform in a small and impoverished country within the space of a few years; the building and development of an underpopulated land, the absorption of immigrants from many countries and their integration into a single nation, the molding of a democratic regime based on human liberty, respect for the individual and for his initiative, without compunction and dictatorship, - we shall not forget that we share, with the American people a common attachment to the heritage

of the Bible. We are neither obliged nor entitled to give blind assent to every position taken up by the U.S. Government, but our resistance to any injurious proposal will not weaken in the slightest our feelings of respect and friendship for the American people and our gratitude for the moral and material assistance that we have received from that Government and people.

We shall not relax our efforts to convince the American Government and people of the justice of our cause. There was a time when we had a tragic conflict with another great country - with the British Government which from 1939 onwards openly violated its obligations and undertakings towards the Jewish people. On that occasion we did not submit to injustice, and in opposition to the policy of the White Paper we organized so-called "illegal immigration" for the purpose of saving as many Jews as possible from the Nazis and building up the ancient homeland of our people. But our bitter and determined opposition to the policy of the Mandatory Government did not prevent our appreciating the moral grandeur of the British people when with supreme heroism it faced the Nazi butchers. Tens of thousands of our sons and daughters volunteered to fight in Jewish units in the ranks of the British Army in Europe and the North African Desert, although at one and the same time we did everything in our power to frustrate the policy of the White Paper.

If the nations take the disastrous course of extending direct or indirect assistance to the Arab rulers in the design which they and their allies are harboring against Israel, we shall not submit. We shall resist it with every ounce of our strength. I am confident that we shall not be alone in this struggle. In every country and in every people there are men who will speak out against international discrimination against the small people which is devoting superhuman efforts to the rebuilding of its ancient and desolated homeland, absorbing hundreds of thousands of refugees from all parts of the world and creating a society based on foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the light of the vision of Israel's prophets, and on the fostering of science and all the achievements of the human spirit in our own day and in the days to come.

And what are the matters at issue between ourselves and our neighbors? The matters at issue do not date from February 3, 1957, nor from November 2, 1956, nor even from October 29 in the same year. They extend back to the founding of the revived State of Israel itself. When the Assembly decided at the end of November, 1947 on the setting up of a Jewish State in this country, the rulers of the Arab

countries headed by Egypt announced that they would oppose the implementation of the Assembly's decision by force. The State of Israel was established in the middle of May 1948 and on the very same day its territory was invaded by six Arab countries, under Egyptian leadership. At the 309th session of the Security Council, Mr. Gromyko, the representative of the Soviet Union said that the states which have organized the invasion of Palestine have utterly failed to take into account the decision of the Security Council, and yet there was no demand either by the Assembly or the Council that the invaders should withdraw, and nothing but the self-sacrificing courage of our sons and daughters enabled us to expel the enemy from our country. In the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt which was signed in February 1949, it was laid down in the first article that the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement between the armed forces of the two sides is accepted as an essential step toward the ending of the armed dispute and the restoration of peace in Palestine. For eight years Israel has been demanding the restoration of peace in accordance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations of all UN member states under the Charter. Yet, though Egypt remains obdurate, none of the organs of the UN has taken any measures against this double violation of the Armistice Agreement and the UN Charter.

In violation of the Armistice Agreement Egypt has declared that a state of war exists between herself and Israel and has been responsible for a long series of acts of hostility, including economic sabotage and the blockade of the Suez Canal and the Tiran Straits, and yet nothing has been done by any organ of the UN. In 1951 Israel submitted a complaint to the Security Council against interference with Israel's shipping in the Suez Canal. Egypt justified this interference on the basis of a state of war existing between herself and Israel, although it is expressly laid down in the Constantinople Convention of 1888 that freedom of navigation in the Canal is assured to all peoples both in time of war and in time of peace. The Council rejected Egypt's contention and laid it down that a state of war is incompatible with the Armistice Agreement and that Egypt is not entitled to interfere with Israel's freedom of passage in the Canal. Egypt defied the Security Council in violation of Article 25 of the Charter, and yet nothing was done by the organs of the UN to deal with this disobedience to the Security Council's resolution by Egypt. We are not aware of a single action of

any organ of the UN against Egypt's noncompliance with the Security Council decision.

And the question arises: does the duty of compliance apply only to a small and democratic state, while a dictatorship is free to act as it pleases even in violation of international law, the Charter of the UN, and the decisions of the Security Council?

On October 13, 1956 the Security Council again unanimously forbade any discrimination, overt or covert, against any state, in the Suez Canal, and Egypt immediately declared that no Israeli ship will be permitted to exercise the right of passage. Once again, nothing was done by the organs of the UN to right the wrong.

In 1950, Egypt occupied two uninhabited islands in the Gulf of Aqaba which had never belonged to Egypt at any time. In a communication to the U.S. Government dated January 20, 1950 the Egyptian Government declared that her occupation of the islands was not intended on any account for the purpose of interfering with maritime traffic in the Straits between the two islands and the Egyptian coast in Sinai and that free navigation would be maintained in accordance with international custom and recognized principles of all the nations. The Egyptian dictator, however, violated this undertaking and stationed an armed force at Sharm el Sheikh for the purpose of interfering with Israel shipping in the straits. And yet neither the U.S., to whom Egypt had given this express undertaking, nor the organs of the UN, which were charged with guarding the principles of the Charter did a single thing throughout these years to prevent this violation of international law and to ensure free navigation for Israel in the straits.

And now, after eight years, we have for the first time ensured freedom of passage for Israel and other nations in the Tiran straits. The Government of Israel has announced its readiness to withdraw the Israel army from the shores of the Straits of Tiran as soon as free navigation in the straits is assured, either by the stationing of the UN forces on the coast of the straits until peace is concluded between Israel and Egypt or in some other way. The Egyptian Government proclaims night and day that as such as it has the power it will not permit the passage of Israeli shipping either in the Suez Canal or in the Tiran straits. Israel dare not conditionally abandon the defense of her rights and her security in the straits proper.

The Security Council's decision forbidding Egyptian acts of this hostility and blockade was taken six years before the Assembly Resolution of February 1957.

Why is it that the UN organs are doing nothing to enforce this decision which has been in existence for six years? Why do they recognize nothing but the Assembly decision of this month? Why has Egypt not been required, and still is not being required, to comply with the decision which was laid down six years before February 1957? Shall there be one law for the Egyptian dictator and another law for democratic Israel? Israel is entitled to free passage through the Suez Canal according to the Constantinople Convention and the Security Council decision. Israel is entitled to free navigation in the Tiran Straits by international law. Israel ships were going through these straits over 3,000 years ago, in the days of King Solomon.

The Government of Egypt in its note to the US expressly declared that navigation in the straits will be free for all ships. This right of ours has been violated for years by the brute force of the Egyptian dictator who openly proclaimed that he will continue in the future to prevent our ships from passing through the Canal and the straits. Nor is there the slightest doubt that if from now on the Egyptian dictator is allowed to return to the straits he will stop Israeli shipping as he has been doing all along in the Suez. Israel therefore is entitled to assured effective guarantees from the US for freedom of passage. Israel has no need and no desire to occupy the desolate coastal strip of the straits but she cannot withdraw from this area without security that the Egyptian dictator's acts of violence against her shipping which the United Nations has tolerated for years will not be repeated.

As is well known, the Gaza strip has never been Egyptian territory. Its life and economy is all bound up with the Land of Israel. When Egypt invaded Israel in 1948 it occupied the Strip. At that time the Gaza Strip became a temporarily occupied area by virtue of that invasion; in other words, by virtue of a violation of the Assembly's decision and of the United Nations Charter. None of the delegates to the United Nations contended then that Egypt should not be rewarded even temporarily for her aggression, a contention which is now brought up against Israel, although in the Sinai campaign Israel did not attack Egypt but acted in self-defense.

What did Egypt do in the Strip in the course of these 8 years? She oppressed and impoverished the population and transformed the Strip into a base for military aggression against Israel and a center for gangs of murderers and saboteurs who set out to attack the people of Israel and their property.



The documents which fell into our hands in the course of the expulsion of the Egyptian army from Gaza at the beginning of November 1956 laid bare all the murderous designs and aggressive plans against Israel that were prepared by the Egyptian dictator and his subordinates several years before the Sinai campaign. The Egyptian dictator dealt with the Armistice Agreement in the same way as he did with all his international undertakings and obligations. He treated it as a scrap of paper, and we cannot be asked to permit the return of the Egyptian invaders to the Strip by virtue of the Agreement which Egypt has made null and void. Egypt cannot enjoy the benefits of the agreement which for years she has been tramping under foot for the purpose of reestablishing in the Gaza Strip a base for aggression, murder and sabotage against Israel.

No matter what may happen, Israel will not submit to the restoration of the status quo in the Strip. As we see it, there are three main problems in the Strip: one, Security for Israel of the settlements of the South and the Negev; two, the economic rehabilitation of the residents of the area; and three, a solution for the problem of the refugees within the Strip. Israel desires basic discussion with the UN and cooperation with it in order to find a solution to these three problems. Israel is prepared to withdraw her military forces from the area.

The unfortunate deadlock of recent weeks in the settlement of the affairs of the Straits and the Gaza Strip have been dealt with to some extent in the last few days by the initiative of the US Administration. The Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, has published with the authority of the President an aide memoire which was handed to our Ambassador in Washington on February 11. The Government of Israel has given most serious consideration to this important document and has expressed its sincere appreciation of the efforts of the President of the United States and the Secretary of State to seek a solution to the two problems of the Straits and of Gaza. The Government has welcomed the U.S. declaration recognizing the character of the Gulf as an international waterway and the reference to the Egyptian Government's undertaking of 1950 on this question. The Government also saw an important step forward in the readiness of the U.S. to dispatch her ships to the Gulf and invite other governments to do likewise. The Government could not, however, ignore the grave and certain danger that Egypt will again interfere with Israel's freedom of navigation as she openly proclaims her intention to do, and the fact that American and other ships

will be passing through the straits does not in the slightest degree detract on this danger.

This is clearly demonstrated by the situation in the Suez Canal. Ships from all nations pass through the Suez Canal. There is a treaty, the Constantinople Convention of 1888, there is an express decision of the Security Council of 1951 which laid it down that Egypt is not entitled to interfere with the passage of Israeli ships in the Suez. And yet Israel was robbed of this recognized right. The Egyptian dictator violated the Constantinople Convention and Security Council decision throughout these years and not a single step was taken against this deliberate violation of international law and UN Charter.

For these reasons the Government of Israel considers it essential that the United Nations Emergency Force should be stationed on the coast of the Straits to safeguard freedom of navigation of Israeli shipping until peace is concluded with Egypt, or until some other reliable and effective arrangement is made to this end. At the last debate in the General Assembly the representative of the U.S. said that it was essential that units of the UNEF should be stationed in the Straits until peaceful conditions necessary for freedom of navigation on these international waterways would be achieved.

As for the Gaza Strip, it should be made certain that Egypt will not return to that area, either directly or indirectly, and the United Nations and Israel should arrive at an agreed settlement in the South and Negev, which will provide for the rehabilitation of the permanent residents, impoverished during the period of Egyptian occupation, and will pave the way for a solution of the problem of the refugees by the United Nations.

Israel is prepared to help in the rehabilitation of the local inhabitants and to contribute to the maximum of her ability to the solution of the refugee problem.

The Government of Israel has declared that Israel does not consider herself in a state of war with Egypt and is prepared to sign a treaty of nonaggression, which shall prohibit all acts of hostility on a basis of mutuality.

The Government has decided to make a further effort to reach an understanding with the United States Government. Ambassador Eban, who is returning tomorrow to Washington, will convey to the American Government the position of the Government of Israel. We hope the door is not closed to further discussions.

Yesterday the President of the United States told the American people that the United Nations should exert pressure upon Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba. In spite of the painful feelings aroused by some of the President's words, I cannot forget for a moment that President Eisenhower is not only the elected leader of the American nation, but one of the most illustrious men of our generation, who headed the forces responsible for the destruction of what was perhaps the most monstrous and terrible regime in human history.

President Eisenhower's letter a fortnight ago containing the same demand as he uttered yesterday in his message to his people, placed me under great moral pressure, for I was keenly conscious of the personality and standing of the writer. And if I was compelled to reply as I did, I did so only under the pressure of the justice for which my people was fighting and the absolute certainty that justice is the source of the strength and survival of my people, a small and humble member of the family of nations, a people that has suffered ignominy and persecution for centuries because of its stubborn refusal to deny its faith, its past and the vision of its future. It was not with a light heart that I gave the answer I did to the President of the United States, but out of a deep sense of responsibility, the crushing historic responsibility that rests on the representative of this small nation in its hard and bitter struggle for survival against many who seek to destroy it.

In my reply, I tried to explain to the President that we have no intention of holding on to the coastal strip of the Straits for a single unnecessary moment and that all we are asking is security for our freedom of navigation in the Straits, of which we were robbed by the piratical actions of the Egyptian dictator, without the United Nations lifting a finger to prevent these acts of piracy.

I also informed him that we are ready to withdraw our military forces from Gaza without delay and that we are interested in appropriate arrangements with the UN to safeguard peace and stability in the Strip, economic rehabilitation for residents and a better hope for the refugees, so that they should no longer be a prey to the incitement of the Egyptian dictator.

I am confident that every single member of the Knesset fully understands the grave meaning of the pressure against Israel referred to by the President of the U.S. The reason given to justify that pressure is only to fortify the authority of the

United Nations Charter. With all the modesty incumbent upon the representative of a small nation, I venture to say that nothing stands in greater conflict with the UN Charter than the injustice and discrimination practiced against us because we are few, weak and perhaps isolated. The discrimination which we condemn is not discrimination between the Soviet Union and Israel, but discrimination between ourselves and Egypt.

In his speech, President Eisenhower rightly declared that the UN and its member states must from now on make a greater effort to safeguard international law and justice. These words clearly imply that until now the UN has not adequately done its duty in this respect and the main victim has been Israel.

For eight years the UN has permitted acts of hostility -- boycott, blockade and murder -- by the Egyptian Government against Israel. Does it not follow from what the President said that this wrong will now be put right and without delay by the UN Assembly and that Israel will be assured of peace and security and the observance of her rights on land, at sea and in the air?

If the UN rights this wrong, that would immediately solve all the problems that trouble the President -- and ourselves as well -- in connection with the Straits and the Gaza Strip, and the question of compliance or non-compliance on Israel's part will not arise at all.

Israel's fight for peace and security is no less valid than Egypt's right to murder and destruction. Ever since the revival of our State we have called for peace and cooperation with our neighbors on the basis of equality and mutual respect. The people of Israel cannot submit to discrimination in international relations.

We have believed, and we shall continue to believe, in the conscience of humanity. We appeal to the American Government and to all the friends of peace and justice in the world to stand by our side, and to help secure for the people of Israel its international rights, freedom and equality, and peace and security.

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"ISRAEL'S FIGHT FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IS NO LESS VALID  
THAN EGYPT'S RIGHT TO MURDER AND DESTRUCTION."

Statement by David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel,  
Before the Knesset (Parliament),  
21 February 1957.

Fate has willed it that our small and young State should have to face hard and bitter controversy with two great forces for which perhaps no country in the world has greater esteem than Israel: namely, the United Nations and the United States of America. It is a controversy over a moral problem of profound significance in international relations: shall the United Nations with the assistance of the United States show discrimination between dictatorial Egypt and democratic Israel? Shall those who seek to destroy us be allowed to trample underfoot all their undertakings and international obligations, and to violate the United Nations Charter and the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and to despatch murderers and saboteurs into our country and subject us to economic siege, boycott and blockade - while Israel should not be permitted to fight for her life, for her rights, for her sovereign equality and her security. Shall the United Nations with the assistance of the United States subject us to sanctions because we would not submit to the double moral standards of the Egyptian dictator, who insists that others shall observe all obligations that are to his advantage, while he ignores any bilateral agreement or international obligation which confers advantage on the other side? Will the United Nations and the United States set the stamp of their approval upon a regime of shameful and deliberate discrimination in international relations?

These are the bitter questions which are now occupying the attention, not only of our own country, but of every one, the world over, who like ourselves, is not prepared to accept the rule that might is right.

Any attempt to compel us to accept a miscarriage of justice and a system of discrimination will meet with the unflinching opposition of the people of Israel. If the United Nations does not maintain the same law and the same justice for all nations, the moral basis of the United Nations will be undermined.

PRINCIPLES OF UNITED NATIONS ARE THOSE OF HEBREW PROPHETS - PEACE, JUSTICE  
AND EQUALITY AMONG NATIONS

Even in the midst of this tragic controversy, we shall not be misled into a sweeping condemnation of others. Wherever we look, there are lights and shadows, and let us not be too hasty in condemning anyone on account of the shadows, while ignoring the light - and the converse also holds true. We must keep this great principle in mind when we are dealing with the United Nations and the United States.

Undoubtedly, the United Nations is still far from perfect, and we have grave and bitter complaints against it which are not confined only to the last few days. But we will not on that account reject this great world organisation. The visions which are personified in the United Nations are the visions of our prophets, and the principles upon which it is based are the principles of peace, justice and equality among nations. These principles are no less precious to us than to any other people in the world. The people of Israel, by its heritage, its faith, its needs and its position in the world, is bound to be loyal to these principles with all its heart, and to cooperate to the utmost of its modest capacity, in preserving them and establishing their authority in international relations.

The fact that there are certain member states in the United Nations which do not respect human rights and freedoms - and even some which maintain a regime of slavery and slave trading, does not affect the value and importance of the principles of the United Nations. We must realize that the implementation of the ideal of the United Nations is a historic process, which will not be completed in a day, or in a year, and we must make the fullest contribution in our power to the speeding up and the consummation of this process. On no account must we despair of the hopes which the great majority of the peoples of the world have reposed in the United Nations.

# FRIENDSHIP IN DISSENT

But even in the midst of our painful controversy with the United States we cannot forget for one moment that the American people has carried out, on an enormous scale, in a great and rich country and in the course of several centuries, the pioneering work of redemption that we have been called upon to perform in a small and impoverished country within the space of a few years: the building and development of an under-populated land, the absorption of immigrants from many countries and their integration into a single nation, the molding of a democratic regime based on human liberty, respect for the individual and for his creative initiative, without compulsion and dictatorship - we shall not forget that we share with the American people a common attachment to the heritage of the Bible. We are neither obliged nor entitled to give blind assent to every position taken up by the United States Government, but our resistance to any injurious proposal will not weaken in the slightest our feelings of respect and friendship for the American people and our gratitude for the moral and material assistance that we have received from that Government and people, and we shall not relax our efforts to convince the American Government and people of the justice of our cause.

There was a time when we had a tragic conflict with another great country - with the British Government which from 1939 onwards openly violated its obligations and undertakings towards the Jewish people. On that occasion we did not submit to injustice, and in opposition to the policy of the White Paper, we organised so-called "illegal immigration" for the purpose of saving as many Jews as possible from the Nazis and of building up the ancient homeland of our people. But our bitter and determined opposition to the policy of the Mandatory government did not prevent our appreciating the moral grandeur of the British people, when with supreme heroism, it faced the Nazi butchers. Tens of thousands of our sons and daughters volunteered to fight in Jewish Units in the ranks of the British Army in Europe and the North African desert, although at one and the same time we did everything in our power to frustrate the policy of the White Paper.

If the nations take the disastrous course of extending direct or indirect assistance to the Arab rulers in the design which they and their allies are harbouring against Israel, we shall not submit. We shall resist with every ounce of our moral strength. I am confident that we shall not be alone in this struggle. In every country and in every people there are men who will speak out against international discrimination, against the small people which is devoting superhuman efforts to the rebuilding of its ancient and desolated homeland, absorbing hundreds of thousands of refugees from all parts of the world and creating a society based on the foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the light of the vision of Israel's prophets, and on the fostering of science and all the achievements of the human spirit in our own day and in the days to come.

#### SINCE 1947 ARABS VIOLATE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS WITH IMPUNITY

And what are the matters at issue between ourselves and our neighbours? The matters at issue do not date from 3 February 1957 nor from 2 November 1956, nor even from 29 October in the same year. They extend back to the founding of the revived State of Israel itself. When the General Assembly decided at the end of November 1947 on the setting up of a Jewish State in this country, the rulers of the Arab countries, headed by Egypt, announced that they would oppose the implementation of the Assembly decision by force. The State of Israel was established in the middle of May 1948 and on the very same day its territory was invaded by six Arab countries, under Egyptian leadership. At the 309th session of the Security Council, Mr. Gromyko, the representative of the Soviet Union, said that the states which have organised the invasion of Palestine have utterly failed to take into account the decision of the Security Council, and yet, there was no demand either by the Assembly or the Council that the invaders should withdraw, and nothing but the self-sacrificing courage of our sons and daughters enabled us to expel the enemy from our country.

#### EGYPT ILLEGALLY EXERCISES "RIGHT OF BELLIGERENCY"

In the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt, which was signed in February 1949, it was laid down in the first Article that "the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement between the armed forces of the two sides is accepted as an essential step towards the ending of the armed dispute and



the restoration of peace in Palestine." For eight years, Israel has been demanding the "restoration of peace" in accordance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement and the obligations of all United Nations member states under the Charter. Yet, though Egypt remains obdurate, none of the organs of the United Nations has taken any measures against this double violation of the Armistice Agreement and the United Nations Charter. In violation of the Armistice Agreement, Egypt has declared that a state of war exists between herself and Israel and has been responsible for a long series of acts of hostility, including economic sabotage and blockade of the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, and yet nothing has been done by any United Nations body. In 1951, Israel submitted a complaint to the Security Council against interference with Israel's shipping in the Suez Canal. Egypt justified this interference on the basis of a state of war existing between herself and Israel, although it is especially laid down in the Constantinople Convention of 1888 that freedom of navigation in the Canal be assured to all peoples, both in time of war and in time of peace. The Council rejected Egypt's contention and laid down that a state of war is incompatible with the Armistice Agreement and that Egypt is not entitled to interfere with Israel's freedom of passage in the Canal. Egypt defied the Security Council in violation of Art. 25 of the Charter, and yet throughout these years nothing was done by the organs of the United Nations to deal with this disobedience to the Security Council Resolution by Egypt. We are not aware of a single action by any body of the United Nations against Egypt's non-compliance with the Security Council decision; thus, the question arises: does the duty of compliance apply only to a small and democratic state, while a dictatorship is free to act as it pleases, even in violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, and the decisions of the Security Council:

On 13 October 1956, the Security Council again unanimously forbade any discrimination overt or covert, against any state, in the Suez Canal, and Egypt immediately declared that no Israel ship will be permitted to exercise the right of passage. Once again, nothing was done by the United Nations to right the wrong.

EGYPT VIOLATES UNDERTAKING TO UNITED STATES TO RENOUNCE BLOCKADE OF STRAITS  
OF TIRAN.

In 1950, Egypt occupied two uninhabited islands in the Gulf of Aqaba which had never belonged to Egypt at any time. In a communication to the United States Government, dated 20 January 1950, the Egyptian Government declared that her occupation of the islands was not intended on any account for the purpose of interfering with maritime traffic in the Straits between the two islands and the Egyptian coast in Sinai, and that free navigation would be maintained in accordance with international custom and recognised principles of all the nations. The Egyptian dictator, however, violated this undertaking and stationed an armed force at Sharm el Sheikh for the purpose of interfering with Israel shipping in the Straits. And yet neither the United States to whom Egypt had given this express undertaking, nor the organs of the United Nations, which were charged with guarding the principles of the Charter, did a single thing throughout these years to prevent this violation of international law and to ensure free navigation for Israel in the Straits.

ISRAEL BREAKS TIRAN BLOCKADE - EGYPT SEEKS ITS RE-IMPOSITION

And now, after eight years, we have for the first time assured freedom of passage for Israel and other nations in the Tiran Straits. The Government of Israel has announced its readiness to withdraw the Israel army from the shores of the Straits of Tiran as soon as free navigation in the Straits is assured, either by the stationing of the United Nations forces on the coast of the Straits until peace is concluded between Israel and Egypt, or in some other way. The Egyptian Government proclaims night and day that as soon as it has the power it will not permit the passage of Israel shipping either in the Suez Canal or in the Tiran Straits.

Israel dare not unconditionally abandon the defense of her rights and of her security in the Straits proper.

The Security Council's decision forbidding Egyptian acts of hostility and blockade was taken six years before the Assembly resolution of February 1957. Why is it that the United Nations organs are doing nothing to enforce this decision which has been in existence for six years?

Why do they recognise nothing but the Assembly decision of this month? Why has Egypt not been required - and still is not being required -

to comply with the decision which was laid down six years before February 1957? Shall there be one law for the Egyptian dictator and another law for democratic Israel? Israel is entitled to free passage through the Suez Canal, according to the Constantinople Convention and the Security Council decision. Israel is entitled to free navigation in the Tiran Straits by international law. Israel ships were going through these Straits over three thousand years ago, in the days of King Solomon. The Government of Egypt in its note to the United States expressly declared that navigation in the Straits will be free for all ships. This right of ours has been violated for years by the brute force of the Egyptian dictator who openly proclaims that he will continue in the future to prevent our ships from passing through the Canal and the Straits. Nor is there the slightest doubt that the moment the Egyptian dictator is allowed to return to the Straits, he will stop Israel shipping, as he has been doing all along in the Suez. Israel therefore is entitled to effective assurances from the United States for the freedom of passage. Israel has no need and no desire to occupy the desolate coastal strip of the Straits, but she cannot withdraw from this area without security guarantees that the Egyptian dictator's acts of violence against her shipping, which the United Nations has tolerated for years, will not be repeated.

#### EGYPT IN THE GAZA STRIP

As is well known, the Gaza Strip has never been Egyptian territory. Its life and economy were always bound up with the land of Israel. When the Egyptians invaded Israel in 1948, they occupied the strip.

At that time, the Gaza Strip became a temporarily occupied area by virtue of that invasion; in other words, by virtue of a violation of the Assembly's decision and of the United Nations Charter. None of the United Nations delegates contended then that Egypt must not be rewarded - even temporarily - for her aggression, a contention which is now brought up against Israel, although in the Sinai Desert campaign Israel did not attack Egypt but acted in self-defense.

What did Egypt do in the Gaza Strip in the course of these eight years? She oppressed and impoverished the population, and transformed the area into a base for military aggression against Israel and a centre of gangs of murderers and saboteurs, who set out to attack the people of Israel and their property.

The documents which fell into our hands in the course of the expulsion of the Egyptian army from Gaza at the beginning of November 1956, laid bare all the murderous designs and aggressive plans against Israel that were prepared by the Egyptian dictator and his subordinates several years before the Sinai campaign.

The Egyptian dictator dealt with the Armistice Agreement in the same way as he did with all his international undertakings and obligations: he treated it as a scrap of paper, in fact, he abolished it for all practical purposes and we cannot be asked to permit the return of the Egyptian invaders to the Gaza Strip by virtue of the Agreement which Egypt has made null and void.

Egypt cannot enjoy the benefits of ~~an~~ agreement which for years she has been trampling underfoot for the purpose of re-establishing in the Gaza Strip her base for aggression, murder and sabotage against Israel.

No matter what may happen, Israel will not submit to the restoration of the status quo in the Gaza Strip.

#### ISRAEL APPRECIATES UNITED STATES INITIATIVE IN SEEKING A SOLUTION

As we see it, there are three main problems in the strip:

- 1) security for Israel of the settlements of the south and the Negev;
- 2) the economic rehabilitation of the residents of the Gaza Strip;
- 3) a solution for the problem of the refugees of that area.

Israel desires basic discussions with the United Nations and cooperation with it in order to find a solution to these three problems. Israel is prepared to withdraw her military forces from the area.

The unfortunate deadlock of recent weeks in the settlement of the affairs of the Straits and the Gaza Strip has been broken to some extent in the last few days by the initiative of the United States Administration. The Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, has published with the authority of the President, an Aide-Memoire which was handed to our Ambassador in Washington on 11 February.

The Government of Israel has given most serious consideration to this important document and has expressed its sincere appreciation for the efforts of the President of the United States and the Secretary of State,

to seek a solution to the two problems of the Straits and of Gaza. The Government has welcomed the United States declaration recognising the character of the Gulf as an international waterway and the reference to the Egyptian Government's undertaking of 1950 on this question.

#### ISRAEL DESIRE S SECURITY AGAINST BLOCKADE AND RAIDS

The Government also saw an important step forward in the willingness of the United States to despatch her ships to the Gulf and to invite other governments to do likewise. The government could not, however, ignore the grave and certain danger that Egypt will again interfere with Israel's freedom of navigation as she openly proclaims her intention to do, and the fact that American and other ships will be passing through the Straits does not in the slightest degree detract from this danger.

This is clearly demonstrated by the situation in the Suez Canal. Ships from all nations pass through the Suez Canal. There is the Constantinople Convention of 1888, and there is also an express decision of the Security Council of 1951, both laying down that Egypt is not entitled to interfere with the passage of Israel ships in the Suez Canal. And yet, Israel was robbed of this recognised right. The Egyptian dictator violated the Constantinople Convention as well as the Security Council decision and throughout these years, not a single step was taken against this deliberate violation of international law and of the United Nations Charter.

For these reasons, the Government of Israel considers it essential that the United Nations Emergency Force should be stationed on the coast of the Straits to safeguard freedom of navigation of Israel shipping until peace is concluded with Egypt, or until some other reliable and effective arrangement is made to this end. At the last debate in the General Assembly, the Representative of the United States said that it was essential that units of the United Nations Emergency Force should be stationed in the Straits until peaceful conditions, necessary for freedom of navigation on these international waterways, would be achieved. As for the Gaza Strip, it should be made certain that Egypt will not return to that area, either directly or indirectly, and the United Nations and Israel should arrive at an agreed settlement guaranteeing security for Israel and her settlements in the South and in the Negev, will provide for the rehabilitation of the permanent residents of the Gaza area impoverished during Egyptian occupation, and which

will pave the way for a solution of the problem of the refugees by the United Nations.

Israel is prepared to help in the rehabilitation of the local inhabitants and to contribute to the maximum of her ability to the solution of the refugee problem.

The Government of Israel has declared that Israel does not consider herself in a state of war with Egypt and is prepared to sign a treaty of non-aggression, which shall prohibit all acts of hostility on the basis of mutuality.

The Government has decided to make a further effort to reach an understanding with the United States Government. Ambassador Eban, who is returning to-morrow to Washington, will convey to the American Government the position of the Government of Israel. We hope the door is not closed to further discussions.

#### THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS THE ISRAEL PEOPLE

Yesterday, the President of the United States told the American people that the United Nations should exert pressure upon Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and from the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba.

In spite of the painful feelings aroused by some of the President's words, I cannot forget for one moment that President Eisenhower is not only the elected leader of the American nation, but one of the most illustrious men of our generation, who headed the forces responsible for the destruction of what was perhaps the most monstrous and terrible regime in human history. President Eisenhower's letter a fortnight ago, containing the same demand as he uttered yesterday in his message to his people, placed me under great moral pressure, for I was keenly conscious of the personality and standing of the writer. And if I was compelled to reply as I did, I did so only under the still stronger compulsion and the pressure of my conscience as a man and Jew, the pressure of justice for which my people is fighting and out of the absolute certainty that justice is the source of strength and of survival of my people - a small and poor member of the family of nations, a people that has suffered ignominy and persecution for centuries, because of its stubborn refusal to deny its faith, its past and the vision of its future.

It was not with a light heart that I gave the answer as I did to the President of the United States, but out of a deep sense of responsibility, the crushing historic responsibility that rests on the representative of this small nation in its hard and bitter struggle for survival against many who seek to destroy it.

In my reply, I tried to explain to the President that we had no intention of holding on to the coastal strip of the Straits for a single unnecessary moment, and that all we are asking is security for our freedom of navigation in the Straits, of which we were robbed by the piratical actions of the Egyptian dictator, without the United Nations lifting a finger to prevent these acts of piracy.

I also informed the President that we are ready to withdraw our military forces from Gaza without delay and that we are interested in appropriate arrangements with the United Nations to safeguard peace and stability, economic rehabilitation for its residents and a better home for the refugees, so that they should no longer be a prey to the incitement of the Egyptian dictator.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ISRAEL CONFLICTS WITH PRINCIPLES OF UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

I am confident that every single member of the Knesset fully understands the grave meaning of the "pressure" against Israel referred to by the President of the United States. The reason given to justify this "pressure" is the need to fortify the authority of the United Nations Charter. With all the modesty incumbent upon the representative of a small nation, I venture to say that nothing stands in greater conflict with the United Nations Charter than the injustice and discrimination practised against us because we are few, weak and perhaps isolated. The discrimination which we condemn is not discrimination between the Soviet Union and Israel but discrimination between ourselves and Egypt.

In his speech, President Eisenhower rightly declared that the United Nations and its member states must from now onwards make a greater effort to safeguard international law and justice. These words clearly imply that until now the United Nations has not adequately done its duty in this respect - and the main victim has been Israel.

For eight years, the United Nations has permitted acts of hostility - boycott, blockade and murder - by the Egyptian Government against Israel. Does it not follow from what the President said that this wrong will now be put right, and without delay, by the United Nations Assembly, and that Israel will be assured of peace and security and the observance of her rights on land, at sea and in the air?

If the United Nations rights this wrong, that would immediately solve all the problems which trouble the President - and ourselves as well - in connection with the Straits and the Gaza Strip, and the question of compliance or non-compliance on Israel's part will not arise at all.

Israel's fight for peace and security is no less valid than Egypt's right to war and destruction. Ever since the revival of our State we have called for peace and cooperation with our neighbours on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

The people of Israel cannot submit to discrimination in international relations.

We have believed - and we continue to believe - in the conscience of humanity. We appeal to the American Government and to all the friends of peace and justice in the world to stand by our side, and to help secure for the people of Israel its international rights, its sovereignty, its equality, its peace and its security.

\* \* \* \* \*



March 29 1957

Dear Mrs. Stewart:

I have been asked to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 21 to Secretary Dulles enclosing a resolution passed by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom concerning United States policy in the Middle East. We appreciate your interest in bringing your views to our attention and your approval of our policies in that area.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Meagher  
Chief  
Public Services Division

Mrs. Annalee Stewart,  
Legislative Secretary, United States Section,  
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom,  
214 Second Street, N. E.,  
Washington 2, D. C.

P:SEV:CERushing:dd

SEV/OL

3/23/57

FW 674.842/2-2157

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# WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

LEGISLATIVE OFFICE

UNITED STATES SECTION



LINCOLN 6-8840

214 SECOND STREET, N. E.

WASHINGTON 2, D. C.

ACTION  
is assigned to

SEV

February 21, 1957

The Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have been asked to forward to you the enclosed resolution which was adopted by the National Board of the United States Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, meeting in Washington, D. C., February 8-10, 1957.

This resolution concerns the Near East.

Respectfully yours,

*Annalee Stewart*

(Mrs.) Annalee Stewart  
Legislative Secretary  
U. S. Section

Enc. att. *yc*

674.84A/2-2157

CSELK

APR 2 - 1957

FILED

674.84A/2-2157

*Dr. J. P. Lee*  
*for [signature]*

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Rev
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Founded in 1915 - Jane Addams, First President



# WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

LEGISLATIVE OFFICE  
UNITED STATES SECTION



LINCOLN 6-8840

214 SECOND STREET, N. E.  
WASHINGTON 2, D. C.


To: The Secretary of State  
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.  
The Hon. Harold E. Stassen  
Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and William F. Knowland, Members of the  
United States Delegation to the United Nations

From: Mrs. Annalee Stewart, Legislation Secretary, U. S. Section

Resolution re Near East passed by the National Board, February 8-10, 1957

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom supports the United Nations resolution calling on Israel to withdraw its armed forces from Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba, recognizing this fulfillment of the General Assembly resolution as an essential step toward securing the peace of its member states. Believing that the application or threat of sanctions against the State of Israel, or against any party to a given dispute, further diminishes the opportunity for peaceful solution, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom unequivocally opposes such action. It urges instead continued exhaustive exploration of all avenues that might lead to the removal of obstacles and the allaying of fears which block accord.

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom  
214 Second Street, N. E.  
Washington 2, D. C.



The Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

**FOSTER & FOGELMAN**  
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

THIRTY-TWO BROADWAY, NEW YORK 4, N. Y

BOWLING GREEN 9-5441

HARRY A. FOSTER  
SHELDON FOGELMAN  
LAWRENCE F. KLEPPER

February 21, 1957

The President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

As a citizen, deeply concerned with world problems, I was astonished by the implication in your address to the nation, that we would support a United Nations resolution regarding sanctions against Israel.

I sincerely trust that our government will not forget that in both World War I and World War II the United States took up arms because of extreme provocation, and to defend our democratic way of life. Certainly, we can expect no less from Israel, a friend of the United States and the only true democracy in the Middle East.

For the United States to support sanctions against Israel would be a renunciation of our own brave defense of democratic principals in the past, and would certainly aid the Communist cause in the volatile area of the Middle East.

Although sympathetic to your earnest desire for peace, I wish to take strong exception to your policy, as enunciated last night.

Very truly yours,

LAWRENCE F. KLEPPER

Copy to: Senator Jacob Javits  
Senator Irving Ives

LFK:emc

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*AWNcm  
file for me*

MAR 29 1957

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6-7-57

• DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

2/25

Mr. Howe

Mr. Greene

Mr. ~~German~~

Mr. Minnich said that they like this letter and it is ok to send over Mr. Wilcox' signature.

MC

File returned to IO-Davis

jmr

for dispatch via

S/S - C.R.-

file

FILES

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. A. J. GOODPASTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Mr. Daniel Parker's Letter to  
Colonel Schulz

Mr. Daniel Parker's letter to Colonel Schulz containing  
a suggested solution to the Gama Strip problem was forwarded  
by Ambassador Lodge to the Department for reply.

Assistant Secretary Wilcox proposes to send the attached  
reply to Mr. Parker if it meets with the approval of Colonel  
Schulz.

Fisher Howe  
Director  
Executive Secretariat

Enclosures:

1. Proposed reply.
2. Letter from Mr. Parker to  
Colonel Schulz, dated  
January 24, 1957.

S/S-RO:RKGerman:jcs 2/21/57

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A true copy of  
the original

674.84A/2-2157

CS/BL

674.84A/2-2157

INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

ACTION COPY

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32  
ActionControl: 13951  
Rec'd: February 22, 1967  
11:21 a.m.NEA FROM: Cairo  
Info  
RMR TO: Secretary of State  
SS NO: 2672, February 22  
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SENT DEPARTMENT 2672, REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 87, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BENGHAZI, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KHARTOUM, LONDON, PARIS, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI UNNUMBERED.

First editorial reaction Eisenhower speech 22 February varied but generally favorable. SADAT declares "We perfectly aware President faced considerable deterring pressure before deciding again prefer principles to friends." Noting criticism from British and Israelis, SADAT hopes "President will guard against their wily methods", and concludes "We assure President he will have no occasion regret his stand in support principles and peace."

AKHBAR noted approvingly President "Supported UN against Israel's defiance" but declared other side speech where President outlined sequel to withdrawal was "objectionable" in that "under Eisenhower's terms withdrawal would insure unmistakable gains for aggression because conditions imposed by aggressors will have been accepted."

AHRAM applauded "Proclamation Israel's guilt, view UN not justified holding back on Israel just because it failed in Hungary, and declaration aggressor not permitted impose conditions on victim," but objected fact President "tried minimize Israel's intractability by alleging Egypt violated armistice." Noting President "supported Egypt morally," editorial pointed out "price that support is freedom navigation canal and gulf," and added "careful avoidance mention sanctions indicates he seems desirous depriving UN its authority impose sanctions." AHRAM concludes "sentiment, outweighs justice in speech because while stressing Israel's right guarantees, President shows no concern regarding Arabs' demands which were approved over ten years ago."

SHAAB using British criticism President's speech as springboard limits editorial comment to broadside against UK.

French

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-2- 2672, February 22 from Cairo.

French language JOURNAL D'EGYPT finds "for Arabs word "pressure" is too vague and clearly insufficient since situation requires implacable economic sanctions and probably an ultimatum of military character" adding Arabs must wait until Lodge states US position in Afro-Asian resolution which "is not vague in slightest." English language GAZETTE after applauding speech declares "moral pressure in form another denunciation would be just a waste of time" and points out "Eisenhower attitude is clearly not so much dictated by pro-Egyptian attitude as by conviction principles must be maintained and badistry must not be allowed to pay."

Prominent play given accounts speech and world reaction including full text or long excerpts in most papers which failed carry text yesterday.

HARE

TT:DMB/16

FEB 26 1957

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NND 897403  
BOX 2677

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation

674.84A/2-2257

Tel 993

Date

2/22/57

From

Tel Aviv

To

Sec State

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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Date

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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AIR

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 994, FEBRUARY 22, 11 AM

Control: 13992 AM  
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 22, 1957  
12:55 PM

ALL PAPERS MORNING FEBRUARY 21 HEADLINE AGENCY REPORTS PRESIDENT'S BROADCAST. ONLY COMMENT CONTAINED HEADLINES TO EFFECT UNITED STATES DETERMINED APPLY PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. SPECULATION ON FEBRUARY 21 CABINET MEETING SHOWS NO WEAKENING ISRAELI DETERMINATION HOLD PRESENT LINE. HAARETZ SAYS BEN GURION DISCUSSIONS WITH COALITION AND OPPOSITION LEADERS SHOWED "CONSISTENT SUPPORT" GOI POLICY. EBAN REPORT TO CABINET TODAY GENERALLY HELD UNLIKELY REVEAL HOPEFUL CHANGE UNITED STATES POLICY. ONLY 1 PAPER HABOKER (GENERAL ZIONIST) SUGGESTS CABINET MIGHT CHANGE POLICY IN VIEW PRESIDENT'S BROADCAST.

AFTERNOON PRESS REPORTS PRESIDENT SENT "DRAMATIC" APPEAL TO BEN GURION LAST NIGHT. YEDIOT AHARANOT (INDEPENDENT) SAYS LETTER CONTAINS BOTH PROMISES AND THREATS AND QUOTES NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE TO EFFECT IT ASKED WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY. MAARIV (INDEPENDENT) ACCUSES PRESIDENT OF HAVING STOPPED NEGOTIATIONS AND LEFT ISRAEL TO MERCY OF "HAMMARSKJOLD AND AFRO-ASIANS".

BANNER HEADLINES MAARIV EXTRA EDITION THIS AFTERNOON ANNOUNCE "BEN GURION TO ANSWER 'NO' TO EISENHOWER; EMERGENCY KNESSET SESSION TONIGHT; ISRAEL WANTS NEGOTIATIONS WITH UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE". ARTICLE SAYS BEN GURION REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILL BE DELIVERED BEFORE HIS SPEECH TO KNESSET TONIGHT AT 8 P.M. SPEECH ASSERTEDLY CONTAINS SMALL ALTERATIONS IN DRAFT PREPARED LAST NIGHT AS RESULT PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND LETTER.

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LAWSON

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Rec'd:

FEBRUARY 22, 1957

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10:40 AM

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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 995, FEBRUARY 22, 1 PM

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 995, USUN 56.

AS AMBASSADOR EBAN PREPARED TO BOARD PLANE AT 11AM LOCAL TIME EN ROUTE TO UNITED STATES HE INFORMED ME BY TELEPHONE HE HAD FOUND AMONG ALL WITH WHOM HE TALKED GENUINE DISPOSITION TO COLLABORATE WITH UNITED STATES IN SOLVING IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS AND HAD ENCOUNTERED GREAT HOPE THAT MEANS WILL BE FOUND FOR REACHING SATISFACTORY FORMULA. HE SAID HE RETURNING WITH "MUCH WIDER SCOPE" FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY WHICH HE HOPED WOULD TAKE PLACE SUNDAY.

I COMMENTED HE MUST ALSO HAVE FOUND IN WASHINGTON EVERY EVIDENCE OF USG'S INTENSE EFFORTS TO FIND SATISFACTORY FORMULA AND TRUSTED HE RETURNING WITH EFFECTIVE MEANS WHEREBY HOPE OF RESOLUTION WOULD BE REALIZED.

HE SAID HE CONFIDENT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT IF THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TIME.

LAWSON

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*Department of State*

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AIR

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 996, FEBRUARY 22

PRIORITY

Control: 13964

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 22, 1957

11:31 AM

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BEN GURION WENT BEFORE KNESSET AFTER 9:00 PM LAST NIGHT TO EXPLAIN WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS ISRAEL'S CONTROVERSY WITH IN AND US ON TIRAN STRAITS AND GAZA ISSUES. CABINET INTERRUPTED ITS DELIBERATIONS ON PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S SPEECH AND EBAN'S REPORT OF HIS RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH STATE DEPARTMENT TO ENABLE BEN GURION TO MAKE KNESSET APPEARANCE. CABINET'S DISCUSSIONS WERE RESUMED THEREAFTER AND CONTINUED UNTIL 1:00 AM THIS MORNING. KNESSET RE-CONVENED AT 9:00 AM TODAY FOR FOUR-HOUR DEBATE ON ISRAEL'S POSITION RE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.

BEN GURION DID NOT SAY ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW EITHER FROM STRAITS OR STRIP BUT REITERATED POSITION THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW MILITARY, RPT MILITARY, FORCES FROM GAZA STRIP AND WOULD NOT OCCUPY SHARM EL-SHEIKH AFTER ISRAEL'S FREE PASSAGE THROUGH TIRAN STRAITS HAD BEEN ASSURED. HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

"SHALL UN WITH ASSISTANCE OF US SHOW DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN DICTATORIAL EGYPT AND DEMOCRATIC ISRAEL?

"SHALL UN WITH ASSISTANCE OF US SUBJECT ISRAEL TO SANCTIONS BECAUSE WE WILL NOT SUBMIT TO DOUBLE MORAL STANDARDS OR EGYPTIAN DICTATOR, WHO INSISTS OTHERS SHALL OBSERVE ALL OBLIGATIONS TO HIS ADVANTAGE WHILE HE IGNORES ANY BILATERAL AGREEMENT OR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION WHICH CONFERS ADVANTAGE ON OTHER SIDE?

"ANY ATTEMPT TO COMPEL US TO ACCEPT MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE AND SYSTEM OF DISCRIMINATION WILL MEET WITH UNFLINCHING OPPOSITION ISRAEL PEOPLE. IF UN DOES NOT

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-2- 996, FEBRUARY 22, FROM TEL AVIV

MAINTAIN SAME LAW, SAME JUSTICE FOR ALL NATIONS, MORAL BASIS OF UN WOULD BE UNDERMINED.

"UN IS STILL FAR FROM PERFECT AND WE HAVE GRAVE AND BITTER COMPLAINTS AGAINST IT BUT WE WILL NOT, ON THAT ACCOUNT, REJECT THIS GREAT WORLD ORGANIZATION.

"WE ARE NEITHER OBLIGED NOR ENTITLED TO GIVE BLIND ASSENT TO EVERY POSITION TAKEN UP BY USG BUT OUR RESISTANCE TO ANY INJURIOUS PROPOSAL WILL NOT WEAKEN SLIGHTEST OUR FEELING OF RESPECT AND FRIENDSHIP FOR AMERICAN PEOPLE AND OUR GRATITUDE FOR MORAL AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THAT GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE.

"IF NATIONS TAKE DISASTROUS COURSE OF EXTENDING DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSISTANCE TO ARAB RULERS IN DESIGNS WHICH THEY AND THEIR ALLIES ARE HARBORING AGAINST ISRAEL, WE SHALL NOT SUBMIT. WE SHALL RESIST IT WITH EVERY OUNCE OF OUR MORAL STRENGTH.

"GOI HAS DECIDED TO MAKE FURTHER EFFORT TO REACH UNDERSTANDING WITH USG. EBAN WILL CONVEY TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT POSITION OF GOI. WE HOPE DOOR IS NOT CLOSED TO FURTHER DISCUSSION.

"I AM CONFIDENT EVERY SINGLE MEMBER OF KNESSET FULLY UNDERSTANDS GRAVE MEANING OF 'PRESSURE' AGAINST ISRAEL REFERRED TO BY US PRESIDENT. REASON GIVEN TO JUSTIFY 'PRESSURE' IS NEED TO FORTIFY AUTHORITY OF UN CHARTER. WITH ALL MODESTY INCUMBENT UPON REPRESENTATIVE OF SMALL NATION, I VENTURE TO SAY NOTHING STANDS IN GREATER CONFLICT WITH UN CHARTER THAN INJUSTICE AND DISCRIMINATION PRACTICED AGAINST US BECAUSE WE ARE FEW, WEAK AND PERHAPS ISOLATED. DISCRIMINATION WHICH WE CONDEMN IS NOT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ISRAEL AND SOVIET UNION BUT DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN OURSELVES AND EGYPT."

BALANCE OF SPEECH WAS LARGELY REVIEW, IN FAMILIAR TERMS, OF EGYPT'S VIOLATIONS OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND INFILTRATION OF ISRAEL WHICH HE SAID LED UP TO GAZA- SINAI CAMPAIGN, AND POLICIES OF ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AND SANCTION; ISRAEL'S WILLINGNESS TO HELP MAKE GAZA'S PERMANENT INHABITANTS ECONOMICALLY INDEPENDENT AND TO ASSIST WITH FINAL DISPOSITION OF GAZA REFUGEE PROBLEM, INCLUDING SOME RESETTLEMENT IN ISRAEL.

LAWSON

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## Department of State

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Control:

13968

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Rec'd:

February 22, 1957

Info

11:52 a.m.

RMR

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 4299, February 22, 1 p.m.

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FOR

SENT DEPARTMENT 4299; REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 75

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Reference: EMBTEL 4209

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French Government, press and public, because continued bitter hostility to Egypt, (#) in support of Israeli position on withdrawal forces. We are not informed exactly what French are saying (#) but it is safe to assume they are not encouraging withdrawal. It is even more true at present than at time dispatch reference telegram that only very high-level approach could induce French to urge Israelis to moderate their stand. Yet we would presume that, in view very close relationship between two countries during recent months, French counsels of moderation might have considerable influence.

Visit of Mollet and Pineau particularly since French have placed on agenda questions of Palestine and Suez, would afford best possible opportunity, if Department deems appropriate, for endeavoring to persuade French to relax their exclusive support of Israel in favor of more broadly conceived policy designed to restore peace and security to Middle East. French can be expected to press very vigorously their points of view on these two issues and it might therefore be advantageous for US first to take initiative in pressing them on this key point.

YOST

BB:MJH/6

(# ) Omission. Correction to follow.

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CORRECTION ISSUED

2/23/57, 2:00 a.m.

Control: 13968

Rec'd: February 22, 1957

11:52 a.m.

FROM: Paris - CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4299, February 22, 1 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 4299: REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 75

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Reference: EMBASSY TELEGRAM 4209

French Government, press and public, because continued bitter hostility to Egypt, are practically unanimous in support of Israeli position on withdrawal forces. We are not informed exactly what French are saying to Israeli Government but it is safe to assume they are not encouraging withdrawal. It is even more true at present than at time dispatch reference telegram that only very high-level approach could induce French to urge Israelis to moderate their stand. Yet we would presume that, in view very close relationship between two countries during recent months, French counsels of moderation might have considerable influence.

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Control:

13984

Rec'd:

February 22, 1957  
12:38 p.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 4308, February 22, 5 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4308, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 76.

Sebilleau today said French Government has no confirmation of Israeli activity along Jordan frontier (London 4418).

He had learned only yesterday that Menahem Begin was in France (EMPTEL 4247) and had seen De Gaulle, but he would look into matter to find what he was up to.

Sebilleau had (#) radio TV speech on Middle East and personally approved United States position. However, he said, French public and French official position could not condone pressure on Israel to withdraw from Aqaba and Gaza.

Israeli Ambassador Tsur informed Sebilleau Tuesday that Israeli Cabinet had approved Ben Gurion's decision of Monday to propose to President that United Nations send delegation (#) to Israel first and later to Egypt to study problem (#) with appropriate safeguards for maintenance peace.

Following Wednesday Tsur again saw Sebilleau and informed him of Israeli proposal whereby other maritime powers might make statement on freedom passage Gulf of Aqaba similar to that of United States, and then each nation send one merchant ship to force the issue. Tsur telephoned Sebilleau yesterday to inform him that above project had met with Israeli Cabinet approval and would provide sufficient guarantees for Israel to remove its troops from Sharm-El-Sheikh.

Sebilleau personally feels Israelis are on point giving in to United States pressure and that United States should continue to emphasize to Israelis its support of principle of UNEF troops on either side of Gaza-Israeli border and freedom of passage for Aqaba Gulf.

YOST

BB:DMB/16

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2/23/57 1:45 p.m. SW:DE

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Control: 13984

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Rec'd: February 22, 1957  
12:38 p.m.

Info

FROM: Paris - CORRECTED COPY

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 4308, February 22, 5 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4308, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 76.

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Control: 14130  
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 23, 1957  
2:50 A.M.

NEA FROM: BAGHDAD  
Info  
RMR TO: Secretary of State  
SS NO: 1424, FEBRUARY 22.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1424, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 136, LONDON 271, TELAVIV 45, DAMASCUS 120, AMMAN 117, BEIRUT 237.

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH PROMINENTLY AND EXTENSIVELY REPORTED BAGHDAD PRESS FEBRUARY 22. THREE PAPERS CARRIED EDIT COMMENT. ALL THREE REGISTERED MILD APPROVAL BUT WONDERED WHY SPEECH HAD NOT DEMANDED IMMEDIATE IMPOSITION SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL.

AL-SHAAB: "DOES SPEECH MEAN US IS NOW DETERMINED TAKE URGENT CONCRETE STEPS TO OBLIGE ISRAEL WITHDRAW? ACTUALLY SPEECH IS VAGUE ON THIS". PAPER SAYS PRESIDENT IN HIS EFFORTS BRING ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS PROBABLY MOTIVATED BY DESIRE ENSURE ARABS ACCEPTANCE "EISENHOWER DOCTRINE" AND WONDERS WHY US WITH ALL ITS POWER DOES NOT TAKE LEAD IN PROPOSING SANCTIONS IN UN.

AL-BILAD'S POLITICAL COMMENTATOR SAID THAT IN LISTENING PRESIDENT ADDRESS HE WAS MUCH PLEASED HEAR US HAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT PRESS ON ISRAEL TO OBLIGE IT WITHDRAW FROM EGYPTIAN TERRITORY BUT SOON "I WAS SADLY DISAPPOINTED HEAR PRESIDENT TALK ABOUT EGYPT VIOLATION INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEMAND PRESSURE ON EGYPT GIVE FREE PASSAGE ISRAELI VESSELS". COMMENTATOR DECLARES PRESIDENT MAY MEAN EVERYTHING OR MAY MEAN NOTHING I.E. SIMPLY A "SEVENTH DECISION" CALLING ON ISRAEL WITHDRAW. ARTICLE CONCLUDES HOWEVER WITH APPROVAL FOR STRONG TONE PRESIDENT TOOK IN DISCUSSING MATTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL SINCE "BIG POWERS DELAY IN TAKING STAND THIS QUESTION WAS ABOUT TO EXPLODE FORTH OF WORLD PEOPLES IN UN".

AL HURRIYAH REMARKS IT ALWAYS BELIEVES US WOULD STAND BY OTHER WORLD PEOPLES AGAINST ISRAELI CHALLENGE. FIRMNESS PRESS ADDRESS SHOWS TRUE REALIZATION US INTERESTS AND INTERESTS WORLD PEACE. PAPER SAID PRESIDENT "MADE FALSE ACCUSATION OF WHICH ISRAELI

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-2- 1424, FEBRUARY 22, FROM BAGHDAD.

WHICH ISRAELI PEOPLE QUITE INNOCENT" WHEN HE DESCRIBED THEM  
"AS OF RELIGIOUS FAITH AND AWARE VALUE OF STRONG CHARACTER".  
PAPER NOTES PRESIDENT REGISTERED DISAPPROVAL OF "INVASIONS"  
AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES AND IT INSISTS "ISRAELS VERY EXISTENCE  
CONSTITUTES AN INVASION WHICH SHOULD BE WIPED OUT.

GALLMAN

OKY

MAR 1 1957

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14232

Rec'd:

February 23, 1957  
7:31 a.m.

Info

FROM: Beirut

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2048, February 22, 8 p.m.

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Prime Minister Solh asked to see me this morning and expressed at length his admiration for the courage and statesmanship shown by President Eisenhower in his speech of February 20. Solh said he called special meeting of parliament Foreign Affairs Committee which was unanimously in favor of President's stand. The latter statement was confirmed by Emile Boustany whom I saw later.

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FROM: Tunis

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 431, February 22, 3 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 431, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 257, TRIPOLI 47, RABAT 81, ALGIERS 60.

1. Late last night Purse delivered texts President's statement of February 18, Department aide memoire to Israel and President's February 20 speech to King who insisted on translator going over latter part speech line by line.
2. King expressed gratification with President's statement. He desired only emphasize that if UN unable settle question of Israeli withdrawal, US itself will either have to take positive action or be faced by profound disappointment throughout Arab world. He said US would be confronted by serious results if it unable to bring about necessary action: information he had received while in Morocco confirmed this view. (King did not (repeat not) say what information was).
3. Purse wishes Department know February 20 speech obviates question publication correspondence between President and King.

JONES

RSP/HSO/1

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Control: 13934  
Rec'd: February 22, 1957  
10:45 a.m.

Info  
RMR

FROM: Belgrade  
TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1186, February 22, 1 p.m.

Press today prominently and extensively reported President Eisenhower's "exceptionally important" speech devoted to Middle East and, as expected, BORBA and POLITIKA editorials heartily endorsed President's decision to support energetic UN action to compel Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory. Editorials observe that USG clearly came down on side of UN by favoring action to obtain Israeli compliance with UN decisions.

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NAVY  
AIR

BORBA mentioned that those portions of President's speech which dealt with larger problems of Middle East and which were not directly related to acute problem of Israeli withdrawal are "subject to discussion", but this, BORBA said, is of secondary importance for the present.

RIDDLEBERGER

LMS:DMB/16

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 785, FEBRUARY 22, 8 PM

PRIORITY

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS.

Control: 14070

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 22, 1957  
9:44 P.M.

LODGE ASKED TO SEE FAWZI THIS MORNING REGARDING GA CONSIDERATION OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. LODGE SAID OUR POSITION CONTINUED TO BE FIRM AS STATED BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER. HOWEVER, WE WISHED TO WAIT UNTIL EBAN RETURNED BEFORE MAKING OUR POSITION PUBLIC RE GA ACTION. LODGE SAID WE WERE WORKING ON DRAFT RES WHICH WE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO SHOW TO EGYPT OVER WEEK END. LODGE SAID US HAD NO OBJECTION TO HAVING PLENARY MEETING FRIDAY AFTERNOON, IF EGYPT STILL DESIRED ONE, BUT WE HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER MEETING OF PLENARY BEFORE MONDAY.

FAWZI REMARKED FAVORABLY ON US ATTITUDE WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN HELPFUL. HE FELT IT WAS GOOD THING TO GO AHEAD ON PLENARY MEETING THIS AFTERNOON, PARTICULARLY FROM POINT OF VIEW OF UN WHICH HAD BEEN FACED WITH NUMBER OF POSTPONEMENTS OF MEETINGS ON THIS QUESTION. FAWZI REPORTED THAT PEARSON (CANADA) HAD DECIDED TO MAKE STATEMENT THOUGH NOT SUBMIT DRAFT RES. FAWZI SAID HE WAS OBLIGED TO TELL PEARSON THAT SMALL GROUP ARABS WOULD SPONSOR THEIR RES AND THAT MALIK (LEBANON) WOULD INTRODUCE IT THIS AFTERNOON AFTER FAWZI HAD MADE BRIEF SPEECH. FAWZI SAID THIS DID NOT MEAN THEY INTENDED TO PRESS THEIR SANCTION RES TO VOTE "TO TABLE RES IS ONE THING, TO PRESS IT IS ANOTHER", FAWZI SAID. HE ADDED THAT BY NOT PRESSING THEIR RES TO VOTE THERE WOULD REMAIN PLENTY OF LATITUDE FOR US AND OTHER SPONSORS TO PUT IN THEIR RES. FAWZI AGREED THAT AFTER HE AND MALIK AND PEARSON SPOKE, GA COULD ADJOURN TO MONDAY.

LODGE, IN ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE FAWZI FROM TABLING RES, SAID IF ARABS WENT AHEAD THAT IT MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR FAWZI AND OTHER ARABS TO COME AROUND TO OUR RES. WE ALSO POINTED OUT

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--2-- DELGA 785, FEBRUARY 22, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK.

DISADVANTAGE OF SUBMITTING SANCTION RES BY PARTISAN GROUP WHICH COULD STIMULATE ANOTHER RES BY OTHERS OPPOSED TO SANCTIONS. MOREOVER, IF ARAB SANCTION RES STIMULATED RES FROM PEARSON, IT MIGHT MAKE MIDDLE COURSE MORE DIFFICULT. FAWZI RESPONDED THAT, ON CONTRARY BY MOVING FROM ARAB SANCTION RES TO OURS, FAWZI COULD SHOW HE WAS BEING CONCILIATORY ON HIS PART AND THEREBY EVEN HELP ISRAELIS IN WITHDRAWING IF THEY ARE DISPOSED TO DO SO. FAWZI SAID HE WOULD SEEK ALSO TO KEEP GA DEBATE IN PROPER EQUILIBRIUM AND THAT HIS MOVE FROM ARAB RES TO OURS WAS NECESSARY. "WINDOW DRESSING". FAWZI CONCLUDED THAT ONLY FEW ARABS WOULD CO-SPONSOR THEIR SANCTIONS RES IN ORDER MAKE IT EASIER FOR OTHER AFRO-ASIANS TO MOVE IN SUPPORT US RES.

LODGE AT HIS REQUEST SAW PEARSON WHO READILY AGREED TO PLAN TO MEET FRIDAY AFTERNOON AND NOT RECONVENE UNTIL MONDAY. LODGE SPOKE TO PEARSON ALONG SAME LINE HE HAD SPOKEN TO FAWZI RE OUR DRAFT RES. HE ASKED THAT PEARSON HOLD OFF ON TAKING FINAL POSITION UNTIL HE HAD SEEN OUR DRAFT. PEARSON SAID HE INTENDED MAKE STATEMENT THIS AFTERNOON, NOT MENTIONING SANCTIONS, BUT SPELLING OUT HOW HE BELIEVED GA RESOLUTION 11 OF FEB. 2 SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. (LATER AT URGING OF COMAY (ISRAEL), PEARSON DECIDED NOT TO MAKE ANY SPEECH THIS AFTERNOON. MURRAY (CANADA) SAID ISRAELIS HAD TOLD PEARSON "THAT HIS SPEECH COULD UPSET THINGS".

PEARSON TOLD LODGE THAT PRESS REPORTS RE POSSIBLE USE CANADIAN NAVAL FORCE IN GULF WERE UNFOUNDED. HE SAID JOCULARLY, "I'VE ALREADY BEEN CRITICIZED AT HOME FOR GIVING AWAY CANADIAN ARMY AND AIR FORCE TO THE UN, NOW THEY SAY I'M GIVING AWAY OUR NAVY".

SUBSEQUENTLY, LODGE SAW HAMMARSKJOLD AND CORDIER. SYG EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION WITH PRESIDENT'S SPEECH SAYING OUR POSITION WAS "CLEARLY AND FINELY EXPRESSED".

LODGE SAID US POSITION WOULD NOT BE IN SHARP FOCUS IN GA UNTIL EBAN'S RETURN. WE WERE, HOWEVER, WORKING ON A RES WHICH WE HOPED

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-3- DELGA 785, FEBRUARY 22, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK.

WE HOPED MIGHT BE AVAILABLE OVER WEEKEND. HE TOLD SYG WE HAD INFORMED EGYPTIANS WE HAD NO OBJECTION TO SESSION OF PLENARY TODAY BUT FELT IT WISE TO PUT OVER SUBSEQUENT SESSIONS UNTIL MONDAY. HAMMARSKJOLD REPLIED THIS WAS EXTREMELY DESIRABLE FROM US POINT OF VIEW, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO TALKS WITH EBAN ON WEEKEND WHICH WOULD BE REMOVED FROM CONTEXT OF CONTINUAL POSTPONEMENT.

LODGE INFORMED SYG SUBSTANCE ABOVE CONVERSATION WITH FAWZI AND SAID HE STILL FELT IT PREFERABLE FOR ARABS NOT TO TABLE THEIR RES. THEREFORE, IF SYG COULD DO SOMETHING WITH ARABS TO GET THEM WITHHOLD THEIR RES, WE WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATIVE.

HAMMARSKJOLD SUGGESTED THAT WE SEE INDIANS AND CEYLONESE BEFORE AFRO-ASIAN MEETING THIS AFTERNOON SINCE THEY HAD BEEN PLAYING "CAUTIOUS GAME" THUS FAR IN AFRO-ASIAN GROUP AND GAVE EVERY INDICATION OF WISHING BE HELPFUL IN THIS SITUATION.

HAMMARSKJOLD THEN NOTED HIS DRAFT STATEMENT ON UN "TAKE-OVER" OF GAZA HAD BEEN APPROVED BY CAIRO AND WOULD BE MADE BY HIM AT BEGINNING OF MID EAST DEBATE IN PLENARY THIS AFTERNOON. HE FELT THIS WAS EXCELLENT DEVELOPMENT IN AREA WHERE IT NOT GENERALLY EXPECTED THAT EGYPT WOULD BE WILLING, EVEN IN THIS LIMITED FASHION, TO COMMIT ITSELF IN ADVANCE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

SYG HAD WEIGHED MATTERS AND CONCLUDED, SUBJECT TO OUR CONCURRENCE, THAT DELIVERY OF THIS STATEMENT WOULD STRENGTHEN LINE TAKEN BY PRESIDENT. WE AGREED HIS STATEMENT WOULD BE HELPFUL.

ON GENERAL PROBLEM OF GAZA, WE POINTED OUT AS WE HAD DONE TO PEARSON THAT UNDUE EMPHASIS ON GAZA AS SOURCE OF INFILTRATION AND RAIDS TENDED OBSCURE IMPORTANT ISSUE THAT UNEF SHOULD BE PLACED ON BOTH SIDES OF ENTIRE ARMISTICE LINE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. SYG AGREED WITH THIS POINT AND SAID HE FELT PEARSON WAS AWARE OF THIS DIFFICULTY.

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-4- DELGA 785, FEBRUARY 22, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK.

ENGEL REPORTED THAT RAFAEL (ISRAEL) HAD SOUGHT HIS URGENT SUPPORT FOR POSTPONEMENT GA MEETING THIS AFTERNOON. RAFAEL SAID HE HAD ADVANCE INFORMATION AS TO WHAT EBAN WOULD BE TELLING DULLES, NAMELY, THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT UNEF IN GAZA. ENGEL ASKED WHAT ABOUT CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND UNEF ON BOTH SIDES INTERNATIONAL DEMARCATION LINE. RAFAEL'S RESPONSE WAS THAT THEY WOULD NOT AGREE TO WITHDRAW THEIR CIVIL ADMINISTRATION.

MOREOVER, HE TOLD ENGEL, IF QUESTION OF STATIONING UNEF ON ISRAEL'S SIDE OF LINE WERE RAISED, THAT WOULD WRECK ENTIRE SITUATION AND PREVENT ISRAEL'S AGREEING TO ANYTHING. HE INSISTED ISRAEL WOULD LOOK AFTER ITS OWN SECURITY, SAYING TO ENGEL "YOU DIDN'T LIKE GERMAN TROOPS ON YOUR SOIL DURING WORLD WAR II, AND WE FEEL SAME WAY ABOUT UNEF".

DURING DEBATE THIS AFTERNOON, NUNEZ-PORTUONDO INFORMED LODGE THAT LAS WOULD NOT VOTE SANCTIONS UNLESS US ASKED TO DO SO, IN WHICH CASE AT LEAST 15 WOULD SUPPORT THEM LATER, BELAUNDE (PERU) INFORMED WADSWORTH HE DID NOT HAVE BLANKET INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT SANCTIONS PER SE.

LODGE

RBW

CONFIDENTIAL

February 22, 1957

*File*

General  
Files

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. A. J. GOODPASTER

THE WHITE HOUSE

Enclosed are copies of messages for your files.

Grant E. Mouser  
Duty Officer  
Executive Secretariat

Enclosures:

1. 2667 from Cairo (Secret) CC#26
2. 2672 from Cairo (Unclassified)

S/S : GEMouser : po  
2-22-57

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FROM:

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*Sed*

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6626 McALLUM STREET  
PHILADELPHIA 19. PA.

RABBI  
GERMANTOWN JEWISH CENTRE  
LINCOLN DRIVE AND ELLEY STREET  
VICTOR 4-1807

February 22, 1957

The Honorable John Foster Dulles  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have this day sent President Eisenhower the following telegram:

"As American citizens we protest your  
unwarranted call for pressure on  
Israel. Let us not commit a second  
Munich. Only firm guarantees by U.N.  
will safeguard peace."

Very truly yours,

*Elias Charry*  
Elias Charry  
Rabbi

Germantown Jewish Centre

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
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SPECIAL DELIVERY

The Honorable John Foster Dulles  
Secretary of State  
Washington 25, D. C.



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February 22, 1957

GEORGE F. SMYTH  
 ELLSWORTH R. ROSTON  
 JESS M. ROBERTS  
 KEITH D. BEECHER  
 REG. PATENT ATTORNEYS

INGLEWOOD OFFICE  
 SUITE 201 MARGENT BUILDING  
 301 EAST REGENT STREET  
 INGLEWOOD 1, CALIFORNIA  
 ORCHARD 2-2390

Dwight D. Eisenhower, President  
 of the United States  
 The White House  
 Washington 25, D. C.

Honorable Sir:

My wife and I have read the speech which you delivered yesterday on the Israel situation, and we cannot agree with your position. We would agree that you are probably attempting to act under good motives. We believe that you and your advisors may have unintentionally formulated double standards of justice.

Several years ago, the United Nations passed a resolution requiring Egypt to give free access to ships of all nations through the Suez Canal. Egypt failed to do this but the United Nations has not imposed any sanctions against Egypt. Actually the United States has not exerted too much pressure to have Egypt change its position. Yet the United Nations has passed a number of resolutions condemning Egypt on this matter.

Last fall Russia invaded Hungary without justifications approaching those which Israel now has. The United States has not exerted any real pressures against Russia and has not moved for sanctions against Russia in the United Nations.

Just a few weeks ago, India invaded Kashmir in violation of a resolution passed by the United Nations. The United Nations has not imposed sanctions against India and the United States has not pressed for such sanctions. Perhaps such countries as India, Russia and Egypt are too important from a political standpoint for the United States to exert pressure against them.

If the United States would attempt to impose sanctions on the above countries, we would agree that it might be justified in having sanctions imposed against Israel. Otherwise, we would believe that double standards would exist.

Sincerely yours,

*Ellsworth R. Roston*  
 Ellsworth R. Roston

APR 18 1957

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
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ERR:ab

cc: Senators William F. Knowland  
 Thomas Kuchel  
 Rep. James Roosevelt



Raymond S. Barry, Inc.

Raymond S. Barry, Pres.  
Alice S. Barry, Treas.

## BUILDING CONTRACTORS

1580 King Avenue  
Columbus 12, Ohio

February 22, 1957

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is assigned toDepartment of State  
United States Government  
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

I wish to register my feelings pertaining to the President's address, by Television to the Nation, relative to the Suez crisis and the occupation of Israel, of the Gaza Strip.

I feel that the President's attitude towards this situation, is a straightforward solution to the problem and I agree with him, on everything that he said. I should like to suggest that we go one step farther, by invoking economical sanctions against Israel if they do not abide by the United Nations decision.

I should also like to take this opportunity, to criticise our President and the State Department, for not heading off the invasion, by Israel, in to Egypt. I firmly believe that Egypt provoked the invasion of their country, by Israel, and I do firmly believe that our State Department knew that, sooner or later, it would happen. It is beyond my comprehension, as to why they sat idly by and let Egypt carry on border raids, close the Suez Canal to ships from Israel flying Israeli flags and harassing their shipments in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Therefore, in my opinion, we have been very lax in coming to the aid of Israel like we are coming to the aid of Egypt now. I can only be left with the feeling that we played favorites, before the Israeli invasion and if the United Nations is expected to work and be respected now, it should have been made to work and be respected before this invasion.

Thanks for your time, in reading this letter and I hope what I have presented my feelings clearly.

Yours very truly,

*Raymond S. Barry*  
Raymond S. Barry  
2691 Leeds Road  
Columbus 21, Ohio

cc: Senators Bricker and Lausche  
Congressman Vorys

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Control: 14391

Rec'd: February 23, 1957

5 p.m.

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2625, February 23.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2625. REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 88, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, ENGBEL, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KHARTOUM, LONDON, PARIS, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI UNNUMBERED.

Israel continues dominate press 23 February AKHBAR declares "Eisenhower attitude toward Israel is result Saud-Eisenhower talks". Those close to talks believe US attitude has changed greatly and is far better than under Truman. Editorial points out "However this does not prove US accepts whole Arab viewpoint because US still disagrees over navigation rights for Israeli ships" and although US President referred refugee problem he did not offer solution. KHALID MOHIEDDIN (chief editor Masaa) declares "while Eisenhower admits Israel is aggressor he supports her demands for free navigation" and asserts "actually Israel did not ask for more guarantees than those given by US President". Masaa opining "imperialist powers especially US should be held responsible for Israel's refusal withdraw" asserts "US did not ask Israel withdraw on strength UN decisions but only in return for free navigation". "US bargained with Israel and agreed give Israel what US does not own". Editorial charges "during past two weeks American exerted every effort save Israel from UN sanctions" (allegation repeated by AHRAH) and "Eisenhower's repeated calls on Israel to withdraw were only designed to win Arab friendship and support for Eisenhower plan".

SADAT puts spotlight on British noting they spent money prevent election Eisenhower" and attacked him in Commons in spite fact: "UK received US protection oil and bread" and dismissing France and Israel as unworthy. Comment counsels Eisenhower "before friendship those three friends".

SHAAH also occupied with British as in thorough-going denunciation Imperialists it declares "it was Britain which drove Palestinians out of their homes and put country in hands evil Jewish elements" and in second editorial asserts "had it not been for Imperialist Britain Israel would not have come into existence". Following suit.

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-2- 2685, February 23, from Cairo

suit AKHBAR declares "outcry in UK over Eisenhower speech show British forget their country lost all leadership as result aggression on Egypt" and admonishes British "keep quiet even if you receive blows from your guardian ally".

KAHIRA recommends "Arabs demand guarantees from Israel" and lists eight including "enforcement partition resolution stationing UNEF in Tel Aviv Haifa and Jaffa to insure Israel does not attack again and permission Arab ships use waters of Haifa and Jaffa ports without hinderance and with protection UNEF when they are in those harbors".

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Action

NEA

FROM: PARIS

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 4317, FEBRUARY 23

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4317; REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 78

FRENCH PRESS TODAY CARRIES STATEMENT MADE BY ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TSUR FOLLOWING FORTY-FIVE MINUTE SESSION WITH PRIME MINISTER MOLLET YESTERDAY.

TSUR EMPHASIZED TO MOLLET ISRAELI DESIRE SUFFICIENT GUARANTEES BEFORE EVACUATING CHARM-ES-SHEIKH AND GAZA. SAID IT WAS UNTHINKABLE THAT CIVILIZED WORLD SHOULD APPLY SANCTIONS AGAINST COUNTRY FOR MERELY DEFENDING ITS RIGHT TO PEACE. TSUR INFORMED MOLLET OF LATEST POSITIONS OF "CERTAIN EUROPEAN CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT" RE SANCTIONS, CITING SPECIFICALLY SPEECH OF DENMARK'S PREMIER OPPOSING ANY SUCH MEASURES. TSUR TOLD MOLLET HE BELIEVED US "WOULD UNDERSTAND SITUATION".

FIGARO SPECULATED ISRAELI AMBASSADOR MAY HAVE BEEN ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS HIS GOVERNMENT IN ASKING MOLLET TO SUPPORT ISRAELI VIEWS IN FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT.

YOST

RAP

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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55  
Action  
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Control: 14335  
Rec'd: February 23, 1955  
12:13 p.m.

Info  
RMR

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4325, February 23, 4 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4325, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 79.

Today's press states Deputy Jacques Soustelle, on behalf alliance France-Israel, has sent telegram to Amembassy Paris expressing "profound emotion" of alliance at US position against Israel. Communique reportedly says French opinion unable understand "sanctions applied to Israel", which is defending its very existence, while similar measures were not (repeat not) taken re Hungary and Kashmir.

OCB  
USIA  
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OSD  
ARMY  
NAVY  
AIR

Despite fact above telegram not (repeat not) yet received, we believe substance is characteristic of wide-spread French reaction to US position.

YOST

SW:DMB

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MAR 6 1955

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Control: 14298

Rec'd: February 23, 1957  
10: 28 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Amman

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 969, February 23, 11 a.m.

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King Hussein expressed admiration for speech delivered February 20 and personally requested this be conveyed to President Eisenhower.

MALLORY

LMS/16

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AIR

FROM: BEIRUT

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2049, FEBRUARY 23

Control:

Rec'd:

14249

FEBRUARY 23, 1957

8:27 AM

NEA  
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SENT DEPARTMENT 2049; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 166, BAGHDAD 195  
CAIRO 256, DAMASCUS 288

JOINT STATE-USIA MESSAGE

ALTHOUGH BEN GURION REJECTION EISENHOWER'S APPEALS STOLE HEADLINES IN ALL FEB. 22 BEIRUT PAPERS PRESIDENT'S TELEVISED ME SPEECH WAS WIDELY COVERED AND DISCUSSED. USIS-RELEASE FULL TEXT APPEARED IN SEVEN ARABIC DAILIES: INFLUENTIAL MODERATE MOSLEM AL HAYAT AND BEIRUT, EXTREME MOSLEM NATIONALIST AL YOUN AND CHRISTIAN AN NAHAR. AL AMAL, AS SAHAFA AND AZ ZAMAN. USIS RELEASE WAS USED RADIO LEBANON ONE O'CLOCK NEW BROADCAST AND MISSION DISTRIBUTED FULL TEXTS TO OVER HUNDRED GOVERNMENT, DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER LEADERS. PAPERS WHICH DID NOT USE FULL TEXT ALL CARRIED REUTERS, AP, AFP OR USIS RELEASES CONTAINING EXCERPTS.

IN RELATIVELY HEAVY PLAY 9 OUT OF 10 EDITORIALS WELCOMED SPEECH NOTING PARTICULARLY PRESIDENT'S COURAGE, SAGACITY, FAITH IN UN AND ADHERENCE TO MORAL STAND ADOPTED AT TIME SANA- SUEZ INVASION. AMONG THOSE IN PRAISE OR NOT PARTICULARLY CRITICAL WERE LEFTIST TELEGRAPH, ANTI-WEST AD DIYAR AND EXTREME MOSLEM NATIONALIST BEIRUT EL MASSA. NEGATIVE COMMENT CAME FROM MOSLEM NATIONALIST AL YOUN WHICH PROFESSED SEE NOTHING NEW IN SPEECH AND EXPRESSED IMPATIENCE US/UN PATIENCE WITH ISRAEL. LEFTIST TELEGRAPH SAID IT WITH PRESIDENT WHEN HE CALLED FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL ISRAELI TROOPS, REJECTED IDEA AGGRESSION SHOULD BE REWARDED AND HOPED UN WOULD NOT FAIL. PAPER HOWEVER FOUND UN HESITATION IN FACE ISRAELI DEFIANCE NOT ENCOURAGING.

IN EDITORIAL ENTITLED "AMERICAN PERPLEXITY" LE JOUR'S KHALIL GEMAYEL PRAISED PRESIDENT'S SINCERITY, IMPARTIALITY

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-2- 2049, FEBRUARY 23, FROM BEIRUT.

AND SENSE OF JUSTICE BUT SUGGESTED LATEST EVIDENCE ZIONIST  
CAPABILITIES AS WITNESS AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS,  
STATEMENTS AND UN HESITANCY INDICATED WEST NOT EVEN YET READY  
FACE UP TO BASIC ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS.THEREOF.

FOR ADDITIONAL QUOTATION SEE USINFO CABLE FEB. 22.

HEATH

RAP

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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CIA

FROM: Oslo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 984, February 23, 1 p.m.

PASS USUN

Foreign Minister told me last night he felt US had gone very far indeed attempt meet Israel. He was most complimentary our statesmanship. He added he hoped very much sanctions can be avoided as would be very difficult here and he assumes for us also. In this connection he expressed hope Canadian ideas might catch on in NY and that UN action can be deferred pending Eban's return.

Lange leaves Oslo tonight, Copenhagen tomorrow inaugural SAS polar flight Tokyo.

Control: 14238  
Rec'd: February 23, 1957  
7:57 a.m.

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RAYNOR

IMS:DMB

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11-673

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 23, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal and Suez Canal Problems

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary  
Ambassador Hervé Alphand  
Mr. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor, French Embassy  
C. Burke Elbrick, EUR

COPIES TO: S/S (2); EUR (2); NEA (2); G; IO; WE;  
American Embassy, Paris

The Secretary said that he thought it might be useful to have an exchange of views regarding the Israeli situation prior to a meeting which he expected to have with Ambassador Eban on Sunday. He pointed out that the statement issued by the White House yesterday made it clear that the door was not closed to further negotiations and that this should offer some encouragement to the Israeli Government. He felt that the White House statement had gone very far in the direction that Ben Gurion seemed to want. In reply to a question by the Ambassador the Secretary said that we had in mind the possibility of a resolution in the General Assembly which would pick up the resolution of February 2 which would commit the United Nations to the maintenance of justice and international law in the area once Israeli forces have withdrawn. The Secretary said that it also appeared desirable to give more authority to the UNEF Advisory Committee which was set up to make recommendations to the Secretary General. In reply to a further question, the Secretary said that it would seem necessary to include in this package something in the nature of sanctions in the event of non-compliance by Israel with previous General Assembly resolutions.

The Ambassador said that he appreciated the opportunity of discussing these matters with the Secretary prior to the forthcoming meeting with Eban. He said that he had several suggestions

that he

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-2-

that he would like to put forward on a personal basis for the Secretary's consideration. He felt that it was most important to retain the idea of a statement by the maritime powers regarding freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran. He wondered if it would not be possible for Israel to make a unilateral declaration stating that it is prepared to refrain from any act of belligerency and to observe the terms of the armistice but that if Egypt resorts to acts of belligerency itself to block passage of Israeli ships through the Strait, Israel would reserve freedom of action to retaliate. The maritime powers could then declare that they have taken note of the Israeli declaration as conforming with international law and justice and with the right of legitimate self-defense under the United Nations Charter. This, he felt, would give Israel the assurances that it requires. He asked whether the United States Senate could not support Israel in this case by the passage of a resolution guaranteeing freedom of navigation. The Secretary said that this had been discussed at the meeting with the Congressional leaders the previous morning and it had been agreed that any attempt to bring about the passage of such a resolution would only serve to start a long debate and would result in undesirable delay.

The Ambassador asked if the United States Government had been in touch with the other maritime powers and the Secretary answered in the negative. However, we had an indication yesterday from the United Kingdom that it was prepared to join in a declaration regarding passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. There was some discussion regarding the possibility of obtaining the participation of an Asiatic maritime power in such a declaration and Japan was mentioned particularly. The Secretary asked Alphand to try to obtain his Government's reaction to the idea of a declaration by the maritime powers.

In connection with the Gaza Strip Alphand wondered whether it would not be possible to establish an "international military government" and charge UNEF not only with military responsibilities but also with the civil administration in Gaza. Presumably, if this were done, UNEF would continue to employ the individuals now administering the Strip, although it would be done under international auspices and the administration would be neither Egyptian nor Israeli. The Secretary said that he thought the Ambassador's ideas might be helpful.

The Ambassador said that he hoped the next day's conversation with Eban would produce positive results. As the Secretary was aware, the French Government had already taken a stand against imposing sanctions on Israel. The Secretary said that

if the

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-3-

if the United Nations takes a reasonable stand it would be difficult to avoid bringing pressure to bear on Israel. Alphand said that pressure should also be brought to bear on Egypt. He thought that something should be done about the passage of Israeli vessels through the Suez Canal. The Secretary observed that Ben Gurion had not emphasized this point in the recent communication to the President, but had confined himself to the problems of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip. He pointed out to the Ambassador that if Israel does not withdraw its forces the cease-fire would come to an end and fighting might easily break out again, in which case the Canal would not be opened to traffic. He inquired whether this presented serious problems for France. The Ambassador said that with the increase in the allowables recently made by the Texas Railroad Commission (some 200 thousand barrels a day) France was no longer under the same kind of pressure and can afford to wait a little longer for a solution. The Secretary felt that if we can show that the world can get along without the Canal, the Western countries would not be subject to blackmail on the part of Egypt. He felt that the closure of the Canal was hurting the Arab-Asian countries more than it is the Western countries and that continued blockage of the Canal will result in Nasser's becoming increasingly unpopular. However, the Secretary said that we cannot afford to make the present situation permanent since it would result in an unacceptable depletion of our oil resources in the United States.

The Ambassador asked what the Secretary thought Nasser's reaction would be to the four-power plan for interim operation of the Canal. The Secretary said that he felt that Nasser would probably not accept the plan as it now stands but would make counter proposals.

032

EUR:CBElbrick:mls

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FORM DS-10  
2-10-47

DEPARTMENT OF  
STATE

DATE

REFERENCE SLIP

3/5/57

TO:

RM/R - Mr. Burke

1167 N.S.

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FROM

11-530

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 23, 1957

DEPT. OF  
R

SUBJECT: US Position on Israeli Withdrawal from Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Farid Zeineddine, Syrian Ambassador

NE - Fraser Wilkins

NE - Edward L. Waggoner

MAR 7 1957

COPIES TO: NE(3cc) OLI(2cc) Amembassies Arab capitals

Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda  
Tel Aviv.

Dr. Zeineddine called at his request on Mr. Wilkins at 11:30 a.m. on February 23, 1957.

Dr. Zeineddine stated that he had been asked by his government to convey to the Department his government's views on recent US-Israeli talks. These views had also been communicated to the American Ambassador in Damascus. The Syrian Government was concerned that while the US intention in having such talks with Israel on the subject of Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Aqaba was a worthy one, the result would be to enable Israel to profit from its aggression and to encourage Israel to take similar aggressive action in the future. If assurances were to be given to Israel, then assurances against Israeli aggression and expansion should also be given to the Arabs.

Mr. Wilkins said that the United States had made it quite clear that in carrying on discussions with the Israelis it was in no sense negotiating for the UN. The United States had expressed its views on various matters but had not arrogated to itself the right to discuss matters within the purview of the UN. The US objective in having these conversations and in making them public had been to bring about peace and tranquillity between Egypt and Israel. By making its attitude known the US hoped to attain that objective which was in the common interest. Mr. Wilkins observed that the Syrian Government, in his opinion, should welcome this development. The assurances to which Dr. Zeineddine referred were a restatement of US attitudes on questions in which the US had been interested for several years and which had been the subject of discussion with all of the interested parties. The US position was based on existing facts. Were there to be an

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important change in those facts, and Mr. Wilkins mentioned as an example the possibility of a ruling by the International Court of Justice, then the US position might change.

Dr. Zeineddine said that if he understood correctly, the recent US statements on Aqaba and Gaza were not to be considered commitments. Mr. Wilkins replied that the statements were an expression of carefully considered US attitudes. The US believed that Israel should withdraw. We had restated certain attitudes which we hoped would encourage the Israelis to withdraw. In no sense were we intending to reward them for withdrawing.

Dr. Zeineddine said that the Arabs would have welcomed a US statement advising that the US intended to deal with the basic Palestine problems. In his opinion, a piecemeal approach would not be successful. Mr. Wilkins remarked that perhaps a piecemeal approach was the only one which offered much chance of success at the present time.

Mr. Wilkins asked Dr. Zeineddine for the latest information on the repair of the IPC pipelines. Dr. Zeineddine said that he had no recent information. Mr. Wilkins observed that it was difficult for us to understand how the pipeline question had become involved in the Israeli withdrawal problem. The situation was one in which the Syrian Government had an opportunity to show statesmanship and to perform a constructive service for much of the world. Dr. Zeineddine said that, speaking personally, a number of things had happened which had been unnecessary such as the destruction of the pipelines and the freezing of Egyptian assets by the US. Mr. Wilkins explained that the freezing of Egyptian assets was a legal step which had been taken prior to October 29, that it was applicable only to transactions prior to July 31, and that it was in no sense a punitive or retaliatory measure.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEPHONE  
*Memorandum of Conversation*

DATE: February 23, 1957

SUBJECT: Sanctions Against Israel

PARTICIPANTS: S. G. M. van Voorst tot Voorst, Netherlands Minister  
Lampton Berry - NEA

COPIES TO: NEA(2cc); NE(2cc)

The Netherlands Minister telephoned to say, purely for information, that he was in receipt of a telegram from his Government to the effect that it would oppose any resolution on sanctions against Israel inasmuch as the United Nations had not invoked sanctions against others who have been in violation of United Nations resolutions, e.g., Egypt, Russia, and India. If such a resolution were passed, his Government would not accept the recommendation.

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2/23/57

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928 Paxton Rd.  
Cleveland 8, Ohio  
Feb. 23, 1957

Mr. Edwin Kretzman  
Bureau of N. Eastern,

So. Asian & African Affairs

Wash., D. C.

Dear Sir:

As I read the review of your comments at the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, I was dismayed at your hostile attitude towards Israel.

Why should Israel's fears leave you "cold"? Why is Israel not justified in assuming that the U.N.'s failures over the past 8 years re Arab-Israel difficulties will continue?



Can't our government find any other method but sanctions against Israel to placate the Arabs? How about a determined effort to bring the countries together at a peace table, instead?

In short, just why is it so contrary to U.S. interests to be opposed to the continued existence and development of Israel?

Yours truly,

(Mrs.) Beatrice M. Gordon

928 Paxton Rd.  
Cleveland 8, O.



Mr. Edwin Kretzmann  
Bureau of Near Eastern, So. Asian  
& African Affairs  
State Department  
Washington, D.C.

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In reply refer to  
NEA/P

March 14 1957

Dear Mrs. Gordon:

I am sorry that an answer to your letter of February 23, 1957 has been so long delayed, but I was away for some time from the office on the speaking tour which took me to Cleveland, and found myself heavily engaged with recent developments in the Near East upon my return. But, I did wish to acknowledge and to answer your brief comments.

First of all let me say that the comments to which you referred were not made in my address at the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, nor in my participation in the panel discussions or a subsequent television show. I had read the article to which you referred before leaving Cleveland and was most unhappy about it because it was quoted largely from a press interview which I granted to several reporters before the luncheon meeting. I am afraid that the reporter who wrote this particular story was trying very hard to get me to make remarks unfriendly to Israel, and in some instances used portions of his questions and attributed them to me as a reply. The security of the State of Israel has been a matter of deep concern to the United States Government for a long time and we are trying to create conditions under which the sense of frustration and desperation on the part of the Israelis could be mitigated by achieving certain new conditions under which the State might enjoy a greater sense of security.

In the dispute between the Israelis and the Arabs we are trying to exercise an attitude of friendly impartiality, and the United States Government was never interested in imposing sanctions on Israel as such, but could not exclude their possible use in persuading the Israelis to withdraw in accordance with the United Nations resolution. We believed that this step was essential to

Mrs. Beatrice M. Gordon,  
926 Paxton Road,  
Cleveland 8, Ohio.


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creating conditions on the basis of which we could proceed to attack the basic problem in the dispute. I think you will find that every administration and every Congress since 1947 has been on record in behalf of the continued existence and development of Israel, and the Department of State's policies are always framed within the context of the Government's policy.

If there are disagreements as to the best methods to pursue these ends, I hope you will not allow these disagreements to shake your faith in the basic objectives outlined above.

Sincerely yours,



Edwin M. J. Kretzmann  
Public Affairs Adviser for  
Near Eastern, South Asian and African  
Affairs

HEA/P:DLJKretzmann:dh 3/13/57

EGY 3/5-CR

MAR 14 1957 A.M.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 25, 1957

NEA - Mr. Oulashin

You are requested to prepare an appropriate reply to the attached telegram to the President from Rabbi Samuel Weisberg regarding our Middle East policy.

Please send copies of your reply to S/S by March 4.

J. H. Cunningham  
S/S-RO

Attachment: As stated above dtd 2/22/57  
(S/S-1224)

*Handwritten notes and stamps:*  
- Top right: ~~SECRET~~  
- Below: 9E  
- Middle right: RBP  
- Bottom right: 1/14/64, 1964/2-23-57  
- Vertical stamp on right: REC-114

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

ROUTE SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

TO Mr. Fisher Howe  
Director, Executive Secretariat  
Department of State

PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL:  
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OFFICE OF THE STAFF SECRETARY.

Central

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Date February 23, 1957

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

**ACTION:**

Comment \_\_\_\_\_  
Draft reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For direct reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For your information \_\_\_\_\_  
For necessary action \_\_\_\_\_  
For appropriate handling X \_\_\_\_\_  
See below \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

By direction of the President:

*A. J. Goodpaster*  
A. J. GOODPASTER  
Staff Secretary

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WA

The White House  
Washington

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NEW YORK NY 22

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

IN YOUR TELEGRAM TO THE RABBINATE, DATED NOVEMBER 10  
YOU EXPRESSED YOUR APPRECIATION TOWARDS THE GOOD WORK  
THE RABBINATE UNSELFISHLY COMPLETED TO REACH THE MUTUAL  
GOAL, AS IT DID ITS SHARE FOUR YEARS AGO.

YOUR BELIEF IN OUR GOOD INTENTIONS TO SERVE THE  
INTEREST OF OUR COUNTRY, ENCOURAGES US NOW TO PROPOSE

F.W. 674840/2-2357



OUR SERVICE TO YOU. WE PROPOSE THAT YOU AUTHORIZE TWO  
OF OUR EXECUTIVES-- RABBI-- MEMBERS TO ACT AS YOUR  
PERSONAL EMISSARIES, TO PRESENT YOUR VIEWPOINT TO  
MR EEN - GURION, THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE LAND OF  
ISRAEL. WE ASSUME THAT THE RABBINICAL DELEGATION  
WOULD REACH BETTER AND MORE EFFICIENT RESULTS,  
BRINGING YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER,  
TO INFLUENCE HIM TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND TO  
ACCEPT A MORE LIBERAL APPROACH TOWARDS YOUR GOOD  
INTENTIONS TO HELP THE LAND OF ISRAEL IN ITS

DIFFICULT DAYS. WE WOULD ALSO SUGGEST TO ATTACH TO  
THE RABBINICAL DELEGATION OUR MUTUAL FRIEND  
BRIGADIER GENERAL MR JULIUS KLEIN.

IF YOU APPROVE OUR PROPOSITION WE SHALL BE  
HAPPY TO COME TO WASHINGTON TO RECEIVE DETAILED  
INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR OFFICE AND FROM THE STATE  
DEPARTMENT AS SOON AS YOU CALL ON US TO DO OUR  
SHARE, TO PROTECT THE PRESTIGE OF OUR BELOVED  
COUNTRY, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

WE WISH YOU, MR PRESIDENT, MANY YEARS OF

ACTIVE AND HEALTHY LEADERSHIP

RABBI SAMUEL WEISLERG EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATOR OF  
THE ASSOCIATED LEGISLATIVE RABBINATE OF AMERICA  
250 WEST 34 ST NEW YORK.

In reply refer to  
NEA:NE

March 1 1957

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Dear Rabbi Weisberg:

Your telegram of February 22 to the President offering your services in presenting United States views to Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion has been referred to the Department of State for reply.

Your kind offer has been noted. You may be certain, however, that the views of this Government on matters of mutual concern to the United States and Israel are being effectively presented to Prime Minister Ben Gurion by the American Ambassador to Israel.

Sincerely yours,

for the Secretary of State: *[Signature]*

Fraser Wilkins  
Director  
Office of Near Eastern Affairs

DC/R
50
Rev
Gen. H. H.

Rabbi Samuel Weisberg,  
Executive Administrator,  
The Associated Legislative  
Rabbinates of America,  
259 West 34th Street,  
New York, New York.

NEA:NE:R: Parker:rej - 2/28/57

MAR 1 1957

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CS/J

674.84A/2-2357

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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32  
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Control: 14458  
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 24, 1948  
8:41 AMNEA  
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FROM: DAMASCUS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1948, FEBRUARY 24, 11AM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1948, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 213, BAGHDAD 240, BEIRUT 587, CAIRO 253, JIDDA 128, TEL AVIV 132.

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ALL PRESS FEBRUARY 21-22 PUBLISHED TEXT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S TELEVISION ADDRESS UNDER GENERALLY OBJECTIVE HEADLINES BUT EDITORIAL REACTIONS ONLY PARTLY FAVORABLE. MOST PUBLISHERS APPROVE AND SOME PRAISE HIS FIRM STAND WITHDRAWAL BUT CRITICIZE HIS SUPPORT FREE NAVIGATION AQABA AND SUEZ. TYPICAL COMMENTS INCLUDE:

OCB  
USIA  
CIA

1. PRESIDENT DISAGREES WITH ARABS ON EVERY POSSIBLE STEP WHICH MAY FOLLOW WITHDRAWAL... IF PRESIDENT REALLY HONEST IN AFFIRMATION BASIC PRINCIPLES ANNOUNCED IN HIS ADDRESS HE CAN PARTICIPATE WITH AFRO-ASIAN BLOC IN MAKING UNGA APPROVE SANCTIONS. (G-2, ASRP RAI AL AM).

2. PRESIDENTIAL DISSATISFACTION ISRAELI INSUBORDINATION APPRECIATED BUT HIS PROMISE HELP ISRAEL RETAIN POLITICAL GAINS FROM MILITARY AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE FORGOTTEN. ARABS WILL ACCEPT NO SETTLEMENT BUT UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL. (PRO-SOVIET AL NASR).

3. ....UNITED STATES ALTHOUGH FIRM IN ASKING ISRAEL WITHDRAW PRESIDENT NEVERTHELESS GAVE HER HOPE EGYPT WILL RESPECT 6 PRINCIPLES SC ADOPTED ON SUEZ CANAL. THIS IS WEAK POINT SPEECH. (SAUDI-SUBSIDIZED AL AYYAM).

4. EISENHOWER DID NOT THREATEN ISRAEL WITH FORCE BUT THREATENED FORCE SHOULD EGYPT REJECT ISRAELI DEMANDS USE AQABA AND SUEZ. UNITED STATES IMPERIALIST POLICY HAS NOT CHANGED. (COMMUNIST LINE AL NUR).

5. PRESIDENT

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5. PRESIDENT CERTAINLY AUDACIOUS IN PROPOSING SETTLEMENTS WHICH WILL NOT HURT ISRAEL AT ALL. NEVERTHELESS HE SAID WORDS WHICH PLEASE ARABS SUCH AS ASSURANCE NO UNITED STATES AMBITIONS IN AREA AND DISAPPROVAL USE FORCE SETTLE DISPUTES. (ERRATIC AL TAHRIR).

SAME TIME MOST PAPERS CARRY (A) BRIEF STATEMENT CREDITED FOREIGN MINISTER SPOKESMAN SAYING EISENHOWER ADDRESS MAY IMPROVE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION SINCE INDICATES HE PREPARING UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION TO SIDE WITH UNITED NATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AND (B) LONGER STATEMENT SAME SOURCE DECLARING IT SHAMEFUL THAT POWERS WHO CREATED ISRAEL FOR AGGRESSIVE PURPOSES ALL ALLOW IT GO UNPUNISHED TODAY AND ADVOCATE PRESENTATION GUARANTEES.

SYRIAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM COMMENTARY FEBRUARY 23 ASSERTS (A) PRESIDENT LENIENT WITH ISRAEL DESPITE CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL (B) NO LOGIC CAN ACCEPT GUARANTEES HE PROMISED ISRAEL (C) RIGHTEOUSNESS EGYPT CAUSE REQUIRES UNITED STATES PUBLIC SUPPORT (D) IF ANY GUARANTEES ARE NEEDED THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN EGYPT AGAINST CONTINUED ISRAELI ATTACKS.

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Info RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 998, FEBRUARY 24, 4 PM

G SP C SENT DEPARTMENT 998, USUN 57.

L IO P UOP O OLI PUBLIC OPINION SEEMS TO BE TAKING MORE HOPEFUL VIEW ON STRENGTH TWO WEEK-END DEVELOPMENTS (1) HAGERTY STATEMENT SATURDAY THAT DOOR NOT (REPEAT NOT) CLOSED TO FULLER DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAEL AND (2) ESTIMATE AFRO-ASIAN RESOLUTION WON'T MUSTER ENOUGH VOTES FOR ADOPTION.

OCB USIA CIA OSD ARMY NAVY AIR ON OTHER HAND "ACTIVIST" ACHDUT AVODA SECOND LARGEST PARTY IN COALITION ANNOUNCED FRIDAY IN KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE IT WOULD LEAVE GOVERNMENT BEFORE ACQUIESCING IN "FURTHER RETREAT". REPRESENTATIVES OF MOST OTHER PARTIES BOTH IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT URGED FIRM STAND ON SHARM EL SHEIKH AND GAZA ALTHOUGH PROGRESSIVE PARTY'S KNESSET MEMBER COHEN URGED KNESSET NOT (REPEAT NOT) TO SET UP "TOO RIGID TARGET" AS MANEUVERABILITY ESSENTIAL. IT SOMETIMES ADVISABLE TO BEND WITH WIND. CAUTION AND MODERATION VITAL CONCOMITANTS IN OUR CIRCUMSTANCES".

ON AFRO-ASIAN RESOLUTION PRESS QUOTED GOI UNITED NATIONS DELEGATION "SOURCES" AS REPORTING UNITED STATES WISHED AVOID SUCH DRASTIC MEASURES PREFERRING "MORAL PRESSURES" PERHAPS INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL DIPLOMATIC MISSION CHIEFS. ONLY FULL WEIGHT OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT WHICH UNLIKELY WOULD WIN ADOPTION AFRO-ASIAN RESOLUTION PRESS TOLD PUBLIC.

THERE VAGUELY DEFINED HINTS OF SOME "GIVE" IN ISRAEL POSITION RE GAZA. "JERUSALEM POST" FOR INSTANCE SAID "STRIP SHOULD NEVER AGAIN BE USED AS SPRINGBOARD FOR EGYPTIAN ATTACKS. THIS SIMPLY MEANS EGYPTIANS SHOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE BE PERMITTED RE-ENTER. IF SOME ARRANGEMENT COULD BE FOUND WHEREBY ISRAEL COULD BE SURE HER SECURITY WOULD BE GUARAN-

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TEED AND AT SAME TIME ECONOMIC LINK ESTABLISHED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR GOVERNMENT WITHDRAW. THIS HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND DOES NOT (REPEAT NOT) REPRESENT ANY UNANIMOUS BODY OF OPINION. IT IS IN FACT POINT ON WHICH STRONG CRITICISM ALREADY BEEN VOICED BY SOME MEMBERS OF COALITION. DISCUSSION ON GAZA KNOWN TO HAVE CUT ACROSS PARTY LINES".

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH MADE DEEP IMPRESSION FOR ITS OBVIOUS SINCERITY AND DETERMINATION BUT WON NO (REPEAT NO) SUPPORT FROM ANY ELEMENT OF PRESS WHICH AFTER PAYING DEFERENCE TO IMPORTANCE ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH US AND UN WENT ON TO ASCRIBE US INSISTENCE ON ISRAELI CAPITULATION TO PECULIAR BLINDNESS LEADING IN WORDS OF HISTADRUT'S OMER TO "TRAGIC PERVERSION OF TRUTH WHICH CONSTITUTES SURRENDER OF GREAT DEMOCRATIC POWER TO DARK FORCES TRYING TO UNDERMINE ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE".

ACHDUT AVODA'S THREAT OF DEFECTION MADE BY FORMER PALMACH COMMANDER YIGAL ALON WHO SAID "NO (REPEAT NO) MERE VERBAL ASSURANCE BY UNITED NATIONS OR ANY POWER COULD SERVE AS GUARANTEE OF FREE NAVIGATION IN RED SEA ... WE MUST BEWARE OF TRAP INHERENT IN PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONALIZATION OF GAZA STRIP. IT WOULD LEAD TO STATIONING OF INTERNATIONAL FORCE ON BOTH SIDES ARMISTICE LINES ... EVENTUALLY FORMING TIGHT-RING ALL AROUND ISRAEL ... WHICH IN TURN COULD SERVE AS INSTRUMENT TO EXTRACT FURTHER CONCESSIONS FROM US. GAZA'S PROPER PLACE WITHIN STATE OF ISRAEL, DESPITE DIFFICULTIES BOUND UP WITH POPULATION OF STRIP. RETREAT FROM THERE AND ABANDONMENT OF STRAITS BEING DEMANDED ONLY AS AN 'INITIAL PAYMENT'. GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) SUBMIT TO CONSPIRACY WOVEN BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND ARAB RULERS WITH THEIR OIL WELLS".

SPEAKERS OF ALL PARTIES ADDRESSED PUBLIC ON SINAI-GAZA ISSUES IN SCATTERED POINTS OVER WEEK-END. MAPAI PARTY SECRETARY JOSEPH THAL REPORTED EBAN'S INSTRUCTIONS AS BEING "TO PREVENT RUPTURE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND UNITED STATES BUT TO REFUSE AT ALL COSTS TO GIVE UP ELEMENTARY BASES ISRAEL SECURITY." MISRACHI'S

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RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS MINISTER SHAPIRO SAID "SANCTIONS DO NOT (REPEAT NOT) FRIGHTEN ME BUT RIFT WITH UNITED NATIONS AND UNITED STATES SHOULD BE AVERTED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE". KNESSET MEMBER SAPHIR OF GENERAL ZIONISTS DEMANDED CREDITS BE OBTAINED FROM WESTERN EUROPE TO PREVENT LARGE-SCALE UNEMPLOYMENT IF NECESSARY BUT TO MAKE NO (REPEAT NO) CONCESSIONS TO AVOID SANCTIONS.

AT ANOTHER MAPAI MEETING EDITOR OF HISTADRUT'S "DAVAR" CALLED FOR "WORLD JEWISH CONVENTION TO PROTEST UNITED NATIONS STAND TOWARD ISRAEL". HE SAID ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE TO FACE AMERICAN-RUSSIAN-ARAB COALITION BUT THAT SANCTIONS COULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) BE WORSE THAN WHAT FACES ISRAEL DURING WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

LAWSON

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SS NO: 1190, February 24, Noon  
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SENT DEPARTMENT 1190; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 334, PARIS 327

NEA L Canadian Ambassador tells me in conversation with Tito following  
IO presentation credentials, Marshal praised highly President's  
UOP statement on Israel, thought situation in Hungary was "settling  
O down" and expressed hope western countries would soon assist  
SCA Yugoslavia in Hungarian refugee problem.  
OLI

RIDDLEBERGER

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 797, FEBRUARY 24, 10 P.M.

PRIORITY

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

LODGE SAW HAMMARSKJOLD AND CORDIER AT 8 TONIGHT AND INFORMED THEM OF EBAN'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY. LODGE SAID 24 HOURS PROBABLY NEEDED TO NAIL DOWN AGREEMENT AND POSTPONEMENT OF PLENARY DEBATE WOULD BE HELPFUL. SYG AGREED POSTPONEMENT DESIRABLE IN CIRCUMSTANCES AND UNDERTOOK OBTAIN FAWZI'S AGREEMENT. SYG LATER INFORMED US FAWZI AGREEABLE TO PUTTING OFF TOMORROW MORNING'S MEETING.

ON SUBSTANCE OF ISRAELI POSITION SYG SAID HE THOUGHT HIS STATEMENT TO PLENARY LAST FRIDAY SHOULD BE ENOUGH. IT HAD BEEN DRAFTED BEARING IN MIND POSSIBLE ISRAELI NEED TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. CORDIER SUGGESTED IT DESIRABLE FOR ISRAELIS INDICATE ACCEPTANCE OF SYG'S STATEMENT AS TO ARRANGEMENTS FOR GAZA RATHER THAN SPEAK ONLY IN TERMS OF UN ADMINISTRATION OF GAZA. SYG FELT IT WOULD LARGELY BE QUESTION OF PUBLIC PRESENTATION ON THIS POINT. HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT MANNER IN WHICH PRESS HAD CHARACTERIZED HIS STATEMENT ON GAZA. EGYPT'S REACTION IN LIGHT OF PRESS TREATMENT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE.

SYG RAISED QUESTION OF SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND LODGE SAID WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE DONE, ACCORDING TO EBAN, ON BASIS OF US AIDE-MEMOIRE WITH MINOR REVISIONS.

CORDIER SAID INDICATIONS FROM FIELD WERE THAT ISRAELI WERE PREPARING FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM GAZA -- SINCE THEY HAD BLOKED UP RAFAH AND RAIL LINES LEADING TO IT.

AT THIS POINT BUNCHE ENTERED AND REPORTED ON CONVERSATION PEARSON

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-2- DELGA 797, FEBRUARY 24, 10 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

(CANADA) HAD WITH COMAY (ISRAEL) THIS AFTERNOON AT 1 P.M.  
COMAY HAD TOLD PEARSON THAT ISRAEL'S POSITION WAS:

1. ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW FROM AQABA ON BASIS OF SPEECH PEARSON EXPECTED TO GIVE WHICH HE HAD SHOWN COMAY FRIDAY PLUS GA AFFIRMATION OF PRINCIPLE OF FREE NAVIGATION IN IRAN PLUS MENTION OF UNEF GOING INTO SHARM EL-SHEIKH, WITH NO TIME LIMIT ON DURATION OF ITS STAY.

2. ISRAEL WOULD MOVE OUT OF GAZA, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, ON CONDITION THAT EGYPTIANS DID NOT MOVE INTO GAZA, THAT EGYPT COULD NOT COME INTO GAZA "IN ANY FORM". PEARSON ALSO RAISED QUESTION OF POSSIBILITY OF DE FACTO UN ADMINISTRATION, WITH LEGAL RIGHTS ONLY ON FACE FOR EGYPT. COMAY SAID THIS NOT GOOD ENOUGH.

PEARSON ASKED COMAY ABOUT HAVING UN FORCE ALONG BOTH SIDES ARMISTICE LINE. COMAY SAID THIS SHOULD BE FORGOTTEN OR IGNORED AT THIS TIME SINCE BEN GURION WAS VERY STUBBORN ON THIS POINT.

ACCORDING TO BUNCHE, PEARSON CONCLUDED FROM HIS TALK WITH COMAY THAT STICKING POINT WAS ASSURANCE OF EGYPT'S NOT RETURNING TO GAZA.

SYG WAS DISTURBED BUT NOT SURPRISED AT DIFFERENCE IN TWO VERSIONS OF ISRAELI POSITION AND ASKED THAT SECRETARY BE INFORMED OF COMAY VERSION. LODGE INFORMED SECRETARY OF COMAY'S VERSION THIS EVENING.

LODGE

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## Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 24, 1957

Sunday, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador  
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Israeli Minister

MAR 6 1957

The Secretary  
Christian A. Herter - U  
Francis O. Wilcox - IO  
Herman Phleger - L  
William M. Rountree - NEA

OK Wm

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Ambassador Eban said he wished to convey the personal greetings of the Prime Minister and his Government to the President and the Secretary. He had been in Jerusalem for only thirty hours, having returned to Washington with the greatest urgency to communicate the position of his Government on the question of withdrawal. The Prime Minister had understood the attitude of the United States and hoped to achieve a closer understanding of our respective positions. The country was in a state of suspense regarding the outcome of discussions in Washington and in the United Nations. The Government felt that its basic aspirations were reasonable and just, and had great pride and gratitude regarding the sympathy throughout the world which the Israeli position had evoked. At the same time, the Government was anxious to proceed in a manner which would be conducive to a solution.

Continuing, the Ambassador said the Prime Minister had been impressed by the American position based upon its interest in global peace. It shared fully our concern that the "universal interest" should be taken fully into account, and his obligation to help preserve peace was fully in his mind. He also had been greatly impressed with the willingness of the President and the Secretary to speak of the current problems in terms of assuring Israel that it could rely on the United States and the United Nations if it withdrew. This, he said, had struck a responsive echo. On the other hand, it was not easy to undertake every decision objectively in view of the nature of the proposals which had been put forward at the United Nations by the six powers which would impose sanctions upon Israel. Such an attitude would do nothing but hinder, rather than help, a solution.

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The Ambassador

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The Ambassador said he had outlined to the Secretary before his trip the positions of his Government. He was now prepared to state how those positions might be amended. First, regarding the Gulf of Aqaba, the Secretary would recall the Israeli feeling that, because of the vital national interest involved, Israel would have been justified in seeking firm guarantees before withdrawal. These guarantees might have taken the form of an agreement regarding the status of the UNEF and an arrangement for that force to remain until a permanent settlement had been achieved. Alternatively, it might have taken the form of international guarantees for Israeli shipping through the Straits. The Ambassador had conveyed the difficulties which the United States had seen in each of these alternatives, and the Israeli Government had concluded that it would not be realistic to expect such guarantees. It therefore would retire from that kind of request. In doing so, however, it must consider other means which would provide less formal assurances. Since they were retiring - and many would think this was a serious recession - Israel would ask if the United States was willing to help in ways which were consistent with international law and were within the general framework of the February 11 Aide Memoire. The Government had been impressed with the declaration of intent by the United States concerning its rights in the Gulf and Straits. It hoped that this was not merely symbolic but that United States flag vessels would in fact use the Straits. Israel would like to feel confident that American flag vessels would be available for commerce by this route, at least insofar as the attitude of the United States Government was concerned. If this was assured, there would be a definite interest in our maintaining free passage.

With respect to the formulation in the Aide Memoire of United States recognition of free and innocent passage, the terms employed might not be understood by persons not familiar with legal language. It would be helpful, the Ambassador said, if the United States could endorse wording used by Hyde, and state in substance that innocent passage meant the passage of a ship whose conduct was not detrimental to the state whose territory was being passed. In other words, it should be made clear that ships should be permitted to pass so long as the ships themselves did not misbehave.

In receding from its previous position, Israel would be accepting the unfortunate estimate that the United Nations was not able to provide for the UNEF on Egyptian soil assuredly to stay there until peace had been established. The Israeli Government was interested in a proposal which had been put forward by other governments that United Nations forces might include, in addition to land units, naval vessels to patrol waters which would be of a less sovereign character than the land itself. Clearly, he said, patrolling south of the Straits outside Egyptian territorial waters might be easier than maintaining forces on the Sinai Peninsula itself. It would be much more difficult for any single state to prevent such a patrol from serving its purpose, and thus the arrangement would provide greater stability than if the forces were on land only. Presumably that would require a decision by the General Assembly, although the Secretary General might find it possible under his present powers to move in a sea

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unit. Egypt, he said, might find it easier from the point of view of its prestige to permit such an arrangement to be maintained longer than land occupation.

The Ambassador said that he would like to discuss an important aspect of the matter which might be decisive with respect to the Israeli decision to withdraw. It appeared reasonably safe to say that ships of countries other than Israel would be permitted to pass through the Straits, but the Israeli Government was apprehensive that Egypt might stop Israeli ships. It was out of that consideration that arose the request for guarantees. The United States, he said, could protect American flag vessels but could not provide protection for vessels flying other flags. In order to insure against the illicit use of force, Israel must itself provide that guaranty for its own ships. Thus Israel was prepared to state that it would protect, within the limits of the United Nations Charter, the freedom of passage of its own vessels. Israel would seek American understanding of such a declaration on the basis that if the United States had the power to speak with respect to its own vessels it followed that Israel likewise had the right to do so with respect to its own. The thought was that declaration of the Israeli intention would serve as a deterrent. Israel's legal advisers were now drafting such a declaration which would be shown to the Secretary after it had been completed. The Ambassador would like for the Secretary to say that Israel had a right to make such a declaration, provided it was legal and within the United Nations Charter. Presumably Egypt would think twice before obstructing Israeli vessels if it knew that such action would encounter an Israeli reaction. The Ambassador emphasized that of all of the considerations involved in the Israeli Government's willingness to retire from its original position regarding the Straits, this was the most decisive.

Continuing, the Ambassador said his Government had noted the reference in the Aide Memoire to the United States willingness to join with others in asserting its rights to use the Straits. It would be extremely valuable if the United States doctrine were widely shared and expressed by other maritime powers. It was hoped particularly that Panama and Liberia might be persuaded to join in such a declaration, since flag vessels of those countries did substantial shipping business in the Middle East. The Ambassador indicated that France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had shown a disposition to adhere to the American concept, although there might be some divergencies in the form which declarations by those countries might take. It was recognized that arrangements for such declarations might take time, and the Israeli Government was not suggesting that its withdrawal be delayed until the arrangements had been completed. It was, however, important to know the United States attitude.

The Ambassador said there were certain additional observations which he would like to make regarding the Straits, but they were of less importance than the ones he had mentioned. For example, he said, the Aide Memoire of February 11 had stated that the UNEF should move in after the withdrawal of

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Israeli forces, but there was no reference there to its mission or duration. On January 28 and February 2 Ambassador Lodge had expressed the hope that the force would prevent belligerent acts and would stay until peace had been restored. Israel hoped that, insofar as the U. S. as a member of the United Nations was concerned, it would continue to maintain that position. He understood that we considered it unlikely that the United Nations could formalize such an arrangement. The Ambassador feared that after withdrawal of Israeli forces, the UNEF would soon be removed from Egypt and then Egyptian forces would move in. Then the only deterrent to Egyptian action might be the declaration made by Israel. It would be useful, he said, if the U. S. could say that it looked at the UNEF task along the lines stated by Ambassador Lodge.

If it were not possible to get general United Nations endorsement of that principle — as many delegations would like — the Israeli Government hoped that the Secretary General could be persuaded to say that, if a proposal should be made to remove the UNEF, he would give the General Assembly an opportunity to consider the matter; thus a time of, say, ten days would be provided for United Nations consideration before the forces were withdrawn. If that should be done, and the U. S. and other delegations could then say that they did not feel that the forces should be withdrawn, Israel could feel that premature action would not be taken. This should not cause difficulty, he said, since the Secretary General had stated on February 7 that the Assembly had reserved for itself the right to determine the conditions under which the force should operate and be withdrawn. The Ambassador felt that if the Secretary General knew how much it meant to Israel, he would not hesitate to agree to inform the General Assembly before any withdrawal.

Alluding again to the fact that the February 11 Aide Memoire had said that only UNEF forces should be put into the area, its functions not having been defined, the Ambassador recalled that in his speech three days ago the President had used a phrase, not in the Aide Memoire, that "the force should move in for the purpose of assuring non-belligerency". The Ambassador observed that he should perhaps ask for clarification of our position, since if that were our joint understanding it would be extremely helpful.

The Ambassador then referred to what he called intangibles. When all the things he had mentioned had been done there would be deterrents, but no guarantees. Israel would be withdrawing in response to the United States feeling that, while no guarantees were possible, Israel should put its faith in the sense of responsibility of those who were recommending the withdrawal. The Secretary had said that the United States would use the full measure of its influence in an effort to bring about realization of Israel's legitimate interests. The United States

was

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was thus giving moral encouragement to Israel. His Government had instructed him to say that Israel would withdraw forces on receipt of guarantees, or upon arrangements for the stationing of U.N. forces with suitable terms of reference, or upon the development of some "other methods" to provide reasonable assurances. It now felt that some of these "other methods" might be put together to constitute a basis for withdrawal. He thought he should now ask the Secretary General to set up a meeting with General Burns to arrange for withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Straits area. In that context, Israel would seek agreement with the proposals which he had outlined.

The Ambassador said he wished to turn to what he called the link between Gaza and the Straits. The Prime Minister had felt that there would be wisdom in proceeding in arrangements for withdrawal from the Straits even if all aspects of the Gaza problem would take a longer time to settle. However the United States had said that if Egypt should interfere with Israeli shipping in the Gulf and in the Suez Canal at a time when Israel was in military occupation, Egypt could properly say that it was meeting one belligerent act with another. Israel proposed that the United States agree that Israeli rights to free passage would be fully operative, not when the whole of the Gaza problem was settled but when Israeli forces withdraw and after the U.N. had taken up their positions in the Straits and Gaza area. At that time the problem of working out the United Nations' relationship with the civil administration would be under active consideration. Israeli lawyers believed that if the U.N. were on hand in Gaza, it could not be stated that Israel was in a state of belligerency. The Ambassador hoped that the United States would "establish" this Israeli concept.

Thus, the Ambassador said, he proposed that on the question of the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel would retire from its demand for guarantees and would compensate for the lack of such guarantees by a patchwork of existing statements and a unilateral Israeli declaration regarding its right to protect its flag vessels. With respect to Gaza, Israel recognized that it was farther away from a majority of the United Nations on this issue than on the Straits issue. It had been the Israeli position that Israel would withdraw only provided its civil administration continued. Israel no longer insisted on this. In fact, there was only one thing that Israel was against: that was the installation of the status quo ante with the re-institution of Egyptian control in Gaza. Israel now favored the U.N. being in control of Gaza, with an international civil administration as an interim measure. Surely, he said, while the future settlement of Gaza was being arranged, it would be illogical to restore the old regime.

Continuing, the Ambassador stated that Israeli opposition to the return to the status quo ante stemmed from security considerations. He thought there was no legal justification for supporting Egyptian rights as before. If it were the Egyptian position that it was in a state of war with Israel, there could be no obligation to restore Egyptian rights in

the territory. There was no legal authority which said that Egypt had the right to invoke the Armistice Agreement after having itself violated the agreement for eight years.

The Ambassador would suggest procedures along the following lines: Israeli representatives would attempt by compromise to solve the Straits problem; Israel would withdraw from the Straits area; the United Nations forces would enter by land, and perhaps by sea. Thereafter, Israeli forces would be withdrawn from Gaza; the UNLF would move into that area. At that stage the General Assembly or another appropriate United Nations body would send to Gaza a mission to deal with all of the problems and to hear the views of the states concerned. The mission would recommend interim administrative arrangements for Gaza. It might rule against Israel; but Israel asked only to be heard. It might say that the United Nations administration should maintain some relationship with Israel, with Egypt, or with both. In this connection, the Ambassador had noted the Secretary General's statement of February 22 concerning the Egyptian attitude regarding the UN role in the administration of Gaza. He did not know the significance of that statement, but thought it might be helpful; however, he had noted that the Egyptians already had made statements denouncing it.

The Ambassador said that the only indispensable condition with respect to Gaza was that the solution must not be an Egyptian solution. The only thing that Israel would say "no" to was the return of Egypt to Gaza. Anything else that was reasonable, Israel would accept.

Concluding his presentation, the Ambassador observed that the President had said that he did not think we should assume that Egypt would deny to Israeli ships passage through the Suez Canal. He would welcome some statement that that represented the policy of the United States. Also, Israel would ask other nations to say something along these lines based upon principles of international law.

The Secretary commented that the Ambassador had made a constructive and masterly presentation of his Government's views. He suggested a short intermission so that he could consult with his colleagues before responding.

After a fifteen minute interval, the meeting with Ambassador Eban was resumed. The Secretary said that further reflection had confirmed his belief that the Israeli Government appeared to have made a sincere and constructive effort to find a solution to the problem. The Secretary felt confident that if the matter could be worked out -- and he did not wish to under-estimate remaining difficulties -- Israel would not have cause to regret its stand.

Regarding

Regarding the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits, the Secretary recalled that the Ambassador had inquired whether it was the intention of the United States to maintain trade routes through these waters. That was our intention, although the Ambassador should understand that we could not impose our will upon shipowners; the United States Government had no power to compel American flag ships to go to any particular place. He would assure, however, that the vessels would go into the Gulf of Aqaba, and if there should be any avoidance of the Straits because of apprehensions of a sub-normal character, we would seek to allay those apprehensions.

Regarding the Ambassador's question concerning the definition of free and innocent passage, the Secretary said there was a more recent and perhaps more **authoritative** statement on this subject than that of Hyde, and which more nearly reflected our own position. He referred to the definition in the International Law Commission's report. At the Secretary's suggestion, Mr. Philozer read this definition. The Ambassador commented that that appeared satisfactory since it referred to the conduct of vessels and not what they might carry. Responding to the Ambassador's query, Mr. Philozer said that while the report had not yet been accepted, the United States had endorsed it and we felt that the position set forth in it was sound.

The Secretary referred to the Ambassador's comments concerning the inclusion in the UNLF of naval units. He judged that there might be authority under existing resolutions adopted by the General Assembly to have naval units with the force, if circumstances indicated that they would be useful to prevent acts of belligerency. The United States would be prepared to support this concept if the situation seemed to call for it. He thought it would be largely a question of the Secretary General seeking the advice of his Committee in giving effect to a proposal that naval units be included. The Ambassador observed that one of the members of the Secretary General's committee had in fact made a proposal along these lines, and thought there was no important opposition to the idea. A representative of Norway had supported the plan on the basis that forces stationed on naval vessels would be far more comfortable than those stationed at the remote land area adjacent to the Straits. The Secretary remarked that naval forces might, by virtue of being in a more comfortable situation, serve to prolong the life of the UNLF, which might be a desirable result in itself.

Turning to the next question which had been raised by the Ambassador, the Secretary stated his understanding that Israel would want United States acceptance of it being in conformity with the Charter and the principles of international law for Israel to make a declaration regarding its inherent right to protect its own ships, and that an attack on ships carrying out peaceful missions through the Straits would give rise to the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. The Secretary saw no inherent obstacle to United States recognition of such a declaration, subject, of course, to our seeing the language which might be employed.

With

With respect to the Israeli suggestion concerning our joining with others in declaring the intention to exercise our own right of passage, the Secretary said we had received indications from other maritime powers of their willingness either to join with us or to make similar but separate declarations. It might be wise to have each nation make its own declaration, because of preferences of the respective Legal Advisers as to the wording which should be employed. We had, in fact, seen language drafted by another maritime power, but thought our own wording to be better for our own purposes.

The Ambassador said he had in mind that if our Aide Memoire of February 11 were sent formally to other maritime powers, it would be helpful. They could then draw upon it for their own statements.

The Secretary stated that we would be happy to see Panama and Liberia participate in any such declaration as suggested by the Ambassador. However, we had to recognize a fact, which some people overlook, that neither of these nations was fully receptive to American suggestions and often delighted in showing their independence of the United States. He thought it would be in the interest of these governments to assert their rights, since benefits would be derived from their getting vessels of their registry to participate competitively in trade. Thus the Secretary saw no great problem in getting them to go along with the general idea. The Ambassador commented that Israel had representatives in Panama and Liberia who could talk with those governments. The Secretary said we would be glad to be helpful, but it should not be assumed that it would be automatic that they would do what we might suggest.

Continuing, the Secretary referred to other points which the Ambassador had made concerning the question of the ULEF in the Straits area. We would be glad to reaffirm in an appropriate manner the views expressed by Ambassador Lodge on January 20 and February 2. He referred particularly to paragraphs 28 and 29 of the Secretary General's report which had been approved by the General Assembly.

The next point raised by the Ambassador, the Secretary said, was that the ULEF should not depart from the Straits area until the General Assembly had been given advance notice of such withdrawal. That seemed a reasonable proposal, and we would support it. The arrangement would, of course, have to be worked out with the Secretary General and we could not bind him in the matter. The Ambassador commented that he planned to ask the Secretary General whether the latter would permit the publication of a private document which had given the Israel Government the impression that the ULEF would not leave while "acts of belligerency were still possible".

The Secretary observed that the Ambassador had suggested there be a clearer understanding with respect to the President's statement that a function of the ULEF was to assure non-belligerency in the area. We would be glad to clarify this.

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The Secretary said the Ambassador had referred generally to the fact that Israeli withdrawal under the circumstances which he had set forth involved an act of faith in the United States and in the United Nations, and that we should recognize that fact. As the Secretary had said earlier, he thought that Israel would have no cause to regret such a decision to withdraw.

Referring to the Ambassador's suggestion that the Israeli right to passage through the Straits and Suez should be recognized when Israeli forces were withdrawn, without awaiting completion of arrangements regarding the administration of Gaza, the Secretary observed that this question arose in considering the link between the ending by Israel of acts of belligerency and the claim that Egypt had no right to exercise belligerent rights. The legal aspects of this question were discussed generally by the Secretary, Mr. Philager and the Ambassador. Mr. Philager thought that the matter would have to be explored with Mr. Hammarskjöld. It appeared to him that, after the U.N.F. moved into Gaza, the Israeli administration would be at the behest of the United Nations' force. The administration then presumably would have no power except that derived from the United Nations. If the Israeli civilian administration were simply carrying out instructions of the U.N.F., it would seem that there no longer would be a question of military occupation or the exercise of belligerency.

Restating the proposition, the Secretary said that the Israeli officials presumably would be in Gaza under the authority of the U.N.F. They would ultimately derive whatever authority they had from those who exercised power. Israel would no longer have power there. He thought that to be an acceptable view, but emphasized that this aspect should be discussed with the Secretary General.

The Ambassador repeated that a major consideration was that, if Israel solved the Agaba problem and withdrew her forces, the United States would have no inhibitions regarding Israel's right of passage.

Regarding the Gaza strip, the Secretary recalled that the Ambassador had said Israel was not against anything except a return to the status quo ante. He took it that that did not mean that every vestige of Egyptian presence must be removed, but meant that the administration must be approved by the United Nations. He did not believe that Israel could stipulate no Egyptian participation, but that that should be left to the United Nations. The Ambassador replied that the essential point was that the authority should be in the United Nations and not in Cairo. Once Egyptian troops were put back in Gaza, it would be hard to control the situation.

The Secretary did not consider it possible for the General Assembly to rewrite in essence the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt, certainly not without the concurrence of both parties. The future of Gaza should

should be worked out on some basis which would involve Egyptian consent, and he believed that Egypt would acquiesce in some change. He thought the Secretary General's statement of February 22 on the subject of Gaza should have gone a long way indeed toward meeting the preoccupation of the Israeli Government. What the Secretary General said coincided with what the Ambassador seemed to hope for. He had reason to believe that what the Secretary General said was agreeable to the Egyptian Government.

The Ambassador said that the Secretary General's Statement worried his government since it indicated a degree of subordination to Egypt. Moreover, there already had been denials from Egypt that the statement was agreeable to Egypt. That was an extremely sensitive point, which was the **crux** of the whole position with respect to Gaza. He would talk the matter over with the Secretary General to see what arrangements might be made. Mr. Shiloah interjected that even before the publication of Egyptian denials, the Israeli Government was extremely worried over Mr. Hammarskjold's statement since it was indirect and vague. It appeared to imply the presence in Gaza of an Egyptian police force. The Secretary responded that he had not inferred from the statement that an Egyptian police force was contemplated. After reading the statement aloud, the Secretary thought it good and constructive.

The Ambassador stated that this aspect of the problem was so essential that the Secretary General should clarify his statement. Perhaps Mr. Hammarskjold knew something that he could not say publicly. The Ambassador must emphasize to him the strength of the Israeli position regarding Egyptian control of Gaza. He thought the concept of an Israeli civil administration in Gaza could be defended on its merits. Unfortunately, this had been regarded as involving a kind of annexation by Israel of Gaza, which was not the case. In order to proceed toward a settlement, Mr. Ben Gurion had decided not to make an issue of that on its merits, but merely to assure that Egyptian control would not be reinstituted. A purely United Nations operation would be acceptable, and if it were necessary to exclude Israel in order to exclude Egypt, Israel would agree.

The Secretary thought that if Mr. Aban were seeking denial of Egyptian rights under the Armistice Agreement, he was asking for more than Mr. Hammarskjold or the United Nations could give. His personal understanding of the situation was that, without confronting Egypt with an abrogation of rights which it had under the Armistice Agreement, Egypt would acquiesce to the non-exercise of those rights, letting the United Nations take over. The Secretary did not believe that the United Nations could obliterate Israeli rights under the Agreement, and thought that Israel would be the first to deny that the United Nations would have power to do so. The background of the situation presented a powerful case for United Nations administration, particularly since the people in the area were on the United Nations dole and many would starve if the United Nations withdraw. However, it was important to arrive at such United Nations responsibility for civil administration by means other than tearing up the Armistice agreement.



The Ambassador responded that this was an intricate and complex problem. For that reason his Government thought the appointment of a United Nations committee to look into it would be the best procedure. With Israeli forces out and the UNEF in, it could then be decided what the future should be. That would postpone finalizing the arrangements and remove the problem from its present tense atmosphere. The Secretary said that we would welcome such a committee, but the decision was up to the Secretary General and the United Nations.

Reverting to the Ambassador's earlier presentation, the Secretary expressed his understanding that Israel would like an elaboration of the President's statement to the effect that we had no reason to believe that Israeli ships would be barred from the Suez Canal if Israel was not itself exercising belligerent rights. The Secretary said this was based upon Egypt's acceptance of the six principles for a settlement of the Canal dispute. For our part, we believed that Israeli shipping should pass through the Suez and had no objection to stating this.

The Ambassador inquired whether the President might have had any basis for his statement other than "ascribing virtue unless there is reason not to ascribe virtue". The Secretary replied that he did not want to say more than if the problem of the Gulf of Aqaba were solved, there appeared to be no incentive for Egypt to get into an international controversy regarding Suez. Our estimate of the situation was based on something more than a broad assumption that everyone would do right.

The Ambassador said he would like to discuss procedure. He would propose that he write the Department asking for elucidation of our Aide Memoire of February 11, including only those points which the Secretary had said would not cause trouble. He then proposed to arrange to see the Secretary General, since many aspects of the arrangements to be made concerned matters within his competence. This, the Ambassador said, raised the question of the General Assembly discussion the following day. Continuation of the debate and discussion of sanctions obviously would be unconstructive. He inquired whether the Secretary had any advice concerning a postponement of the debate for a few days while we were working on the matter.

The Secretary responded that we would have to move fast. We had encountered considerable difficulty in holding off the debate as long as we had. Assuming that the Ambassador had adequate authority, he saw no reason why the memorandum requesting elucidation of the American position could not be prepared that night, and we would be prepared to work overnight on the reply. He thought it important that the Ambassador place himself in a position to talk to the Secretary General the following day. Perhaps if progress could be made a statement could be issued which would justify a further delay in the debate. He thought it would be necessary, however, to say something of real substance.

The Ambassador

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- 12 -

The Ambassador wondered if there could be an agreed statement to the press that substantial progress toward an understanding had been made. He doubted that much of a delay in the General Assembly would be needed, although time should be provided for the matter to be considered by the Israeli cabinet which would have to render another decision. After discussing the problems involved in a postponement at the General Assembly it was understood that the Ambassador would talk to Mr. Hammarskjold and endeavor himself to make appropriate arrangements.

The Secretary said that Mr. Hammarskjold might be told that, insofar as the Gulf of Aqaba was concerned, it seemed that arrangements could be worked out within the four corners of existing General Assembly resolutions and what the United States unilaterally had said. Regarding Gaza, the Ambassador would have to talk it over with Mr. Hammarskjold, but what he had said today seemed reasonably consistent with what the Secretary General had said on February 22. He hoped that the results of talking with the Secretary General would be such that Mr. Hammarskjold could join in requesting a postponement of from 24 to 48 hours. The Secretary observed again that we had to be careful not to make it appear that the United States Government was usurping the functions of the Secretary General or the United Nations.

At this point the Secretary and his colleagues left Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah so that the Israeli representatives could consider the type of joint press statement which they would propose be made following the meeting. After reconvening, the draft was considered and revised by agreement between the Secretary and Mr. Eban. While the statement was being typed, the status of arrangements for the Suez Canal was discussed. Responding to the Ambassador's question, the Secretary said that not much progress was being made either physically or diplomatically. It appeared obvious that Egypt was trying to slow up completion of the Canal clearance in the belief that that would influence the discussions which we were having. There was submitted to the Egyptian Government a 4-power suggestion on how tolls might be handled, but we had not learned of the Egyptian reaction. The Ambassador commented that he had heard that Egypt had at first agreed to the proposals and had then receded, much in the same manner as they had done in the case of the Secretary General's February 22 statement on Gaza.

The Secretary observed that the movement of oil to Europe was increasing. The Texas Railway Commission had just authorized an increase of 200,000 barrels a day in domestic production. With the unusually warm weather in Europe, the situation there had greatly improved. Thus, the urgency for clearance of the Canal was not as great as it might have been.

Reverting

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- 13 -

Reverting to the question of Gaza, the Secretary emphasized again the hope that Israel was in search of substance and was not unduly concerned with form. Heknew that Mr. Ben Gurion would like to say to his people that he had been able to get the Egyptians out of Gaza. The Secretary did not think that would be possible. He hoped that the Prime Minister would be aware that Egypt could not accept the claim that they had been put out. It was clear that the United Nations could not force Egypt to give up its rights under the Armistice Agreement, any more than Israel would agree that the United Nations could usurp its rights under that Agreement.

After further discussion on procedures, it was understood that Ambassador Eban would go to New York the following day and that the Israeli draft document requesting elucidation of the United States Aide Memoire would not be submitted until the following day.

NEA:WM Rountree:av:hh

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Department of State

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February 25, 1967

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Info  
RMR

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2698, February 25

PRIORITY

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2698; REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 89, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BENGHAZI, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KHARTOUM, LONDON, PARIS, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI UNNUMBERED

Israel dominates press 24 and continues paramount topic 25 February although headlines go to arrival Arab leaders and beginning conference. Report "US preparing resolution advocating moral sanctions as alternative extreme course military, economic and financial sanctions" and quoting "US delegation sources" to effect "US wanted avoid such drastic step and proposing instead bring moral pressure by recalling all chiefs diplomatic missions from Tel Aviv" banner headlined and played as top story SHAAB and MASAA and frontpaged all other papers. Anti sanction views Humphrey and other Senators carried prominently and together with Dirksen comment "no final decision would be reached until after Dulles-Eban meeting" form basis news column editorializing that President may not be strong enough adhere stated position. Efforts Canada, UK, and France prevent sanctions reported fully and give rise speculation Afro-Asians may not have necessary votes secure passage their resolution. Albania's announcement in support sanctions frontpaged all papers.

Editorials cite imperialism as "crux problem facing Arab leaders" and list failure Israelis withdraw, free navigation Aqaba, refugees, Gaza, North African Pact, "to isolate Egypt" and Eisenhower plan as principal topics conference. Papers insist UN must impose sanctions and declare failure do so will destroy UN just as it destroyed League Nations.

POSE AL YUSUF notes "US is granting all Israel's requests and supporting her financially" while continuing freeze Egyptian funds and participating in economic blockade Egypt and concludes "in face this US still want US believe Eisenhower policy based justice and law". MASAA charges Israeli defiance is "closely

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-7- 2698, February 25, from Cairo

is "closely connected US Mid-East policy and aggressive Eisenhower plan". Noting "USG is concerned about injustices suffered by Israel and voiced view Israeli military aggression resulted from serious provocative actions", paper asserts "US call on Israel to withdraw was only face-saving gesture" and declares "US protestations peaceful intent wont deceive Arabs so long as Sixth fleet in med mv". Editorial concludes "Arab world disgusted by love making between Eisenhower and Ben-Gurion" and charges "US wants Arab-Israeli dispute continue in order justify US interference in Mid-East via Eisenhower plan". AHRAM bitterly attacks "ignorant" Senator Green for failing realize "Arab bonds motivated Egypt send teachers Libya" and for "interpreting Arab cooperation as proof Arabs have same objectives as Soviets".

HARE

LMS:BAG/16

MAR 6 1957

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

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Action

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Control: 15018

Rec'd: February 25, 1957  
3:24 pm

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1000, February 25, 4 pm

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1000 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 170, DAMASCUS 121, BEIRUT 152, AMMAN 170, USUN 58, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

GOI turned spotlight on reported Fedayeen activity last few days in obvious step-up campaign establish it cannot risk Egyptian control areas vital to its security and freedom movement.

February 24 press carried reports attack from Jordan in which two Israel police and two civilians were wounded. Foreign Minister issued communique linking these incursions to "encouragement" Egyptians are obtaining for such activity from "propitiatory attitude of UN toward Arab belligerency."

February 25 press gave massive attention to Foreign Minister White Paper on "Egyptian violations of international law" public. February 24 on Eighth Anniversary signing Israel-Egypt armistice agreement. At same time Foreign Minister Director General, Walter Eytan, made White Paper available to press; he told correspondents "Israel has received concrete information" Fedayeen who escaped during Sinai campaign are incorporated in large unit now being trained in Egyptian camp. He said "their activity is being organized in El Atish, Sinai headquarters of UNEF. They are composed of former Palestinians and Egyptians are being reinforced with some who in recent months have been operating from Jordan. Their number amounts to several hundred. Simple fact these Fedayeen have infiltrated into Sinai after UN troops were stationed there and have been active during past weeks is example why Israel cannot feel completely secure leave Gaza strip entirely in hands UN forces."

Turning to questions of sanctions he said, "sanctions only aggravate and not solve Middle East situation. If passed and acted upon, sanctions might well have negative effect on UN bodies such as truce supervision organization and conciliation commission."

If UN sanctions resolution is adopted and generally accepted, Israel might find it difficult to regard TSO as neutral body and it would certainly be reduced to impotence. It would further make it impossible for UN to be regarded by Israel as impartial mediator.

Sanctions

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Sanctions resolution would certainly have its effects on proposals Israel made recently regarding rehabilitation refugees and Gaza. Israel suggested in talks with US she could repatriate unspecified number. Sanctions would put end to this constructive effort precisely at time when it is possible to do something for refugees."

Incidents attributed to infiltrators from Jordan were as follows:

1. Policemen wounded when border patrol car attacked by grenade and rifle-fire near Lydda 1 a.m. Friday.
2. Civilian truck ambushed Thursday night near Mishmar Ha Amek. Two passengers wounded and taken to hospital.
3. Border police patrol ambushed near Afula Thursday night. One policeman wounded.
4. About noon Thursday livestock crossed from Jordan to Israel near Hebron. IDF unit approached area and exchanged fire with Arab legion positions which lasted about half hour without IDF casualties.

Communique inspired by these incidents stated "propitiatory attitude of UN toward Arab belligerency continues to encourage Egyptians in their campaign of aggression. In utter disregard charter provision Egypt persists in dispatch Fedayeen gangs from its territory as well as from territory other Arab States ...

"These raids have been carried out in wake series Fedayeen incursions from Sinai through UN lines into southern part of country.

While these raids are being perpetrated well inside Israel territory, Egypt openly publicizes her determination to carry on her campaign of murder and terror against Israel."

Copies of White Paper and text communique being pouched.

LAWSON

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Reaction

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55-H  
Action  
EURControl: 15084  
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 25, 1957  
5:26 PMInfo  
RMR

FROM: LONDON

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 4490, FEBRUARY 25

PRIORITY

JOINT EMBASSY-USIS MESSAGE

REPLYING TO QUESTION IN COMMONS TODAY ON WHAT DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE GOVT ABOUT USE OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL IN EVENT OF HER REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW FORCES FROM GAZA AND AQABA UNTIL DEFINITE GUARANTEES FOR HER SECURITY ASSURED, PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN SAID:

"WE BELIEVE THAT THE GAZA STRIP SHOULD BE EVACUATED BY ISRAEL. WE EQUALLY BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE MADE A UN RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT UN FORCES SHOULD BE STATIONED THERE.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD RETIRE FROM THE WEST SHORE OF THE GULF OF AQABA. WE EQUALLY BELIEVE THAT COUPLED WITH THAT WITHDR IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR BEYOND PERADVENTURE BOTH BY THE UN AND LEADING MARITIME COUNTRIES. THAT THEY REGARD ACCESS TO THESE WATERS AS FREE TO THE WORLD. THUS WE SHOULD ACHIEVE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE FAIR TO ALL AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS AN ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT OF THE MANY PROBLEMS OF THE AREA, WHERE PEACE AND STABILITY ARE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE WORLD.

"WE HAVE THROUGHOUT MADE THIS VIEW CLEAR TO THE AMERICAN GOVT AND THOSE OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. I AM NOT WITHOUT HOPE THAT A SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND ALONG THESE LINES."

WELCOMING THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT, MR. SHINWELL (LABOR) ASKED FOR AN ASSURANCE THAT THE GOVT WOULD NOT CONSENT, EVEN UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE US OR THE UN, TO ANY SOLUTION WHICH DID NOT PROVIDE THE EFFECTIVE GUARANTEES TO WHICH HE HAD JUST REFERRED IN HIS STATEMENT.

MR.

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-2- 4490, FEBRUARY 25 FROM LONDON

MR. MACMILLAN REPLIED "THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO. WE ARE TRYING TO FIND A SETTLEMENT WHICH IS NEAR TO BOTH SIDES. THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING ON. WE HAVE QUITE A DIFFICULT TASK IN CONDUCTING THEM AT A DISTANCE, IN CONTINUALLY CHANGING SITUATIONS UNDER PROCEDURES WHICH ARE DIFFICULT TO FOLLOW SOMETIMES AND DIFFICULT TO OPERATE."

"I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT BOTH PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY WE SHALL DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION. I BELIEVE THERE HAS BEEN SOME MOVEMENT TOWARDS IT IN THE LAST TWO OR THREE DAYS AND I WOULD HOPE NOT TO BE PRESSED TO SAY ANYTHING THAT WOULD MAKE THAT SOLUTION LESS LIKELY TO HAPPEN."

NICHOLSON (CONSERVATIVE) THEN ASKED "ARE YOU AWARE THAT THE ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES ARE EQUALLY BALANCED AND IF WE ARE GOING TO DO ANY GOOD WE MUST RETAIN A REPUTATION FOR IMPARTIALITY?"

PRIME MINISTER REPLIED "THESE WERE VERY DIFFICULT QUESTIONS IN WHICH NOT ONLY LOCAL, BUT WORLD INTERESTS WERE INVOLVED, AND HE WAS SURE THAT BRITAIN WOULD MAKE HER BEST SERVICE IF SHE TRIED TO SEE THAT WAS FAIR AND PUT HER INFLUENCE BEHIND IT."

DUGDALE (LABOR) TOLD MACMILLAN THAT ANY PROPOSAL TO USE SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AT THE MOMENT WOULD BE ABHORRANT TO LARGE NUMBERS OF MEMBERS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE HOUSE.

"MACMILLAN REPLIED "63-84. FOR THAT REASON I DO NOT WANT TO THINK IN TERMS OF SANCTION GM WE WANT TO THINK IN TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT."

GAITSCELL (LABOR LEADER) SAID "IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT EGYPT SHOULD RENOUNCE ALL THOUGHT OF BELLIGERENCE IN THIS MATTER. IF THAT CAN BE DONE AT THE SAME TIME AS A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES THERE WOULD BE A REAL ADVANCE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST."

PRIME MINISTER REPLIED "OF COURSE. IF THERE IS TO BE A SETTLEMENT THERE HAS TO BE A PROPER WILL ON BOTH SIDES. BUT THE VITAL THING IS THAT THOSE PARTICULAR WATERS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A FREE WATERWAY TO THE WORLD."

REPLYING

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-3- 4490, FEBRUARY 25, FROM LONDON

REPLYING TO NOEL-BAKER (LABOR) WHO ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE OF ADVANTAGE IF THE GOVT WERE REPRESENTED BY A SENIOR MINISTER AT THE UN ASSEMBLY, MACMILLAN SAID "WE ARE EXTREMELY WELL REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTER OF STATE (CDR ALLAN NOBLE) WHO HAS EARNED AN INCREASING REPUTATION SINCE HE HAS BEEN THERE; AND PERHAPS ONE OF THE MOST DISTINGUISHED AND ABLE CIVIL SERVANTS WE HAVE IN THE SERVICE OF HER MAJESTY TODAY.

BARBOUR

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58-H  
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12:07 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Bangkok

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2499, February 25, 6 p.m.

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PRIORITY

Acting Foreign Minister informed me February 25 his "personal concern" that US may be "pinpointing" Israel too much re censorship and sanctions. He felt it would be desirable "hold off" applying sanctions against Israel alone until free world had been able bring sufficient pressure bear on Egypt to force Egypt agree equitable solution such problems as free passage Suez Canal for Israel as well as all other countries. He asked "officially" why US pressuring for sanctions against Israel for failure observe UNGA resolution when US had not (repeat not) pressed for sanctions against Egypt which had violated earlier GA resolutions re right free passage through Suez Canal for Israeli and all other ships. Said US had not (repeat not) recommended sanctions against USSR for ignoring UNGA resolutions re cessation deportation and return those already deported from Hungary, cessation use force in Hungary, acceptance UN mission, etc. I told Rak that, quite naturally I was not (repeat not) well versed on intricacies situation re UNGA action on Suez Canal and earlier resolutions for free passage or UN action re Hungary. I felt however there were considerable legal and technical differences among all three situations. At his specific request I agree forward his query to my Government. Added that I would recommend USUN delegation in so far as practicable brief Thai UN delegation re US policies and position. Rak added he needed this information to help him prepare instructions for Thai delegation re Thai position sanctions and censorship Israel.

Have appointment with Acting Foreign Minister morning February 27. Foreign minister asked that, if possible, I bring Department's views re UN censorship and sanctions Israel at that time. Please instruct urgently.

BISHOP

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USUN, NEW YORK 664

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Info

President's speech of February 20 should prove useful in responding to request made by Acting FOMIN. Suggest you review with him points made by President. You should ~~xxx~~ add that since President spoke to American people on this matter, US has been making further efforts in UN and elsewhere bring about solution problems Gaza and Aqaba within framework compliance by all parties with all parts of UNGA resolution November 2 and subsequent resolutions. Meanwhile, as developments are taking place rapidly and as center of action is in New York, suggest Thai and US Delegates might exchange further views there.

Dulles DULLES

(CW)

Dist. Desired  
(Offices Only)

51

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:FWilkins;DCBergus:erc 2/26/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NE - Fraser Wilkins

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 15172  
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 25, 1957  
9:40 P.M.

FROM: NEW YORK

Info  
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: DELGA 802, FEBRUARY 25, 9 P.M.

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VERBATIM TEXT

FOR SECRETARY FROM LODGE

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL



MESSAGE CENTER

DEPT. OF STATE  
TENTATIVE  
14

674.84A/2-2557

FOLLOWING ARE TWO MEMORANDA FROM HAMMARSKJOLD RELATING TO HIS DISCUSSIONS TODAY WITH EBAN. TRANSCRIPT OF HAMMARSKJOLD'S SECOND MEETING WITH EBAN AFTER MY TALK WITH SYG WILL FOLLOW.

QUOTE

MEMORANDUM OF IMPORTANT POINTS IN THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON 25 FEBRUARY 1957

1. GULF OF AQABA AND STRAITS OF TIRAN

A. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL, STATING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S PRIMARY CONCERN IN THIS AREA WAS IN MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF RE-OCCURENCE OF ACTS OF BELLIGERENCY AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL, RAISED THE FOLLOWING THREE QUESTIONS:

1. FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL'S FORCES, WOULD THE FUNCTION OF UNEF BE AS DESCRIBED IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM OF 5 JANUARY IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR EBAN'S QUESTIONS, NAMELY, THE PREVENTION OF POSSIBLE ACTS OF BELLIGERENCY?

2. IN CONNECTION WITH THE DURATION OF UNEF'S DEPLOYMENT IN THE SHARM AL-SHEIKH AREA, WOULD THE SECRETARY GENERAL GIVE NOTICE

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-2- DELGA 802, FEBRUARY 25, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS BEFORE UNEF WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA, WITH OR WITHOUT EGYPTIAN INSISTENCE; OR BEFORE THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD AGREE TO ITS WITHDRAWAL?

3. THE QUESTION OF ADDING A NAVAL UNIT TO UNEF FOR PURPOSES OF INSTITUTING A UN NAVAL PATROL IN THE GULF OF AQABA AND STRAITS OF TIRAN TO ENSURE FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE.

B. THE RESPONSES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THESE QUESTIONS ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

1. WITH REGARD TO THE FUNCTION OF UNEF IN THE PREVENTION OF BELLIGERENCY, THE ANSWER IS AFFIRMATIVE, SUBJECT TO THE QUALIFICATION THAT UNEF IS NEVER TO BE USED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO FORCE A SOLUTION OF ANY CONTROVERSIAL POLITICAL OR LEGAL PROBLEM.

2. ON THE QUESTION OF NOTIFICATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE SECRETARY GENERAL WANTED TO STATE HIS VIEW AT A LATER MEETING. AN INDICATED PROCEDURE WOULD BE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO INFORM THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, WHICH WOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE MATTER SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

3. THE QUESTION OF THE NAVAL UNIT, IN THAT IT IMPLIES A FUNCTION WHICH WOULD GO BEYOND THE PREVENTION OF BELLIGERENT ACTS AS ENVISAGED IN THE BASIC GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS, WOULD BE BEYOND THE COMPETENCE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE BASIS OF THOSE RESOLUTIONS.

II. GAZA

A. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL DEFINED THE POLICY OF HIS GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO GAZA AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE POLICY OF ISRAEL IS OVERRIDINGLY ONE OF OPPOSITION TO EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION OR MILITARY CONTROL IN GAZA; ISRAEL CANNOT COMPROMISE ON THE DIRECT OR INDIRECT RETURN OF EGYPT TO GAZA.

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-3- DELGA 802, FEBRUARY 25, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

2. EGYPT HAS VIOLATED CONTINUOUSLY THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND IS IN A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY AGAINST ISRAEL WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THAT AGREEMENT, THEREFORE, CANNOT BE INVOKED TO BRING EGYPT BACK TO GAZA.

3. THE QUESTION WAS RAISED WHETHER A DE FACTO UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION IN GAZA AS OUTLINED IN THE RECENT STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD EXCLUDE EGYPT'S RETURN TO THE AREA.

4. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL'S ARMED FORCES, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD SEND A "FACT FINDING COMMISSION" TO GAZA TO INVESTIGATE THE SITUATION AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ITS OBJECTIVES.

B. THE SECRETARY GENERAL RESPONDED AS FOLLOWS:

1. EGYPT IS GIVEN THE RIGHT TO CONTROL THE GAZA STRIP BY THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THIS BEING BINDING ON THE SECRETARIAT, THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S CONCENTRATION HAS BEEN ON ARRANGEMENTS TO SECURE PEACE AND QUIET IN THE AREA - ALWAYS ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THE EGYPTIAN LEGAL POSITION.

2. QUESTION 3 IS DEALT WITH IN A SPECIAL MEMORANDUM ANNEXED HERETO.

3. IN THE LIGHT OF ISRAEL'S STAND ON GAZA, IT MAY BE SERIOUSLY DOUBTED THAT THE QUESTION OF AQABA CAN BE SOLVED SEPARATELY, AS INTENDED BY ISRAEL'S APPROACH.

III. DEPLOYMENT OF UNEF

A. WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF STATIONING OF UNEF ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ARMISTICE LINE AND IN THE EL AUJA AREA, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL STATED THAT HE HAS NOT CONSIDERED THIS QUESTION AS RELATED TO THE PROBLEMS OF GAZA AND AQABA, WHICH IN HIS VIEW WERE THE URGENT PROBLEMS BECAUSE IT IS FROM THERE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES IS ENVISAGED.

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-4- DELGA 802, FEBRUARY 25, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM

IN THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL, AMBASSADOR EBAN, AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AMBASSADOR EBAN ASKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHETHER HIS STATEMENT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FRIDAY 22 FEBRUARY, MEANT THAT AFTER THE TAKE-OVER, UNITED NATIONS WOULD HAVE "EXCLUSIVE ADMINISTRATION" OF THE GAZA AREA. THE QUESTION WAS MOTIVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT THE RETURN OF EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN OR MILITARY ADMINISTRATION, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, TO THE AREA. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AREA WAS DISCUSSED BY THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NO SUCH RETURN WOULD TAKE PLACE.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN REPLY POINTED OUT THAT HIS STATEMENT OBVIOUSLY WAS MADE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LEGAL SITUATION ESTABLISHED BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. HE COULD NEITHER DETRACT FROM, NOR ANNUL ANY RIGHTS EXISTING UNDER THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. HIS STATEMENT INDICATED PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS, ENVISAGED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EGYPTIAN CONTROL OF THE TERRITORY AS ESTABLISHED BY THE AGREEMENT, AND COULD, THEREFORE NOT BE UNDERSTOOD AS LIMITING EGYPTIAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE AREA UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

25 FEBRUARY 1957

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Syrian Ambassador Zeineddine February 23 informed Department under instructions GOS is concerned that assurances US has given Israel on Gaza and Aqaba will permit Israel profit from its aggression and will encourage further aggressive moves. GOS believes that if assurances are to be given Israel similar assurances against Israeli aggressive and expansionist moves should be given Arab states.

Zeineddine was told US objective in discussions with Israelis was to secure Israeli withdrawal and peace on Egyptian-Israeli border. Assurances which Zeineddine referred were restatement of US attitude. US was in no way arrogating to itself right to discuss or settle matters within purview of UN. Department representative further expressed view GOS should welcome this development which serves common interest.

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FROM : Embassy, Ottawa

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DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

February 25, 1957

DATE

REF :

50 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION NEA-4	DEPT. RM/R-2 EUR-5 IO-4 CRI-8 4/OP-1 2/0-1 P-1
	REC'D 3-1	OTHER CIA-12 OCB-1 OSD-4 ARMY-4 NAVY-2 AIR-3 USIA

SUBJECT: CANADIAN POSITION ON SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL

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**SUMMARY:** External Affairs Minister Pearson stated in the House of Commons on February 19 that a United Nations move to impose sanctions against Israel at this time would be "premature and unwise" until other possibilities for bringing about an agreed withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egypt had been exhausted. This statement of Government policy is consistent with current sentiment in Canada, especially evidenced in the press and Parliament, that sanctions against Israel at this time are uncalled for. Canadians feel that it would indeed be unfortunate to single out Israel for punishment as long as the Soviet Union, Egypt and even India defied United Nations' resolutions.

#### Government Opposed to Sanctions at Present

External Affairs Minister Pearson returned to Ottawa from the General Assembly February 18-20 to hold discussions with his Cabinet colleagues and to keep abreast of departmental business and events in Parliament.

During the Parliamentary question period on February 19, Mr. Pearson was asked specifically about the Government's position with respect to the possible imposition of sanctions against Israel. Mr. Pearson replied that a United Nations move to impose sanctions against Israel at this time would be "premature and unwise" until other possibilities for bringing about an agreed withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egypt had been exhausted. He added, "I think there is still a very good possibility of bringing about an agreed withdrawal by relating the necessity for withdrawal, which has already been indicated by Assembly resolutions, with the equal necessity of ensuring that the withdrawal should not be to the state of affairs which existed last October, and which had so much to do with bringing about the explosion then." (An excerpt from the Parliamentary debates for February 19 covering Mr. Pearson's statement is attached as enclosure 1.)

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United Nations Naval Forces in Gulf of Aqaba

Mr. Pearson's statement in Parliament was followed by increased speculation in the press that he would press for a resolution in the General Assembly which would call for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza and Gulf of Aqaba areas and the simultaneous stationing of UNEF troops in the two disputed areas and on both sides of the demarcation line. There was further speculation that Mr. Pearson might suggest that United Nations naval forces might be used to guarantee freedom of shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba.

Questioned on these topics in the House of Commons on February 21, Acting Minister of External Affairs Paul Martin firmly denied that Mr. Pearson had made any suggestion regarding the stationing of UN naval forces in the Gulf of Aqaba and added that no naval forces were at present at the disposal of the United Nations for such a purpose. Mr. Martin then hinted gratuitously that Canada would not be prepared to supply naval forces to UNEF should a request for naval reinforcements be made by the Secretary General. Mr. Martin's hint was expressed in the following language:

"If and when a request for naval reinforcements for the United Nations Emergency Force were made by the Secretary General, it should be recalled that Canada is already supplying a higher proportion of the UNEF than any other participating country. It should also be remembered that there are other countries not now participating in the UNEF which have offered forces."

(An excerpt from the House of Commons debate for February 21 covering Mr. Martin's statement is attached as enclosure 2.)

Embassy Comment: The statement of present Canadian Government policy in the House by Mr. Pearson is consistent with an apparent growing sentiment in Canada, especially evident in the press and Parliament, that sanctions should not be imposed against Israel at this time. Several considerations underlie this point of view.

First, there is a conviction held by Canadians in general that Middle East tensions are attributable to the machinations and intransigence of President Nasser as much as they are to any other factor. Secondly, Canadians are increasingly sympathetic to Israel's position regarding the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza strip. Finally, but not least important, is a general feeling that it would be unfortunate and indeed wrong for the United Nations to single out Israel for punishment when other nations such as the Soviet Union, Egypt and even India continue to defy United Nations' resolutions.

(Incidentally, the inability of the United Nations to enforce its decisions and resolutions with respect to the Soviet Union and Egypt

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has led to frequent allegations that the United Nations is guilty of applying a "double standard of international morality." An increasing number of commentators and Parliamentarians have recently asserted that the United Nations is "ineffective" at present and that Canada should therefore place greater emphasis on military alliances for defence and the maintenance of world peace.)

Progressive Conservative Party Leader John Diefenbaker made the position of his party clear on the question of sanctions in a recent speech before the Chamber of Commerce in Montreal. In his address, Mr. Diefenbaker expressed the hope that "Canada will not support any resolution for the imposition of sanctions against Israel".

Israel's failure thus far to respond satisfactorily to United Nations' resolutions and to assurances from the United States with respect to the Gulf of Aqaba has led some Canadian commentators to express the belief that the time is now propitious for the United Nations to call for a stationing of UNEF forces in the disputed areas simultaneously with the withdrawal of Israeli forces. It is contended by these commentators that this action would serve to guarantee Israel from hostile Egyptian acts from these areas. Invariably, the press points out that this is a position that has been consistently advocated by Mr. Pearson, especially at the time that the resolutions of February 2 were under consideration.

Generally speaking, the Canadian press has looked favorably on United States efforts outside the United Nations to break the present deadlock.

For the Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

*Adolph Dubs*

Adolph Dubs  
Second Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures: *2/14*

1. Statement by External Affairs Minister Pearson.
2. Statement by Acting External Affairs Minister Paul Martin.

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From Embassy Ottawa

EXCERPT FROM HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES FOR FEBRUARY 19 COVERING  
MR. PEARSON'S STATEMENT ON CANADIAN POSITION WITH RESPECT TO IMPOSI-  
TION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL

Mr. M. J. Coldwell (Rosetown-Biggar): I wish to address a question to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Will the minister bring the house up to date on the situation in the Middle East, particularly regarding the position in which Israel finds herself and the likelihood of a settlement in the near future?

Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs): It would, of course, be difficult and probably not appropriate for me to make a statement on the orders of the day on a matter of such general importance, and it would take a great deal of time. But I can tell my hon. friend that, as he knows, the general assembly of the United Nations was to have discussed the Middle East situation today. That discussion has been postponed until Thursday in order, among other things, to give the delegations a little longer to work out proposals which might be of some value when the assembly meets on Thursday in bringing about an agreed withdrawal of Israeli forces from the two parts of Egyptian, or Egyptian-controlled territory which they now occupy.

It has been suggested that a sanctions resolution might be introduced for this purpose, and that this kind of pressure would be required, but I do not think, Mr. Speaker, we have reached that point yet. I think there is still a very good possibility of bringing about an agreed withdrawal by relating the necessity for withdrawal, which has already been indicated by assembly resolutions, with the equal necessity of ensuring that the withdrawal should not be to the state of affairs which existed last October, and which had so much to do with bringing about the explosion then.

I think those two objectives can be reconciled, and I think if they can the question of sanctions need not arise.

Mr. Speaker: I take it there are supplementary questions which some hon. members wish to ask of the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Is that the case?

Mr. Donald M. Fleming (Eglinton): Thank you, Mr. Speaker. May I ask the Secretary of State for External Affairs if he will indicate to the house the position of the Canadian government with reference to the proposed sanctions?

Mr. Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I think I have already mentioned the possibility of sanctions. I believe that any proposal for sanctions should not be considered at this time until we have exhausted other possibilities for bringing about an agreed withdrawal of Israeli forces. I think that if a proposal for sanctions were introduced at the United Nations assembly at this time without these other steps having been taken it would be both premature and unwise.

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Desp. No. 696  
From Embassy Ottawa

EXCERPT FROM THE HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE FOR FEBRUARY 21 COVERING  
STATEMENT BY ACTING MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS PAUL MARTIN ON  
UN NAVAL FORCES IN GULF OF AQABA

Mr. Solon E. Low (Peace River): I would like to ask the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs whether he is prepared to answer the question I asked yesterday concerning the proposed use of United Nations naval forces to guarantee freedom of shipping to the gulf of Aqaba?

Hon. Paul Martin (Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs): Mr. Speaker, I am ready now to deal with this matter. I was aware that there was a news report over the radio yesterday morning which indicated that the Secretary of State for External Affairs had suggested that United Nations naval forces might be used to guarantee freedom of shipping through the gulf of Aqaba.

I can say that the Secretary of State for External Affairs made no such suggestion. The hon. member also asked whether or not naval forces were at the disposal of the United Nations for such a purpose, and the answer to that is that there are no naval forces at the disposal of the United Nations for this purpose.

I might add that no Canadian offer of naval forces has been made to the United Nations emergency force, nor has any request been received from the secretary general for such forces. If and when a request for naval reinforcements for the United Nations emergency force were made by the secretary general, it should be recalled that Canada is already supplying a higher proportion of the UNEF than any other participating country. It should also be remembered that there are other countries not now participating in the UNEF which have offered forces.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, on behalf of the Canadian government, is exploring all possible avenues to break the present deadlock between Israel and the United Nations. If, as the result of negotiations now going on at the General Assembly in New York, the United Nations emergency force were given specific duties to perform in the gulf of Aqaba requiring the use of naval forces, the matter would have to be considered by members of the United Nations in the light of any specific request made by the secretary general.

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## FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : American Embassy Tehran

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DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

February 25, 1957

DATE

REF : Depcirtels 681 and 691, February 13 and 14, 1957

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	3-6	CIA-12 OSD-4 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3 USIA-10

SUBJECT: Foreign Ministry Reaction to U.S. Position on Navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Future of the Gaza Strip

The Embassy appreciates the helpful information contained in the reference telegrams. It was used as a basis for an official use only memorandum left with the Director General of the Foreign Office, who is always interested in Departmental views, especially of this nature.

The Director General after reading the memorandum, three copies of which are enclosed, observed that President Eisenhower is, in his opinion, pursuing the right course of action regarding Israel, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip. By giving full support to the United Nations resolutions on this subject, he believed the President's hand would be strengthened in encouraging Nasser to be more flexible in his position. The Director General was concerned, however, over the recent report that Great Britain supported Israel's demand for a specific guarantee before evacuating the disputed areas. This, he feared, would result in a reopening of U.S.-U.K. differences over the Middle East.

FOR THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES a.i.

*Philip Clock*  
Philip Clock  
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure (to Department only):

Memo. "U.S. Position on Navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Future of the Gaza Strip".

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UNITED STATES POSITION ON NAVIGATION IN  
THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE FUTURE OF THE GAZA STRIP

The United States has been exerting strong efforts on behalf of implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions arising out of hostilities in Egypt. The United States stands for unconditional Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the area of the Straits of Aqaba. On February 18, 1957, President Eisenhower said in a public statement, "The United Kingdom and France, which occupied portions of Egypt at about the time of Israel's attack upon Egypt of last October, withdrew promptly and unconditionally in response to the same United Nations resolution that called for Israeli withdrawal. They deferred to the overwhelming judgment of the world community that a solution of their difficulties with Egypt should be sought after withdrawal, and not be made a condition precedent to withdrawal. The United States believes that Israel should do likewise."

At the same time the United States believes that the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba have international character; and as was stated in an aide memoire handed to the Israeli Ambassador on February 11, 1957, "No nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the straits giving access thereto." The United States believes that the Egyptian Government holds the same view. On January 28, 1950, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the United States that the Egyptian occupation of the two islands of Tiran and Senafir at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba was only to protect the two islands themselves and that "this occupation being in no way conceived in a spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through the stretch of water separating these two islands from the Egyptian coast of Siani, it follows that this passage, the only practicable one, will remain free as in the past, in conformity with international practice and recognized principles of the law of nations."

In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, as perhaps by the International Court of Justice, the United States on behalf of vessels of United States registry believes it is entitled to the right of free and innocent passage, which should be generally recognized. The United States position on the international character of the Gulf of Aqaba is an affirmation by the United States of its attitude, which requires no endorsement by other parties.

With respect to Gaza the United States aide memoire of February 11 said, "It is the view of the United States that the United Nations General Assembly has no authority to require of either Egypt or Israel a substantial modification of the armistice agreement which as noted now gives Egypt the right and responsibility of occupation. Accordingly, we believe that Israeli withdrawal from Gaza should be prompt and unconditional, leaving the future of the Gaza Strip to be worked out through the efforts and good offices of the United Nations."

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In summary, the United States stands first and foremost for immediate Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the Straits of Aqaba. The United States Government's efforts are designed to achieve this and to do so urgently. The United States does not think Israel should gain advantages from its invasion or that Egypt should have to make fresh promises to Israel to assure Israeli withdrawal. After Israel withdraws, the rules of international law should apply to shipping of all nations in the Gulf of Aqaba. The United States would consider any decision of the International Court of Justice to be binding, if such a decision were involved. Thus, it is the belief of the United States that Israel would obtain no rights or privileges to which it is not entitled by international law.

A press statement of February 13, 1957, by a spokesman of the Department of State in connection with this question is quoted below:

"Inquiries have been made of the Department of State as to whether Secretary Dulles stated to Israeli Ambassador Eban that Egypt had informed the Secretary General of the United Nations that it will allow Israeli shipping to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba if Israeli troops withdraw from Egyptian territory. The Department said that no such statement has been made by the Secretary."



11-514

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Memorandum of Conversation

This document consists of 3 pagesNumber 1 of 9 Series A

DATE: February 21, 1957

SUBJECT: ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Hoeny  
 Ambassador Caccia  
 Charles Lucet, Minister, Embassy of France  
 Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor, Embassy of France  
 S. P. Lee, Minister, Embassy of Canada  
 The Secretary  
 BU - Mr. C. Burke Elbrick  
 NEA - Mr. William M. Rountree  
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 Embassy London 9

The Secretary presented the following summary of the discussions he had had with Ambassador Eban and Minister Shiloah yesterday, February 24, at his home. On the whole, he felt that the talk indicated some progress had been made, that there had been some softening of the Israeli position and a real desire on its part to arrive at a solution. They had gone over thoroughly all aspects of the situation and there had been considerable legal argument of the exact nature of right of innocent passage and what restraints could be placed thereon. The Israelis showed a good deal of interest in some sort of a declaration by the principal maritime powers regarding the status of the Strait of Tiran. The Secretary and his advisors had referred to a definition of the right of innocent passage given by the International Law Commission's report on Territorial Waters to which, he explained, the United States can subscribe. Regarding the Gulf of Aqaba, the Secretary was under the impression that the problem could be worked out on the basis of the Secretary General's report of January 24, declarations by various maritime states and what already has been programmed by the United Nations.

The Secretary foresaw more difficulties with regard to the Gaza Strip where the problems are more political than substantive. The Secretary felt that the Secretary General's report on Gaza of February 22 seems to come close to what the Israelis want. However, for political reasons, Ben Gurion's Government may be reluctant to admit the return of any Egyptian elements now that Israel has gotten them out of the area. The Secretary had pointed out that such a position would be incompatible with the Armistice Agreement and that any United Nations administration of the Gaza area would have to depend to some extent on Egypt's consent. The critical question, he said, depends on whether matters

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Paul J. Smith, dealing with the United Nations, would have to be satisfied with the situation. He was worried chiefly in the matter of the General Assembly's vote to elect a Security Council permanent members, which is not an artist's, the Assembly. It is obvious that the fact, as the last step, is a major problem, there was little chance in their hands to get out and have a good understanding of the situation. General Assembly delay. In summary, the Secret is told that the last situation is soluble, but it is a political standard, which is the last situation and not what the United Nations would be.

The Secretary said that the Committee should consider in detail the social and domestic political problems which have arisen since the signing of the 1945 plan, in order that the Committee should be enabled to make a report to explain its position in the United Nations and to make such proposals as might be required when and the Secretary General.

ambassador of Ireland, a member of the Executive of the League of Nations, was critical. The Secretary replied that, at the request of Prime Minister de Valera, the United States has been successful in having the debate postponed until today but that there was a certain suspicion levelled in the work that there is stalling in the matter. He added that he did not get the impression from either Ambassador de Valera or Mr. Wilson that the Israelis are stalling but that, to those who do not know the details of what is going on, there probably does seem to be some basis for suspicion. The Secretary stated that he has warned the Israelis of the possible dangers if no solution of the situation were evolved before the General Assembly adjourns. Ambassador Lacey then asked how the United States expects the debate will develop in the General Assembly. The Secretary said, first, if the debate is not formally postponed further, he hoped that there will be no substantial debate this afternoon. He reiterated that the United States will not be ready to formulate its position until after the Ambassador will have spoken to the Secretary General and after the Ambassador will have had an opportunity to talk to Jerusalem following the exchange of views.

Ambassador Vaccia asked if there had been any further development on Suez Canal clearance and settlement terms. The Secretary said that there was nothing new, but that it is clear that the Egyptians are in fact holding up operations on clearance pending Israeli withdrawals. In answer to a further question from Ambassador Vaccia, Mr. Rountree said that the Secretary General had given the Egyptians the 4-power plan for a settlement but that the Egyptian reactions had not yet been made known.

In response to a question from Mr. Lucet, the Secretary said that Ambassador Eban had brought up the matter of the possible inclusion of naval units in the UMER. The United States feels that the terms of the United Nations resolution are broad enough to permit the inclusion of naval units in UMER and is disposed to consider favorably such inclusion, if developments indicate that it would be helpful to do so. Mr. Lucet asked if the Secretary had in mind suggesting that various maritime powers now make declarations with regard to the Gulf of Aden. The Secretary said that he had told Ambassador Eban that he thought a number might be willing to make

such

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such declarations if they could be of help and provided Israel with information of the Gulf of Aqaba.

At that point the Secretary withdrew from the meeting.

Ambassador Lodge then mentioned the desirability of planning tactics in the General Assembly. He said that Foreign Minister Pearson had been scheduled to speak early in the debate. The question is whether the Canadians should go ahead with the statement or remain silent. He invited the United States views. Mr. Wilcox said that he hoped that the Secretary General would see the wisdom of a further postponement. If not, he would hope that not too many states would make statements today. He added that he felt that circumstances warranted a further delay. Ambassador Lodge said that it was difficult to plan tactics in Washington and that the decision in such matters would be left up to the people at the United Nations.

Ambassador Lodge then asked whether the Secretary General had obtained Egyptian advance agreement to his statements of February 22 which, in his opinion, went a long way toward a solution of the problem. Mr. Wilcox answered that his understanding was that the statement had been approved by the Egyptian Government. Mr. Lucet then asked if the United States Government was agreeable to the idea of a UN Commission going to Gaza. Mr. Wilcox recalled that the problem would have to be discussed by Ambassador Eban and the Secretary General. He added that if the Secretary General's report were to be put into effect, the United Nations would probably want to send someone out to the area. Ambassador Eban has told the Secretary that Israel was willing to accept any United Nations solution for the Gaza Strip but would not accept an Egyptian solution. Mr. Lucet asked, if Egypt claims the right of belligerency, how can the Israelis envisage exercising the right of innocent passage in the Suez Strait? Mr. Wilcox pointed out that, in his February 2 statement, Ambassador Lodge had mentioned that one of the purposes of the UNEF was to prevent the exercise of belligerent rights. Ambassador Eban had asked the Secretary if the United States would re-emphasize Ambassador Lodge's statement and the Secretary had agreed that the United States might do so.

Mr. Wilcox then added that during yesterday's conversation Ambassador Eban had expressed the desire of the Israeli Government that the General Assembly be notified prior to the withdrawal of UNEF from any position. He said that Ambassador Eban had been informed that this was a reasonable request.

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: February 25, 1957

SUBJECT: Israel Withdrawal

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel  
NEA - Mr. Rountree  
NE - Mr. Bergus

COPIES TO: NEA (2cc), NE (2cc), IO (cc)

Mr. Shiloah wished to report on what his Embassy had done since Ambassador Eban's conversation with the Secretary on the previous day. An extensive report had been sent to the Government of Israel. The Israelis had prepared a working paper which summarized Mr. Eban's queries to the Secretary and the Secretary's comments. Mr. Shiloah handed several copies to Mr. Rountree emphasizing that the paper had no status as a document. Mr. Shiloah added that bad flying weather had caused a brief postponement of Mr. Eban's appointment with the United Nations Secretary General.

Mr. Shiloah repeated some of the substantive arguments put forth by Ambassador Eban on the previous day, emphasizing the need of some kind of formal action by the United Nations which would make it clear that the Egyptians would not return to Gaza. He felt that Israel had erred in presenting Gaza as a prize to be gained. Administration of the Strip would be a very difficult responsibility for Israel which he thought the United States should be urging on the Israelis, rather than vice versa. In any event, Israel had stopped insisting on an Israel civil administration in Gaza.

Mr. Shiloah urged at some length United States initiative in obtaining a further forty-eight hour postponement of debate in the UNGA. He said that the prospect of sanctions was like a pistol held at Israel's temple and that such an atmosphere was not conducive to further constructive progress. Mr. Rountree agreed that postponement of debate would be useful and said he hoped that Ambassador Eban could persuade the Secretary General to use his influence to bring about a postponement. He would pass on the Israel request to the Secretary and keep Mr. Shiloah informed of developments.

NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 2/26/57

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1957

March 21 1957

In reply refer to  
SEV 674.84A/2-2557

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Dear Mr. Brown:

I refer to your letter of February 25, 1957 to Secretary Dulles enclosing telegrams from four constituents concerning sanctions against Israel and a letter from Mr. Harvey Levy of Augusta, Georgia, on the same subject and our relations with the Government of Saudi Arabia.

The United States does not now have the question of sanctions against Israel under consideration because of the decision of the Government of Israel to complete her withdrawal behind the Armistice line in compliance with the United Nations Resolution of February 2, 1957. This decision demonstrates once again that the free world nations have decent respect for the opinion of mankind, as reflected in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Now that this withdrawal has been completed, in the President's words, "...there should be a greater effort by the United Nations and its members to secure justice and conformity with international law... The United States, for its part, will vigorously seek solution of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law."

I am enclosing a copy of a statement prepared by the Department concerning the discrimination of certain Arab states against Americans of Jewish faith together

with

The Honorable  
Paul Brown,  
House of Representatives.

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with a copy of the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the recent visit by King Saud of Saudi Arabia to the United States. I hope that these statements will be of use to Mr. Levy in understanding our relations with that country.

Your constituents' telegrams and letter are returned for your records.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

**Enclosures:**

- ✓ 1. Statements.
- ✓ 2. From constituents (four telegrams and one letter returned).

*Kai*  
*H*

S/S-CR  
MAR 18 1957 P.M.  
to J. H. signet  
MAR 21 1957

*Checked in substance*

NE - Mr. Fugge  
IO - Mr. White R. H. 3/15/57

*L*  
P: SEV: C Rushing: OBL: b2



**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, D. C.**

February 25, 1957

**ACTION**  
is assigned to

*NEA*

Honorable John Foster Dulles,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am enclosing telegrams I have received from Dr. Solomon Schwartz, Mr. and Mrs. Bernard Silverstein, and Mrs. Meyer Edelstein, and also a letter from Mr. Harvey Levy, all of Augusta, Georgia, and all opposed to sanctions against Israel.

I shall appreciate any consideration given to the views of these people in passing upon this important question.

Sincerely yours,

*Paul Brown*

MAY 20 1957

PB-g

P.S. Since writing the above I have received telegram, which I am enclosing, from Mr. Sydney Carter of Augusta, Georgia.

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*9/3*

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Cat <i>100</i>

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FROM AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT

DATE DUE

DATE REC'D

Brown, Paul

DATE

2/23/57

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NO.

SUBJECT

Ltr. fr. constituents (sanction against) Israel

TO:

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2/26/57

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2-27-57

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ANSWERED

NO REPLY NECESSARY

OCB

MAR 29 1957

In reply refer to  
SEV 674.84A/2-2557

Dear Mr. Coffin:

I refer to your letter of February 25, 1957 to Secretary Dulles acknowledged by telephone March 21, 1957, commenting generally upon United States policy in the Middle East. We appreciate your writing to express your opinion upon the conduct of our relations with the nations of that area.

The United States does not now have the question of sanctions against Israel under consideration because of the decision of the Government of Israel to complete her withdrawal behind the Armistice line in compliance with the United Nations Resolution of February 2, 1957. This decision demonstrates once again that the free world nations have a decent respect for the opinions of mankind, as reflected in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Now that this withdrawal has been completed, in the President's words, "The United States, for its part will vigorously seek solutions of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law."

Throughout the recent situation, it has been the constant position of the United States that the Israelis withdraw from Egypt without achieving political advantages which Israel did not possess before it invaded Egypt. Soviet disregard of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the ruthless suppression by the Soviet Union of the Hungarian people cannot mean that the United Nations should not take action in situations where such action might prove effective. As the President said, "Perhaps this is a case where the proverb applies that two wrongs do not make a right."

This

The Honorable  
Frank M. Coffin,  
House of Representatives.

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This Government emphasised its intention to take advantage of the fluidity of the situation which was produced by the Israel invasion of Egypt as early as November 3, 1956 when we introduced in the United Nations General Assembly two resolutions stating our determination to come to grips with the basic issues.

We did and continue to recognize that Israel had some very legitimate and genuine concerns for its own security, particularly regarding free passage through the Straits of Tiran and the danger of renewed fedayeen raids from the Gaza Strip. We believe that the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Armistice line, and United States intention to exercise the right of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and to join with others securing general recognition of this right will go far to remedy the conditions which led to the outbreak of the recent conflict.

On August 26, 1955 Secretary Dulles outlined the contributions which this Government is prepared to make in assisting the parties directly concerned in efforts to reach a basic settlement in the Middle East. This offer remains valid today. A copy of the Secretary's speech is enclosed for your ready reference.

We are grateful for your support of the President's proposals for the Middle East, which as you know, are not directed at the Arab-Israel dispute but at the threat of Communist or Communist-inspired aggression or subversion. However, with the passage of these proposals and their forthcoming implementation we believe that an improved atmosphere in the area will make more possible the solution of its other regional political problems.

I am also enclosing a copy of Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy's address of March 14, 1957 at Georgetown University in the event you have not had an opportunity

to read

- 3 -

to read it. In this speech Mr. Murphy discusses the background of the issues in the Middle East and our relations with the countries of the area. In addition, I believe that you may like to have for your personal use the enclosed copies of the President's radio and television speech of February 20, 1957, the United States Aide Memoire to Israel of February 11, 1957 and the statement by Ambassador Lodge of March 1, 1957 in the General Assembly.

Sincerely yours,

~~For the Acting Secretary of State:~~

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

✓ As stated.

1.  
P:SEV:CFRushing:OBL:bt

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3/20/57

NEA/P-Mr. Frye

5/5/57  
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MAR 20 1957 A.M.  
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to [signature]

FROM AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT		DATE DUE	
Coffin, Frank M.		DATE REC'D	
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SUBJECT			
suspect against Israel			
TO:	TO:	TO:	TO:
<del>FOR</del>	SEV		
DATE	DATE	DATE	DATE
2/15/57	2-27-57		
ANSWERED		NO REPLY	
NCB			

FRANK M. COFFIN  
SECOND DISTRICT, MAINE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**

**Washington, D. C.**

February 25, 1957

ROOM 145  
HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
DONALD E. NICOLL  
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

DISTRICT SERVICE OFFICE  
400 MAIN STREET  
LEWISTON, MAINE

MRS. CATHERINE TIMPANY  
DISTRICT ASSISTANT

**ACTION**  
is assigned to

*N.A.*

Honorable John Foster Dulles  
Secretary of State  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As I have read the events of the past few weeks leading up to the President's speech of last Wednesday night I have been disturbed by the indications that the Administration is determined to support sanctions against Israel if it does not withdraw its troops from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba.

I had hoped that the strong and sound expressions of opposition to this course by both the Majority and Minority Leaders in the Senate, together with expressions of similar opinion from other distinguished members of Congress and eminent private citizens would deter the Administration from what seems to me a most unwise and unjust course. Unfortunately, the President's speech does not give me such assurances.

The President, Ambassador Lodge and you have spoken repeatedly of the necessity for taking a "moral position" in this dispute. This is an admirable expression of intent, but I am not sure that it answers the questions posed to us.

The other night the President was understood by many to say, in effect: Russia does not understand and would not respond to moral pressure, but it is too big and too powerful for any attempt to apply sanctions. Israel shares our ethical concepts and would respond to moral pressure, but it is small and weak. Therefore, we shall apply moral pressure to Russia and sanctions to Israel.

To me this is bad logic and absolute injustice. We are acting like the town bully while dressed in the robes of justice.

Israel is a small nation, surrounded by hostile neighbors. Egypt has consistently refused to honor the armistice agreement of February 24, 1949, by preventing the passage of Israeli-bound shipping through the Suez Canal. Egypt has ignored and defied the action of

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enclosures, if any) micro-  
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Honorable John Foster Dulles

February 25, 1957

the United Nations Security Council of September 1, 1951, asking cessation of the blockade. In view of this record, the reluctance of the Israelis to accept the agreement of the Egyptians to the "six principles" at face value is understandable.

To me, the most sensible and constructive approach to this situation is set forth in the Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.J. Res. 117:

Other basic problems, causing tension in the area, are not dealt with in the resolution. The solution of the Arab-Israel controversy, the resettlement of refugees, the reopening of the Suez Canal with the adequate safeguarding of the interests of its users, and other problems, are of grave importance and should be given continued attention by the Executive.

Positive and comprehensive measures for dealing with the fundamental problems of the Middle East should be prepared and presented by the Executive to the United Nations and to the Congress. Sufficient legislative authority already exists for the settlement of many phases of these problems. Our country should lead in boldly pursuing and implementing policies and programs to bring peace, security, and economic stability to the Middle East.

I supported the Middle East Resolution in the House of Representatives because I believed we had no alternatives, and because I believed it would provide a beginning for a policy. I still hope for that development, but as of this moment we seem still to be reacting to individual situations without apparent forethought.

The time is ripe for thoughtful and positive declarations of policy which will place the present crisis in proper perspective and will give the world a balanced view of our total approach. I believe Congress, our own citizens, and the peoples of the world would applaud such action. To do less is to fail in our leadership responsibilities.

Sincerely,



Frank M. Coffin, M.C.



STEVEN B. DEROUNIAN  
2d DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEE:  
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

ROOM 1627  
HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

TELEPHONE: NATIONAL 8-3120

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, D. C.**

**ACTION**  
is assigned to

*[Signature]*

February 25, 1957

April 1 1957

Honorable Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hill:

May I not send along to you for your good advice a letter which has come to me from a constituent, Murray Geller, of 12 Moreland Court, Great Neck, New York.

I should like especially to answer Mr. Geller's statement that "It seems strange to us that we find it proper to unilaterally by-pass the UN in urging terms on Israel but defer to the UN when it is suggested we use a similar approach vis-a-vis Egypt."

When it has served its purpose, may I ask that you return to me Mr. Geller's letter?

I shall be most appreciative of your assistance in this.

Sincerely yours,

*Steven B. Drounian*

APR 26 1957

Enclosure *att 2*

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674.84A/2-2557

April 1 1957

In reply refer to  
SEV 674.84A/2-2557

Dear Mr. Derounian:

I refer to your letter of February 25, 1957 enclosing a letter from Mr. Murray Geller of Great Neck, New York, concerning United States relations with Israel and Egypt. Thank you for bringing Mr. Geller's comments to our attention.

The United States did not unilaterally bypass the United Nations to "urge terms" on Israel as a condition to her withdrawal behind the 1949 Armistice line. The consistent position of the United States on the question of the Israel withdrawal was stated again by President Eisenhower on February 20, 1957 in his radio and television address when he asked, "Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal?"


"If we agree that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant ... we will, in effect, have countenanced the use of force as a means of settling international differences and through this gaining national advantages.

"... If the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization and our best hope of establishing a world order ...

"I would, I feel, be untrue to the standards of the high office to which you have chosen me if I were to lend the influence of the United States to the proposition that a nation which invades another should be permitted to exact conditions for withdrawal."

The United States

The Honorable  
Steven B. Derounian,  
House of Representatives.



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The United States in its Aide Memoire to Israel of February 11, 1957 pointed out that neither the United States nor the United Nations had authority to impose upon the parties a substantial modification of the Armistice Agreement which was freely signed by both Israel and Egypt. However, the United States sought and received the support of the United Nations and the approval of the Government of Egypt to deploy the United Nations Emergency Force on the Armistice line at the Gaza Strip to prevent further hostilities in that area. Our belief in the international character of the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba has been made clear on several occasions.

The United States has from the beginning made clear its belief that after the withdrawal of British, French and Israel forces, there should be established conditions different from those which had previously prevailed. As Secretary Dulles stated before the United Nations General Assembly on November 1, 1956: "There needs to be something better than the uneasy armistices which have existed now for these eight years between Israel and the Arab neighbors."

One of our principal tasks is to create peaceful conditions and tranquillity through the prevention of hostilities. We believe that even if formal peace with definitive settlement may not now be obtained, we should vigorously seek to bring about the conditions of security and tranquillity which may, as rapidly as possible hereafter, make a peace settlement practicable.

If, now that the forces of Israel have withdrawn, there should be any recurrence of hostilities or any violation by either party of its international obligations, including those of the Armistice Agreement, then this would create a situation for United Nations and United States consideration.

I believe that your constituents will be interested in the enclosed material which describes United States efforts to prevent the outbreaks of further hostilities in the Middle East and assure that the rights of international navigation will be respected.

Mr. Geller's letter is returned as you requested.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

S/S-CR

MAR 28 1957 P.M.

to A for signature

Enclosures:

1. Material as stated.
2. From Mr. Geller (returned).

P:SEV:CERushing:OBL:dcd Language from Lodge of March 1, 1957  
in General Assembly 3/26/57

April 24 1957

Dear Mr. Malloy:

After consideration at the White House, the resolution of the City Council of Boston of February 25, 1957 concerning the possibility of United Nations sanctions against the State of Israel has been sent to the Department of State for reply.

The United States does not now have the question of sanctions against Israel under consideration because of the decision of the Government of Israel to complete her withdrawal behind the Armistice line in compliance with the United Nations Resolution of February 2, 1957. This decision demonstrates once again that the free world nations have a decent respect for the opinions of mankind, as reflected in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Now that this withdrawal has been completed, in the President's words, "The United States, for its part, will vigorously seek solution of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law."

Please accept my most sincere apologies for the delay in this response.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Meagher  
Chief  
Public Services Division

Mr. Walter J. Malloy, City Clerk,  
City of Boston,  
Massachusetts.

L.  
P:SEV:CERushing:bt

APR 24 1957  
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4/17/57

File 694 840/2-2557

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

ROUTE SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

TO Mr. Fisher Howe  
Director, Executive Secretariat  
Department of State

PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL.  
WHEN DRAFT REPLY IS REQUESTED  
THE BASIC CORRESPONDENCE MUST  
BE RETURNED. IF ANY DELAY IN  
SUBMISSION OF DRAFT REPLY IS  
ENCOUNTERED, PLEASE TELEPHONE  
OFFICE OF THE STAFF SECRETARY.

Date March 6, 1957

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

**ACTION:**

Comment \_\_\_\_\_  
Draft reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For direct reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For your information \_\_\_\_\_  
For necessary action \_\_\_\_\_  
For appropriate handling ☒ \_\_\_\_\_  
See below \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks: Resolution from City Council, City of Boston, urges, Pres. SecState, and US Reps at UN to oppose sanctions against Israel.  
Dr. Marko Zuzic, International Council for Christian Leadership, Washington, DC, encloses his address "Islamic-Christian Cooperation the Solution to the Middle East" and offers his assistance in present crisis in Middle East.

By direction of the President:

*A. J. Goodpastor*  
A. J. GOODPASTER  
Staff Secretary  
*jam*

MAY 9 - 1957

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FILE 674 842/2-557

CITY OF BOSTON  
IN CITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE  
MAR 2 11 52 AM '57  
RECEIVED

WHEREAS: The United Nations is reportedly considering the invoking of economic sanctions against the State of Israel; and

WHEREAS: According to analysts the success or failure of this movement will depend upon the decision of the administration in Washington; and

WHEREAS: It is manifestly unfair to single out the State of Israel for such punitive action; therefore be it

RESOLVED: That the City Council places itself on record as opposing this movement and urges the President, the Secretary of State, and our Representatives at the United Nations to do their utmost to prevent the United Nations from invoking "economic sanctions" against the State of Israel.

In City Council February 25, 1957. Adopted.

Attest:

*Walter J. Malloy*

City Clerk.

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FEB 25 1957  
XR 784w-3

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. A. J. GOODPASTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from  
Prime Minister Ben Gurion

XM  
784w-13  
There is enclosed the original of Prime Minister  
Ben Gurion's letter to the President dated February 10  
received from our Embassy in Tel Aviv.

The text of the above letter was received by  
telegram 941 from Tel Aviv transmitted to you on  
February 11.

FISHER HOWE

Fisher Howe  
Director  
Executive Secretariat

Enclosure:

Scaled envelope.

HLB  
S/S-RO:HSKean:po 2-23-57

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A true copy of  
signed original

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

16 Department of State

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Control: 15959  
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 26, 1957  
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NEA  
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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1003, FEBRUARY 26, 6 PM

PRIORITY

BEN GURION'S SUCCESS IN RETAINING CONTROL OF COALITION DESPITE ACHDOUT AVODAH AND MAPAM THREATS TO LEAVE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ISRAEL AGREE WITHDRAW SINAI AND GAZA WITHOUT OBTAINING CLEAR ASSURANCES REFERENCE HER POSITION, MAY BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN HE WILL BE ABLE TO DEFEND HIS ACCEPTANCE OF A POSITION SOMEWHAT LESS RIGID THAN THAT TAKEN PRIOR EBAN RETURN. FAR LESS FEAR OF GOVERNMENT CRISES AND DEFEAT OF THREATENED DEFECTION SEEMS TO US TO GIVE BEN GURION APPRECIABLE FLEXIBILITY IN ARRIVING AT REALISTIC COMPROMISE IF THERE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR DISCUSSIONS. I THINK IT SIGNIFICANT MEASURE OF HIS PRESENT STRENGTH THAT DEFECTION WAS SQUELCHED EVEN BEFORE DEBATE AND REPORTEDLY WITHOUT NECESSITY OF HIS INTERVENTION.

THIS DEVELOPMENT, TOGETHER WITH PROGRESS MADE IN HAMMARSKJOLD-LODGE MEETING AND AS REFLECTED ON ISRAEL POSITION REPORTED BY COMAY TO BUNCHE (IN TELEGRAM FEBRUARY 25) AND APPEARANCE HERE PAST FEW DAYS OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE SOMEWHAT LESS INTRANSIGENCE IN PUBLIC AND OFFICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS WITHDRAWALS MAKES US HOPEFUL FINAL SOLUTION NOT FAR OFF. WE SHALL ENDEAVOR NOTE WHEN AND IF THIS SAME OPTIMISM REFLECTED IN GOI.

KNESSET DEBATE RESULT REPORTED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

LAWSON

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38

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FROM: DAMASCUS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1964, FEBRUARY 26, 5 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1964; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 218, BEIRUT 596, BAGHDAD 244, CAIRO 258, JIDDA 132, TEL AVIV 134.

ASRP LINE REGARDING EISENHOWER TV ADDRESS AND EISENHOWER ME PROGRAM ESTABLISHED IN EDITORIAL BY HAWRANI WEEKLY NEWSPAPER AL-BAATH FEBRUARY 25. HAWRANI LISTS (A) "FAIR" POINTS: FUTURE OF UN AND PEACE IN ME THREATENED BY ISRAEL, INVADER CANNOT EXACT CONDITIONS, UN SHOULD EXERT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL; (B) "UNFAIR" POINTS: CHARGING EGYPT WITH PROVOCATIONS, PROPOSING STATIONING UNEF GAZA, CALLING FOR FREE NAVIGATION INTO GULF OF AQABA, PROPOSING THAT EGYPTIAN VIOLATIONS ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH FIRMLY, (C) OMISSIONS: AMERICA CREATED ISRAEL, EISENHOWER ME PROPOSALS BASED ON VACUUM THEORY THREATEN INDEPENDENCE ARAB STATES.

HAWRANI CONCLUSION: SPEECH INVOLVES PRESENT AND FUTURE DANGERS WHICH ARAB "SUMMIT" LEADERS SHOULD COUNTERACT WITH ARAB WEAPONS OF OIL, SUEZ CANAL AND FAVORABLE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.

COMMENT: HAWRANI APPARENTLY INTENDED GIVE IMPRESSION OF IMPARTIALITY IN POINTING OUT FAVORABLE POINTS, AND HE AVOIDED PERSONAL CRITICISM OF PRESIDENT. HOWEVER, EDITORIAL ADDS UP TO CONTINUED SYRIAN HOSTILITY TO US SINCE AT PRESIDENT ASRP PROPAGANDA LINE (CONCERTED WITH EGYPTIANS AND RUSSIANS) IS GOS LINE.

MOOSE

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Action

Control: 16103  
Rec'd: February 27, 1957  
3:08 a.m.NEA FROM: Beirut  
Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2070, February 26, 7 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2070, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 167, DAMASCUS 29

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President's address of February 20 continues evoke statements of commendation in press and from leaders of Lebanese intellectual and political life. The fear is expressed here that United States may retreat from its stand for unconditional and immediate Israeli withdrawal from Sharm-el-Sheikh and Gaza. Such retreat would, they say, be blow to beneficent American influence in Middle East and would promote Nasser-ism. Another fear expressed, in which we share is, that if an obdurate Israel should refuse to withdraw and sanctions were not invoked against her, then it would be impossible ever successfully to call for sanctions against Syria or Egypt in case they should flout the international will which quite likely they may do.

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EOC:DMB

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1957 FEB 27 PM 12 13

*2m/12 Feb*  
*Heath*

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Action  
NEAControl: 15288  
Rec'd: February 26, 1957  
3:52 a.m.

Info

FROM: Jidde

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 486, February 26, 8 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 486, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 24, BAGHDAD 36, BEIRUT 45, CAIRO 99, DAMASCUS 35, LONDON 77, TEL AVIV 7.

Text President's speech published AL BILAD. Local reaction favorable according Embassy opinion sampling.

Speech generally viewed as further affirmation belief President is "man of principle even in face Zionist pressure." Most profess inability understand, however, why world power such as US unable force Israel to withdraw, and express hope of action, if necessary, will follow speech.

Reaction articulate public appears be in line with only editorial on subject which appeared AL BILAD February 24. Editorial commented frankness of speech. Stated President "has condemned Israel and added that after condemnation there could be no question Israel's guilt. "Arabs ... support President's statement. How could state be member such body as US without being subject its rules?" Editorial concluded, "we shall wait see what action President ... takes in positive support decisions UN, and see whether his action conforms with his words. If he and American people interested in world peace, we await their effective efforts in that cause".

JENKINS

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Action

Control: 16086

Rec'd: February 27, 1957  
2:19 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Baghdad

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1448, February 26, 7 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1448; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

Out of 19 editorials appearing in Baghdad Arabic press in last four days, ten are concerned with problem Israeli evacuation Egyptian territory. While 3 of these expressed some sympathy for US efforts, general weight of opinion is critical US actions and in some cases of US intentions.

Among those registering approval of US efforts, AL-AKHBAR gives President credit for awareness expressed in his February 2 address that if an aggressing country like Israel is not punished result will be death of UN. Similarly AL-HAWADITH obviously approves of President's clear acceptance that an aggressing country should not be allowed to lay down conditions for withdrawal of its forces and blames Israel for its determination to foil US effort at solution ME problems.

More characteristic, however, AL-BILAT's view that delay by the UN and US in applying sanctions against Israel condemned five months since as an aggressor constitutes threat to world peace. Criticism based too on allegations that US trying satisfy the situation with "moral sanctions" alone which are viewed as wholly inadequate punishment for Israel's crime.

AL-YASDHA's columnist Safwani sees President's address as "on the whole in favor of Israel and a guarantee of its safety". AL-HURRIYAH applies this same accusation to "imperialist power" generally.

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NEA

Control: 15612

Rec'd: February 26, 1957  
10:51 a.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: Tehran

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1322, February 26, 9 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1322, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 8.

Foreign Minister today expressed hearty endorsement views set forth by President in broadcast on Israel. Ardalan particularly associated himself with what he called "basic principles" of President's speech. While in his opinion Israel has good case and he has so informed Arab chief of mission here, he agreed entirely with President's position that Israel could not be permitted achieve objectives as result aggression. He feels US leadership is steadily strengthening prestige and authority UN and is important contribution maintenance of peace.

STEVENS

BB:CHS/8

*[Handwritten signature/initials]*

1957 FEB 23 PM 5 05

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JUN 28 1957

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35  
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Control: 15536  
Rec'd: February 26, 1957  
9:17 a.m.

Info

FROM: Kabul

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 1050, February 26, 1 a.p.

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PRIORITY

Both official and public Afghan opinion has been high in praise President Eisenhower address to American people, re Israeli refusal withdraw behind armistice lines. Foreign Minister Inaom, Deputy Foreign Minister Malwandai and other officials describe speech as "magnificent", bringing hope not only for saving United Nations and increasing its effectiveness but also increasing Asian willingness to follow high-minded leadership of President Eisenhower and US in cause of free world against Soviet communism. See also TOUS 170, twenty-sixth.

MILLS

LMS:CHS/8

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Control: 15639

Rec'd: February 26, 1957  
11:42

FROM: Stockholm

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 919, February 26, 11 a.m.

DEPARTMENT PASS USUN

Secretary General Foreign Office confirms published reports that Foreign Relations Council will today decide Sweden's course re sanctions against Israel. He indicated that despite Sweden's agreement with UN's course against Israel so far it was unlikely Sweden would agree to sanctions.

CABOT

LMS:GEV/5

Note: PASSED USUN 2/26/57, 3 p.m. FW 854R



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FROM: Oslo

Control: 15788  
Rec'd: February 26, 1957  
2:14 p.m.

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 991, February 26, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 991, REPEATED INFORMATION COPEHAGEN 81, STOCKHOLM 50.

PASS USUN

Acting Foreign Minister Skaug today briefed Storting enlarged Foreign Affairs Committee in closed session on Cabinet's position Israeli troop withdrawal question. Moe (committee chairman) told Embassy Cabinet hopeful need to impose sanctions can be avoided through compromise formula widely supported by West (including US and UK), possibly along lines Canadian proposals (EMBTLS 980, February 21 and 984 February 23). Should, however, (presumably strong) Afro-Asian proposal sanctions against Israel come to vote, Moe thought, Norway would oppose. If US proposed mild sanctions in separate resolution, he added, Norway would either abstain or vote for, depending nature of resolution. Second source stated committee not (repeat not) in favor imposition sanctions. See EMBDES 587.

674.34A/2-2657

RAYNOR

RSP:GEV/6

Note: Passed USUN, 2/26/57, 6 p.m. (CTW)



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43-47

Action  
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Control: 15896

Rec'd: February 26, 1957  
4:24 p.m.

FROM: ARMA Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: MAE - CX 40 -57 February 26 (Army Message)

SENT DEPARTMENT ARMY FOR AC8I REPEATED INFORMATION STATE.

JOINT ARMY-STATE CABLE.

At approximately 1030 hours a group of Palestinians who had been in camp east of Maadi (R-187-57) attacked a police station at Maddi. Result 5 Palestinians killed and local authority in full control. One untested source stated that reason for attack was desire of Palestinians to return to Gaza but were not being permitted to do so. Observation of the tent camp at Maadi 1250 indicated no unusual security measures being taken. Signed Anderson.

AB:HC/16

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File Designation 674,84A/2-2657  
Tel Delga 806  
Date 2/26/57  
From New York  
To SecState

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 807, FEB 26, 1 AM

Control: 15233

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 26, 1957

1:45 A.M.

P R I O R I T Y

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

WE LEARNED FROM SYG TONIGHT THAT FIRST OF TWO MEMORANDA CONTAINED IN DELGA 802 REPRESENTED TEXT AGREED BETWEEN EBAN AND HAMMARSKJOLD. SECOND AND SHORTER MEMORANDUM WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST FROM EBAN FOR CLARIFICATION OF SYG'S STATEMENT BEFORE GA ON 22 FEBRUARY. AT CLOSE SECOND MEETING BETWEEN HAMMARSKJOLD AND EBAN, EBAN AGREED TO CONVEY TO SYG ANY COMMENTS FOREIGN MINISTER MEIR MIGHT HAVE ON HAMMARSKJOLD'S SECOND MEMORANDUM.

BUNCHE INFORMED US LATE TONIGHT THAT RAFAEL (ISRAEL) HAS JUST TELEPHONED AND ON BEHALF MRS. MEIR STATED THAT IN VIEW THE "NEGATIVE AND UNRESPONSIVE NATURE" OF HAMMARSKJOLD'S SHORTER MEMORANDUM, THERE WAS NOTHING THAT ISRAELI DELEGATION COULD SUBMIT FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

LODGE

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BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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Control: 15248

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 26, 1957  
2:08 A.M.

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: DELGA 808, FEBRUARY 26, 1 A.M.

PRIORITY

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL



1. THIS MORNING LODGE SAW MENON (INDIA) AT LATTER'S REQUEST. MENON EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT US ATTITUDE WAS MOVING TOWARD CANADIAN POSITION. HE CLAIMED THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH WERE PROMOTING THIS IDEA AND THAT WHOLE OBJECTIVE OF OUR POSITION ON AQABA WAS TO CREATE AN ALTERNATIVE TO SUEZ CANAL. HE RAISED QUESTION AS TO WHOM AQABA BELONGS AND SAID THAT HE FELT MOST THAT EGYPTIANS WOULD AGREE TO WOULD BE REFERENCE OF QUESTION TO COURT FOR ADVISORY OPINION. MENON SAID EGYPTIANS WOULD AGREE TO ABIDE BY AN OPINION OF COURT ON ANY INTERNATIONAL QUESTION RELATING TO INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHTS UNDER 1888 CONVENTION.

MENON STRESSED THAT ISRAELIS SHOULD GET OUT WITHOUT CONDITIONS AND THAT QUESTIONS OF AQABA, REFUGEES AND OTHER LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS WERE MATTERS FOR SEPARATE CONSIDERATION. MENON SAID INDIA WOULD NOT AGREE TO ANY REWARDS BEING GIVEN TO ISRAEL AS RESULT OF ITS INVASION. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THERE WAS NO "DEAL" BETWEEN US AND ISRAEL WHICH WOULD FORCE EGYPTIANS REJECT IT AND FORCE THEM TO PLAY THEIR ONLY CARD, NAMELY, NOT TO REOPEN SUEZ CANAL. WITH RESPECT BASIC SETTLEMENT OF SUEZ, HE FELT WAY TO APPROACH IT WOULD BE FOR EGYPT ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE TO PRODUCE SOLUTION. HE SAID THAT INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SUEZ WAS IMPOSSIBLE. MENON SAID EGYPT COULD NEVER ACCEPT ANYTHING WHICH WOULD DEROGATE FROM ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND WOULD RESTORE FRENCH-BRITISH POSITION IN SUEZ.

MENON INDICATED INDIA BELIEVED THAT RESOLUTION REGARDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS SHOULD STATE THAT IF ISRAELIS HAVEN'T WITHDRAWN WITHIN 72 HOURS, SANCTIONS WOULD BE APPLIED AGAINST THEM. TEXT

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-2- DELGA 808, FEBRUARY 26, 11 A.M., FROM NEW YORK.

THEM. TEXT DATES HANDED US BY LALL SENT DEPARTMENT DELGA 803.

2. NOBLE AND DIXON (UK) CALLED ON LODGE THIS AFTERNOON FOR EXCHANGE VIEWS RE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION. AFTER LODGE GAVE THEM BRIEF SUMMARY DULLES-EBAN, SYG-EBAN CONVERSATIONS, DIXON SAID THEIR THINKING WAS ALONG LINES OF "UN PROGRAM" ON BASIS OF WHICH ISRAELIS COULD WITHDRAW. AS DIXON DESCRIBED IT IT BECAME APPARENT THEIR IDEAS WERE QUITE SIMILAR TO THOSE DESCRIBED PREVIOUSLY TO US BY PEARSON. DIXON SAID UK WOULD NOT VOTE FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AND IF GA ADOPTED SUCH RESOLUTION HE DOUBTED SUPPORTING LEGISLATION WOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN UK. DIXON EXPRESSED HOPE UK WOULD NOT BE DIVIDED FROM US ON THIS MATTER, PARTICULARLY BEFORE BERMUDA MEETING.

DIXON INFORMED US THEY WERE CONSULTING WITH OLD COMMONWEALTH AND NUMBER OF EUROPEANS RE NEXT STEPS IN GA ON MIDDLE EAST.

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 809, FEBRUARY 26, 10 PM

PRIORITY

VERBATIM TEXT

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

SYG HAMMARSKJOLD RELEASED TODAY AS DOCUMENT A/3563 HIS TWO MEMORANDA OF 25 FEBRUARY PREVIOUSLY SENT TO DEPARTMENT IN DELGA 802 WITH FOLLOWING INTRODUCTORY NOTE:

QUOTE

ON 22 FEBRUARY 1957, THE SECRETARY GENERAL MADE AN ORAL STATEMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE NATURE OF A SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPORT OF 11 FEBRUARY (A/3527) REGARDING UNITED NATIONS RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE GAZA AREA. IN HIS STATEMENT, THE SECRETARY GENERAL REFERRED TO DISCUSSIONS CARRIED ON OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THESE EFFORTS TO BREAK THROUGH THE UNFORTUNATE IMPASSE AND UNLOCK THE DOOR TO CONSTRUCTIVE ENDEAVOUR WERE DESERVING OF WARM APPRECIATION.

FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSIONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD TWO MEETINGS WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL, ON THE LATTER'S INITIATIVE, ON 25 FEBRUARY.

A SUMMARY OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN THE FIRST OF THESE TWO MEETINGS, AS CONFIRMED BY BOTH PARTIES, IS PRESENTED FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS AN ANNEX TO THE NOTE.

AT THE SECOND MEETING, THE DISCUSSION MAINLY CENTRED AROUND THE

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FROM: NEW YORK

Control: 16027

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 26, 1957  
11:15 P.M.

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: DELGA 810, FEBRUARY 26, 10 PM  
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VERBATIM TEXT

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL



FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION AS IT PRESENTLY STANDS AFTER PROLONGED AND DIFFICULT DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIANS AND EGYPTIANS. WE HAVE NOT SHOWN FOLLOWING TEXT TO ANYONE ELSE EXCEPT ENGEN (NORWAY) PENDING DEPT'S COMMENTS. (DEPT DRAFT, WITH CHANGES TELEPHONED TO US, PREVIOUSLY GIVEN FAWZI (EGYPT), MENON (INDIA), ENGEN (NORWAY) AND SYG; LODGE ALSO DESCRIBED IT TO PEARSON (CANADA) BUT DID NOT MAKE AVAILABLE ANY TEXT TO HIM IN VIEW DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN CONSULTATIONS THUS FAR.)

QUOTE

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

CONSCIOUS OF THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, EXPRESSED IN ARTICLE 1 OF THE CHARTER, TO SUPPRESS ACTS OF AGGRESSION AND OTHER BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND TO BRING ABOUT THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW;

DESIRING TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH JUSTICE AND RESPECT FOR THE OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM TREATIES AND OTHER SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CAN BE MAINTAINED;

NOTING THAT ISRAEL HAS SINCE 29 OCTOBER 1956, VIOLATED, WITH MILITARY FORCE, THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF EGYPT, AND HAS OCCUPIED BY FORCE THE GAZA STRIP, IN BREACH OF THE UNDERTAKINGS

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1000 HOURS, FEBRUARY 26, 10 P.M., FROM NEW YORK.

UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UN BY ALL MEMBERS NOT TO USE FORCE TO SOLVE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND NOT TO VIOLATE THE TERRITORY OR INTEGRITY OF ANOTHER STATE, AND HAS CONTINUED THESE ACTIONS IN SPITE OF THE REPEATED EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONCERNING ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINE;

NOTING FURTHER THAT ISRAEL, DESPITE THE REPEATED CALLS OF THE GA, CONTAINS AN OCCUPATION OF THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AREA IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE GULF OF AQABA AND AN OCCUPATION OF THE GAZA STRIP;

NOTING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT OF 24 JANUARY 1957 AND THAT UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM ALL TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY IT SINCE OCTOBER 29, 1956 IN THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AREA INCLUDING THE ISLANDS, THE UNCT WOULD ACT IN PURSUANCE OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GA.

NOTING FURTHER THAT THE GA IN ITS RESOLUTION OF 2 FEBRUARY, WITH REFERENCE TO THE GAZA STRIP, CALLED FOR THE PLACING OF THE UNCT ON THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND GAZA AREAS AND THAT THE SYG ON 22 FEBRUARY MADE A FURTHER REPORT INDICATING THE WILLINGNESS AND READINESS OF EGYPT TO MAKE SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE GAZA AREA WITH THE UN WHICH IN THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT POLICE PROTECTION, GUARANTEE GOOD CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION, ASSURE MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE TO THE UN REFUGEE PROGRAM, AND PROTECT AND FOSTER THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERRITORY AND ITS PEOPLE;

NOTING FURTHER THE SYG'S SPECIAL MEMORANDUM OF 26 FEBRUARY TO THE EFFECT THAT HIS STATEMENT OF 22 FEBRUARY WAS MADE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LEGAL SITUATION ESTABLISHED BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AND THAT THE PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE ENVISAGED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EGYPTIAN CONTROL OF THE TERRITORY AS ESTABLISHED BY THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT;

CONDEMNS ISRAEL'S

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-3- DELUGA 810, FEBRUARY 26, 10 P.M., FROM NEW YORK.

1. CONDEMNS ISRAEL'S REPEATED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GA;
2. RENEWS ITS CALL UPON ISRAEL PROMPTLY TO WITHDRAW BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINE;
3. REQUESTS THE SYG TO REPORT NOT LATER THAN 72 HOURS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION ON ITS IMPLEMENTATION BY ISRAEL;
4. CALLS UPON ALL GOVERNMENTS, IN THE EVENT OF THE SYG'S NOT BEING ABLE TO INFORM THE GA THAT ISRAEL IS WITHDRAWING FULLY BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINE, WITH EFFECT FROM THE DATE OF THE RECEIPT OF THE SYG'S REPORT, TO WITHHOLD ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL UNTIL ISRAEL COMPLETES ITS WITHDRAWAL BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINE, AND SO TO REGULATE THEIR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AS TO BRING ABOUT RESPECT FOR THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GA CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL;
5. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO COOPERATE WITH THE SYG IN GIVING EFFECT, IMMEDIATELY UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL, TO THE PROVISIONS OF ITS RESOLUTION II OF 2 FEBRUARY 1957 CONCERNING THE PLACING OF THE UNEF ON THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER MEASURES PROPOSED IN THE SYG'S REPORT OF 24 JANUARY 1957, WITH A VIEW TO ASSIST IN ACHIEVING SITUATIONS CONDUCTIVE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL CONDITIONS IN THE AREA;
6. PLEDGES ITSELF, WHEN ISRAEL HAS WITHDRAWN, TO ASSIST THE PARTIES TO SETTLE BY PEACEFUL MEANS DISPUTES BETWEEN THEM, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER;
7. REQUESTS THE SYG AND THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ESTABLISHED BY THE GA RESOLUTION OF 7 NOVEMBER 1956 TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GA, AND IF NECESSARY TO A SPECIAL SESSION, AS MAY BE APPROPRIATE IN RESPECT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF PARAGRAPHS 5 AND  
THIS RESOLUTION

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Info:

Re: Revised draft resolution on Israeli withdrawal, DELGA 810.

Following are Department comments revised draft resolution confirming Lodge-Wilcox-Wilkins telephone conversation.

Our major comments relate to following key provisions:

Operative para 4: It is essential that word QUOTE peaceful UNQUOTE be restored so that phrase would read QUOTE and so to regulate their peaceful relations with Israel, etc. UNQUOTE Deletion QUOTE peaceful UNQUOTE opens this provision to interpretation, which Soviets might seize upon, that force might be employed against Israel.

Operative para 1: Although we recognize Arab desire see Israel condemned, we believe our common objective is to bring about complete withdrawal. We believe unconditional condemnation as now provided this para will hinder rather than help in this regard.

We therefore believe Arabs should be asked either to delete this para ~~provision~~ or to restore the conditional form of condemnation in our original text. If you find it difficult secure support for our original version suggest you propose deletion present operative para 1 and insertion new para after operative para 3 reading as follows:

QUOTE Declares, in the event the Secretary General is not able to inform

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:SDePalma:rs 2/27/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

F. O. Wilcox

IO - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Wilkins

L - Mr. Phleger (in substance)

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NI ACT *misfiled*  
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the General Assembly within 72 hours that Israel is withdrawing fully behind the armistice line, that Israel stands condemned for its repeated failure to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly. UNQUOTE

Seventh preambular para: We recognize that this is substantially accurate rendering of SYG's special memo 26 February, but believe words QUOTE Egyptian control of the territory as established by UNQUOTE should be deleted. Alternatively you might suggest either simple noting of SYG's special memorandum of 26 February or substantially complete spelling out this and related memos.

Fifth preambular para: As reported to Ambassador Lodge, we believe it highly important spell out recital of GA actions taken and SYG reports made to date in order set forth most convincing possible case for ~~subsequent~~ <sup>strongly</sup> additional measures against Israel. Therefore/believe our original language should be restored this para.

~~DELA 810~~

With regard other changes, we believe:

1. Omission our second preambular para (Recalling disregard ~~many~~ many occasions by parties, etc.) undesirable since distorts resolution's balance. However, you are authorized trade away this para as part of agreement to restore above points.

2. Changes third preambular para acceptable, though you ~~may not~~ <sup>should</sup> seek deletion last phrase (QUOTE and has continued these actions, etc. UNQUOTE) as redundant.

3. Changes sixth preambular para acceptable. For reasons indicated above we could not accept deletion para as suggested by Fawzi.

4. Change in operative para 5 acceptable.

5. Changes operative para 6 acceptable.

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6. Changes operative para 7 acceptable.

Following your consultations on above, request you ~~inform~~ confirm text with Department prior decision to introduce it.

" DULLES "

*Dulles*

*(7aw)*

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UNITED NATIONS  
UNITED STATES MISSION

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GADEL 154

1956 FEB 26 PM 7 42

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Origin

Info

Confirming text telephoned last night and further modified by telephon today, following is draft resolution on Israeli withdrawal. Phrase in brackets at end of fourth preambular paragraph should be deleted as redundant.

QUOTE The General Assembly,

Conscious of the Purposes of the United Nations, expressed in Article of the Charter, to suppress acts of aggression and other breaches of the peace and to bring about the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international ~~at~~ law;

Recalling the disregard on many occasions by parties to the Israel-Arab Armistice Agreements of 1949 of the terms of such agreements;

Desiring to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained;

Noting that Israel has since 29 October 1956, violated, with military force, the territorial integrity of Egypt, and has occupied by force the Gaza Strip, in breach of the basic Charter undertaking of all members not to use force to settle international disputes and not to violate the territorial integrity of another state, and has continued these actions in disregard of the repeated efforts of the United Nations to bring about Israel's withdrawal

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IO - F. O. Wilcox

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behind the Armistice line;]

Noting further that Israel, despite the repeated calls of the General Assembly, continues in occupation of the Sharm-el-Sheikh area on the Straits of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba and in occupation of the Gaza Strip;

Noting that the Secretary General's report of 24 January 1957, in dealing with the Straits of Tiran, states that no claim to belligerent rights should be exercised in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran and that, upon the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sharm-el-Sheikh area, the United Nations Emergency Force would move into the area to function in support of mutual restraint, and that on 2 February the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the implementation of the measures set forth in this report;

Noting further that the General Assembly in its Resolution of 2 February, with reference to the Gaza Strip, called for the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Armistice demarcation line following the withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm-el-Sheikh and Gaza areas and that the Secretary General on 22 February made a further report indicating that there will be established in the Gaza area, with the cooperation of Egypt, special arrangements with the United Nations designed to provide effective and efficient police protection, guarantee good civilian administration, assure maximum assistance to the United Nations Refugee Program, and protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people;

Renews its call upon Israel promptly to withdraw behind the Armistice line;

Requests the Secretary General to report not later than seventy-two hours after the adoption of this resolution on its implementation by Israel; in the <sup>event</sup> ~~case~~ of the Secretary General's not being able to inform the General Assembly that Israel is

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withdrawing fully behind the armistice line, condemns Israel's repeated failure to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly, and calls upon all governments, with effect from the date of the receipt of the Secretary General's report, to withhold assistance to Israel, and in general to regulate their peaceful intercourse with Israel so as to bring about respect for the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter and the recommendations of the General Assembly calling for withdrawal;

Urges the parties concerned to cooperate with the Secretary General in giving effect, immediately upon the withdrawal of Israel, to the provisions of its resolution II of 2 February 1957 concerning the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures proposed in the Secretary General's report of 24 January 1957, with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area;

Pledges itself, when Israel has withdrawn, to assist the parties concerned to achieve by peaceful means the settlement of outstanding disputes between them, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law;

Requests the Advisory Committee, established by the General Assembly Resolution of 7 November 1956, to consider and recommend to the General Assembly from time to time, if need be in special session, such further measures as may be appropriate to achieve the objectives of this Resolution. UNQUOTE.

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USUN, NEW YORK 665

Origin

Info

Following based on memo conversation not yet cleared with Secretary of State. Three hour discussion Eban had with Secretary February 24. Complete memo being airpouched.

Re Aqaba, Eban said Israel would retire from request for firm guarantee before withdrawal. Israel would like to feel confident that US flag vessels would be available for commerce by this route at least insofar as attitude of USG concerned. Israel hoped US would state in substance that innocent passage meant passage of ship whose conduct was not detrimental to state whose territory was being passed. Israel interested in proposal stationing UNEF naval forces in waters South of Straits. Israel prepared state it would protect within limits UN Charter passage of its own vessels and would seek US understanding of such a declaration. Israel sought US efforts persuade other maritime powers stand adopt/similar to position taken in US Aide-Memoire of February 11. Israel hoped US would restate its adherence to view UNEF should remain in Straits area to prevent belligerent acts. If it not possible get general UN endorsement of that principle ISRAEL hoped UNSYG could be persuaded to say that if proposal should be made to remove UNEF he would give UNGA opportunity consider matter.

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classification approved by:

William M. Rountree

Cleanances:

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FEB 28 1957 P.M.

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matter. Eban said he would ask UNSYG set up meeting with Burns to arrange for withdrawal Israel forces from Straits area and in that context Israel would seek agreement with proposals which he had outlined.

Eban turned to what he called link between Gaza and Straits. Ben Gurion felt there would be wisdom in proceeding with arrangements for Straits even if all aspects of Gaza problem would take longer settle.

Re Gaza, Eban said Israel now favored UNEF in control of Gaza with international civil administration as interim measure. Eban suggested following timetable: Israel representatives attempt by compromise solve Straits problem, Israel would withdraw, UNEF enter by land, and perhaps sea. Thereafter Israel forces withdrawn from Gaza and UNEF move into area. At that stage UNGA or other appropriate UN body would send to Gaza mission to deal with all of problems and hear views of states concerned. Only thing Israel would say no to was return Gaza to Egypt. Anything else reasonable Israel would accept.

Re Suez Canal, Israel would welcome statement that President's remark we should not assume Egypt would deny passage to Israel ships represented policy of US and Israel would ask other nations say something along these lines based upon principles international law.

In reply Secretary stated that it was US intention maintain trade route through waters of Gulf Aqaba. US would support concept UNEF naval unit if circumstances indicated would be useful to prevent acts belligerency. No inherent obstacle to US recognition of Israel declaration of intention protect within limits UN Charter  
passage

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passage of its vessels through Straits, subject our seeing language which might be employed. We had received indications other maritime powers their willingness join with us in joint statement re right of passage through Aqaba or willingness make similar but separate declarations. US would be glad reaffirm our views re question UNEF in Aqaba area as expressed by Lodge on January 28 and February 2. Secretary referred particularly to paragraphs 28 and 29 in UNSYG report which had been approved by UNGA on February 2. Point that UNEF should not depart from Straits until UNGA had been given notice seemed a reasonable purpose and we would support it. Arrangements would have to be worked out with UNSYG and we could not bind him. Re linking Gaza and Aqaba, question would have to be explored with UNSYG.

Re Gaza, Secretary recalled Eban said Israel not against anything except return status quo ante. He took it that did not mean that every vestige of Egyptian presence must be removed but that administration must be approved by UN. Secretary thought UNSYG statement of February 22 re Gaza went long way to meet preoccupation of Israel Government with respect that area. Secretary thought Eban asking for more than UNSYG or UN could give if he seeking denial Egyptian rights under Armistice Agreement.

Re Suez Canal, we believed Israel shipping should <sup>be permitted</sup> pass through <sup>after Israeli withdrawal</sup> and had no objection to so stating. Secretary thought it important Eban be in position talk to UNSYG following day.

*Dulles*  
**DULLES**

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## FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMELBASSY, OSLO

587

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

February 26, 1957

REF : Embdes 557, February 14, 1957.

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	3/1	CIA-12 USA-10 OCB-1 Army-4 Navy-3 Air-3

SUBJECT: Sanctions against Israel.

Begin Unclassified: Morgenbladet (Conservative) was critical of President EISENHOWER's address to the nation in an editorial on February 22 and in a second one on February 25 the paper attacked Foreign Minister LANGE, the Norwegian Government, Arbeiderbladet (Labor) and Finn MOE (Chairman of the Storting's Foreign Affairs and Constitution Committee and contributor to Arbeiderbladet), mainly because they refused to come out flatly in opposition to the imposition of sanctions against Israel. In the second editorial Morgenbladet referred to a pro-Israel editorial in Fremtiden (Labor -- Drammen; edited by Olav WATNEBRYN, Labor vice-chairman of the Storting's Military Affairs Committee) and to an article by Martin TRANMEL (member of the Central Committee of the Labor Party) in Arbeiderbladet (see below).

Arbeiderbladet apparently irritated Morgenbladet by its February 23 editorial when the suggestion was made that the best solution of the question of the withdrawal of Israeli troops was for the US to convince the Israeli Government of the value of its guarantees and when the paper stated that it would be a tragedy, if as a result of the Israeli attitude, the question of sanctions had to be discussed in the UN. On the same day Tranmel in his regular column in the paper strongly opposed the use of sanctions against Israel. On February 26 Arbeiderbladet carried a second editorial in which it defended the position of the paper, Lange and Moe. The editorial referred to past statements by the paper in which, the editorial claimed, the paper's position opposing the use of sanctions against Israel was made perfectly obvious. In its defense of the Norwegian Government and Lange, the editorial stated that if the Government made its position clear during the course of the negotiations it would have meant taking sides in a conflict in which Norway was negotiating and would also have meant excluding Norway from mediating.

Morgenbladet presumably attacked Moe for his previous articles on the Middle East crisis, particularly for one that appeared in Arbeiderbladet on February 25. In it Moe lauded US foreign policy in the Middle East, stating that it had not been an affair of chance. An examination of US policy, he wrote, showed a trend developing in the summer of 1956 which has been consistently followed. Moe added that an

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appraisal of US Middle East policy indicates that the uncommitted countries are playing an increasingly more important role in the rivalry between East and West and US policy is designed to "promote good relations" with these countries. He concluded that this policy acknowledges as of the highest importance the demands of the Middle East countries for national independence and the freedom from alien rule, things for which Moe himself has long argued.

For more comprehensive press comments on the Middle East crisis, see this Embassy's WEEKA's 8 and 9. End Unclassified.

Begin CONFIDENTIAL: The Morgenbladet attacks on the US and Lange are based on the pro-British attitude of Birger KILDAL, co-editor of the paper, which speaks only for a small, right-wing segment of the Conservative Party. Moe and others have told an Embassy officer that Kildal's attack on Lange are motivated by Lange's refusal to consider him (Kildal) for the position of press attache in Washington and in Stockholm. Kildal, the Embassy believes, was interested in these positions as the result of his failure to advance in the Conservative Party. In June 1956, for example, there was widespread opposition within Conservative ranks to his appointment as Secretary General of the Conservative Party.

The February 22 Arbeiderbladet editorial was written by the paper's young foreign affairs editor, Jakob SVERDRUP, who intended to discuss the Israeli question realistically and in a factual way. Moe told the Embassy officer that Olav LARSEN (editor-in-chief of Arbeiderbladet and a member of the Central Committee of the Labor Party) had asked him (Moe) to reply to Kildal. Moe prepared a lengthy editorial, which Larssen cut in half and carried as a second editorial, Moe said, in order to deemphasize the importance of the affair.

No other non-Communist paper is attacking Lange on this issue and a number (e.g., Aftenposten -- Conservative) have complimented the Norwegian Government for its "neutral" position, and for its effective contribution concerning the issue in the UN.

Two usually reliable sources (including Moe) told the Embassy officer on February 26 of a closed and unreported meeting earlier that day of the Storting's Enlarged Foreign Affairs and Constitution Committee (the twelve regular members of the Committee and nine others selected by the Storting's Electoral Committee), which was chaired by Moe. Acting Foreign Minister SKAUG (with Lange's prior consent) gave a briefing on the Cabinet's position on sanctions. The briefing largely repeated and expanded on what Lange and the head of the Office of Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry previously told the Embassy -- that they hoped a compromise formula along the lines of the Canadian proposals could be worked out and that sanctions should be used only as a last resort (Embels 980, February 21 and 984, February 23). Moe told the Embassy officer that Skaug's report was re-

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port was received with understanding in the Committee, and he and the other source stated that the Committee was not in favor of the imposition of sanctions. Moe added that if the proposed Afro-Asian resolution on sanctions came to a vote, he was certain that Norway would oppose. If the US proposed an alternate, mild resolution Norway would either abstain or vote in favor, depending on the wording of the resolution.

Approved:

*Hayden Raynor*

Hayden Raynor  
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

For the Charge d'Affaires a.i.

*W. Stratton Anderson, Jr.*

W. Stratton Anderson, Jr.  
First Secretary of Embassy

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Memorandum of Conversation*

DATE: February 26, 1957

SUBJECT: United Nations Action re Gaza and Aqaba

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. J. E. Coulson, Minister, British Embassy  
NEA - Mr. Rountree  
NE - Mr. Bergus

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Mr. Rountree reviewed developments that had taken place since the Secretary's talk with Eban on February 24. Eban had gone to New York to discuss with the Secretary General those elements which were more in the UN field. This meant Gaza, primarily, because in the matter of Aqaba there was quite a bit that individual countries could do. The talks did not result in the establishment of a firm position by the Secretary General which was satisfactory to the Israelis.

The situation had now returned to the point where Israel must withdraw its forces and rely on the UN and others for correction of injustices. We had had a further talk with Eban a few hours ago. We had told him that we had held off for a long time in the UNGA debate, and did not see how we could postpone the matter further. Ambassador Lodge had been authorized to discuss provisionally a US draft resolution. Mr. Rountree proceeded to review the main points in the draft, pointing out their provisional character.

Mr. Coulson asked if the US intended to table such a resolution on the following day. Mr. Rountree said he could not answer that question specifically but he thought that the process toward tabling such a resolution would go forward in the absence of an Israel withdrawal. Mr. Coulson asked if the final US decision on a resolution of this type had been taken. Mr. Rountree replied that we believed that the time had come when it may be desirable and necessary to have such a resolution. The final decision was not made at present.

Mr. Coulson indicated that he was doubtful that the United Kingdom would support such a resolution since the public and Parliamentary situation at home would not permit. There was a feeling throughout Western Europe that sanctions against Israel would be unfair. Mr. Coulson feared that there would be another split in the Western Alliance on this issue.

Mr. Rountree

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Mr. Rountree said that our recognition of the fact that sanctions might be necessary to induce Israel to withdraw came only after the most laborious soul-searching on our part. No one was less inclined to impose sanctions for their own sake. We believed that Israel must withdraw and that the consequences of Israel's failure to withdraw would be very grave, might imperil world peace, and would certainly adversely affect the interests of the Free World and the United States. The purpose of our resolution was to persuade Israel to withdraw.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: February 26, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli withdrawal.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel  
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister of Israel  
The Secretary  
The Under Secretary  
Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, IO  
Mr. William H. Rountree, NEA  
COPIES TO: Mr. Herman Phleger, L

S/S (2), C (cc), G (cc), L (cc), NEA (2 cc), NE (2 cc), USUN, IO  
R, Amembassy Tel-Aviv, Amembassy Cairo.

Ambassador Eban reported briefly on his meeting yesterday with the Secretary General on the problem of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egypt. He indicated that he believed that in spite of certain differences we were moving towards agreement. Indeed he thought the time had about arrived for Israel to announce that portion of its withdrawal schedule relating to Aqaba.

The Secretary intervened to point out that a matter that was giving us very great concern was Israel's attitude towards the Armistice Agreement. If the Armistice Agreement were voided, then there is a recurrence to belligerency and that would raise difficult problems about innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran.

Ambassador Eban replied that it was Israel's assumption that the UN Charter would prevail. In the event the Armistice Agreement does not apply, the relations between Israel and Egypt, he said, would be governed by the Charter. Israel in these circumstances remained in a state of non-belligerency even though the Armistice Agreement might be inoperative. The Secretary and Mr. Phleger pointed out that if we did not have the Armistice Agreement to guide us we would have only chaos in the area. The UN Charter in itself was not sufficient. Our assurances with respect to Israeli withdrawal were predicated upon the existence of the Armistice Agreement and the legal framework which it provided. The Secretary made clear that this point goes to the whole heart of Israel's position in the Gulf of Aqaba.

Ambassador

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Ambassador Eban protested that Israel had repeatedly asserted belligerency rights and had repudiated the Armistice Agreement. He maintained that Egypt wanted the Armistice Agreement minus its own non-belligerency.

Ambassador Eban then went on to say that with respect to Gaza, he thought we had come closer together. Israel had simplified and made more flexible its position. Any kind of jurisdiction, he said, which does not mean the return of Egypt would be acceptable to Israel. What Israel envisaged was de facto exclusion of Egypt; his government was interested in substance and not in form. He doubted, however, whether plans contemplated by the Secretary General conformed to this principle. In his exchanges with the Secretary General he said the latter had envisaged the return of Egyptian control with practical arrangements subject to Egyptian approval. The Secretary General, he said, even spoke of possible return of Egyptian forces to the area. What the Ambassador had learned at the UN therefore seemed at variance with the hope Israel had entertained about the future of Gaza. The Secretary General, said Eban, had made clear that he could not limit Egypt's rights as they were defined by the Armistice Agreement and by the resolutions of the General Assembly; that Egypt retained the rights which they had before and that any arrangements made would depend upon Egypt's consent. This was very important from the point of view of Israel.

The Ambassador then turned to procedural matters, pointing out that the problems involved in Gaza particularly could not be resolved in a matter of days. He said the Pearson proposal calling for a UN Commission to go to Gaza was an important development in New York although he did not know whether Mr. Pearson would press the suggestion. He felt, however, that the Secretary General was pretty thoroughly bound by the legal position in which he found himself and had not demonstrated very much flexibility.

The Ambassador then suggested the following procedure:

1. The withdrawal of Israeli troops from Aqaba together with finalizing of the arrangements contained in our aide-memoire;
2. The entry of UNEF into the area which would prevent belligerent activities;
3. The withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza;
4. Arrival of the UN Commission or some other organ of the UN in Gaza. The Commission would establish itself there and make recommendations with respect to both interim and long-term arrangements for Gaza.

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He admitted that all the problems involved would not be solved in this fashion, but that a good many of them could. He further pointed out that it would be impossible to change the administration of Gaza overnight anyway. Moreover, he felt that if the U.S. could cooperate, we would be able to show real progress in a matter of days without waiting until everything is agreed upon.

The Secretary stated that he doubted very much that this would constitute a practical procedure. He said there was a definite link between Gaza and Aqaba and he doubted that the U.S. would feel able to give any assurances with respect to Aqaba if there was not compliance on the part of Israel with UN resolutions relating to Gaza and if rights were asserted by Israel which were incompatible with the terms of the Armistice Agreement. The Secretary said that he believed a solution needs to be found for the whole problem and that the solution ought to involve the withdrawal of forces from both Gaza and Aqaba. He envisaged a gradual withdrawal of administrative forces from Gaza and the initial replacement by UNEF and by UN administrative machinery. It might be possible to retain on a de facto basis some of the administrative machinery now there. In any event, he said, the conditions would have to be such as to give to Israel confidence that the situation would not deteriorate again. Personally he did not think it would deteriorate. The Secretary General, according to his report of February 22, envisaged a long-term arrangement for the area.

The Secretary then commented on talks he had had that morning with M. Pineau and with the President. M. Pineau, he said, had some ideas which might be helpful but that he preferred to have Pineau discuss them with Ambassador Eban. In any event, the ideas M. Pineau put forth commended themselves to the President and to M. Mollet.

The Secretary then went on to say that the thing that disturbed us most is Israel's position that there isn't any Armistice Agreement; if that is the case, we will be on an uncharted sea. He hoped very much we could get a common understanding about that; otherwise our whole position would be undermined as would the status of the resolutions approved by the General Assembly. The Secretary expressed the view that there would be an adverse reaction by UN members with respect to any belligerency on the part of Egypt. It was not a situation, he said, which involves only two or three countries of the Middle East area; the potentialities are world-wide in scope.

Ambassador Eban protested that Israel had not repudiated the Armistice Agreement; his government has merely said that Egyptian action in violating the agreement and in denouncing it had brought the Armistice

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Agreement to naught. The Secretary commented that we were faced with the same problem in Korea; that an Armistice Agreement had existed for more than four years without any political settlement. The Armistice Agreement system, however, had been violated by North Korea. As a result, some people feel that we should treat the Armistice Agreement as void. We do not want to do that, however, because it acts as a restraining factor and gives at least a de facto status with respect to boundaries and other problems. If the agreement were terminated, then the whole area would be in a state of chaos. He hoped, therefore, that Israel would not seek our support for any position involving a renunciation of the Armistice Agreement.

The Secretary then called attention to the situation in New York, stating that it was important to get quick action from Israel if we were to avoid a show-down on a resolution. He said that we were discussing the provisions of a possible resolution in New York; that we were most reluctant to proceed and that he hoped that such a resolution would not be necessary.

Ambassador Eban said that things were in a state of flux in New York; that Canada was putting forth certain proposals and that the Secretary General had not been able to meet the positions which the U.S. and Israel had agreed upon. He could not understand the procedure we were following in discussing at this juncture with other governments measures against Israel. It did not seem to him to be logical or desirable for us to be talking with Israeli representatives on constructive measures to resolve the Aqaba and Gaza problems and at the same time carrying on discussions in New York about the kind of punitive measures to apply against Israel. On his part he would urge working day and night to try to resolve the basic problems. Moreover, he felt that the majority of the UN would not be in favor of sanctions. The African-Asian group would support such a move but he could not imagine the U.S. approving.

Mr. Rountree agreed that indeed a majority of the members would prefer to avoid the issue of sanctions and that they would prefer prompt solution through the process of Israeli withdrawal rather than any recourse to sanctions. For this reason, the Secretary had exerted so many efforts to postpone the debate and to find some formula which would permit progress. M. Pineau's proposal, he thought, might be helpful.

Ambassador Eban objected again to our discussions in New York relating to any sanctions proposals. He thought instead that the U.S. should make known its opposition to the resolution of the Asian-Arab states and in that manner avert a sanctions vote. He continued to believe that we had made enough progress in our discussions to permit us to go ahead along constructive lines.

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The Ambassador then inquired with respect to Gaza and Aqaba; whether we took the view that the U.S. doctrine with respect to innocent passage would come into effect only when the entire Gaza problem is solved. Mr. Phleger replied that the Straits were international in character and that the principles outlined in the report of the International Law Commission of the UN would uphold the right of innocent passage. This did not apply, however, to nations at war or in a state of belligerency. We did not feel we were bound to support the idea that passage through the Straits under such circumstances was in effect innocent passage. When Israel had withdrawn behind the armistice lines, then we would be in a position to agree. When the UN moved into Gaza, even if a few people were left from the Israeli administration, the rights could then be exercised. In any event, it ought to be clear that our rights in the Straits were not dependent on Israel's rights.

Mr. Rountree referred again to the press reports from Israel that the Israelis considered the Armistice Agreement as a dead letter. Mr. Phleger pointed out that we were trying to restore the validity of the Armistice Agreement and then require compliance on the part of Egypt.

With respect to Gaza, the Ambassador said that Israel wants to make sure that the solution is an international solution and not an Egyptian solution. They were not insisting upon a de jure change in the Egyptian position. He commented that there was a danger in emphasizing the Armistice Agreement - that this could work against the interests of Israel. The control of Gaza could go back to Egypt as the result of too much emphasis on the Armistice Agreement. He added that if our people thought that the new regime in Gaza would be in fact a return of Egyptian control, it would be serious indeed.

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1323

## Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 2/26/57

SUBJECT: Near East Problems

α per WBM  
RS

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary  
 Mr. Firoz Khan Noon, Pakistan Foreign Minister  
 Mr. Mohammed Ali, Pakistan Ambassador  
 Mr. J. Jefferson Jones, III, SOA,

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Mr. Noon said that the U.S. should "force" a solution of the Israeli problem. He thought that the most desirable way to proceed in the United Nations was to secure the adoption of a resolution calling upon both Israel and Egypt to take specified actions. He reiterated the importance of insuring that both Egypt and Israel complied with United Nations recommendations. If those countries evaded compliance, Nehru would think that India could do the same in connection with United Nations action on Kashmir.

The Secretary doubted the desirability of the type of UN action envisaged by the Foreign Minister. In response to the Foreign Minister's question as to how we expected to deal with the problem, the Secretary said that Ambassador Lodge had been requested to begin discussions with the countries which had co-sponsored the last resolution on the Israeli situation to determine if they would be willing to go along with another resolution. The new resolution which we had in mind was not so strong as the one submitted by the Arabs, but was stronger than that which we understood the Canadians wished to present. The new resolution would recite what the United Nations had done in order to insure tranquillity in the area, would call upon Israel to withdraw within a short time, and would request member states to restrict their association with Israel and to develop their policies towards Israel in such a way as to bring about compliance by that country with United Nations resolutions.

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The Secretary said that we were now having talks with the French Prime Minister on the Near East situation. France sustains Israel and, if we could persuade France to change its attitude of support for Israel, it would have considerable effect upon the policies of the latter country and would tend to facilitate Israeli withdrawal. If Israel withdrew, did the Foreign Minister think that Egypt would adopt a more enlightened attitude? The Foreign Minister replied that Egypt would have to do so.

YH 8-10-4 The Secretary thought that the Egyptian action in stopping transit through the Suez Canal was hurting Asian countries much more than Western European countries. Western Europe was now receiving all the oil it needed and as the U.S. was now increasing production even more, the Western European oil position would be comfortable in the future. It was necessary to re-open the Canal and to reach agreement for the use of the Canal, not for the benefit of Western Europe but of the Asian countries. The Foreign Minister agreed, pointing out that India was increasing its trade, particularly textiles, with areas on the eastern coast of Africa as a result of the closure of the Canal.

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DATE  
3/4/57

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Room 1167 NS

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## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Date: February 26, 1957  
 Room 5100  
 10:30 - 11:30 a.m.

Subject: Israeli-Egyptian problem.

## Participants:

French:

Mr. Christian Pineau, Foreign Minister  
 Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Ambassador to U.S.  
 Mr. Louis Joxe, Secretary General of the Foreign Office  
 Mr. Jean Daridan, Director of Political Affairs, French Foreign Office.  
 Mr. Emile Noel, Chief of Cabinet of Prime Minister Mollet  
 Mr. Jean Beliard, Assistant Press Chief, French Foreign Office

U.S.

## The Secretary

Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under-Secretary  
 Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary for EUR  
 Mr. C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs-Designate  
 Mr. Amory Houghton, Ambassador to France- Designate  
 Mr. J. Burke Wilkinson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs  
 Mr. William R. Tyler, Director, Office of Western European Affairs  
 (part of the time)  
 Mr. Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser  
 Mr. William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary for NEA  
 Mr. Fraser Wilkins, Director, NE.  
 Mr. Charles Sedgwick, Interpreter

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Mr. Pineau said he thought it would be appropriate to discuss first the most urgent question: that of Israel. He referred to the recent talk of

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Ambassador Alphand with the Secretary and said that he wished to confirm officially what Alphand had said to the Secretary. He said that with regard to the situation in the Gulf of Aqaba, the French Government is in favor of a solution which recognizes that Israel would find herself in a state of legitimate defense in conformity with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter if an Israeli ship were attacked while in the Gulf. Mr. Pineau said that France would be willing to make a statement to this effect jointly with the United States and he thought that the United Kingdom would also be prepared to do so.

Mr. Pineau said that with regard to Gaza the situation is more difficult because there are a number of problems which have not been resolved, such as: whether Egypt is in a state of belligerency or not. If Egypt is to be considered a non-belligerent, then in so far as the United Nations are concerned, the situation would be determined by the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and Gaza should be administered by Egypt. On the other hand, if Egypt is a belligerent, there would be other problems. However, Mr. Pineau said, France could envisage the setting up of a neutral administration for Gaza. In order to achieve this he said that the French Government was prepared to exert pressure on Israel to withdraw her troops, so long as Egypt does not send her troops in.

The Secretary said that he did not see any insoluble problem with respect to the Gulf of Aqaba, because Israel had indicated that it would accept the assurances that would be given. The Secretary said he would, however, wish to qualify this by saying that any assurances which could be given to Israel on Aqaba would depend on a solution of the Gaza problem and the recognition by both sides of non-belligerency.

(At this point the Secretary handed Mr. Pineau a copy of an informal memorandum which the Secretary had given to the President for his talks with Prime Minister Mollet. This copy was subsequently returned to the Secretary by Mr. Pineau at the Secretary's request.)

Mr. Pineau said he wondered whether Israel and the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, both accepted the idea of a de facto U.N. administration in Gaza. The Secretary said that he thought that both agreed on the desirability of this. However, the difference was that Israel insisted that the administration should not be dependent on Egypt, but on the United Nations, as the power replacing Egypt. The Secretary said that Mr. Hammarskjold felt that the United Nations had no authority to substitute itself for the Armistice Agreements, and that any administration in Gaza required the acquiescence of Egypt. This meant that theoretically Egypt's acquiescence could be withdrawn at any time. However, in fact, said the Secretary, Egypt would probably not want to do this since she would not find it very desirable to come in again and take over responsibilities for the 200,000 refugees and all the attendant problems which they create. The Secretary said that the Government of Israel wanted to be in a position to say to its people that the Egyptian right of occupancy was ended for all time.

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The Secretary said he thought that if Israel could take a chance on this and not insist that the administration of Gaza should depend formally on the United Nations in replacement of Egypt, the prospects for Israel's interests and security being protected would be the best possible.

The Secretary said he agreed that the situation with respect to Gaza is different and that this was why he had suggested on the first page of the memorandum for the President concerning the problem of Aqaba that he thought that agreement could be reached on a declaration. However, with regard to Gaza, it was not so certain whether Israel had a good case or not. The Secretary said that Mr. Hammarskjold considered the Gaza problem extremely important because it was necessary that any solution be consistent with the Armistice Convention and that this was an issue which threatened the collapse of current negotiations. The Secretary went on to say that if Israel should take the chance offered to her she would have gained a certain measure of support from public opinion by giving the United Nations a chance to succeed. If, on the other hand, this solution failed and if Egypt were to intervene and terminate the U.N. administration, or use the area as a base for attacks, then Israel would have world sympathy behind her and would be in a better position than if she now insisted on staying.

Mr. Pineau observed that there was a distinction between establishing a case of aggression as a result of individual Fedayeen raids and specific shooting against an Israeli ship. It might be difficult to prove the former to be aggression. For this reason, the French Government felt that it was desirable that the international administration of Gaza should continue until the United Nations decided to the contrary. The Secretary said that Mr. Hammarskjold was juridically correct in turning this down, as he had in his recent talk with Ambassador Eban, because of the existence of the Armistice Agreements, which the United Nations could not abrogate. Mr. Pineau said that perhaps Egypt might agree not to protest a de facto situation, but she could never be brought to agree publicly. The Secretary observed that the present proposal for a United Nations administration, outlined in Mr. Hammarskjold's report of February 24, was cleared with Fawzi and Nasser and has Egyptian acquiescence. He added that while Israel was perfectly right in saying that this acquiescence might be terminated any time by Egypt, the question was: which risk is Israel prepared to take. The Secretary said that he thought that the risk would be less if Israel were to accept than if she were to stay on, for in the latter case the cease-fire would come to an end, the UNEF would be withdrawn, and the area might deteriorate into hostilities which the Arabs are not in a position to carry on now but which they might be tempted to provoke with the aid of the Soviet Union. The Suez Canal would almost certainly remain blocked and this was something which concerned all of us. Mr. Pineau raised the question of the possibility of a guarantee to Israel against future Fedayeen attacks, to which the Secretary replied that the United States could not extend such a guarantee, but that he agreed with Pineau that the United Nations was in a position to exert efforts along these lines. Mr. Pineau asked whether the Secretary thought that there would be a chance of a two-thirds majority for a United Nations resolution designed to save face for both parties. The Secretary said he thought this was a difficult matter to

determine.

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determine. Mr. Pineau said that perhaps the UNEF and the UN administration in Gaza could be established without any specific limitation of time, and that Israel could then accept this solution, while reserving its rights which it would exercise if and when this period came to an end. Other powers could take note of this de facto situation, which would continue indefinitely. The U.N. might pass a resolution by a two-thirds vote that both sides should undertake negotiations for a peace settlement, thereby linking in fact, although not explicitly, the duration of the period of administration to the duration of the period of negotiations. It might also be stated that if Egypt's occupancy were resumed prior to the conclusion of a permanent peace settlement, this would create a new situation which would call for consultation either within, or outside the United Nations.

The Secretary stated that the present moment was critical. Ambassador Eban was returning at 11 a.m. If we could agree on a reasonable position for Israel to take within the next few hours, he thought that there was a good chance that Israel would accept it. If not, there might be tragic consequences. The positions of the two parties were so near to each other that he hoped that a final effort to bridge the gulf that remained would be successful. The Secretary agreed that if Egypt reoccupied Gaza prior to the peace settlement this would create a new situation requiring consultation to consider ways of ending acts of belligerency.

(Mr. Phleger and Mr. Rountree at this point consulted with the Secretary.)

Mr. Pineau then summarized the French suggestions under four headings:

1. The UNEF and a UN administration should be established for an indefinite duration, with the tacit acquiescence of Egypt.
2. Israel would reserve her rights with regard to the termination of this arrangement.
3. Other countries would take note of this arrangement, without approving or disapproving it.
4. It would be recommended to both parties that they undertake negotiations for a peace settlement.

The Secretary commented with regard to point three above that it would be desirable that other countries should also express the hope that the UN administration should last until the conclusion of a peace settlement, and that if negotiations were to break down and Egypt were to reassert her occupancy, this would create a new situation calling for consultation. Mr. Pineau nodded his acceptance of the Secretary's suggestion. The Secretary said that there was another problem: whether or not Israel admitted the continuing validity of the Armistice Agreements of 1949. He said that if Israel, as has been reported in the press, were to denounce these agreements, she could not obtain the non-belligerency rights which she needs for her position with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba.

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(At this point the Secretary was informed that the President had asked that he and Mr. Pineau join Prime Minister Mollet and himself at the White House, and the meeting broke up.)

*-adjourned*

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March 29 1957

In reply refer to  
674.84A/2-2657

Dear Senator Potter:

I refer to your communication of February 26, 1957 enclosing a copy of a resolution adopted by Congregation Ahavas Israel of Grand Rapids, Michigan, concerning the situation in the Middle East.

The United States has from the beginning made clear its belief that after the withdrawal of British, French and Israel forces, there should be established conditions different from those which had previously prevailed. As Secretary Dulles stated before the United Nations General Assembly on November 1, 1956: "There needs to be something better than the uneasy armistices which have existed now for these eight years between Israel and the Arab neighbors."

One of our principal tasks is to create peaceful conditions and tranquillity through the prevention of hostilities. We believe that ~~even if final peace with definitive settlement may not now be obtained~~, we should vigorously seek to bring about the conditions of security and tranquillity which may, as rapidly as possible hereafter, make a peace settlement practicable.

If, now that the forces of Israel have withdrawn, there should be any recurrence of hostilities or any violation by either party of its international obligations, including those of the Armistice Agreement, then this would create a situation for United Nations and United States consideration.

I believe that your constituents will be interested in

The Honorable  
Charles E. Potter,  
United States Senate.

*although our hopes for a settlement have been deferred as a result of recent events*

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the enclosed material which describes United States efforts to prevent the outbreaks of further hostilities in the Middle East and assure that the rights of international navigation will be respected.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

✓ Material as stated.

1.  
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*Language from Ledge of March 1, 1957*  
*+ Secretary Dulles December 18, 1956*

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# United States Senate

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Washington, D. C., February 26, 1957


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*Respectfully referred to*

Hon. Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary of State for  
Congressional Relations  
Washington 25, D. C.

For your information.

encl. cy resolution fr Congregation  
Ahavas Israel, Grand Rapids,  
Mich., adopted Feb. 15, 1957.

*at*  


Charles E. Potter,

U.S.S.

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CLASHA



February 26, 1957

a reply refer to

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Dear Mr. Haskell:

I refer to Mr. Hoghland's inquiry from your office concerning the possibility of sanctions against Israel. Your interest in this matter is appreciated.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the

United Nations

The Honorable  
Harry G. Haskell, Jr.,  
House of Representatives.

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United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

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In reply refer to  
SEV 674.84A/2-2657

March 26 1957

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Dear Mr. Karsten:

I refer to your letter of February 26, 1957 enclosing a telegram from Mr. Alvin B. Vittert of St. Louis, Missouri endorsing Israel's request for Egyptian nonbelligerency. Thank you for calling Mr. Vittert's views to our attention.

On March 1, 1957, speaking in the United Nations General Assembly, Ambassador Lodge stated: "Once Israel has completed its withdrawal in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly, and in view of the measures taken by the United Nations to deal with the situation, there is no basis for either party to the Armistice Agreement to assert or exercise any belligerent rights."

Perhaps Mr. Vittert would be interested in the enclosed material which sets forth United States policy concerning the recent withdrawal and the circumstances surrounding it.

Your constituent's telegram is returned as you requested.

Sincerely yours,

*for the Secretary of State*

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Material as stated.
2. From Mr. Vittert (returned).

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The Honorable  
Frank M. Karsten,

House of Representatives.

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FRANK M. KARSTEN  
1st DISTRICT, MISSOURI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMBER OF:  
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS  
JEFFERSON NATIONAL EXPANSION  
MEMORIAL COMMISSION  
MIGRATORY BIRD CONSERVATION  
COMMISSION

February 26, 1957

Honorable John Foster Dulles

Secretary of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Enclosed is a telegram I received  
from Mr. Alvin B. Vittert, 7200 Wydown  
Boulevard, St. Louis 5, Missouri.

Please consider and advise with  
return of enclosure.

Sincerely yours,

*Frank M. Karsten*

*Draft file  
off 3/17*

MAY 3 - 1957

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FEB 26 1957

In reply refer to  
IO:UNP: 674.84A/2-957

Dear Mr. Thornberry:

I have received your communication of February 9, 1957, addressed to the Secretary, acknowledged by telephone on February 15, 1957, transmitting a telegram, dated February 9, 1957, from Mr. Sirimavody expressing his concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only

The Honorable  
Homer Thornberry,  
House of Representatives.

This Document is Returned to

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effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

The telegram from Mr. Novy is returned as requested, a copy having been made for the files of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

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MEMORANDUM

WFO Document must be returned  
to the RM/R Central Files

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1. Israel announces that it is making a complete withdrawal in accordance with the United Nations Resolutions.

2. It further announces

a. That it is its understanding that on its withdrawal, Gaza and Aqaba will be occupied by United Nations forces; that in Gaza, the United Nations will set up an administration in accordance with the Secretary General's letters of February 12 and 22 and the Resolution of February 2.

b. That it is Israel's hope the United Nations administration of Gaza will continue until the Armistice Agreement is replaced by a peace settlement.

c. That if Egypt reenters the Gaza Strip and conditions are created there which destroys the condition of non-belligerency created by the Armistice Agreement; or if



the conditions of non-belligerency in the Strait of Aqaba

are violated  
created by the Armistice Agreement, then in either of these

events

~~conditions~~ Israel reserves its freedom to act in its self-defense,

under Section 51 of the United Nations Charter.

3. The United States and such other states as so decide will make a

statement in the United Nations:

a. Taking note of the Israel statement and its withdrawal

b. Declaring its hope that United Nations administration of the

Gaza Strip will continue until a peace settlement and that in the meantime

there will be a strict compliance by both parties with the terms of the

Armistice Agreement, and in this connection there will be no

assertion of belligerency in the Straits of Aqaba or the Gulf of Tiran

or in the Gaza Strip.

c. If after Israeli withdrawal in accordance with the United

Nations Resolution, there is a recurrence of belligerency or a violation

of the Armistice Agreement, then this will create a situation calling for United Nations consideration, and the United States will consult with other members of the United Nations to consider action within and without the United Nations appropriate to the circumstances to bring about a settlement in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.

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With respect to the Straits of Aqaba Israel has the following:

1. Assurance that upon its withdrawal the ~~force~~ <sup>force</sup> United Nations Emergency

Force will move in;

2. That their purpose, among other things, will be to restrain the exercise thereof of belligerent rights which would prevent passage;

3. The willingness of the principal maritime powers to declare that they recognize that the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran are free for passage and that this freedom will, in fact, be exercised;

4. Acquiescence by the United States, and presumably others, in an Israeli declaration that the use of armed force to prevent passage of Israeli ships would be and "are an armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter giving rise to the right of self-defense.

Israel has indicated that it, in fact, finds the foregoing as an adequate basis for withdrawal.

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~~While it is indicated the duration~~

With respect to Gaza Israel has the following:

1. Assurance that upon its withdrawal the forces of the UNLF

will move in;

2. That the function of the United Nations forces will prevent violation of the Armistice line;

3. That there will be established, with the acquiescence of Egypt, a United Nations Administration which for an undefined period will be designed to provide police protection, civilian administration, assist in the United Nations Refugee program and protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people.

While it is indicated the duration is indefinite, it can be assumed that it will be for a considerable time in view of the fact that one of the accepted purposes is to "foster the economic development of the territory and its people" which is not a short-term proposition.

Israel so far finds this unacceptable because it wishes "guarantees" that Egypt will never return to the Gaza Strip. However, under the Armistice Agreement Egypt has a right of occupancy and there is no way in which the United Nations or Israel can take this right away without Egypt's consent and Egypt does not consent, although it acquiesces in the exercise of its rights through a United Nations Commission, as indicated.

It is submitted that Israel should withdraw on the basis of the foregoing. It will have a generally accepted right to use force again if its shipping is forcibly barred from the Gulf of Aqaba.

As regards Gaza, if Israel withdraws in accordance with the United Nations Resolutions and thus shows its regard for international opinion and if the situation subsequently deteriorates so that the Strip becomes a menace to Israel, then Israel will have a case for seeking relief by its own action which is at least as good a case as it can make for remaining in Gaza in ~~strict~~ defiance of the repeated appeals of the United Nations.

Israel will then have given the United Nations program a chance to work and there is a very good prospect that the program will work and that there will never be the deterioration which Israel professes to fear.

The enjoyment of the rights of Israel in Aqaba is dependent on the solution of the Gaza problem and vice-versa, and both require the continuance of the 1949 Armistice Agreement.

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File of documents of reference  
to the RMR Central Files

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Noting further that the General Assembly in its Resolution of 2 February with reference to the Gaza Strip called for the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Armistice demarcation line following the withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm-el-Sheikh and Gaza areas and that the Secretary General on 11 February made a further report indicating that there will be established in the Gaza area, with the acquiescence of Egypt, a United Nations administration designed to provide effective and efficient police protection; guarantee good civilian administration, assure maximum assistance to the United Nations Refugee Program and protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people;

Renews its call upon Israel promptly to withdraw behind the Armistice line;

Requests the Secretary General to report not later than seventy-two hours after the adoption of this resolution on its implementation by Israel. In the event of the Secretary General's not being able to inform the General Assembly that Israel is withdrawing fully behind the

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armistice line, condemns Israel's repeated failure to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly, and calls upon all states with effect from the date of the receipt of the Secretary General's report, to withhold assistance to Israel, and in general to regulate their peaceful intercourse with Israel/<sup>so</sup>as to bring about respect for the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter and the recommendations of this General Assembly calling for withdrawal;

Urges the parties concerned to cooperate with the Secretary General in giving effect, immediately upon the withdrawal of Israel, to the provisions of its resolution II of 2 February 1957 concerning the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures proposed in the Secretary General's report of 24 January 1957, with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area;



#### Source Citation

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